

The official party statistics do not have exact data on the number of "purges" from the party during this first purge. Only the total number of 91,000 members and 50,000 candidates expelled from the party and mobilized for the civil war is given. At the same time, the so-called "party week" was announced for the recruitment of workers and Red Army soldiers into the party. Recruitment yielded more than 200,000 communists (The Ninth Congress of the RCP (6). Protocols, 1960, p. 574). The main criterion for admission is absolute obedience to the directives of the party apparatus.

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THE ORIGIN OF PARTOCRACY VOL. TWO

Central Committee and Stalin

Chapter 22

THE TROIKA CONSPIRACY AGAINST LENIN

From the end of 1921, Lenin was often ill and took long vacations. Back in the spring of 1922, he successfully held XI the party congress, although it was not as active as at previous congresses. On April 23, 1922, he undergoes an operation to extract one of the two bullets with which he was wounded in the summer of 1918, but already on April 27 he participates in a meeting of the Politburo. Subsequently, Lenin directed the work of the government and the Central Committee for a whole month,

until he was struck down by the first stroke of the disease, which led to partial paralysis of the right arm and right leg and to a speech disorder. It was May 25, 1922.

Trotsky describes the history of Lenin's illness and its political consequences with his characteristic pathos: "On the third day, Bukharin came to me.

"Are you in bed too?" he exclaimed in horror.

"Who else besides me?" I asked.

- "It's bad with Ilyich: a blow, - he doesn't walk, he doesn't speak. Doctors get lost in

guesses"...

Lenin was considered a strong man, and his health seemed to be one of the indestructible foundations of the revolution. He was invariably active, vigilant, even-tempered, cheerful... At the end of 1921 his condition worsened...

In March, headaches intensified ... Lenin fell ill, it turns out, on the third day. At the time, I didn't have any doubts. Bukharin spoke quite sincerely, repeating what the "seniors" had instilled in him. At that time Bukharin was attached to me with a purely Bukharinian, i.e., semi-hysterical, semi-childish affection. Bukharin ended his story about Lenin's illness by throwing himself on my bed and, grabbing me through the blanket, began to lament: "Don't get sick, I beg you: there are two people whose death I always think with horror ... this is Ilyich and you..." The blow was deafening. It seemed that the revolution itself held its breath ... Much later ... I again remembered with fresh surprise that I

Lenin was informed only on the third day... It could not be accidental. Those who had long been preparing to become my opponents, primarily Stalin, sought to buy time. Lenin's illness was of such a kind that it could immediately bring a tragic denouement. Tomorrow, even today, all the questions of leadership could come to the fore. Opponents considered it important to win at least a day for preparation ... At this time, presumably, the idea of a "troika" (Stalin-Zinoviev-Kamenev) had already arisen "(L. Trotsky, "My Life", Part P, p. 206-209). Since then, the struggle for the inheritance of the not yet dead, but clearly dying Lenin begins. True, Lenin seemed to have recovered from the first blow, even returning to work in October, but in December a second, even more serious blow followed ... Lenin was slowly but clearly dying. There were three pretenders to the heirs in the Politburo: Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev. Neither Stalin, the de facto heir, nor Rykov, the legal heir, crossed anyone's mind. With regard to Rykov, this is quite

understandable, but in relation to Stalin this was due to ignorance in the knowledge of the party machine and the role of Stalin in it from the first days of his entry into the Central Committee (1912). Nobody, including Lenin, even knew the Soviet state machine as universally as Stalin did. In fact, from the very first days of the Bolshevik revolution, Stalin has been continuously entering the bureau of the Central Committee, then the Politburo, at the same time the Orgburo, as the only member of the Politburo, he is the people's commissar of nationalities, at the same time the people's commissar of state control (RCI), he is a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the republic from the Central Committee, he is a member of the Collegium of the Cheka - OGPU from the Central Committee, he is a member of the Council of Labor and Defense from the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. These are not nominal positions, but those where Stalin left deep traces of personal creativity. Let us not forget that in the seven-member legislative body, the Politburo, there are five émigrés (Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and to some extent Kamenev and Rykov) and only two real underlings of the revolution in Russia—Stalin and Tomsy. In emigration there were "party writers", as they were called in the minutes of the Central Committee in March 1917, and in Russia - the organizers of the party and the revolution. Psychologically, Stalin was for the workers of the Bolshevik underground "his boyfriend", and the emigrants - "intellectuals". It was not a secret, although because of respect for Lenin they did not talk about it out loud, but only whispered: intellectuals - regulars in Geneva cafes and Parisian "bistros" - spent tsarism abroad, and Bolshevik workers, like Tomsy, and underground fighters, like Stalin made a revolution. A cursory glance at the biographies of the leaders showed that each of the emigrant members of the Politburo was exiled once, and Stalin was arrested seven times, exiled five or six times, and fled five times in order to continue to make a revolution, although he could emigrate, as the "intellectuals" emigrated ". All this must be remembered if we want to understand the further development of events.

The first serious clash between Lenin and Stalin was over the principles of creating one federation of the USSR from the Soviet republics of the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (the name "USSR" was chosen as a universal form for the world federation, since it does not contain any ethnic or continental limitation; at first, Lenin wanted to give a name: "Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia"). On August 10, 1922, at the suggestion of the Politburo, a commission of the Orgburo of the Central Committee on the issue of federation was created with the inclusion of representatives of the named republics. Stalin headed the commission, he also submitted a draft resolution to the commission. According to the project, all

Soviet republics were part of the RSFSR on the rights of autonomous republics ("autonomization"). Stalin hurried, without Lenin's knowledge, to send his draft to the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Belarus. Georgia rejected the project with

reasoning: "The unification proposed on the basis of Comrade Stalin's theses in the form of autonomization of the independent republics is considered premature. We consider it necessary to unite economic efforts and a common policy, but with the preservation of all the attributes of independence" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 45, p. 556). Belarus spoke in favor of preserving the old form of contractual relations between the republics. Ukraine hesitated, Azerbaijan and Armenia supported Stalin's idea.

On September 24, the Orgburo commission adopted Stalin's project as a basis. On September 25, Lenin requested all the materials of the Stalin Commission to come to Gorki. But, as the official commentator notes, "at the same time, without waiting for Lenin's instructions and without considering this issue in the Politburo, the secretariat of the Central Committee sent out the resolution of the commission to all members and candidates of the Central Committee for the plenum scheduled for October 5" (ibid., p. 558). Dissatisfied with this, on September 26, Lenin wrote to Kamenev, the temporary chairman of the Politburo, a letter to the members of the Politburo demanding that the issue be discussed ("the question is paramount. Stalin has a little desire to hurry"). Lenin reports that at a personal meeting on September 26, "Stalin had already agreed to make one concession" (under paragraph No. 1 of his draft) - this concession by Stalin fundamentally changed the whole scheme of unification in the spirit of Lenin: the Soviet republics do not "join the RSFSR", as this was demanded by Stalin, and together with the RSFSR they form a new federation of sovereign Soviet republics. However, Stalin considered his concession as a concession of terminology, and not of the essence of the matter. Together forming the RSFSR a legally new federation, in fact the union republics must be subordinated to the organs of the supreme power of the RSFSR. Lenin's proposal on "equality of rights and sovereignty" (Lenin, of course, was of the same opinion as Stalin, but was looking for a more flexible propaganda formula) Stalin, in a letter to members of the Politburo dated September 27, assessed it as the position of "national liberalism" (ibid., p. 558).

The remaining points of Stalin's project, which Lenin criticizes, are as follows:

§ 2 from Stalin is stated as follows:

The resolutions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR, the Council of People's Commissars and the STO are obligatory for the union republics (Lenin, ibid., p. 557).

Lenin proposes: to change it in accordance with Amendment 81, namely, to create new legislative and executive bodies of the new federation;

84 Stalin put it this way:

The people's commissariats of finance, food, labor and the national economy of the Union republics are subordinate to the corresponding people's commissariats of the RSFSR;

Lenin proposes that these people's commissariats be merged into all-Union people's commissariats;

85 of Stalin is stated as follows:

The rest of the people's commissariats (of justice, education, agriculture, internal affairs, health, social security) are considered independent, but the bodies of the GPU of the Union republics are subordinate to the GPU RSFSR.

Lenin proposes: the republican people's commissariats are independent, in

including the GPU, but joint congresses or conferences of the relevant People's Commissariats with an advisory character can be established (ibid., pp. 211-212 and 557).

In his cover letter addressed to the Politburo, Stalin rejects all three of Lenin's amendments: the amendment to §2 "cannot, in my opinion, be adopted. The existence of two Central Executive Committees in Moscow gives nothing but conflicts and discussions...", the amendment to the §4 is not acceptable, here "Comrade Lenin himself is in a bit of a hurry, proposing a merger of the people's commissariats ... "hurriedness" gives fuel to the defenders of independence to the detriment of Comrade Lenin's national-liberalism" (L. Trotsky, Stalin's School of Falsification, pp. 66-67).

Lenin's reaction to these remarks of Stalin is unknown, but on the day of the meeting of the Politburo - October 6, Lenin writes to Kamenev: "I declare war on great-power chauvinism not for life, but for death. We must absolutely insist that the allied Central Executive Committee be chaired in turn

Russian

Ukrainian

Georgian it. d.

Absolutely!" (Lenin, ibid., p. 214).

On October 6, the Politburo, in Lenin's absence, discussed Stalin's draft and

Lenin's objections. The exchange of notes between Kamenev and Stalin at the meeting shows the acuteness of the situation. Kamenev writes to Stalin: "Ilyich declares war in defense of the independence" (of the republics), Stalin answers: "I think that we must be firm with Lenin" (TsP. Pospelov, V. I. Lenin. Biography, 2nd ed., 1963, p. 611).

The Politburo, like the Central Committee as a whole, did not share Stalin's position. It decided to set up a new commission (Stalin, Molotov, Ordzhonikidze, Myasnikov) and radically revise Stalin's draft on the basis of Lenin's remarks. Forced to comply with this decision, Stalin showed disloyalty towards Lenin. The official commentator on Lenin's Works writes that when sending out a new draft to the members of the Central Committee, Stalin kept silent about the fact that the new draft was born as a result of Lenin's fundamental remarks, but - even worse: "the fundamental difference between the project of "autonomization" and Lenin's project was smeared, it was argued that the new the resolution was only "a more precise formulation of the resolution of the commission of the Orgburo, which is fundamentally correct and unconditionally acceptable" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 45, pp. 558-559).

On October 6, the plenum adopted resolutions on the creation of the USSR on the principles set forth by Lenin in his criticism of Stalin's project. Stalin, even after that, continued to fight for his "autonomization", which would later form the essence of the so-called "Georgian issue".

Another issue on which Lenin had fundamental disagreements with Stalin concerned the law of the monopoly of foreign trade. Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev passed through the plenum of the Central Committee of October 6 a decision, according to which the foundations of the monopoly of foreign trade were revised, allowing the free import and export of a number of goods. Lenin was

extremely outraged. In a letter to Stalin for members of the Central Committee, Lenin assessed the decision of the plenum as "a disruption of the monopoly of foreign trade" and demanded that its implementation be postponed for two months - "until the next plenum of the Central Committee" (ibid., pp. 221-222). Stalin sent copies of Lenin's letter to PC members. In the accompanying letter, Stalin wrote: "Comrade Lenin's letter did not dissuade me of the correctness of the decision of the plenum of the Central Committee ... Nevertheless, in view of Lenin's insistent proposal to postpone the decision of the plenum of the Central Committee, I vote for the postponement so that the issue is again put on the next plenum with the participation of Comrade Lenin" (ibid., p. 563).

We note here that when Lenin informed Stalin on December 15, 1922,

that he had concluded "an agreement with Trotsky on the defense of my views on the monopoly of foreign trade ... and I am sure that Trotsky will defend my views no worse than I" (ibid., pp. 338-339), then Stalin decided to warn formation of the Lenin-Trotsky bloc. Therefore, in a letter to members of the Central Committee on the same day, Stalin writes: "In view of the new materials accumulated over the past two months ... speaking in favor of maintaining the monopoly, I consider it my duty to announce that I withdraw my objections to the monopoly of foreign trade" (ibid., p. 589). Of course, the "new" materials were the same old materials, but what was new in the entire political development of the party was this clearly marked bloc of Lenin and Trotsky, which was very dangerous for the cause of Stalin. He had to be warned at all costs. For Stalin, as for the "troika" in general, Trotsky, acting under the mandate of Lenin, was worse than Lenin himself. The Party would have clearly seen whom Lenin was targeting as his successors.

It is between the two blows (May and December) that a special rapprochement takes place between Lenin and Trotsky. On October 10, Lenin returns to work. Trotsky writes that "Lenin sensed that in connection with his illness, for the time being, almost elusive threads of a conspiracy were weaving behind him and behind my back. He was preparing to rebuff the "troika" (L. Trotsky, "My Life", part P, p. 212). In the last weeks before the second blow, Lenin talks with Trotsky, suggesting that Trotsky become his deputy. Trotsky refuses (this is also confirmed by official party documents). The motive for Trotsky's refusal is not very modest: "There is no doubt that for current affairs it was more convenient for Lenin to rely on Stalin, Zinoviev or Kamenev ... Lenin needed obedient practical assistants. I was not fit for such a role" (ibid., pp. 214-215).

Lenin insisted, during a new meeting, on his proposal, saying that "we need a radical personal regrouping" - and that a new position would help Trotsky "shake up" the apparatus. When, in response, Trotsky said that all the evil lies not so much in state bureaucracy, but in the party and in the mutual harboring of influential groups gathering around the hierarchy of party secretaries, then "after thinking a little, Lenin put the question point-blank: "you, therefore, propose to open a struggle not only against state bureaucracy, but also against the Orgburo of the Central Committee ... "Orgburo of the Central Committee meant the very center of the Stalinist apparatus." - "Perhaps it turns out like this." "Well, well," continued Lenin, obviously

Satisfied with the fact that we have named the essence of the issue, I propose to you a bloc: against bureaucracy in general, against the Orgburo in particular. "It is flattering to make a good bloc with a good man," I said. We agreed to meet again after some time ... He planned the creation of a commission of the Central Committee ... We both had to go there. In essence, this commission should have become a lever for the destruction of the Stalinist faction" (L. Trotsky, ibid.,

pp. 216-217). Trotsky does not even suspect what a great compliment it is to Stalin, that the recognized leaders of the October Revolution - Lenin and Trotsky - should form a bloc in order to overthrow Stalin alone!

Could the bloc have succeeded, could Stalin have been overthrown? These questions are not very easy to answer. In the hierarchy of the party apparatus, Stalin's position was almost irresistible, in the Central Committee he had a reliable majority of personal supporters, in the person of the "troika" a force was created ready to resist even Lenin. Trotsky poses the same question and gives the answer: "Would Lenin have been able to carry out the regrouping of the leadership he planned? At that moment, absolutely" (ibid., p. 218). However, this does not seem very certain in the light of subsequent events. But Trotsky's second answer sounds completely unconvincing: "Moreover. I have no doubt that if I had come out on the eve of the KhP Congress in the spirit of the "bloc" of Lenin and Trotsky against Stalinist bureaucracy, I would have won without the direct participation of Lenin" (p. 219). The whole situation in the "hierarchy of party secretaries" and all the facts of the alignment of forces within the party, even the meticulous preparation by the "troika" of the KP congress decisively speaks against Trotsky's confidence, or rather, self-confidence, that he alone could cope with the tasks of the "bloc". However, Trotsky did not intend to move into such a battle, despite all the help and prodding of Lenin. As early as December 21, when the Troika capitulated on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade (it is true that Zinoviev was still brave to please Stalin) and the Central Committee revised its old decision, Lenin wrote to Trotsky: "It was as if we had succeeded in taking positions without a single shot being fired by a simple maneuvering movement. I propose not to stop and continue the offensive" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 54, pp. 327-328).

Why didn't Trotsky follow Lenin's call to "continue the offensive"?

Before listening to Trotsky on this score, let us set out the contents of two other important documents of Lenin: 1) Lenin's Testament

("Letter to the Congress"), 2) Lenin's Note "On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomization"".

On December 13, 1922, Lenin had two attacks of illness, and on December 15-16 there was a sharp deterioration in his health. On December 18, a plenum of the Central Committee takes place, which, by a special resolution, makes Stalin personally responsible for observing the regime established by the doctors for Lenin. On the night of December 22-23, Lenin had a second stroke - paralysis of his right arm and leg. But on the same December 23, Lenin, as if anticipating the approach of the end, asks the doctors to allow him to dictate to the stenographer for five minutes, since he is "concerned about one question." However, both the Central Committee and the doctors equally did not want Lenin to write. Then, according to the testimony of Lenin's sister, M. Ulyanova, Lenin presented an ultimatum: either he would be allowed to dictate his "diary" for several minutes, or he would stop being treated. He receives permission and on December 23, 1922, begins to dictate his famous "Testament" ("Letter to the Congress"). On December 24, after a meeting between Stalin, Kamenev and Bukharin with doctors, the Politburo was forced to confirm the decision:

1. Lenin is allowed to dictate every day for 5-10 minutes, but this should not be in the nature of correspondence, and Lenin should not wait for an answer to these notes. Dates are prohibited.

2. "Neither friends nor family should tell Lenin anything from

political life, so as not to provide material for reflection and unrest" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 45, p. 710).

This means that Lenin is denied access to any political information, and most importantly, to all documents of the Central Committee. Stalin must supervise the observance of this regime. Still, there is one person from the Politburo with whom Lenin can freely talk on political topics and get information from him - this is Stalin himself during his "duty" visits to Lenin. After all, it was Stalin himself who described one of his visits to Lenin during the early stages of Lenin's illness. Lenin said to Stalin: "I can't read newspapers, I can't talk about politics, I diligently go around every piece of paper, ... afraid that it might turn out to be a newspaper and that this breach of discipline might come out of it." But Stalin remarks to Lenin's story: "I laugh and exalt to the skies the discipline of comrade. Lenin. We immediately laugh at the doctors, who cannot understand that professional politicians who get a date cannot help but talk about

politics" (Stalin, Op. vol. 5, p. 135).

It is clear what kind of "policy" Stalin spoke with Lenin and what information he supplied him with.

The events with and around Lenin from December 23 (when Lenin began to write the Testament) (and until March 6, 1923, when he broke off all relations with Stalin) lend themselves to approximate reconstruction thanks to three sources:

1) "Diary of Lenin's secretaries on duty" (November 21, 1922 vol. - March 6, 1923), 2) fragmentary comments on the edition of Lenin's Works of the fifth edition, 3) Lenin's "notes" themselves.

For all his subjectivity in relation to Stalin and his assessment of political events, Trotsky is an additional source, since all the facts and documents that he cites are now directly or indirectly confirmed by Soviet historians.

On December 23, 1922, Lenin dictated the note to his secretary M. Volodicheva. The "diary" says: "Before he began to dictate (Lenin), he said: 'I want to dictate a letter to you for the congress. Write it down.' He dictated quickly, but his painful state was felt" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 45, p. 474).

The essence of this part of the "Letter to the Congress" is that Lenin proposes: 1) to increase the number of members of the Central Committee "up to several tens or even hundreds ... I think that such a thing is needed both to raise the authority of the Central Committee, and for serious work to improve our apparatus, and to prevent the conflicts of small parts of the Central Committee from becoming too exorbitant for all the fate of the party "and

2) "to give a legislative character, under certain conditions, to the decisions of the State Planning Commission, meeting the demands of Comrade Trotsky" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 45, p. 343). This part of the "Letter" was sent to Stalin on the same day, but, as the official commentator notes, "the minutes of the meetings of the Politburo and the plenums of the Central Committee do not mention this entry by Lenin" (ibid., p. 593). It is more than likely that Stalin hid it even from members of the Troika. Such an assumption is based not only on the absence of a mention of this part of the "letter" in the papers of the leading bodies of the Central Committee, but also on the fact that, making a political report of the Central Committee at the HIP Congress (April 1923),

Zinoviev completely ignores Lenin's instructions, while Stalin speaks of the need to increase the membership of the Central Committee, giving it away

a proposal for his own (0b we will have more to say about this later). In the future, Lenin's health began to improve again. He has permission to dictate 30-40 minutes a day. When later the "troika" refused to fulfill Lenin's "Testament", they presented him as the product of the diseased mind of a dying paraplegic. Meanwhile, the official commentator writes: "Being seriously ill physically, Lenin retained complete clarity of thought, extraordinary willpower, and the greatest optimism" (ibid., p. 592). Lenin hopes that he will be able to speak at the forthcoming KP congress and there he will present his own proposals and arguments. The harder he works. On the one hand, he continues to dictate the Testament (from December 24 to January 4, 1923), on the other hand, he dictates articles on topical topics for Pravda (Pages from a Diary, On Cooperation, On Our Revolution "(Regarding the notes of N. Sukhanov), "How can we reorganize the Rabkrin", "Better less, but better"). The Politburo also thinks that Lenin will be able to speak at the KhP Congress, which explains the decision of the Politburo of the CPC on January 11 to appoint Lenin as a speaker on the political report of the Central Committee of the KhP Congress.

There is no indication that Stalin received, apart from the aforementioned first part of the "letter", its continuation. M. Volodicheva wrote already in the period of Stalin's autocracy in 1929 (which makes her testimonies of this period be critically treated):

"All the articles and documents dictated by Lenin were copied at the request of Lenin in five copies, of which one asked to be left for him, three to Nadezhda Konstantinovna and one to his secretariat (strictly secret) ... On envelopes sealed with wax seals in which copies were kept documents, he asked to note that only Lenin could open it, and after his death, Nadezhda Konstantinovna (draft copies were burned by me)" (ibid., pp. 592-593).

It is very likely that Stalin here retroactively creates an alibi for himself, because it is absolutely impossible to admit that Stalin was not interested in the "continuation" of Lenin's recording, and Lenin's secretaries are people appointed here by Stalin (including his wife Nadezhda Alliluyeva), who know well that Lenin dies, but Stalin remains. Interestingly, Stalin, who subsequently shot many of the wives of "enemies of the people," did not touch any of Lenin's secretaries.

The main part of the "Will" is contained in the entries on December 24-25 and

postscript dated January 4, 1923. If Stalin hid it from the party for 30 years, then Stalin's heirs, having published it, nevertheless interpret it disloyally, simply anti-Leninist.

In fact, the "Testament" does not contain anything ambiguous and does not allow different interpretations. Here is a brief description of his Central Committee members:

1) Stalin: "Comrade. Stalin, having become the general secretary, has concentrated immense power in his hands, and I am not sure whether he will always be able to use this power carefully enough";

2) Trotsky: "Comrade. Trotsky ... is distinguished not only by outstanding

abilities. Personally, he is perhaps the most capable person in the present Central Committee, but he is also overly self-confident and overly enthusiastic about the purely administrative side of things”;

3) Zinoviev and Kamenev: “The October episode of Zinoviev and Kamenev, of course, is not an accident, but it can be just as little blamed on them personally as non-Bolshevism on Trotsky”;

4) Bukharin: “Bukharin is not only the most valuable and prominent theoretician of the party, he is also legitimately considered the favorite of the whole party, but his theoretical views can with very great doubt be classified as completely Marxist, for there is something scholastic in him (he never studied and I don't think I ever fully understood dialectics)”;

5) Pyatakov: “Then Pyatakov is a man of undoubtedly outstanding will and outstanding abilities, but too keen on administration ... to be relied upon in a serious political issue. Of course, both remarks are made by me for the present on the assumption that these two (Bukharin and Pyatakov. - A. A.) outstanding and devoted workers will not find an opportunity to replenish their knowledge and change their one-sidedness ”(December 24-25, 1922 d.) (Lenin, PSS, vol. 45, pp. 345-346).

Then, on January 4, 1923, "Addendum to the letter dated December 24, 1922" followed. This "addition" is the whole essence of Lenin's "Testament". It says: “Stalin is too rude ... This shortcoming becomes intolerable in the position of General Secretary. Therefore, I suggest that the comrades think over the method of moving Stalin from this place and appoint another person to this place, who in all other respects differs from Comrade Stalin in only one advantage, namely, more tolerant, more loyal, more

polite ... less capriciousness, etc. This circumstance may seem like an insignificant trifle ... But from the point of view of protecting against a split and from the point of view of what I wrote above about the relationship between Stalin and Trotsky, this is not a trifle, or it is such a trifle that can become decisive” (ibid., p. 346).

Although Lenin's characterizations of the leaders of the Central Committee are somewhat reminiscent of the characterization that the unforgettable Sobakevich gave to the provincial prosecutor, nevertheless, clear political conclusions follow from these characteristics. However, not those made by official historians, but also not those made by Trotsky. Trotsky thinks that Lenin wanted to carry out such a restructuring of the leading cadres at the top of the party and create “such conditions in the party that would give me the opportunity to become Lenin's deputy, in his opinion: a successor in the post of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars ... The indisputable purpose of the will: to facilitate my leadership work” (L. Trotsky, “My Life”, part P, p. 217).

Trotsky is wrong. This does not follow from the Will at all. True, Trotsky is called “the most capable person in the Central Committee,” but “the most capable person” does not yet mean the most capable Bolshevik. In addition, in such a characterization of Trotsky, Lenin was clearly mistaken. Since Lenin is talking about political “ability”, the most capable turned out to be the one whom Lenin wanted to remove altogether - Stalin. After all, the greatness or insignificance of a political figure is judged by his success in politics, and not in journalism or oratory, especially not by what he thinks of himself.

The whole meaning of the Testament is as follows: in a clear awareness of the feeling of the approaching end of his life, Lenin came to a conclusion that was crushing for his legacy: he leaves the Politburo at the head of the party and the state, in which there is not a single politician without a major political vice, and one is even predisposed to criminal crimes - Trotsky is a non-Bolshevik, Zinoviev and Kamenev are capable of new treason (Lenin once assessed the October episode as treason), Stalin is not loyal and is able to abuse power, Bukharin is a scholastic and a Marxist without dialectics. There were two more members of the Politburo that Lenin did not mention: Rykov and Tomsy, but Rykov was a pre-revolutionary "conciliator", a revolutionary "deserter" (leaving the Soviet government in November 1917), and Tomsy constantly fought with Lenin for "independence"

komfractions in the hierarchy of trade unions, for their independence from the Central Committee. It is unlikely that they, even being mentioned, would deserve characteristics without reservations. Although Lenin does not demand to remove any of them, except Stalin, he wants them all to be placed under the control of the expanded Central Committee, because without this, according to Lenin, he listed "the qualities of two outstanding leaders of the modern Central Committee (Trotsky and Stalin. - A. A .) are capable of inadvertently leading to a split" (ibid., p. 345). Note: Lenin still did not note in Stalin, unlike others, any of his political flaws, although he had them, as for "rudeness" and "disloyalty", then Stalin would later admit these qualities, adding extenuating circumstances: yes, comrades, said Stalin, that's right, I'm rude and disloyal to those who mock Leninism!

But after Lenin's political "Testament" was drawn up, the whole question came down to which of the persons named in it would make the best use of it. Here, Stalin showed such a high class of tactical art, in which all the recipes of Machiavelli and Lenin's achievements seem to be just childish babble.

Lenin returns to Stalin once again in his notes "On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomization"" of December 30 and 31, 1922. A brief history of the appearance of these notes is as follows. In Transcaucasia, a local federation was created from three Soviet republics - Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. The Transcaucasian Territory Party Committee, headed by S. Ordzhonikidze, was placed over the Communist Parties of the three republics. Zakkraykom did not consider the "sovereignty" of the republics, and Ordzhonikidze felt like, if not a "grand vizier", then in the role of the Caucasian governor of Moscow. In essence, he was right, but Lenin attached great importance to precisely the polite form of government of his satrap, especially in such a sensitive country as the Caucasus (he even wrote a special letter in 1921 to the communists of the Caucasus so that they would not copy Moscow's policy, but in accordance with with national living conditions modified it). When Ordzhonikidze began to govern Georgia, bypassing the governing bodies of Georgia, the Central Committee of Georgia resigned on October 22. The situation was further complicated by the fact that at one of the conferences, Ordzhonikidze, having apparently exhausted all other arguments, gave a strong slap in the face to one of the supporters of the Georgian Central Committee in the presence of Lenin's deputy, Rykov. The leaders of the Communist Party of Georgia, headed by the old Bolsheviks, Budu Mdivani and Makharadze, filed a complaint against

Ordzhonikidze at the Central Committee of the Party in Moscow. The Central Committee appointed a commission consisting of Dzerzhinsky (chairman), Manuisky and Kapsukas-Mickiewicz (November 25, 1922). Since Stalin unconditionally supported the "great power" Ordzhonikidze against the "social nationalist" B. Mdivani (Mdivani wanted Georgia to join the USSR directly,

bypassing the Transcaucasian Federation - this was the whole "national deviationism"), returning from Georgia, Dzerzhinsky reported to Lenin the Georgian case in the light pleasing to Stalin. Lenin doubted the objectivity of Dzerzhinsky, as he began to receive from Georgia convincing facts not only about the arbitrariness of Ordzhonikidze, but also about harboring him by Stalin. Hence the titled entries on the national question were born. In a note dated December 30, Lenin says that he twice intended (at the October and December plenums of the Central Committee) to intervene "in the notorious question of autonomy", but both times he was prevented by illness. Which side Lenin was going to take - on the side of Ordzhonikidze and Stalin, or on the side of the "national deviationists" or "social nationalists", as Stalin originally dubbed them, - the notes themselves show quite clearly. Official historians are still falsifying Lenin, claiming that Lenin allegedly condemned the "national deviationists" led by Mdivani, in fact, Lenin condemned the inventor of this label and the main culprit in the persecution of the Georgian Bolsheviks - Stalin and his assistants Dzerzhinsky and Ordzhonikidze. Lenin says that after a conversation with the head of the Central Committee commission, who returned from Georgia (she went there on November 25), he brought out "only the most serious fears ... If it came to the point that Ordzhonikidze could go too far to use physical violence, then one can imagine what a swamp we flew into. Apparently, this whole idea of "autonomization" (Stalin's idea. - A. A.) was fundamentally wrong ... I think that Stalin's haste and administrative enthusiasm, as well as his bitterness against the notorious "social nationalism", played a fatal role here. Anger in general usually plays the worst role in politics" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 45, pp. 356-357). Accusing non-Russians - Dzerzhinsky, Ordzhonikidze, Stalin of Great Russian chauvinism, Lenin makes one interesting remark: "It is known that Russified foreigners always overdo it in terms of a truly Russian mood" (ibid., p. 358). In a note on the same subject dated December 31, Lenin pronounces a murderous political sentence on Stalin. Lenin writes: "In this case, in relation to the Georgian

nation, we have a typical example of where extreme caution, courtesy and compliance are required on our part... not only a "social-nationalist", but also a rude Great Russian bullshit), that Georgian, in essence, violates the interests of proletarian class solidarity ..." (ibid., p. 360). Finishing his notes on the national question, in particular on the Georgian question, Lenin demanded that "Ordzhonikidze be exemplarily punished," that "all the materials of the Dzerzhinsky Commission be investigated and re-investigated in order to correct the enormous mass of inaccuracies and biased judgments that undoubtedly exist there" (ibid., p. 361). Lenin concludes: "Political responsibility for this whole truly Great Russian-nationalist campaign should, of course, be made of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky" (ibid., p. 361). According to the testimony of Lenin's secretary, L. Fotieva, Lenin wanted to publish these notes by the KhP Congress in the form of one article on the national question in Pravda (see L. Fotieva's letter to Stalin in the appendix to the book Veigat O. Mo[e, KyugazVsVeu apa ZfaPp '5 CB\$%, r. 278, Rgaedeg, Memkh WotK). Despite the severity of his illness, Lenin continued to persistently and in detail take an interest in the Georgian question. From this it is already clear that he is really preparing a "bomb" against Stalin at the KhP Congress, as he himself put it in one of his conversations with Fotieva, making the Georgian question a fundamental question of the party's national policy in general.

Under January 30, L. Fotieva's entry in the Diary reads: "January 24

Vladimir Ilyich summoned Fotieva and gave instructions to ask Dzerzhinsky or Stalin for the materials of the commission on the Georgian question and to study them in detail. This order was given to Fotiyeva, Glyasser and Gorbunov. The goal is a report to Lenin, who needs it for the party congress. Apparently, he did not know that the question was in the Politburo. On Thursday, January 25, he asked if the materials had been received. I replied that Dzerzhinsky would arrive only on Saturday... On Saturday I asked Dzerzhinsky, he said that Stalin had the materials. I sent a letter to Stalin... Yesterday, January 29, Stalin called that he could not give materials without the Politburo. He asked if I was saying anything superfluous to Vladimir Ilyich, from where he is aware of current affairs ... Today Vladimir Ilyich ... said that he would fight to

materials were given" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 45, pp. 476-477).

Indeed, on February 1, 1923, the Politburo made a decision to hand over to Lenin the materials of the Dzerzhinsky commission. Instructing these materials to be worked out by his collaborators, Lenin said: "If I were free (at first he made a reservation, and then repeated, laughing: if I were free), then I could easily do all this myself" (ibid., p. 478). But Lenin does not know that in the meantime the Politburo approved the report and conclusions of the commission condemning the Georgian "social-nationalists" and fully confirmed the policy of Stalin - Ordzhonikidze. Lenin received the commission's materials not without Stalin's resistance. Fotieva recalls that at a meeting of the Politburo, Kamenev said that "since Lenin insists, it would be even worse not to give," to which Stalin replied: "I don't know. Let him do what he wants" and demanded that he be relieved of responsibility for the regime of the patient, but the Politburo did not agree with this (Fotieva, "From memories", pp. 64-65).

On February 3, Lenin asks Fotieva if she looked through the Georgian materials and whether this issue was raised in the Politburo. When Fotiyeva replied that she had no right to talk about it, Lenin asked: "Are you forbidden specifically and specifically about this?" - "No, in general I have no right to talk about current affairs." - "So this is the current case?" Fotieva remarks: "I realized that I had made a mistake" (ibid., p. 479). On February 5, Lenin asked another secretary, M. Glyasser, in detail how the processing of the materials of the Dzerzhinsky commission was progressing. He learns that the report will be made to him in three weeks, and there are still six weeks before the congress.

L. Fotiyeva's note dated February 12 says that the doctors upset Lenin so much with their bans on newspapers, information, and meetings that "his lips trembled." "Vladimir Ilyich got the impression that it was not the doctors giving instructions to the Central Committee, but the Central Committee giving instructions to the doctors" (ibid., p. 485).

On February 14, L. Fotieva wrote down that Lenin was in a hurry with a report on the Georgian question and instructed A. Solts, a member of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, to be informed that he, Lenin, was "on the side of the offended" (that is, on the side of Mdivani and his supporters), the same inform "any of the offended" (ibid., pp. 486, 607).

On March 3, Lenin's collaborators presented Lenin with a written report on the results of their study of Dzerzhinsky's materials.

On March 5 Lenin dictated two letters, one to Trotsky and the other to Stalin, and on March 6 he wrote a letter to Mdivani, Makharadze and others. Of these, the most important letter is the letter to Stalin.

According to the official commentator, Lenin learned that the Politburo of January 25, 1923 approved the conclusions of the Dzerzhinsky commission. Having previously studied the materials of this commission through his own employees, whose conclusions he already had on hand, Lenin came to the conclusion that it was necessary to protest against the decision of the Politburo at the forthcoming plenum of the Central Committee. Lenin himself cannot speak, but to whom can he entrust? Zinoviev and Kamenev for Lenin fall away in advance, then only Trotsky remains. Having previously ascertained Trotsky's position on the Georgian question, which turned out to be identical with Lenin's, and in the false hope that Trotsky would have the courage to speak out against the "troika" and for the "bloc" of Lenin-Trotsky, Lenin wrote him the following letter: "Strictly secret. Personally.

Dear comrade Trotsky!

I would ask you to take it upon yourself to defend the Georgian cause at the Central Committee of the Party. This matter is now under the "persecution" of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky, and I cannot rely on their impartiality. Even quite the opposite. If you agreed to take over his protection, then I could be calm. If for some reason you disagree, then return the whole case to me. I will take this as a sign of your disagreement. With best comradely greetings, Lenin" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 54, p. 329).

Recalling the history of this letter with fresh traces, Trotsky wrote: "Lenin's two secretaries Fotieva and Glyasser serve as a link. Here is what they send me. Lenin is extremely excited about Stalin's preparations for the upcoming party congress... "Vladimir Ilyich is preparing a bomb against Stalin at the congress." This is the literal phrase of Fotieva: The word "bomb" belongs to Lenin, not to her. Vladimir Ilyich asks you to take the Georgian matter into your own hands" (L. Trotsky, "My Life", part II, p. 220).

Trotsky was convinced that "by the example of Stalin's policy, Lenin wanted to reveal to the party, and mercilessly at that, the danger of a bureaucratic degeneration of the dictatorship...

"Kamenev is going to Georgia tomorrow for a party conference," I say to Fotieva. I can acquaint him with Lenin's manuscripts in order to encourage him to act in Georgia in the proper spirit. - In a quarter of an hour

Fotieva returns (Lenin and Trotsky lived in different houses in the Kremlin. - A. A.): "No way. Lenin says: "Kamenev will immediately show everything to Stalin, and Stalin will conclude a rotten compromise and deceive" (ibid., p. 222.)

On March 6, Lenin wrote to Mdivani, Makharadze and others: "Dear comrades! I follow your work with all my heart. Outraged by the rudeness of Ordzhonikidze and the indulgence of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky. I'm preparing notes and a speech for you. Yours faithfully, Lenin" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 54, p. 330).

A copy of this letter is addressed not only to Trotsky, but also to Kamenev. When the surprised Trotsky inquires why Lenin had changed his mind about Kamenev, Fotieva reported that Lenin had said: "In order not to be late, we have to speak ahead of time" (L. Trotsky, ibid., p. 223).

But Stalin is in a hurry too. He knows that Lenin sharply condemns Dzerzhinsky's biased commission. Therefore, Stalin sends

Georgia a new commission consisting of Kamenev and Kuibyshev. As soon as Kamenev and Kuibyshev arrived in Tiflis, they received a telegram from Stalin: Lenin had another grave blow. If before his departure Kamenev still hesitated in favor of Lenin, now he decided to act in the spirit of Stalin - Ordzhonikidze - Dzerzhinsky.

Lenin is really in a hurry. Events begin to take a dramatic turn. Sometimes it seems that Lenin's "bomb" against Stalin will explode even before the opening of the congress. The inner-party drama reaches its apogee on March 5, when Lenin writes the following letter to Stalin:

"T. Stalin. Strictly secret. Personally.

Copy of vol. Kamenev and Zinoviev.

Dear comrade Stalin!

You were rude to call my wife to the phone and scold her. Although she agreed to forget what was said to you, nevertheless this fact became known through her to Zinoviev and Kamenev. I do not intend to forget so easily what was done against me, and it is useless to say that I consider what was done against my wife to be done against me. Therefore, I ask you to consider whether you agree to take back what was said and apologize or prefer to break off relations between us.

Yours faithfully, Lenin" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 54, pp. 329-330).

The fact of Lenin's break with Stalin is capable of producing in the party

a deafening impression, but hardly the most ardent disciples of Lenin will understand his motive, when the offended feeling of a capricious and, of course, nervous woman is placed above the interests of the party. Many will see in this act of Lenin, if not a burp of philistinism, then the belated chivalry of a "hereditary nobleman" (after all, in the metrics of Ulyanov-Lenin, where the "estate" column stands: "hereditary nobleman"!).

This letter also became known to Trotsky through Kamenev. Trotsky writes: "Kamenev gave me additional information. He was Krupskaya, at her call. She told him that Vladimir dictated a letter to Stalin about breaking off all relations with him ... He would never have gone to break personal relations if he did not consider it necessary to defeat Stalin politically "(L. Trotsky, *ibid.*, p. 223).

In the "Diary" on March 6, M. Volodicheva writes that Lenin asked that his letter be handed over to Stalin "personally from hand to hand and receive an answer ... Stalin's answer was received immediately after he received Vladimir Ilyich's letter (the letter was handed over by me personally to Stalin and his answer was dictated to me...)" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 45, p. 486).

Lenin did not have time to read Stalin's answer - on the same March 6, not without the influence of this whole story, he had a sharp deterioration in his state of health, and on March 10 - the third blow, which led to increased paralysis of the right side of the body and loss of speech.

It is not possible to document whether Stalin really wrote a response letter to Lenin and Krupskaya and, if so, what was its content. When the leader of the "new opposition" Zinoviev raised this issue at the joint plenum of the CPC and the Central Control Commission in June 1926, telling the plenum that

Stalin did not even honor Lenin with an answer, then instead of announcing his answer to Lenin, Stalin brought Lenin's sister, M. Ulyanov, as a witness. She informed the presidium of the plenum that Stalin had indeed written a letter of apology to Krupskaya and Lenin (Lenin, PSS, vol. 54, p. 675).

If we don't need documents, but witnesses, then why didn't Stalin take as witnesses Lenin's wife, Krupskaya, who was immediately present at the plenum as a member of the Central Control Commission? Lenin's official commentators do not answer such a question.

Let us now return to the question that we have already posed: why didn't Trotsky follow Lenin's call by joint efforts ("Lenin-Trotsky bloc") to overthrow Stalin, especially since Trotsky himself

claims that Stalin was also his main enemy and that he could have overthrown him without the direct participation of Lenin? Trotsky's answer shows an inexplicable ill-luck in politics, helplessness in tactics, dilettantism in the handling of power, and a striking ignorance of the "secrets" of the functioning of the party machine. The revolution, in which Lenin was the brain, and he was the motor, seemed to castrate his "will to power." He remained a revolutionary without becoming a master of power. Of course, in the revolution he is a giant, and Stalin is a pygmy, but once in power, the giant became a pygmy, and the pygmy turned into a giant. No, Trotsky, of course, could not topple such a giant. Even worse, he doesn't even want to.

In the above-quoted conversation with Kamenev on the question of how to deal with Stalin after all the actions that Lenin is taking against him, Trotsky openly opposes Lenin. He himself writes: "I presented to him (Kamenev) my view of the situation. Sometimes, out of fear of an imaginary danger, I said, people are able to call upon themselves a real danger. Bear in mind and convey to others that the last thing I intend to do is to raise a struggle at the congress for the sake of some kind of organizational restructuring. I stand for the status quo... I am against the liquidation of Stalin, against the expulsion of Ordzhonikidze (Lenin demanded that he be expelled from the party), against the removal of Dzerzhinsky... There is no need for intrigues. We need honest cooperation" (L. Trotsky, My Life, part P, p. 224).

"Honest cooperation" with Stalin!

Why, after all, did Trotsky reject Lenin's proposal for a joint action against Stalin? Trotsky's answer could be qualified as an example of bottomless naivety in politics, if it were not Trotsky's answer. Here it is: "The idea of the "bloc of Lenin and Trotsky" was at that moment fully known only to Lenin and me, the other members of the Politburo vaguely guessed ... My speech could be understood, depicted as my personal struggle for Lenin's place in the party and the state. I could not think about it without an inner shudder. I thought that this could introduce such demoralization into our ranks, for which, even in the event of victory, we would have to pay dearly... sick Lenin? (Trotsky, *ibid.*, pp. 219-220). What a question?

After all, it is Lenin himself who demands that Trotsky speak in the name of Lenin and

Trotsky with documents destroying Stalin, signed personally by Lenin, on the Georgian case.
Difficult to find satisfactory

an explanation for such behavior by Trotsky, unless we assume that Trotsky did not know Stalin at all, or perhaps the American historian is right who claims that all of Trotsky's behavior in this matter was simply "unheroic" (A. Chjat, Vo]5 \$, p.571, Thie MastChap Contributor, Mech Work, MU).

Even Krupskaya, who on December 23, 1922, wrote a letter to Kamenev and Zinoviev against Stalin in connection with her insult (Krupskaya: "The interests of the party and Ilyich are no less dear to me than to Stalin," Lenin, PSS, vol. 54, p. 675) , now that Lenin has broken with Stalin, does not show any activity to persuade Trotsky to fulfill Lenin's will. The American biographer of Lenin, Stefan T. Possoni, believes that perhaps Krupskaya did not rely much on Trotsky's firmness (5. T. Rosopou, Gepa, 5. 425, Wayad Uzzesvay ipa Ropic, Kot).

All this does not speak in favor of Trotsky as a politician. On the other hand, it is difficult to speak about his lack of civic courage. In one respect he is strikingly unique: he has started every discussion in the party at the wrong time, on the wrong subject, and with the wrong allies. When the time was exceptionally favorable (crisis in the Politburo), and the question was a question of power (the main goal of any politician), and the ally was the founder and leader of Bolshevism (Lenin), Trotsky indulges in Hamletian doubts: will the party understand or not understand?

The KhP congress was approaching, in whose name Lenin's "Letter to the Congress" was written. Although the "troika" took every measure to prevent not a single paper from Lenin from reaching the congress, one nevertheless slipped through and took the "troika" by surprise. It was April 16, the day before the opening of the congress, when Fotieva wrote a letter to Kamenev with a copy to Trotsky. In this letter, Fotieva wrote: "As I have already informed you, Vladimir Ilyich dictated 31. HIP. 22 article on the national question ... He was going to raise this question at the congress. Shortly before his last illness, he informed me that he would publish this article, but after that he fell ill and there was no final agreement. VI regarded his article as a guide and attached great importance to it. By order of Vladimir Ilyich, this article was sent to Comrade Trotsky, to whom V.I. entrusted the defense of his position on this issue at the Party Congress, since both of them

had the same view on the matter. L. Fotieva, personal secretary of Comrade Lenin. 16. Gu. 1923" (here, as in what follows, a reverse translation from English) Khrushchev at the 20th Congress). From Fotiyeva's letter to the Politburo, the Troika learned for the first time that Lenin was in touch with Trotsky (a "bloc"!) and that Trotsky concealed both this fact and Lenin's article from the Central Committee. Trotsky, guessing what turn this thing might take, decided to quickly rectify the situation. On the same April 16, he wrote a letter to Stalin "for all members of the Central Committee." Trotsky informs Stalin that he received Lenin's article on March 5, made a copy of it to use it for his own article in Pravda, as well as to amend Stalin's theses on the national question at the KhP Congress (which, amendments, Stalin had already accepted). Trotsky adds: "This article is of exceptional importance. It also contains a sharp condemnation of three members of the Central Committee. As long as there was even a shadow of hope that V. I. would give any instructions regarding this article to the Party Congress, I avoided reporting this article. If none of the members of the Central Committee decides to bring this article in one form or another to the attention of the party or congress, then I, for my part, will consider this a decision to remain silent, a decision which - in connection with the party congress - relieves me of personal responsibility for

this article" (ibid., p. 270).

Having received Fotieva's letter with the attachment of Lenin's article, the temporary chairman of the Politburo Kamenev simply washed his hands: he sent all the material to the Secretariat of the Central Committee, since the material "contains nothing that would concern me personally", but, with an eye to Trotsky's possible insistence (in which he was mistaken) and the still living Lenin, added: "In my opinion, the Central Committee must immediately decide to publish Vladimir Ilyich's article" (ibid., p. 278). However, unlike Kamenev, Stalin did not lose his head. He easily turned the "case of Stalin" into the "case of Trotsky", and he prevented the publication of Lenin's article by his most usual trick in such cases. He forced the same Fotieva to write a new letter to him concerning Lenin's article. This letter, dated the same date, reads: "Comrade. Stalin! Today I consulted with Maria Ilyinichnaya (Lenin's sister. - A.A ..) whether Vladimir Ilyich's article, which I sent you, should be published ... From my point of view, I should only add that Vladimir

Ilyich did not regard this article as complete and ready for publication. L. Fotieva, 16. GU. 1923 v. 9 p.m. (ibid., p. 278).

With letters from Trotsky and Kamenev in hand, and especially the last letter from Fotieva, Stalin addresses the "Statement to the members of the Central Committee", in which he writes:

"I am very surprised that the articles of Comrade. Lenin, which, no doubt, are of particularly fundamental importance and which Comrade Trotsky received on March 5 of this year, he considered it permissible to keep his own secret for more than a month without bringing their contents to the attention of the Politburo or the plenum of the Central Committee, up to the day before the opening HP Party Congress.

The topic of these articles - as I was informed by the delegates of the convention - is the subject of discussion and rumor among the delegates; these articles, as I heard today, have become known to people who have nothing to do with the PC. The members of the Central Committee themselves must be content with information from these rumors and stories, while it goes without saying that the content of these articles must be communicated to all members of the Central Committee in the first place.

I think that Comrade Lenin's articles should be published in the press" (ibid., pp. 278-279).

Thus, Stalin joined Kamenev on the need to publish Lenin's articles. However, Stalin added, as the end of the letter, one more remark, which completely removes the possibility of publishing the articles. Stalin ends the letter as follows: "It is only regrettable - as it clearly follows from Comrade Fotieva's letter - these articles clearly cannot be published, since they have not been verified by Comrade Lenin" (ibid., p. 279). No matter how transparent Stalin's arguments were - after all, the articles were edited and signed by Lenin - the members of the Central Committee had to believe Lenin's secretary more than Lenin himself. In addition, no one undertook to check either Lenin's signatures or how Stalin organized the second letter to Fotieva.

Not to mention publishing, Stalin and Kamenev at first did not even want to bring Lenin's article (letter) to the attention of the KhP Congress, and only the direct intervention of Lenin's secretariat forced them to retreat from their original decision to hide the article from the Congress. The same L. Fotieva wrote after the 20th Congress: "Despite the fact that Stalin and Kamenev knew the content

letters and Lenin's instructions about the need to read the letter at the KhP congress, they evaded reading it at the congress, taking advantage of the fact that Lenin,

state of health, could not personally intervene in this matter. And only as a result of an official letter from the secretariat of V. I. Lenin ... about the will of Lenin, Stalin, literally on the eve of the party congress, on April 16, requested it from Lenin's secret archive, and it was read to the leaders of the delegation at the KhP Congress "(That was Lenin, Moscow, 1965, p. 431).

The "leaders of the delegation" are actually the members and candidates of the Central Committee, whom Trotsky, in addition to Kamenev and Stalin, already informed. Very characteristic and important is L. Fotieva's indication that Stalin and Kamenev had known about the content of Lenin's letter (article) even earlier, just as they could have known and probably knew about the whole "Testament" as a whole. It was entirely within their calculations not to take the "Testament" into account officially until the "troika" had dealt with Trotsky. Trotsky, apparently, knew only the article on the national question, but did not know all the notes included in the Testament, did not even know Lenin's first note of December 24 on the need to expand the Central Committee to 50-100 people, which was forwarded to Stalin. Stalin hid it not only from Trotsky, but also from Zinoviev and Kamenev. Only this ignorance can explain that at the February plenum of the Central Committee (1923), where Stalin, as if on his own behalf, raised the question of expanding the Central Committee at the upcoming congress (he repeated the same thing without reference to Lenin at the KhP congress), Trotsky and Rykov began object to this (see the chapter on the HP Congress).

Let us return to the correspondence between Trotsky and Stalin about the article on the national question. Trotsky, guessing that Stalin wants to "make virtue out of need", praising Lenin's "fundamental article" and reproaching Trotsky for hiding such an important thing from the Central Committee, decided to give an explanation again and avert any suspicion of his conspiracy with Lenin ("block!").

On the opening day of the congress, April 17, Trotsky sent a statement to all members of the Central Committee, in which he deflected Stalin's reproach, saying that "comr. Lenin sent his article to me personally and secretly, and yet Lenin categorically rejected my definite intention to acquaint the members of the Politburo with the article through Comrade Fotieva. If anyone thinks that he acted incorrectly, then, Trotsky wrote, he can, for his part, make a proposal to transfer the given case to the investigation of a special commission of the congress (T. Hopon, Nosh\$ apa Sashcheg, Gla., 1947).

On April 18, on the second day of the opening of the congress, Trotsky sent a personal

a letter to Stalin on the same issue. Trotsky's insistence on justifying himself from any accusation of "illegal" connections with Lenin is so great that it is difficult to find a satisfactory explanation for this. In the new letter, Trotsky reveals one interesting detail. He writes: "Yesterday, in a personal conversation with me, you said that I didn't do anything wrong in the affairs of Comrade Lenin's article and that you would formulate a written statement in this sense," noting that he still has not received such a statement, Trotsky informs Stalin. If Stalin has changed his mind about doing as he promised, then all that remains is to refer the matter to the conflict commission "for an investigation from beginning to end" (ibid., p. 363). Of course, Trotsky did not wait for Stalin's written statement of this rehabilitation, nor the creation of a commission to investigate Stalin's accusation. But Stalin achieved his goal: he showed Trotsky as a disloyal member of the Central Committee, and even conspi-

rallying with the sick Lenin. This is what Trotsky was afraid of, seized, as the aforementioned historian writes, by "panic", he proceeds to threats ... by a conflict commission (Lat, Sh14., p. 573).

About all this, in a report on the national question at the congress itself, Stalin said: "Many referred to the notes and articles of Vladimir Ilyich. I would not like to quote my teacher, comrade. Lenin, since he is not here, I am afraid that, perhaps, I will refer to him incorrectly and out of place" (Stalin. Works. vol. 5, p. 266). Quoting this passage from Stalin's speech, Trotsky says that "these words are undoubtedly a model of the most extreme Jesuitism" of Stalin, since Stalin knew very well with what indignation Lenin condemned his national policy and that only the fatal illness of the "teacher" prevented the political death of such "dedicated" student.

Chapter 23

LAST CONGRESS WITHOUT LENIN

The last congress during Lenin's lifetime was the HIP congress, which took place in April 1923. Hopes for Lenin's participation in the work of the congress

were still so great that on January 11, 1923, the Politburo approved him as the rapporteur on the political report of the Central Committee. But specialist doctors - foreign and Russian - are less and less confident about this possibility; the more intensively Lenin worked on letters and notes addressed to the congress, on directive articles for Pravda, which each time were published only with the special permission of the Politburo. Lenin tries to get around the Politburo's censorship with the help of Pravda editor Bukharin and his sister Maria Ulyanova, who worked in the editorial office, but he almost never succeeds. The most important documents - "Letter to the Congress" and "On Autonomization" Lenin intends - the first for the KhP Congress, the second - for publication on the eve of the KhP Congress. The history and purpose of both documents, even those that exposed Stalin, are falsified. The falsification is based on legends composed by Stalin himself in agreement with Zinoviev and Kamenev, but kept secret from other members of the Central Committee, including Trotsky. Three women from Lenin's entourage took direct part in the creation of Stalin's legends and in concealing the "Letters to the Congress" from the KhP congress: his wife N.K. The most surprising thing is that the Stalinist legends, based on the forced and implausible testimonies of these collaborators of Lenin and Stalin's captives, even formed the basis of the uncritical writings of Western historians about the Letter to the Congress. Let's analyze these legends in order:

1) The title "Letter to the Congress" was invented by the then Stalinist apparatus to say that Lenin wrote this letter only for the first congress after his death, and not for a specific one, that is, for the upcoming KhP congress. To support this version, the "Diary" of Lenin's secretariat was also falsified. Nowhere does it say that Lenin wrote a "letter" to be read precisely at the KhP Congress. However, Lenin's letter itself begins with the words: "I would very much like to ask you to undertake a number of changes in our political system at this congress" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 45, p. 343). This means that it is not a "Letter to the Congress" in general, but a "Letter to the KhP Congress" (this is very important, as we shall see later);

2) Therefore, if Lenin writes "for this congress", which opens

after 21/2 months, then it is completely illogical the statement that Stalin took from Lenin's secretary M. Volodicheva retroactively - in 1929 Volodicheva "testifies" that Lenin asked her to do

the inscription on the envelope containing the "Letter to the Congress" that Lenin could open it, and after his death Krupskaya, but that she refused to write the words "Lenin's death" (ibid., p. 593). How is it possible that the letter destined for the KhP congress in April 1923 should be opened only after Lenin's death?

3) However, in a strange way, Krupskaya does not open Lenin's "letter" even after Lenin's death on January 21, 1924, but only four months later - on May 18, 1924 (ibid., p. 594); that in the first days after the death of Lenin, Krupskaya had no time for "letters", this is psychologically quite understandable (although the conspirators used a similar story of the belated opening of the envelope with Alexander's "Testament" [in the same Russia to raise the tragic military revolution on December 14, 1825), but why not hand over the most important documents to the Central Committee within four months after Lenin's death?

4.) On the day of Lenin's death, in the absence of Trotsky, who was being treated in the Caucasus, the Central Committee creates two commissions: one state commission for the burial of Lenin, headed by Dzerzhinsky (whom Lenin himself wanted to bury politically), another commission of the Central Committee for receiving "papers of V. I. Lenin" under the direct leadership of Stalin himself, against whom all the last "papers" of Lenin were written.

What "papers" of Lenin were accepted by the second commission? Of course, everything, whether they are political or family, under a wax seal or open, whether they are entrusted to Lenin's secretariat or even to Krupskaya - there was no private Lenin for the party, therefore all Lenin's papers are papers of the party, including, of course, in the first place his Letter to the KhP Congress. In addition, the "Letter to the Congress" was made, according to M. Volodicheva, in five copies - one personal copy for Lenin, the second copy for his secretariat and three copies for Krupskaya (ibid., p. 592). How could at least a copy from Lenin's personal archive and a copy from the archive of his secretariat escape from the commission? What papers of Lenin did the commission accept, if not this most important of all the papers of a deceased person - his "Testament" of the party? Trotsky seriously thinks that the "Testament" was not known to anyone, and hence to Stalin (L. Trotsky, My Life, part P, p. 219). If we allowed even for a minute the correctness of this assumption of Trotsky, it would mean only one thing: absolute ignorance in understanding the detective abilities and criminal way of thinking of Stalin. Actually, the physical victim of this misunderstanding

just became Trotsky. So that Stalin, the legal representative of the Politburo of the Central Committee for the supervision of the sick Lenin, Stalin, who perfectly knows from at least two documents - Lenin's letter of March 5 on the severance of personal relations and an article on the national question with a strong condemnation of his policy - that Lenin is preparing against him a blow so that Stalin, who has Lenin's secretaries on errands, including his own wife Nadezhda Alliluyeva, so that this Stalin did not know Lenin's "Testament" - it is difficult to admit. Stalin knew, but he needed time. To prevent the transmission of Lenin's "Letter" to the KhP congress at any cost - such is Stalin's goal. Since Zinoviev and Kamenev are also interested in this, this goal was achieved. Since among the members of the Politburo, still in emigration, Krupskaya's closest friends (like Lenin's) were Zinoviev and Kamenev, and Kamenev, moreover, was temporary

Chairman of the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars, Stalin could easily persuade Krupskaya through them to refrain from handing over Lenin's "Letter" to the Congress. Moreover, Stalin himself renamed the "Letter to the XII Congress" into "Letter to the XIII Congress." When Zinoviev and Kamenev admitted at the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in October 1927 that they, together with Stalin, hid Lenin's "Letter to the KhP Congress" from the KhP Congress, Stalin, not only contrary to the facts, but contrary to all logic, declared: "It was proved and it has been reproved that no one is concealing anything, that Lenin's "testament" was addressed to the 13th Congress" (Stalin, Soch. vol. 10, p. 173). The KhPI congress is coming, and Lenin writes to the HT congress!

On the eve of this 13th Congress, Stalin's apparatus organized the so-called "Protocol of N. Krupskaya on the transfer of V. I. Lenin's records." The protocol was drawn up on May 18, 1924. It bears a clear imprint of its artificial fabrication. In the protocol, Krupskaya shows: "I handed over the notes that Vladimir Ilyich dictated during his illness from December 23 to January 23 ... Among the unpublished notes there are notes dated December 24-25, 1922 and January 4, 1923, which conclude in personal characteristics of some members of the Central Committee. Vladimir Ilyich expressed his firm desire that after his death this note of his be brought to the attention of the next party congress. N. Krupskaya "(Lenin, PSS, vol. 45, p. 594.).

Nowhere in any of the records of Lenin's "Testament" is there a single word about transferring these records "after his death", there is not a single word

also to hand over the notes to the "next congress" after death, but, as we have seen, the "Testament" itself begins with the words that Lenin destines the notes to "this congress," that is, the XII Congress, which takes place nine months before Lenin's death.

In addition to all this, it must be said that Lenin, although seriously ill, but not yet old (he was only 52 years old), did not intend to die, and in this sense he did not draw up any dying testament. His hopes for recovery were shared by the doctors. That is why Kamenev, in his opening speech at the HIP Congress, said: "The best representatives of medical science from all countries were gathered here ... They told us: Lenin's illness is difficult, but by no means hopeless ... There is no danger now" (Twelfth Congress of the RCP (6) Verbatim Record April 17-25, 1923, p. 1, 1923). Yes, Lenin lived for another nine months, with changes in his state of health, sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse. And the "troika" kept Lenin's "Letter to the KhP Congress" a secret for almost a year and a half, even from members of the Politburo, not only from members of the Central Committee.

Thus, Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev took every measure to prevent the "Letter to the KhP Congress" from reaching its addressee. On Stalin's part, additional measures were taken so that the composition of the congress turned out to be, if not anti-Leninist, then, in any case, anti-Trotskyist and pro-Stalinist. Members of the "troika" - Zinoviev firmly owned Leningrad, Kamenev was considered the master of Moscow (he was also the chairman of the Moscow Council, just like Zinoviev was also the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet). Further, in the provinces, they did not look. The "general secretary" reigned supreme in the province. The provinces actually made up the absolute majority of the delegates to the regular congresses. Zinoviev and Kamenev had a majority in the Politburo, but the congresses were organized by the Orgburo and the Secretariat, where all power belonged to Stalin (later we will see how Zinoviev and Kamenev will complain about Stalin that he usurped the power of the Politburo through these bodies). Through the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat, Stalin and

prepared the KhP congress according to the same method of Lenin, guided by which he prepared the previous XI congress without being the general secretary. Mikoyan in 1970, in his memoirs about Lenin, told us the technique of such preparation. Mikoyan writes: "In early January 1922, I was urgently summoned to the Central Committee (Mikoyan then worked as the first secretary of the provincial party committee in Nizhny Novgorod. - A. A.). When I arrived, the Central Committee said that they wanted me

see Stalin... Stalin said that he called me on Lenin's instructions. It's about preparing for XI party congress ... We are very concerned about which delegates will come to the congress, whether there will be many former Trotskyists among them. After all, delegates will now be chosen at provincial conferences only on the basis of personal qualities. And there are quite a lot of Trotskyists among the responsible workers, and they enjoy confidence in their organizations. There are especially many of them in the Siberian provinces. So we are afraid that many Trotskyite delegates may arrive from Siberia. Therefore, Lenin instructed me to tell you all this and, if you agree, ask you to go to Novo-Nikolaevsk (Novosibirsk) to Lashevich (Chairman of the Sibrevkom and member of the Sibburo Central Committee. - A. A.) and convey to him on behalf of Lenin everything that I told you here... When talking, Stalin was very calm and generally made a good impression on me then. I was about to leave when suddenly Lenin entered. He greeted me and, smiling, looking at Stalin and me, jokingly asked: - Are you discussing your Caucasian differences? Stalin replied that he gave me everything that they had agreed" (zh. Yunost, No. 4, 1970, p. 53). Mikoyan, probably, does not even suspect that, revealing this "secret", he paints Lenin as the same disloyal person as Stalin, for Trotsky was not only Lenin's colleague in the Politburo, but also, according to the testimony of the same Stalin, in the same 1922 Mr. Lenin suggested that Trotsky become his first deputy. But that is not what is important, what is important is how Lenin taught Stalin how to prepare party congresses. It is important that the KhP Congress was prepared with the same technique as the Tenth Congress. Lenin now, on the eve of the KhP Congress, vainly appealed to the help of the same Trotsky, unsuccessfully tried to tear Kamenev away from Stalin, fought in despair in order to get at least with his letters to the KhP Congress, but Stalin, in a Leninist way, blocked Lenin's way there. Indeed, "who sows the wind, reaps the whirlwind!"

After the congress was well prepared, and the delegates were thoroughly filtered, the second important problem was the appointment of a rapporteur on the political report of the Central Committee, with whom Lenin himself always spoke from the day the party was created, and especially after coming to power. By the one who delivered this report at the KhP Congress, they were to judge who the heir to the dying Lenin was. If the speaker is appointed from the point of view of his popularity in the country, then he should be Trotsky, if the speaker is appointed on formal legal grounds, then he should be either the temporary chairman of the Politburo Kamenev, or

General Secretary of the Central Committee Stalin. But Trotsky and Stalin categorically refused, Kamenev's position remained unclear, and Zinoviev demanded that the political report be entrusted to him. This is how Trotsky tells the story of the appointment of a political rapporteur: "The XII Congress was approaching. There was almost no hope left for Lenin to participate in it. The question arose as to whom to read the main political report.

Stalin said at a meeting of the Politburo: "Of course, to Trotsky." He was immediately supported by Kalinin, Rykov and, obviously against their will, Kamenev. I objected. The party will feel uncomfortable if any of us tries to personally replace the sick Lenin. Let's dispense with this time without an introductory political report... Zinoviev was on vacation in the Caucasus. The question remains

unresolved. Zinoviev returned. Zinoviev demanded a political report for himself. Kamenev interrogated the "old Bolsheviks", of whom most of them left the party for 10, 15 years: "can we really allow Trotsky to become the sole leader of the party and the state?" ... The Troika decided that Zinoviev would make a political report. I didn't mind..." (L. Trotsky, My Life, part P, pp. 227-8).

Trotsky wrote this in 1930. Ten years later, in a book about Stalin, which Stalin's ax in the hands of an NKVD agent did not allow him to finish, Trotsky makes a significant change to this story: when Stalin said that Trotsky should make a political report, Trotsky refused to do report, but suggested: "Let's hope for a speedy recovery of Lenin, in the meantime, a report on the position should be made to the General Secretary of the Central Committee. So any speculation will be deprived of ground... I continued to insist that Stalin make the report. "Under no circumstances will the Party understand this. The report should be made by the most popular member of the Central Committee," he answered with demonstrative modesty" (T. Tto&\$K, Zbapn, Gopaog, p. 366).

It is difficult to say whether Stalin was sincere in offering to make a report to Trotsky, but Trotsky's refusal and his proposal that the General Secretary himself make such a report, probably pursued the goal, if not to cause discord in the "troika", then to warn the open contender for the heirs of Lenin - Zinoviev. On the other hand, Stalin clearly wanted to oppose the "non-Bolshevik" Trotsky to the leader of the Comintern and Lenin's long-term assistant in exile, Zinoviev, in order to prevent a possible alliance between Trotsky and Zinoviev. However, Trotsky, who constantly complains about the "troika" and Stalin, even when Stalin betrays the "troika" and

offers him a report, does not agree to it in any way, only because the party does not think that he wants to be Lenin's heir! Where is the state mind, political audacity, or simply Nietzsche's "will to power"?

KhPI congress met from April 17 to April 25, 1923. It was attended by 458 delegates with a decisive vote and 417 delegates with an advisory vote from 386,000 communists. Agenda of the KhPI Congress:

1. The political report of the Central Committee - Zinoviev, the organizational report of the Central Committee - Stalin.

2. Report of the audit commission - Nogin.

3. Report of the Central Control Commission - Shkiriyatov.

4.. Report of the Russian representation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern - Bukharin.

5. About industry - Trotsky.

b. National moments in party and state building - Stalin.

l. Tax policy in the countryside - Kamenev (co-speakers - Sokolnikov, Kalinin).

8. About zoning - Rykov.

9. Elections of the central bodies of the party.

The presidium of the congress was elected from 25 people, which included all the members and candidates of the Politburo, the majority of the members of the Central Committee, including Ordzhonikidze. Dzerzhinsky was included in the commission for receiving complaints.

The congress was opened by Kamenev with a brief introductory speech.

It can be seen from the agenda that, in addition to the sick Lenin and Tomsy, all members and candidates of the Politburo acted as speakers, but the "troika" both secured the most important positions for themselves: the opening of the congress (Kamenev), the political report of the Central Committee (Zinoviev), the organizational report of the Central Committee (Stalin), tax policy in the countryside (Kamenev), closing of the congress (Zinoviev). Stalin was compensated by another report precisely on the question on which Lenin wanted to crush him at the same congress - on the national question. How far the "troika" went in their reckless defense of Stalin against Lenin is shown by this fact, unprecedented in the history of Bolshevism (the Central Committee approves Stalin's report on the national question, in which Stalin, contrary to Lenin, defends the position of Ordzhonikidze, approves the conclusions of the Dzerzhinsky commission and condemns the "social nationalists »

(Mdivani, Makharadze and others).

In a brief but solid opening speech, although Kamenev paid tribute to the absent Lenin, he noted that Lenin did not know either the agenda or the draft resolutions of the congress, but he told a deliberate lie in the light of Lenin's "Testament": "Although he is not here physically, he is in fact ideologically directs this Party Congress of ours as well." He ended his speech with a call for party unity (Twelfth Congress of the RCP (6). Verbatim report. 1923, p. 3). The speech was greeted with applause. When the presiding Kamenev said that the floor for the Central Committee's report was given to Comrade Zinoviev, not a single hand moved to applaud. A formidable expectant tit settled in the hall. Trotsky, who is not very impartial, thinks that the congress was on the alert in order to let Zinoviev know that he is a usurper, if not of power, then of Lenin's prerogatives, but about the applause, this was arranged by the younger "ally" Stalin himself, who controlled the presidium mind of the congress - the presidium always gives a signal congress: when, to whom and how much to applaud. Stalin and the presidium did not give a signal, so the hall was silent.

Zinoviev was so diplomatic that he immediately made the reservation that he could not and did not pretend to replace Lenin. He said that the congress would have to "work more attentively than it was before, when this work was to a large extent done for us by Lenin. We will have to replace Lenin's instructions with collective work" (ibid., p. 6). Zinoviev went on to say that at the previous congress Lenin had declared that the retreat was over. The Central Committee fulfilled this promise, now there is no more retreat, preparations are underway for the offensive. Zinoviev argued, referring to Lenin, that the possibility of starting a "second round" of world war was not ruled out. But the USSR needs peace to restore its economy, and hence to prepare for the "second round", so "our strategy is simple: if we have to intervene, then as late as possible" (ibid., p. 13). The revolutionary reserves and allies of the USSR are the countries defeated by the Entente (Germany!) and the revolutionary East, especially China. The speaker attached great importance to rapprochement with America, but quoted from a speech by Hughes, the US Secretary of State, who, in Zinoviev's opinion, showed a commendable knowledge of the Soviet doctrine of world revolution. He cites many quotations: in

November last year, I, a sinner, said, they say, that "the eternal thing in the Russian revolution lies in the fact that it marked the beginning of the world

revolution." He then accuses Comrade Lenin of having declared at the PU Congress of the Comintern that the prospects for a world revolution are good and will be even better. But with even greater indignation, Hughes quotes the speech of Comrade Trotsky, who declared that not only in Europe, but in America the world revolution will come in due time" (ibid., p. 16). Three authorities of the world revolution: in the first place - Zinoviev, in the second - Lenin, in the third - Trotsky, although in an incomprehensible way Trotsky is presented qualitatively better than both First, the principle of the monopoly of foreign trade is unshakable (although it was Zinoviev who, even after Lenin's protest, remained in the singular in the Politburo for its abolition.) The last phrase on this subject is characteristic: "Let it (the bourgeoisie) drop its stupid gossip that we have a left, right and center in this question, as, incidentally, in other questions (ibid., p. 17). Zinoviev proposed that the export of grain be increased. We have exported about 20 million so far, the south of Russia alone exported 400 million to year (ibid., p. 21). Zinoviev suggested that, because of trade, one should not forget that the main goal of the "hegemon" - the proletariat - is, ultimately, to organize a world revolution. He said that in 1917 the hegemon was to seize power, in 1918-1919 - to organize the Red Army against the whites, in 1921 - to help the peasantry, in 1923 the hegemon demanded the organization of grain exports, and in 1930 - hegemony, perhaps, will be expressed in the fact that we, Russian communists, will fight side by side with foreign workers on the streets of European capitals" (ibid., p. 24).

Still, the overall economic result two years after the end of the civil war was not comforting: in 1922 agriculture produced three-quarters of the pre-war harvest. Industry - 25% of pre-war production, foreign trade - 14% of the pre-war balance, productivity - 60%, wages - 50% (ibid., p. 25). But the coming years of the NEP will block all pre-war indicators, which will force the same Zinoviev and Trotsky to panic, especially in front of the prosperous, that is, in front of the most diligent peasantry. But then, in the same report, Zinoviev said: "Yes, we must not only 'deviate' in the direction of the peasantry and its economic needs, but we must bow, and if necessary, bow before the economic needs of the peasant" (ibid., p. 37).

On the national question, Zinoviev said something that was in clear contradiction with the decision of the Central Committee and Stalin's directives. He said: "No ma

We must not and will not allow the slightest concessions to the "great-power" point of view and the slightest deviation from Lenin's school on the national question" (ibid., p. 38).

In matters of atheistic propaganda, one must be careful (this was influenced by the sharp reaction of the West to the persecution of religion in the OSSR

From the point of view of the tactical taboos of Bolshevism, Zinoviev made a gross mistake in his theses in the Politburo, in the report at the congress, and in the resolution of the congress itself, adopted on the basis of the reports of Zinoviev and Stalin. Nowhere, not once, including in his report after Zinoviev's report, did Stalin correct Zinoviev, but he took advantage of Zinoviev's mistake literally two months later against Zinoviev. The tactical error was as follows: Zinoviev began to develop and substantiate the thesis that in the USSR

party dictatorship. Zinoviev recalled: "We have comrades who say: "The dictatorship of the party - they do it, but they don't talk about it." Why don't they speak? This bashful attitude is wrong... Why should we not say what is and what cannot be hidden" (ibid., p. 41). Zinoviev proposed to carry out this "dictatorship of the party" at all levels of the party hierarchy and in all spheres of state and economic life. The minutes of the congress, published in 1923, indicate that Zinoviev received "stormy, long-lasting applause" (ibid., p. 47), but it is extremely perplexing how the employees of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism correct the minutes of the congress, although these employees do not even were present at the KhP Congress: the republished minutes of the congress in 1968 say that Zinoviev received only "applause" (Twelfth Congress of the RCP (6). Verbatim report. 1968, p. 53).

Stalin's organizational report favorably differed from Zinoviev's verbose and vague report in that he was the first to set out not only a clear concept of power, but also a well-founded doctrine of the primacy of the party apparatus in a dictatorship system.

The main tasks that Stalin set before the party apparatus even before the congress were 1) to purge the party, as well as the state and trade union apparatus, of inner-party oppositionists; 2) to carry out a police-Chekest operation in the state apparatus in order to seize former White Guards, former members and supporters of former anti-communist parties - Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, nationalists,

monarchists, etc.; 3) to put the newly created party apparatus everywhere above the state apparatus - just as the party apparatus of the Central Committee placed itself above the government apparatus in Moscow (against which, as we have seen, Lenin and Trotsky rebelled). But he substantiated a new doctrine - "What to do?", what to do in order to put the party apparatus over both the state and the party itself, for the first time at the KhP Congress. The delegates saw (and sympathized with) how Stalin justified his organizational practice of creating a new "party within a party", of creating a professional party bureaucracy on strictly hierarchical principles with military discipline and military subordination (subsequently, Stalin even used military terminology in this connection: at the March plenum of the Central Committee of 1937, he said that the party workers consist of three corps - the corps of party non-commissioned officers, the corps of party officers and the corps of party generals). Here are the relevant passages from Stalin's report at this KhP congress on the principles of selection and placement of party apparatchiks:

"Hardly any of you will argue that it is enough to give a good political line and the matter is over. No, that's only half the battle. After the correct political line has been given, it is necessary to select workers in such a way that people who are able to carry out directives, who are able to understand directives, who are able to accept these directives as if they were their own, and who know how to put them into practice, stand in posts. Otherwise, politics loses its meaning, turns into a wave of hands. That is why the "Ukrainian Distribution Agency," that is, that organ of the Central Committee, which is called upon to take into account our main workers both at the bottom and at the top and distributes them, acquires tremendous importance. Hitherto, things have been conducted in such a way that the work of the administrative distribution center has been limited to accounting for and distributing comrades among ukoms, provincial committees, and regional committees. Now the administrative distribution center cannot be closed within the framework of ukoms, provincial committees, regional committees ...

... The leading role of the party should be expressed not only in issuing directives, but also in putting people in well-known posts

able to understand our directives and able to carry them out honestly. It is necessary to study every worker by bones ... It is necessary to cover all branches of management without exception "(Twelfth Congress of the RCP (b.). Verbatim report, 1923, pp. 56-57).

We have already quoted Lenin's words from What Is To Be Done? (1902): "give us an organization of revolutionaries and we will turn Russia over." And Lenin dey

turned it over, transforming democratic Russia into Soviet Russia. The same idea underlay Stalin's new doctrine on the ways and methods of transforming Soviet Russia into Stalinist Russia - "give me an organization of party apparatchiks and I will turn Soviet Russia over" - such was the plan of this doctrine of Stalin's power. But the very word "party apparatchik" was and remains banned. Stalin spoke only of "party workers" or "activists" of the party. Even during Stalin's lifetime, the Pravda newspaper formulated the Stalinist doctrine of power as follows: "Comrade Stalin points out that an asset, if used skillfully, can constitute the greatest force capable of miracles" (Pravda, 25. 7. 1952).

Stalin himself explained the basis of his new doctrine, the establishment of his one-man dictatorship. "The Central Committee was guided in this," he said, "by Lenin's brilliant idea that the main thing in organizational work is the selection of people and verification of execution" (Stalin, Questions of Leninism, p. 479). In less than a year after his appointment as General Secretary of the Central Committee, Stalin managed not only to recreate the party apparatus, but also to place a whole army of party apparatchiks over the state apparatus.

How the purge took place, for example, in the state apparatus, Stalin reported to the KhPI congress as follows:

"We have such an institution called the Industrial Bureau in the southeast. This apparatus consisted of about 2,000 people. This apparatus was called upon to direct the industry of the southeast ... comrade. Voroshilov told me in desperation that it was not easy to manage this apparatus ... There were good people: Voroshilov, Eismont and Mikoyan, who really got down to business "(Twelfth Congress ... 1923, p. 55).

"Good people" left after the check of these two thousand employees only 170 people "socially close" and "devotees", and all the rest were cleared out. The new recruitment was carried out in accordance with the requirements that Stalin announced at the KhP Congress. So it was everywhere.

True, at the same congress, according to the report of the same Stalin, critical voices were heard against the usurpation by the apparatus of the Central Committee of the "sovereignty" of the national republics, calling for purges from above. The Georgian disciples of Lenin especially protested against the dictatorship of the party apparatchiks, arguing that Stalin's cruel and indiscriminate methods of reprisal not only against non-party, but also dissident communists contradicted

the teachings of Lenin.

Stalin also substantiated the program for transforming the Soviets from organs of state power into auxiliary organs of the party apparatus. The usurpation of the power of the Soviets in favor of the party apparatus took place imperceptibly and outwardly in a completely legal form. The so-called "compromises" were created in the Soviets at all levels (village, district, city, region, region,

center), which were directly subordinate to the party organs at each level. Such communist factions, both at the congresses of Soviets and in the executive bodies elected by them - in the executive committees, preliminarily discussed and decided all questions without exception that were to be considered by the Soviet bodies with the participation of non-party people. In this way, the decisions adopted by the "Comfraction" and approved by the corresponding party committee were submitted for formal approval by the Soviet organs. Today such an order in the USSR is taken for granted, but at a time when the Soviets came to power under the slogan of Lenin himself "All power to the Soviets!"), was considered downright blasphemy by the party apparatchiks (now the "compromise factions" have been renamed into "party groups"). For the first time, Stalin took advantage of Lenin's idea of increasing the composition of the Central Committee at the KhP Congress to strengthen his position in the Central Committee, and he used it so skillfully that at the same time he dealt a hidden, but most severe blow to his allies. It happened like this. Making the organizational report of the Central Committee, as if incidentally, Stalin declared that a whole "core of 10-15 people" had formed in the Central Committee, or, as he also put it, something like a caste of "priests in leadership." These "priests" have monopolized power in their hands, but they, says Stalin, have "every chance of becoming ossified and breaking away from the masses." To prevent this from happening, there is only one means - to increase the number of members of the Central Committee at the expense of "capable and independent" local communist functionaries. Not a single word that this is Lenin's will, but on the other hand a clear indication that in the Central Committee, when discussing this issue, they could not come to a positive decision, moreover, some members of the Central Committee are not only against the expansion of the Central Committee, they are even for its reduction (as suggested Trotsky), but he, Stalin, thinks that the Central Committee should be expanded at the expense of "independents"! Stalin's unfortunate allies from the Politburo silently swallowed Stalin's bitter pill, pretending that everything that Stalin

he speaks of "priests", he does not refer to them, but to one "priest", and this "priest" is Trotsky!

This passage of Stalin's speech is a masterpiece of tactical art of evasive attack on rivals and a high class of disguised falsification of the dying Lenin's political "testament". Stalin said: "There is one question about the expansion of the Central Committee itself, a question that was discussed several times within the Central Committee, and which at one time caused serious debate. There are some members of the Central Committee who think that the number of members of the Central Committee should not be expanded, but even reduced. I do not state their motives: let the comrades express themselves. I will briefly outline the motives for expanding the Central Committee. The present state of affairs in the central apparatus of our Party is as follows: we have 27 members of the Central Committee, and within the Central Committee there is a core of 10-15 people who have become so skilled in directing the political and economic work of our bodies that they risk turning into a kind of priests for leadership. This may be good, but it also has a very dangerous side: these comrades, having gained great experience in leadership, may become infected with conceit, withdraw into themselves and tear themselves away from work among the masses. If some members of the Central Committee, or, say, the core of 15 people, have become so experienced and sharpened up that in working out instructions in nine cases out of ten they will not make a mistake, then this is very good. But if they do not have around them a new generation of future leaders who are closely connected with the work in the field, then these highly qualified people have every chance of becoming ossified and detached from the masses. Secondly, that core within the Central Committee, which has grown greatly in leadership, is becoming old, it needs a change (note that the oldest of this "core" - Stalin and Trotsky were only 43 years old. - A. A.). Do you know the state of health

Vladimir Ilyich. You know that the other members of the main core of the Central Committee have also worn out enough. But there is no new shift yet - that's the trouble. It is very difficult to create party leaders, it takes years... It is much easier to conquer this or that country with the help of Comrade's cavalry. Budyonny than to forge 2-3 leaders from the bottom, who in the future could become the real leaders of the country. And it's time to think about forging a new shift. For this there is one means - to draw new, fresh workers into the work of the Central Committee and in the course of work to raise them to the top, to raise the most capable and independent, who have their heads on their shoulders" (ibid., pp. 60-61).

It was a hymn directly addressed to the "hierarchy of party secretaries" rushing into the "Areopagus" of the party, as Stalin called the Central Committee.

Chairman of the Central Auditing Commission Nogin, who at the previous congress so sharply criticized the apparatus of the Central Committee, now under Stalin found it almost ideal. He reported to the congress the conclusions of the Commission that the secretariat of the Central Committee was now working better, "which led to a more correct division of labor, established greater communication between departments and subdivisions, and also strengthened and developed the connection of the apparatus with the localities, allowing it to quickly and more fully take into account the broad the experience of party organizations and respond more correctly to the demands put forward by life" (ibid., p. 74). This already shows what a self-sufficient force the Party apparatus has begun to transform into.

The debate over the reports of Zinoviev and Stalin was interesting because of how the delegates reacted to the content of their reports and how they assessed their places in the pyramid of power. VI. Kosior called Stalin's report "detailed" compared to Zinoviev's report, but he accused both of them of creating an atmosphere of intolerance of any criticism within the party. Kosior said that the resolution of the 10th Congress "on the unity of the party" was adopted in the conditions of Kronstadt and the crisis in the party, but now there is neither one nor the other, "and this resolution has become the system of administration of our party... Zinoviev himself testifies that in parties of all kinds of groupings are dying out - why do we need this exceptional law now? And at the same time, comrades, this is an exceptional law (Laughter, noise). The exceptional law has been elevated to the system of the party's administration. Tov. Zinoviev speaks of collective opinion in the Party. But how is a collective opinion possible (with such a law)?.. Every collective opinion of 3-6 members of the party is elevated to a faction and is subject to this very law... Real unity and protection of the party from personal friction and influences, about which Comrade Lenin writes in our first article, perhaps when we change the system and method of selecting the leading bodies of our Party" (ibid., p. 95).

Larin criticized only Zinoviev, who justifies the wrong policy by referring to the wisdom of the party. In this regard, he recalled his article "History of the RCP" in Pravda: "I wrote: the RCP is never wrong, the RCP is always right, the RCP has the maximum talent, intelligence and character. In the interval between congresses, the Central Committee possesses these qualities, and in the intervals between meetings of the plenum and the Central Committee, they

belong to the Politburo.

If Zinoviev did not find any shortcomings in the policy of the Central Committee, "then he does so because of a lack of medical education - it is better to keep silent about the "bad disease" instead of treating it" (ibid., pp. 103-104).

The old Bolshevik worker Lutovinov said that "Comrade Zinoviev's report made me very despondent. Frankly speaking, I personally did not expect much that was new from Comrade Zinoviev's report, but still sparks of hope glimmered that Comrade Zinoviev would come closer to resolving internal Party questions that were of deep concern to all of us... Zinoviev says that there are no groupings, but there are driven underground ... The Central Committee, like an ostrich, hides its head in the sand ... If anonymous theses appear, it is only because in our party there is no opportunity to express your views in a normal way ... If you try to criticize a non-political line but the purely practical implementation of this line, then you will immediately be enrolled in the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, in anyone. We heard this from the report of Comrade Zinoviev, I wrote down the following phrase from him: "Under the present conditions, any criticism, even from the left, will inevitably have to turn into Menshevik" ... Only the Politburo is an infallible pope ... Do not dare to object, no one has the right to make any criticism. This position is not only un-Marxist, but also extremely harmful in practice" (ibid., pp. 105-106).

These speakers were objected by the delegate Belenky, who said briefly: "The Central Committee of this composition pursued a line that is a continuation of our entire policy, starting from 1903." (ibid., p. 108).

A severe blow to the prestige of Zinoviev, as a contender for Lenin's successor, was the speech of Lenin's old comrade-in-arms, multiple People's Commissar for Economic Affairs, railway engineer L. Krasin. Krasin said that Zinoviev was known in the party as one of the best agitators and polemicists, but "these features of his had a somewhat unfavorable effect on his political report." The internal regime of the party is such that even people's commissars cannot come to the podium at the congress and frankly express their opinion. Zinoviev thinks that "everything should be left as it was," but it is impossible to leave it as it was, "because it is impossible that the most important element of this old one - Lenin - has gone out of work for a rather considerable period ... When I am told that some kind of no three or five will replace the so-called.

Lenin, and that we are all leaving the old way, I say: no, the old will not be until such time as Lenin again takes the helm of the state ship into his own hands ... I, remaining within the limits of parliamentary expressions, cannot indicate the charge Menshevism, abandoned crumples. Zinoviev, otherwise than by panic demagoguery. The general assessment of Zinoviev's report, according to Krasin, can be expressed in the words: "it is impossible not to admit that both will not be entirely good, but at the same time it must be admitted that much is going well" (ibid., p. 114 -115).

Krasin also criticized the foreign policy part of the report for the lack of a statement of the main tasks of Soviet foreign policy in the new conditions. Krasin's speech was marked by applause.

Osinsky began his speech by pointing out that Zinoviev and Kamenev counted him among the revisionists of Leninism. If I do not have enough time to answer this accusation, he said, then "I agree to remain in the eyes of just Comrade T. Zinoviev and Kamenev and a Smenovekhite, and a liberal, and a revisionist, and even a man who killed his own aunt (Laughter)" (ibid., p. 119).

From Osinsky's further speech, it became clear that the "troika" suspected him of wanting to turn off the entire "troika" from the Politburo. Such a proposal was put forward in the anonymous platform of the old Bolsheviks,

who previously belonged to the "detists", like Osinsky and Saprnov, and to the group of the "Workers' Opposition" (the group "Working Truth"). In relation to Kamenev and Stalin, Osinsky dissociated himself, but in relation to Zinoviev he found such a demand just. Osinsky said: Zinoviev, who is strenuously trying to tie an anonymous platform to me, just as mischievous boys tie a tin can to a cat's tail - Comrade Zinoviev is trying to tie me to the stupid proposal to remove Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin from the Central Committee. Osinsky said that Kamenev and Stalin were needed in the Central Committee, but about Zinoviev he thinks that Stalin's characterization of "priests" and Party generals who have broken away from the Party refers exactly to Zinoviev, "we have a number of proofs of this" (ibid., p. 122).

Osinsky ended by stating that he was "extremely pleased with Comrade Stalin's report", he was waiting for the "real implementation" of Stalin's plan to recruit people "with independent heads from the places" to the Central Committee, but "unfortunately, the real implementation has always differed from words, and, maybe be, will be different and

now" (ibid., p. 122).

Karl Radek objected to Kosior not very convincingly, and perhaps even insincerely. He rejected the accusation that the Politburo carried out group politics. If workers are transferred or removed, this does not mean that a group goal is being pursued. Radek gave the following argument: "After all, it is enough to name: in the history of the party, how many times Stalin was dissatisfied with a decision against him, or Trotsky, or Ordzhonikidze, but no one came up with the idea that the Central Committee acted here on the basis of group interests" (ibid., p. 123). Radek also tried to deflect criticism of Lutovinov on the grounds that the authors of the anonymous platform did not have the courage to come out openly; if they did come out openly, then their "platform could be published, although it is largely anti-Party." Lutovinov does not demand freedom of criticism, said Radek, but "reimbursement of travel expenses for critics." Radek, like Zinoviev, criticized the following thesis of Krasin's article on the eve of the congress: "A strictly adhered political line and state power must not interfere with the restoration of production ... It is necessary that in the state and leading party apparatus, production workers and business executives - of course, party ones - at least the same share of influence would be given to newspapermen, writers and pure politicians" (ibid., p. 113). By "newspapermen" and "writers" Krasin had in mind, first of all, Zinoviev, Kamenev, the same Radek, and then Bukharin and Trotsky, but the indignant Zinoviev answered Krasin in his report: "After all, Lloyd George is not an agronomist either. Poincaré is also not an engineer of means of communication, so, really, it is not a sin for the working class to also have its own political leaders" (ibid., p. 43). Radek added to Zinoviev's argument that Zinoviev himself, like Kamenev, are no less business executives than Krasin, since they are at the head of the Soviets of Petrograd and Moscow (ibid., p. 124.). Radek asserted that "there was not a single comrade in the Central Committee who - as far as the political line is concerned - did not fully agree with Comrade Zinoviev" (ibid., p. 126).

Preobrazhensky recognized the foreign policy part of Zinoviev's report as satisfactory, but considered his analysis of economic policy and economic tasks unsatisfactory, although he defended him as a politician against the business executive Krasin. About Stalin's report: "Comrade Stalin's report was extremely informative - I would say that it was very

smart report", but he criticized the practice of the Central Committee "to recommend the secretaries of the provincial party committees". If the practice of "recommendations" (that is, actual appointments from above) of secretaries becomes a system, then such secretaries, not meeting with the support of local organizations, create their own "state within a state" (ibid., p. 133).

Sorin reproached the Central Committee for accepting about 30,000 people from other parties (Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries) into the party, while there were only about 10,000 old Bolsheviks themselves in the party. Sorin also disagreed with Kosior that "we need to create a 'barrier' in this Central Committee, which should serve as a counterbalance to the main group that is working in our Central Committee"; The "barrier" proposed by Kosior, Sorin said, is "nothing but a stake that you want to drive into the Central Committee" (on the eve of the congress, Trotsky proposed creating such a "barrier" in the form of a "Soviet" of the party over the Central Committee, which was rejected by the Central Committee, as contrary to the principle of monocentrism). Although Kosior, Sorin said, does not agree with the demand of the anonymous group to exclude from the Central Committee "a group of three" (Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin), he nevertheless agrees to exclude one of them (Zinoviev).

While agreeing with Stalin that the Central Committee should be expanded with "independent" people from the localities, Sorin pointed out that they should still "depend" on the "circle of people" who were at the head of the Central Committee. His only objection to Stalin is that the Central Committee is not a management school, but a "leading and managing body", it is only "in tenth place" as a school (ibid., p. 136).

The Troika, sensing that even the most zealous defenders of its line at the congress could not weaken the impression of the speeches of Kosior, Lutovinov, Krasin, Larin, Osinsky, released Kamenev to the podium. Kamenev justified the hopes placed on him only partially. First of all, he admitted that "we know that we have been accused of the fact that, for the sake of all sorts of goals," it was said in an anonymous platform and in by no means anonymous speeches, "that the policy of the Party is directed by us not in the name of certain ideas, but by these or those group combinations..." (ibid., p. 139). Kamenev tried to refute this accusation, but he did not succeed. He proved the correctness of the policy of the "troika" (Politburo) with the help of one argument: "in this Politburo the political mandate of the working class is concentrated at the moment, while you (the critics of the PC. - A. A.) have a mandate from statistics" (ibid., p. 141). Kamenev quotes: "T.

Osinsky says: The Politburo is afraid to put responsible people in the Council of People's Commissars so that they don't eat up the Politburo,' but, says Kamenev, the same is said in the anonymous platform. Kamenev concludes, as a "Marxist", addressing his critics: "The class element alien to us makes you its instrument!" Kamenev said that "we use Osinsky and Krasin to judge the moods that exist outside this hall. If we delve into this matter not from the point of view of what Zinoviev and I want or don't want someone not to eat us, but from the point of view of ideological principles, "then, according to Kamenev, Krasin, Osinsky and other critics are simply deviationists, which are influenced by "moods outside this hall", that is, "petty-bourgeois elements". In regard to Krasin's remark that "People's Commissars are afraid to speak here," that he speaks on behalf of those "People's Commissars who speak down the corridors," Kamenev said: Krasin delivered "a bold, brilliant speech, which is the political manifesto of those comrades who in all our only NEP was understood and accepted in politics" (ibid., pp. 142-143). The critics want, Kamenev said, that "the state apparatus should govern," and the party should be engaged in agitation and propaganda of communist consciousness. "No, comrades, we are standing here and we will not go anywhere from here," added Kamenev.

Kamenev read out one paragraph from that anonymous platform about which Zinoviev spoke so much. Kamenev: "This platform says: 'We call on all honest proletarian elements grouping around democratic centralism, Rabochaya Pravda and adjoining the workers' opposition, both those who are in the party and those who are outside its ranks, to unite on the basis of the manifesto of the 'working group of the RCP After quoting this passage, Kamenev asks with feigned indignation: 'Why don't the honest worker elements who are grouping around the Central Committee really call?' Turning to the former 'Decists' Osinsky and Saprionov, Kamenev said: 'You took a political step that gave our class enemies the right to enroll you in your church, in your parish' (ibid., p. 145). set in motion by Stalin against Kamenev and Zinoviev, they will be deeply indignant at the 'manipulation of facts.'"

The Georgian question occupied a prominent place not only in the debate on the national question, but also in the debate on the reports of the Central Committee. Mdivani was the first to speak, whom Stalin recalled from Georgia through the Orgburo, declaring the leader of the Georgian chauvinists, and Lenin was going to rehabilitate him on that

the same congress. The history of the question and the documents on this score were known to the congress delegates. The speeches of the Georgian "deviators" met with all the greater interest. However, the "deviators" showed more tact and restraint than those who accused them. Mdivani began by saying that big people were talking about big issues, and it befits him, a provincial, to talk about what happened "on a very small piece of Soviet land called Georgia." He said that both the Central Committee in Moscow and its organ in the Transcaucasus, the Transcaucasian Committee, showed constant fluctuations in the national question: either they proposed the economic unification of the Transcaucasus, then they proposed a federation, then they rejected the federation, and they proposed "autonomization", the same leapfrog took place and in relation to the continuous recalls, withdrawals, transfers of workers. Mdivani said: "As an old Party member, I admit, I find all this necessary and even welcome such a transfer, if necessary. But we must remember, comrades from the Orgburo, from the Politburo, from the Central Committee, I spoke about this already in the Politburo, it is one thing when you transfer a comrade from the Tambov province to the Oryol province, and another when you transfer from Georgia to Moscow ... If this it is necessary, we Communists cannot protest against this... Personally, we are extremely pleased here in Moscow... But the attitude towards these transfers of non-party masses, for which Comrade Stalin is so diligently engaged in the search for drive belts, is another matter. Such transfers are always considered as a punishment on the part of the Russian part, (against) a given nationality (Voice from the place: "Not true!"). "Untruth" can be said by the one who does this untruth there" (ibid., pp. 150-151). Mdivani probably did not speak even for five minutes (according to the transcript, he spoke only 11/2 pages), while according to the regulations he is entitled to 15 minutes, as the chairman (Rudzutak) stopped him: "Your term has expired." Mdivani: "Give me three more minutes." From the hall of voices: "Please."

Mdivani said that even according to the conclusion of the commission of Kamenev and Kuibyshev, the accusations against the "deviators" were not confirmed, their policy on the national question turned out to be correct. Mdivani: "And now we are at such a stage that there, in the Central Committee, this policy is recognized, and is now recognized in the theses of Comrade Stalin, since I can generally understand Comrade Stalin ... (but) now such a situation has been created, when the policy is one, but the faces are different. Well, Comrade Stalin, I ask you a question: politics is for individuals, or individuals

fit into politics? (Stalin agreed to approve the policy of the "deviators", but did not agree to return them from Moscow to Georgia. - A.A ..). Mdivani ended with the question: "...Where is your national policy?... To talk about any deviations... these are jokes and jokes... There were disagreements on the national question, and these disagreements have now been resolved in favor of our group. Their policy should be carried out there, and people remain here. So what, Comrade Stalin, is politics for individuals or individuals for politics? (ibid., p. 152).

A supporter of Stalin, Orakhelashvili, who spoke after Mdivani, disputed that the Dzerzhinsky or Kamenev commissions found the right policy on the national question of the Mdivani group in anything. He said that "in the face of Comrade Mdivani, a type of Georgian deviationist appeared before the congress" (ibid., p. 152). Mdivani's supporter, the former chairman of the government of Georgia F. Makharadze, pointing out that Orakhelashvili still continues to talk about "deviators", remarked: "After those facts that are well known, Comrade Orakhelashvili (the speaker refers to Lenin's secret article on the national question. - A. A.), this word should be withdrawn from use ... This term (deviation) should, perhaps, be attributed to those comrades who really deviated from our national program, from Comrade Lenin's teaching on this issue" (ibid., p. 155).

Makharadze told how Ordzhonikidze single-handedly directed not only the Transcaucasian Regional Committee, but also directly supervised local organizations, bypassing the Central Committees of the Transcaucasian republics. Ordzhonikidze gave a very sharp answer to the "deviators", who, in fact, condemned not so much the policy of the "deviators" as the cautious national policy that Lenin demanded to be pursued in Georgia. According to Ordzhonikidze, it appeared that the nationalists-Mensheviks and princes were ruling Georgia with the hands of the "deviators". Even after Lenin's secret letter on the national question, with which all the delegates were already acquainted, Ordzhonikidze did not deviate a single step from his, in Lenin's words, "policy of the great-power juggernaut." Such a bold and unconditional opposition to Lenin Ordzhonikidze could afford, provided the absolute support of the "troika".

Ordzhonikidze's speech was recorded on five pages without being interrupted by the chairman, as was the case with Mdivani. Even after extending the time limit, Mdivani's speech is only 2 1/2 pages, Makharadze's speech is 3

pages. Another detail showing how patient Stalin went in his petty vindictiveness: Mdivani and Makharadze were members of the Bolshevik Party continuously from the day of its creation - from 1903. This is how it was written in all reference books before this congress. But in the list of delegates to the twelfth congress, where the dates of joining the party are given, Mdivani has a dash instead of the date, as if he did not join the party at all, and Makharadze says: "there are different dates in three questionnaires. Requested by the Central Committee of Georgia" (ibid., pp. 693, 701).

In the final speech, Stalin answered only four opponents - Lutovinov, Osinsky, Mdivani and Makharadze. About Lutovinov: "He is not satisfied with the regime of our party: there is no freedom of speech in our party, there is no legality, there is no democracy ... He wants all the most important issues to be discussed in all cells from top to bottom ... so that the whole party takes part in the discussion question" (ibid., p. 181).

Stalin rejected this demand, declaring that "with this order, the party has turned into a debating club for us who are always talking and deciding nothing ... We are surrounded by enemies ... To discuss the issue in 20,000 cells means to take the issue out into the street. It should be remembered that in conditions when we are surrounded by enemies, a sudden blow from our side, an unexpected maneuver, speed decide everything ... Comrade Lutovinov's democracy is a utopia" (ibid., p. 182).

About Osinsky: "He clung to my phrase that by expanding the Central Committee, we must introduce independent people into its composition. Tov. Osinsky believes that at this point I arranged a certain link with Osinsky, with democratic centralism ... We need independent people, free from personal influences, from the skills and traditions of the struggle within the Central Committee ... He praised Comrade Stalin, praised Comrade Kamenev and kicked Comrade Zinoviev, deciding that for the time being it would be enough to remove one, and then the turn of the others would come. He took a course towards the disintegration of the core that had been created inside the Central Committee ("troika") in order to gradually disintegrate everything ... If Comrade Osinsky seriously thinks of pursuing such a goal, then I must warn him that he will come across a solid wall about which he will break his head. Let Comrade Osinsky take pity on himself" (ibid., p. 183).

About Mdivani: Mdivani is fighting against the Central Committee, "this was established both by the commission of comrade Dzerzhinsky and the commission of comrade Kamenev - Kuibyshev ... comrade Mdivani portrays the matter in such a way that, despite his recall, he nevertheless

won. I don't know what to call defeat then. However, it is known that Don Quixote of blessed memory also considered himself a winner when he was smashed by windmills. I think that some comrades... in Georgia, there, on the top floor, apparently, not everything is in order" (ibid., pp. 185-186). When Stalin, before the congress, so emphatically disputed the correctness of Mdivani and defended the conclusions of the Dzerzhinsky commission, he thereby disputed and rejected both the arguments and the conclusions in favor of Mdivani, which were contained in Lenin's article and which were already known to the congress. But even when Stalin spoke out against Lenin's guidelines, he did so by appealing to Lenin as his teacher. So here. Going straight from Mdivani to Lenin, Stalin finished: "I regret that Comrade Lenin is not here. If he were here, he could say: "For 25 years I nurtured the party and nurtured it, great and strong" (Prolonged applause)" (ibid., pp. 187-188).

Verbose, as always, Zinoviev replied to every opponent, including those to whom Stalin had already replied. In these answers, Zinoviev resorted, like Stalin (probably, such was the agreement in the Central Committee), to the method of denying existing facts, known actions, or deliberately keeping silent about Lenin's position on the issues under discussion. Here is a typical example - responding to critics about the vacillations in the PC on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade, Zinoviev said: "There was not the slightest dispute in the Central Committee about the inviolability of the monopoly of foreign trade" (ibid., p. 188). We know from the previous presentation that the Central Committee, at the suggestion of the Troika, carried out a decision to revise the monopoly and only after the categorical intervention of Lenin, together with Trotsky, canceled it. One of the critics, Krasin, was blamed by Zinoviev: "He criticized Lenin's policy, but pretended to criticize the policy of his students, although Krasin could not criticize Lenin's policy for the simple reason that for the past six months Lenin had not even the right to know what is done in PC. To another critic - Larin - who cited the facts of the forced cancellation of the Central Committee not only of the decision on the monopoly of foreign trade, but also on the concession, Zinoviev answered as follows: "i.e. Larin spoke as if he not only sat in the Politburo, but there

was born, he spends the day and night there" (ibid., p. 196).

The argument against the third critic - against Kosior - was this: "i.e. Kosior made exactly the same speech last year after a report, not by a random speaker like me, but after a report by Vladimir Ilyich...

apparently, this is his profession" or: "i.e. Kosior obviously did not speak on his own and accused us of not giving the opportunity to work to comrades who belonged to a different group than we did. If this accusation were true, then we should have been kicked in the neck" (ibid., p. 199).

To the fourth critic, Osinsky, who complained that there was no freedom of criticism in the party because of the "exclusive law" of the Tenth Congress, Zinoviev replied: "In our party (ask any member of the Comintern), there is enough freedom in our party ... We don't have an exceptional law, and for this reason it cannot be canceled in any way" (ibid., p. 200). Or T. Osinsky said that what is allowed for Lenin is not allowed for anyone else. Needless to say. Osinsky said: when Lenin flogs, then this is still all right. I fully share his tastes: cut yourself, cut yourself off at the master ... According to Osinsky ... "they say they don't want to let go of power" ... comrade Osinsky, stop it! .. We have power, if it comes to that, everyone has more than enough, and no one feels longing for power" (ibid., p. 202). At this point, one involuntarily recalls the words of Zinoviev (put into his mouth by Stalin) at his trial in August 1936. When asked by the prosecutor why you and Kamenev became saboteurs, spies, murderers, Zinoviev replied: "We craved power!" Zinoviev, in essence, accused Osinsky, Saponov and other former leaders of democratic centralism, among whom was such a now loyal subject as Bubnov, that they bear political responsibility for the mentioned anonymous platform, which required the rallying of all communists around the "working group of the RCP" and removal from the Central Committee of the Troika. Zinoviev's proofs were very simple: "I instructed a comrade to take the platform of democratic centralism and take an anonymous platform and write out in one column what is said in the first platform, and on the right side what is said in the second ... and it turned out to be a coincidence of 99%" (ibid., p. 203).

The categorical statement of the "detists" that they still had nothing to do with the anonymous program did not impress Zinoviev and the Central Committee.

The fifth critic of the policy of the Central Committee - Lutovinov - Zinoviev first quoted literally: "If this continues, there will inevitably be groupings," he said. "This is a threat in the mouth of a loner ... And we say that it will continue in this way" (ibid.,

p. 200). In a year, the leader of the Comintern will remember what a prophet this "loner" turned out to be, a simple miner from the Donbass.

Unlike the miner, Zinoviev himself turned out to be a bad prophet when, finishing his closing remarks, he said that in the absence of Lenin, the party would be led by the collective, because "we have no other leader of genius in reserve" (ibid., p. 205). Exactly five years later, the same Zinoviev, returning to the party after the first exclusion, will say: there is another brilliant leader - this is "Stalin - Lenin today." What Zinoviev accused the critics of the "troika" policy of - it is not good to play hide and seek when Lenin is not here - was entirely related to him. Both speakers of the Central Committee -

Zinoviev bluntly, and Stalin more diplomatically, denied the deep differences between the "troika" (the Politburo) and Lenin on a number of critical issues. Both speakers inspired the delegates that everything they said about the past and future policy of the Central Committee was entirely based on Lenin's written or oral instructions. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that the congress "unanimously" approved the policy of the Central Committee.

Shkiryatov's report of the Central Control Commission aroused in some respects greater interest because just Lenin's last articles on the reorganization and revision of the role of the Central Control Commission in relation to the Central Committee were published in the newspaper Pravda, 25.01.1923 and 4. Sh. 1923.). Lenin clearly wanted to increase the independence and control functions of the Central Control Commission in relation to the Central Committee, for which he proposed the obligatory participation of a delegation of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission at every meeting of the Politburo. The Central Control Commission, elected along with the Central Committee directly by the party congress, according to Lenin, should not only be the court of honor of the party, but also the scourge of the party apparatus and state bureaucracy, jointly and unite with the RKI (Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate of the USSR), "regardless of persons", the general secretary and other members of the Central Committee," as Lenin wrote in an article whose subtitle reads "Proposal of the KP to the Party Congress" (Pravda, 1/23/1923). Therefore, Lenin proposed expanding its composition and electing old party leaders independent of the Central Committee with long party experience; in order to maintain this independence, a member of the Central Control Commission could not be a member of the PC at the same time. Shkiryatov did not say anything about all this, even more - in the report of Shkiryatov (who remained his most faithful assistant in the purges throughout the entire period of Stalin's rule) there was not a single reference to the title of Lenin's article (Twelfth Congress ..., pp. 217-227). This is understandable. The central point of Shkiryatov's report on the work of the Central Control Commission was that

The Central Control Commission "the resolution of all more or less important questions was agreed upon with the Central Committee" and that the organs of the Central Control Commission should be regarded as organs "working jointly with the Central Committee" and, of course, with the GPU (ibid., pp. 221, 224). In Trotsky's book "Stalin" there is a note indicating that Stalin was the unofficial chairman of the Central Control Commission. There is indirect confirmation of this in Shkiryatov's report where it is said that the Central Committee and Stalin wrote and spoke about things that clearly fell within the exclusive competence of the Central Control Commission (ibid., p. 223). The presidium of the congress, not wanting to dwell too much on the tasks of the Central Control Commission (contrary to Lenin's articles), made a proposal that no debate should be opened on the report of the Central Control Commission; Delegate Myshkin, referring specifically to Lenin's articles and proposals on the Central Control Commission, objected to the presidium and insisted on opening the debate. A minority voted for Myshkin. Thus, under the leadership of the Troika, the congress did not even discuss these articles of Lenin published on the eve of the congress.

Bukharin's report on the work of the Comintern is interesting only in relation to two problems that he raised back then (1923), when they seemed either transient or completely irrelevant: the problem of the threat of fascism and the forthcoming awakening of the colonial world. About fascism, he said that. "the ubiquitous spread of fascism" is becoming the main trend in the development of Europe and that "the deepest root of fascism lies in the fact that the European bourgeoisie is not able to manage the entire economic life of the country on such principles that correspond to the normal course of capitalist development ... Fascist organizations and the functions of these fascist organizations represent a legalized civil war... Fascist terror has intensified... In Italy the Fascist Party has become the ruling party... In Germany... the most striking organization is the Bavarian organization of "National Socialists" headed by Hitler" (there same, pp. 248-249). With regard to the colonial world, Bukharin anticipated not only the doctrine, but also

terminology of Mao Tse-tung. Bukharin said: "If we consider the state of affairs in their world-historical scale, we can say that large industrial states are cities, and colonies and semi-colonies are villages. And when revolutionary fermentation begins in the "city" and the red rooster begins to be sown in the countryside, it is necessary to create a great united front between the revolutionary proletariat of the world "city" and the peasantry of the world "village". On this path is history

entered irrevocably" (ibid., p. 279). There was no debate on Bukharin's report, and the activity of the RCP delegation in the Comintern was approved.

On the other hand, Stalin's second report, "National Moments in Party and State Construction," again provoked heated debate, and sharp objections from the Georgian "National Socialists."

First of all, Stalin passed over with deathly silence Lenin's article on the national question, in which, as we have already seen, Stalin's policy on the national question in general and on the Georgian question in particular was so sharply and categorically condemned. Stalin declared that there was not only one deviation - towards great-power chauvinism (as indicated by Lenin), but also another - a deviation towards local nationalism. Although the deviation towards great-power chauvinism is more dangerous, both deviations must be fought. Stalin did not name anyone who could be suspected of great-power chauvinism (we saw that Lenin named such: Stalin, Dzerzhinsky and Ordzhonikidze, although they were former "nationalists"), but he did name deviators towards local nationalism in the person of the Mdivani group in Georgia. Stalin saw the manifestation of the Georgian nationalism of this group in the fact that it wanted, firstly, to enter directly into the USSR, bypassing the Transcaucasian federation, and secondly, Georgian deviators oppress the national minorities in Georgia - the Abkhazians, Adzharians and South Ossetians. The first in the debate with the answer to Stalin was the same Mdivani. He began by pointing out that "we have the Ilyich school on the national question, which once and for all resolved the national question ... Many of our comrades did not reject the national program, but pushed it aside ... One of the members of the Central Committee declared that the national question for us it is a matter of tactics... What do we need? We need what Comrade Ilyich always taught us and what he called on us to do in his last letters, known to the congress only through individual delegations ... I declare that the opposition that took place here (in Stalin's report. - A. A.) internationalism, our "nationalism" is fundamentally wrong if we understand internationalism as Comrade Ilyich understands it... The letters of Vladimir Ilyich very firmly and expressively say exactly what we were fighting for.

Ordzhonikidze (from the spot). Geniuses. Mdivani. No, we are not geniuses, we have other people elevated to the rank of geniuses, but we are simple communists who think about the national program. If we have come to the right resolution of the national program, so have our

communist and international heads, not yours. I have to object, which I did not think to do, to the speaker. Tov. the speaker gave a lot of space to Georgia and Georgian chauvinism.

Stalin (from the spot). As a sign of special respect! Mdivani. Thank you, comrade Stalin. But allow me, as a sign of "most special" respect, to remind you of something from our past life" (ibid., pp. 454-455).

Mdivani cited a number of facts showing that the national

minorities of Georgia - Abkhazians and Ossetians - received their autonomies from the hands of the "deviating" Central Committee of Georgia and always approved the policy of this Central Committee, and an incident occurred with the Adjarians, the proclamation of their autonomy was delayed, because Stalin, who arrived in Georgia in 1921, ordered the chairman Georgian government Mdivani to be "cautious" with the Adjarians. Mdivani added: "When this is done on the orders of Comrade Stalin, I must say: I obey, Comrade Stalin! I was instructed to make sure that the Adjarians do not run the show in Batum (the capital of Adjara. - A. A.). This was the beginning of their discontent... We gave the Adjarians autonomy" (ibid., pp. 456-457).

Mdivani also dwelled on the most important accusation of deviationism, the "social-nationalism" of the Central Committee of Georgia, which he headed. Mdivani said: "The most terrible thing is that we are against the Transcaucasian federation... We are not against the Transcaucasian federation, but against the very united Transcaucasian republic that we created... When the Kamenev and Kuibyshev commission arrived, Kuibyshev said: "why this federation in this form, is it not possible to federate on the economic issue and create an economic council?" This was said by the secretary of the Central Committee (Kuibyshev). Another member of the Central Committee, Kamenev, sits right there and does not protest. And so, as a result, they are not deviationists, but we are deviationists and terrible people" (ibid., p. 458).

What was the root of all the disagreements between Stalin and Ordzhonikidze, on the one hand, and the "deviators", on the other? This question was raised by Mdivani himself, to which he gave a rather clear answer: "Comrades, what do we want? (Voice: "Who: "we"?") Who? You ask those who have dubbed us deviationists... Yes, we are an all-Soviet association! Give this Soviet association the most important commissariats that determine our foreign policy, the defense of our republic... Give these individual nationalities other commissariats, where they can show their will, their ability to manage things, their ability to create a new life" (ibid., p. 455, 458).

A supporter and one of Stalin's informants in Georgia, a former "Buddhist", that is, a student of Budu Mdivani, now the people's commissar of Georgia, Sturua said that "if we remain loyal to Marx, the proletariat has no homeland," and as for morality, "let's remember the words of Lenin, who naive comrades, when they asked what "communist morality is?", said: kill, destroy, leave no stone unturned when in favor of the revolution; but in another case, pat on the head, call Alexander the Great, if it is in favor of the revolution. Here's how to get to the point." Sturua said that one illegal meeting of the old Georgian Central Committee, which he attended, opened his eyes. Ordzhonikidze, Stalin and others, they must be sent home ... But how? It turned out that the mice wanted to hang a bell around the cat's neck so that it would ring when she walked, but no one dared to hang it. Same here. They tried and judged and came to the conclusion that ... they would beat us. We found a way out: we will leave the RCP and join the Comintern as the Georgian section... Now I understand: "there was a different intent, the master loved music" (ibid., pp. 462-644).

Makharadze pointed out that in the exact sense of the word in the USSR there is no independence or interdependence of any Soviet republics at all: "after all, we have one party, one central body that determines everything decisively for all republics, and common directives, up to the appointment of responsible leaders in republics - all this comes from one center, so to speak under these conditions of independence, not dependence - this is an eminently incomprehensible position in itself.

(ibid., p. 472). Therefore, we can talk about the correct practical implementation of the national program in the republics. He pointed out to Stalin that the now famous "cordon decree" of Georgia against other Soviet republics was drawn up not by "deviators", but by an "internationalist", a supporter of Stalin and Ordzhonikidze, Gegechkori, Commissar of Internal Affairs, "this project of Gegechkori did not see the light in Georgia and disappeared" (ibid., p. 472). Makharadze said that this draft, which Ordzhonikidze deliberately slipped to the "deviators", was not only published in Pravda, but even in the Congress Bulletin - "I find, comrades, this is unworthy of our Congress." Makharadze also pointed out that the point of view of Stalin in his correspondence with Lenin, so as not to rush with the federation, also

was the point of view of the "deviators" against Ordzhonikidze, who wanted to carry out the federation simply "by military order." Makharadze pointed out, referring to Sturua's speech, that it was not the "deviators" who spoke of Stalin and Ordzhonikidze as "great powers", but another person: "It was Comrade Ilyich. You all know this well. Now I ask you: is what is proclaimed here similar to what Vladimir Ilyich said? (ibid., p. 474).

Member of the Central Committee, Chairman of the Government of Ukraine Rakovsky expressed the general mood of many members of the Central Committee when he said that "for some time we harbored the hope on the eve of the congress that the national question, as Ilyich assumed, would become the center of our congress, and it became the tail of our congress." The party has many times put the national question on the agenda of its congresses, but "the more we put it, the further we move away from the communist understanding and solution of the national question." Rakovsky further pointed out that "Vol. Stalin stopped just on the verge of clarifying the underlying reason for the national question, "and this underlying reason Rakovsky considered the concern of the party-Soviet bureaucracy with the inconvenience of the technique of governing a multinational country, taking into account all sorts of "autonomies" there. Rakovsky: "Our central bodies are beginning to look at governing the entire country from the point of view of their office conveniences ... It is inconvenient to manage twenty republics, but if it were all one, if, by pressing one button, it would be possible to manage the whole country, - that would be convenient. Rakovsky ended with the words: "The county executive committee knows its rights better than the national republics. Union building went the wrong way. As you know, this is not only my opinion, it is the opinion of Vladimir Ilyich" (ibid., pp. 532-534).

The delegate Tsintsadze reminded the congress that the principle of the peoples' right to self-determination, which had won the sympathy of the colonial peoples of the East for the Bolsheviks, was nullified by Stalin in his plan of "autonomization" of the independent Soviet republics. The speaker pointed out that the point is not at all that individual people in the center or in the localities are wrong, "it's not about people, it's about the management system", if this system is not revised, the situation will not change, therefore, Tsintsadze said, "it is necessary drastically change the policy that has been and is being pursued," and on this issue the so-called deviationists "are in absolute solidarity with the school of Comrade Lenin, with

Comrade Lenin" (ibid., pp. 534-537).

The secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, one of Stalin's most trusted and close friends and associates, himself also a Georgian by nationality, Yenukidze (whom Stalin later, of course, also shot) spoke out with a sharp, open criticism of Lenin's secret article on national

question. Although Stalin's editorial hand is clearly visible in Yenukidze's speech, Stalin himself did not dare to defend himself against Lenin as much as his zealous comrade-in-arms did for him. First, Yenukidze, seeing in Rakovsky's speech the formation of something like a "Ukrainian-Georgian front" against Stalin, decided to strike at Rakovsky. He explained Rakovsky's accusations as a misunderstanding as a result of his vehemence. Yenukidze said: "Yesterday, the comrades, seeing the vehemence of the Georgians speaking here, joked that they should be searched before the performance, no matter how a clash occurred, but Comrade Rakovsky eclipsed all the Caucasians put together with his vehemence."

Turning to the analysis of Lenin's national article, Yenukidze dared to make a number of statements that clearly falsified Lenin's article. Here they are:

1) "The question that Lenin puts forward in his letter known to you is of tremendous importance not in relation ... to Georgia or Ukraine, or in relation to those individual facts with which he illustrates his general thought. This question is interesting in relation to our international position" (i.e., according to Yenukidze, Lenin's letter or article is of no importance for internal national policy, but only for external propaganda);

i) "There were many complaints here, and most of all it gave the impression that Ordzhonikidze's policy was a policy of violence, the policy of Derzhimorda ... This word appears in Comrade Lenin's letter ... In fact, Ordzhonikidze pursued the policy of the Central Committee ..."

3) Lenin demanded "to show maximum compliance in the Caucasus... If compliance borders on the fact that we are yielding to all sorts of petty nationalist prejudices, then such compliance must be nipped in the bud... Deviators have succumbed to these prejudices";

4) "Now about Comrade Lenin's letter. Here comrade Mdivani in his speech every second declined the name of comrade Ilyich, and he wanted to create the impression that comrade Lenin wrote this letter on purpose in order to support the comrade deviators and fully justify their policy. (Bukharin: "Of course, with this

purpose.") Not for this purpose, Comrade Bukharin. I will allow myself to say that we also know a little about Comrade Lenin";

5) "Most of Comrade Lenin's letter is devoted to general questions of our national policy, and neither Comrade Stalin nor Comrade Ordzhonikidze, of course, object to these general thoughts. As for the private issues raised in his letter (i.e., issues related to criticism of the actions of Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, Dzerzhinsky. - A. A.), it seems to me that Comrade Lenin became a victim of one-sided incorrect information. .

Mdivani. Why is the letter not published?

Yenukidze. All the delegates read the letter" (ibid., pp. 537-541).

The question of why the Central Committee refuses to publish Lenin's letter was also raised by other delegates. The Presidium of the Congress instructed Zinoviev to answer this. Zinoviev explained that the non-publication of Lenin's article was due to the nature of Lenin's instructions, but he did not explain what these instructions consisted of, he did not explain for the simple reason that they did not exist at all. Here is the corresponding passage from Zinoviev's speech: "T. Yakovlev demanded that Comrade Lenin's letter be published. The Presidium of the Congress unanimously adopted

decision: not to publish this document for the time being, in view of the nature of the instructions that Vladimir Ilyich himself gave," but Zinoviev decided at once to avert all suspicions against Stalin, Ordzhonikidze and Dzerzhinsky. He said, "It's not about personal attacks. The comrades who are directly interested were the first to demand the publication of this letter. How can Zinoviev be believed that the "interested comrades," that is, Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and Dzerzhinsky, demanded the publication of Lenin's letter, politically fatal to them? Besides, Zinoviev contradicts himself. After all, these "comrades" sat on the presidium of the congress, and the presidium "unanimously" decided not to publish Lenin's letter, including the voices of members of the presidium Stalin and Ordzhonikidze (ibid., p. 552).

The representative of Azerbaijan, Akhundov, did not agree with the "deviators" that Lenin, if he were present at the congress, would strike at the policy that is being pursued now. Akhundov said that "it will never happen that Vladimir Ilyich or any individual member of the party, no matter how respected he may be, decides to strike at the whole party." Akhundov warned that "deviators from all countries are uniting" and therefore "there should be no hesitation in the fight against them" (ibid., p. 560).

A number of local delegates also spoke in the spirit of Akhundov - the policy of the Central Committee is correct, it is in the spirit of Lenin. When the members of the Central Committee began to come out in favor of Stalin's policy on the national question, which was criticized in Lenin's letter, it seemed that there was unanimous support for Stalin in the Central Committee. Therefore, Bukharin's speech sounded like complete dissonance. It is unlikely that Lenin would have defended his position better than Bukharin did. Bukharin pointed out to Zinoviev that things in national politics were not as brilliant as Zinoviev portrayed them. If the national question has recently been discussed at three plenums of the Central Committee, then there is something to discuss and something to condemn. Bukharin fully supported Lenin's thesis about "great-power chauvinism" in the policy of the Central Committee. He declared: "Why did Comrade Lenin sound the alarm on the Georgian question with such frenzied energy? And why didn't Comrade Lenin say a word in his letter about the mistakes of the deviators, and, on the contrary, he said all the words, and said four-yard words, against the policy that was waged against the deviators? Why did he do it? Because he did not know that there is a local chauvinism? But because Comrade Lenin is a brilliant strategist. He knows that it is necessary to beat the main enemy. For example, at this congress there is nothing to talk about local chauvinism. This is the second phase of our struggle. If we speak for the sake of "objective justice" about Great Russian chauvinism and at the same time argue that there is still Georgian, Ukrainian, Akhaltsikhe, Gomel-Gomel chauvinism and any kind of chauvinism, by this we will drown the main question. And therefore, it is quite clear that Comrade Lenin, in his letters and in the well-known document referred to here, did not at all stand on the point of view of this remarkable "objective justice", but took someone by the hair and let's pull right and left. And he did it quite correctly, precisely because this is the only way to turn the public opinion of the Party along the road that Comrade Lenin considers correct (Applause). You will notice that Art. Zinoviev happened when he spoke against local chauvinism - a thunder of applause rained down from everywhere. What wonderful solidarity... But when it comes to Russian chauvinism, only the tip sticks out (applause, laughter) and that is the most dangerous thing." Bukharin made an exception for Stalin, but one that probably sounded like an insult in Stalin's ears: , opposes Georgian chauvinism" (ibid., pp. 563-564)

(Who Stalin was by nationality was best expressed by his son, the boy Vasily, when he told his sister Svetlana, according to her, the news: "You know, our father used to be a Georgian").

Radek's speech was structured in such a way as to please Lenin, but not to offend Stalin either. He began with Bukharin: "Here, some comrades said that when Comrade Bukharin sees a dead sparrow, he shouts: 'We will all die in two days' and falls into a panic. I share the opinion about the growing importance of the national question ... And it's better for Mdivani to shout with might and main here than the peasants in Georgia, 'but, to the satisfaction of Stalin and Zinoviev, he added: 'Here comrade Zinoviev said one important thing: not one or two chambers (that is, the chambers of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. - A. A.) are important in themselves, but the party is important ... Despite my agreement in principle with Comrade Bukharin ... I do not agree with the 'carte blanche' that Comrade Bukharin gives Mdivani to the deviators as well" (ibid., pp. 565-567).

In his concluding remarks, Stalin accused Bukharin and Rakovsky of exaggerating the significance of the national question and because of this "they overlooked ... the question of the power of the working class." Bukharin "suggested to delete the paragraph that speaks of the dangers of local chauvinism. Say, there is no need to bother with such a worm as local chauvinism when we have such a 'Goliath' as Great Russian chauvinism. In general, Comrade Bukharin was in a repentant mood. This is understandable: for years he has sinned against nationalities, denying the right to self-determination - it is time, finally, to repent. But repentant, he went to the other extreme. It is curious that Comrade Bukharin calls on the Party to follow his example and also repent, although the whole world knows that the Party has nothing to do with it ... it has nothing to repent of. The point is that Comrade Bukharin did not understand the essence of the national question" (ibid., pp. 596-597).

What did Stalin say on the substance of the accusations that Lenin personally formulated so sharply against him? Only the following: "Here, many referred to the notes and articles of Vladimir Ilyich. I would not like to quote my teacher, Comrade Lenin, since he is not here, and I am afraid that perhaps I will refer to him incorrectly and out of place. Nevertheless, I am compelled to quote one axiomatic passage... Analyzing Marx's letter on the national question, Lenin draws the following conclusion: 'Compared to the labor question, the subordinate importance of the national question is beyond doubt for Marx.' There are only two lines, but they decide everything.

This is what some zealous comrades, who are not wise enough, need to cut on their noses" (ibid., p. 597). In order not to be mistaken in interpretation, Stalin was afraid to quote what the teacher wrote about him and the national question only four months ago, but he was not afraid to quote and interpret what Lenin wrote about Marx and the national question long before the seizure of power.

Some details regarding the coverage of the struggle within the Politburo and the Central Committee, both around the national question and on other issues that were on the agenda of the congress, are given by a new verbatim report of the KhP Congress of 1968. The editors of the publication of the minutes of this congress added to the old minutes those were released from the old protocols in 1923:

1) On the national question: The Presidium of the Congress heard information from the Central Committee about Lenin's letter. The Presidium decided not to publish it, but only to read Lenin's letter and "all the material" (that

there is, the material of the commissions of the Central Committee and Stalin. - A. A.) at the "Senior Convention", "after that, the members of the Presidium announce at the congress delegations ... do not announce at the sections on the national question." Since they began to say in wide circles of the party that the Politburo ("troika") has been hiding Lenin's letter for four months, the Presidium considers it necessary to say that Lenin's "Note" became known to the Central Committee only on the eve of the congress, therefore the Presidium will consider the spread of any rumors about the delay in the announcement of this note by any of the members of the Central Committee by slander" (Twelfth Congress of the RCP (6). Verbatim report, 1968, p. 821).

The new edition of the protocols is accompanied by a letter from all members and candidates of the Politburo, in which Trotsky's position is criticized. With regard to Georgian affairs, we learn at least the ambivalence of Trotsky's behavior. We already know that Lenin asked Trotsky to support before the Central Committee the line of Lenin's article or letter against Stalin, Ordzhonikidze and Dzerzhinsky. Now, from the letter of the members and candidates of the Politburo, we learn that Trotsky, in essence, did not support Lenin, but proposed a resolution for which even Stalin voted. This letter says: "On the question of Georgia, we state that Comrade Trotsky himself formulated the Politburo resolution on Georgia ... despite the fact that most of the undersigned now consider the previous decisions of the Central Committee not in all parts

correct, Comrade Trotsky bears full responsibility for these mistakes" (ibid., p. 819). It is not clear what mistakes are being made, in the light of Stalin's report and the speeches of his supporters at this congress, it can be assumed that they are talking about the fallacy of the compromise decisions of the Central Committee about the "deviators", instead of sharply condemning them, even if it was against the letter Lenin.

2) Concerning Trotsky's theses on industry. Trotsky recounted in his memoirs that the "troika" was looking in every possible way for a reason to emphasize their differences with him. This is confirmed by the now published "Letter of Members and Candidates of the Politburo", which, although it emphasizes that "the Plenum of the Central Committee unanimously voted for taking Comrade Trotsky's well-known theses on questions of industry as a basis" (ibid., p. 816), but after the Plenum On the eve of the opening of the congress, members of the Politburo ("troika") pointed out to Trotsky that he had made a mistake by not indicating in his theses "on the relationship between the proletariat and the peasantry" and "on the relationship between the party and the state apparatus" (ibid., p. 819), that is, he did not indicate the points that concern the political and organizational reports of the Central Committee, and not the report on the narrow, purely economic topic entrusted to Trotsky. The artificiality of this accusation was so obvious that the editors of the old minutes of the congress excluded the "Letter from the members of the Politburo" from the materials, and the new edition cited it as deadly proof of Trotsky's underestimation of the role of the peasantry!

3) Concerning the group organizational policy of the Central Committee.

The following passages from the speeches of Kosior and Stalin have been excluded from the old protocols, and now restored. V. Kosior: "The main issue is that the leading group of the Central Committee in its organizational policy is to a large extent pursuing a group policy" (ibid., p. 102).

Stalin's answer: Kosior said that the Central Committee was engaged in a tendentious selection of workers from top to bottom, and as a result of such a selection a number of comrades from Trotsky to Shlyapnikov found themselves without work (we are talking about

about party work. - A.A ..) ... In September last year, Comrade Lenin submitted a proposal to the Politburo that Trotsky be appointed his deputy, deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. This proposal was voted on. T. Trotsky categorically refused without motives. In January of this year, I repeated Comrade Lenin's proposal ... We once again received

a categorical answer with the motivation that appointing him as a deputy means liquidating him as a Soviet worker" (ibid., pp. 198-199).

But there was one significant difference between Lenin's and Stalin's proposals - Lenin wanted to make Trotsky deputy chairman of the government for political affairs, and Stalin for economic affairs. (VSNKh, Gosplan, etc.). Stalin, undoubtedly, aimed even further - to deprive Trotsky of the direct leadership of the Red Army. Only this could Trotsky have in mind when he said that they wanted to liquidate him as a "Soviet worker." In his answer to Kosior, Stalin went so far as to suspect the member of the Politburo, the supreme chief of the Red Army, of some ulterior motive before the whole congress. Here are the words of Stalin: "Obviously, Comrade Trotsky has some motive, some consideration, some reason that does not allow him to take, besides military, even another, more difficult job. Here, comrades, the Central Committee, of course, has nothing to do with it" (ibid., p. 199). It was probably pointed out to Stalin at the congress that it was inconvenient to suspect a colleague in the Politburo in this way because he did not want to be the deputy chairman of the government, that is, according to Soviet concepts, "a minister without a portfolio." Therefore, probably, this place of Stalin's speech was removed from the old protocols, even from the Works of Stalin himself. Nevertheless, Stalin circulated the above-cited "Letter of members and candidates of the Politburo" among the congress delegates, it ended with the words: "As if in the Politburo we dismiss some kind of biased majority, bound by circles, as a simple perversion of the truth" (ibid., p. 818), but since this letter was not signed by only two members of the Politburo - the sick Lenin and the healthy Trotsky - it is quite clear that it in itself testifies to the formation of an anti-Leninist, anti-Trotskyite majority around the "troika".

4) Concerning the expansion of the Central Committee.

Lenin proposed to spread the composition of the Central Committee in order to prevent a split in the Central Committee between Trotsky and Stalin. Stalin seized on this idea (without referring to Lenin) and proposed to the February plenum of the Central Committee to expand the Central Committee at the expense of "independent people" from the localities (in other words, at the expense of the secretaries of the provincial committees, who depended only on Stalin alone). Trotsky saw that Stalin wanted to expand the Central Committee precisely with his people from the field. Therefore, he and Rykov voted against Stalin's plan. Zinoviev and Kamenev did not understand at all

than the case. When Trotsky put forward a proposal instead of expanding the Central Committee to create a new supreme center - the "Council of the Party", as a directive body, the "troika" saw in this proposal a threat to the monopoly of their power in the Politburo. Trotsky's proposal was rejected, and Stalin's proposal was accepted (ibid., p. 848). The congress ended with the adoption of a resolution in the spirit of the "troika" and the election of new leading bodies in the spirit of Stalin.

The membership was expanded from 27 to 40. 17 candidates were elected to the Central Committee. 50 people were elected members of the Central Control Commission, 10 candidates. 3 members were elected to the Central Audit Commission.

Let us list the composition of the Central Committee.

CPC members:

1. Andreev; 2. Bukharin; 3. Voroshilov; (new, Stalinist), 11. Kirov (new, Stalinist), 12. Short, 13. Komarov (new, Stalinist), 14. Quiring (new, Stalinist), 15. Kamenev, 16. Lenin, 17. Lashevich (new, first a Stalinist, then a Trotskyite), 18. Manuilsky (new, Stalinist), 19. Molotov, 20. Mikoyan (new, Stalinist), 21. Mikhailov (new, Stalinist), 22. Ordzhonikidze, 23. Petrovsky, 24. Pyatakov (new, Trotskyist), 25. Rudzutak, 26. Rykov, 27. Radek, 28. Rakovsky, 29. Stalin, 30. Sulimov (new, Stalinist), 31. Sokolnikov, 32. Smirnov, 33. Tomsy, 34. Trotsky, 35. Uglanov (new, Stalinist), 36. Ukhanov (new, Stalinist), 37. Frunze, 38. Kharitonov (new, Stalinist), 39. Chubar, 40. Tsyurupa (new).

Of these sixteen new members of the Central Committee, only two were closer to Zinoviev and Kamenev, and ten provincial or central workers were direct nominees of Stalin. Central Committee candidates:

1. Badaev, 2. Bubnov, 3. Kaganovich, 4. Kolotilov, 5. Kosior S., 6. Lepse, 7. Lebed, 8. Moskvina, 9. Myasnikov, 10. Morozov, 11. Narimanov, 12. Orakhelashvili, 13. Romyantsev, 14. Ryskulov, 15. Skrypnik, 16. Uryvaev, 17. Miracles.

Of these seventeen candidates, three people stood close to Zinoviev (Badaev, Myasnikov, Moskvina), two were central workers, the remaining twelve were Stalin's nominees from the field.

Kuibyshev and Yaroslavsky were not re-elected to the Central Committee, since Stalin entrusted them with direct leadership of the Central Control Commission. The Central Control Commission was also expanded from 5 people to 50 members and 10 candidates of the Central Control Commission and selected

approximately on the same principles and in the same proportions as the Central Committee of the party. That "immense power" of the general secretary, against which Lenin warned in the "Testament", was now institutionalized. Not only Trotsky, but hardly even his united bloc with Zinoviev and Kamenev could shake it now. However, the patient and prudent Stalin would block with Zinoviev and Kamenev until he had done away with Trotsky politically.

Even this congress, openly prepared by the "troika" in an anti-Trotskyist way, showed Trotsky's still incredible popularity not only in the country, but also in the party. Almost every delegation of workers and other organizations that came to greet the congress ended their speech with the exclamation "Long live our leaders Lenin and Trotsky!", sometimes "Long live our leaders Lenin, Trotsky and Zinoviev!" Stalin. According to the applause of the congress itself, Trotsky is in first place, Zinoviev in second, Stalin in third place. The Party itself does not yet know who its true leader is.

CHAPTER 24

THE DEATH OF LENIN, TROTSKY'S DISAPPEARANCE, AND THE THIRD CONGRESS

In the civil war against the White Bolshevik movement morally

and politically supported certain groups of Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties, for which, by decision of the Central Committee of the party in 1919, they were again admitted to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and local soviets. When the war ended with the complete triumph of Bolshevism, not only in the areas of the White movement, but also in the distant national outskirts, where, after the Bolshevik revolution, independent national states were proclaimed (Caucasus, Turkestan, etc.). Lenin also took up the liquidation of his temporary allies. First, Lenin tries to act according to the principle: "not by washing, then by rolling." So, when at the beginning of March 1920 in the elections to the Moscow Soviet 46 people, led by Yu. Martov and F. Dan, passed on the list of Mensheviks, Lenin wrote to the chairman of the Moscow Soviet L. Kamenev:

"In my opinion, you should "drive" them with practical assignments:

Dan - sanitary facilities,

Martov - control over canteens "(Lenin, PSS, vol. 51, p. 150).

Lenin thinks that high politicians will not like the prosaic work of controlling kitchens and latrines and that they can be "driven" by this. Its goal is clear - to isolate, arrest or deport the leaders of the "loyal" Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, and to include the rank-and-file members of these groups in the Bolshevik Party. He achieved his last goal very soon: in the early 1920s, there were about 30,000 former Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in the RCP (6), while there were only about 10,000 old Bolsheviks themselves. Now it remained to isolate the leaders of these parties. First of all, Lenin took up the Mensheviks of the internationalists of the Martov group.

The relationship between Lenin and Martov was more complex than the relationship between ordinary enemies. They were contradictory and psychologically strange, if not mysterious. Their initial ideological positions (orthodox Marxism, including here at the beginning the concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat") were the same, even their political line was at first the same (together they organized the "Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class" in St. Russian Social Democrats" in 1899 against the "sgero" "economists" E. Kuskova and others, Martov, Lenin and Potresov formed an initiative group for the publication of Iskra, Martov, together with Lenin, was one of its chief editors, together with Lenin and prepared the Second Party Congress through this newspaper).

Only at the Fifth Party Congress did it become clear that Lenin and Martov were not a single force, not even parallel forces, but deeply antagonistic forces. There, from the same ideology, two antipodes were born, who mortally hated each other: Martov's democratic socialism (Menshevism) and Lenin's dictatorial socialism (Bolshevism). But no matter how furiously the adherents of the new "churches" in Russian Marxism fought among themselves, their leaders in a strange way observed the rules of a decent game and the immunity of personal integrity. And after the split, Lenin and Martov participate together at party congresses at which attempts are made to unite again (1st and 19th congresses), participate together at the Zimmerwald (1915) and Kienthal (1916) conferences as "internationalist socialists", participate together at P Congress of Soviets (October 25-27), together participate and

in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee - always together and always against each other.

The only time Martov resolutely and unconditionally sided with Lenin was after the July days, when Lenin was accused of spying for Germany, and Martov considered this an unheard-of slander. He spoke publicly in defense of Lenin, and U! sent greetings to the Bolshevik Congress, although he immediately specified his disagreement with the methods of the party and Lenin. For what he himself was not capable of, Martov considered Lenin also incapable. After all, all their lives, with all the fights, intrigues, disagreements, nevertheless, both ate the juices from the same ideological tree - Marxism. Martov was a believing Marxist, and Lenin was an exploiter of Marxism. For Martov, as for Rosa Luxemburg, "there is no socialism without democracy, just as there is no democracy without socialism", for Lenin democracy is a fiction, socialism is a distant goal, and dictatorship is a means for an entire historical era. Martov focuses on the belief in the innate virtues of man and in the possibility of improving his social ethics. Lenin focuses on another person - a person with innate vices of selfishness, cruelty, meanness, which can and should be used to make this same person blameless, in the words of I. Ehrenburg, "uskomchel" - an improved communist person.

Martov's historical defeat, as well as that of Menshevism as a whole, stemmed from his dogmatic doom in assessing the driving forces and prospects of the Russian revolution. Martov was too virtuous to become a dynamic politician. On the contrary, Lenin was too refined a tactician to reckon with such a "ballast" in politics as the "moral code" of people. Therefore, as a politician, Martov cannot stand comparison with Lenin, but as a person, he was beyond Lenin's reach, sometimes even incomprehensible. Lenin for the rest of his life retained in himself some kind of mysterious complex of his moral inferiority in comparison with Martov. Hence, Lenin, in Shakespeare's words, had "loving malice and malicious love" for Martov. Therefore, it is psychologically quite understandable that when Martov died in Berlin in 1923, this fact was hidden from the sick Lenin. Those close to Lenin were afraid that Lenin might have a stroke if he found out about Martov's death! Lenin learned of Martov's death when he himself recovered from his first bout of illness and was allowed to read old newspapers.

We owe to the period of Khrushchev's liberalism that the Soviet

the writer and security officer E. Kazakevich (during the war he was an assistant to the chief of intelligence of the army) received permission to delve into the archives of the Cheka and the Central Committee and thus told us about one interesting episode in the relationship between Lenin and Martov, about such an episode, the mention of which in the official history was considered taboo until now. The named writer in 1962 published in Izvestia a story about Lenin and Martov. The story is called "Enemies". The note to the story says: "This story describes a true incident." What is the essence of the story? 1920 Lenin is the chairman of the government and lives in the Kremlin Palace, Martov is an underground worker and lives like an ascetic in the attic of a house on Myasnitskaya Street, but Cheka is intensely looking for him in order to arrest him and ... through his secretary, Lenin summons a former Menshevik, a certain Sophia Markovna, whom he knew from emigration as a person close to Martov, but now joined the Bolshevik Party. He gives her a task:

"I want to entrust you with one thing. You must find out where Julius (Yuli Osipovich Martov. - A. A.), see him and tell him on my behalf ... no, no, do not write it down. Remember. You are an old underdog. conspirator. And now we are conspiring ... So, on Friday, at eleven o'clock in the evening from the first platform of the Baltic Station

the last departs - mind you, the last passenger train to Minsk and Warsaw. The latter because we expect literally in the next few days the beginning of the war with Poland ... If Julius wants, he can get on this train, in the sixth car, seat fifteen. There, in the carriage, they will know. If he doesn't want to, then let him stay underground, that's his business... The Mensheviks are going full steam ahead to create an anti-Soviet underground. Yuli, their leader, they have already hidden... But we cannot tolerate the anti-Soviet underground... Mart's enemy is because he opposes the dictatorship of the proletariat. You don't tell him all this... It's useless. Just tell him about the train." When Sofia Markovna asked Lenin whether she would be obliged to report to Cheka on Martov's whereabouts and, in general, why Lenin did not give such a responsible assignment to his chief of the secret police, Dzerzhinsky, the answer followed, which should have seemed to an orthodox Bolshevik a monstrous betrayal of Bolshevism. Lenin said:

"In no case will you tell me or anyone else where Julius is hiding. I simply forbid you to report it to me. Even the Council of People's Commissars (government. - A. A.) will not be made aware of our

conversation." In answer to the question why he did not entrust this matter to Dzerzhinsky and why he was acting behind the backs of the government and the party, Lenin was disarmingly sincere: If only I could tell you this - more resolute Leninists than Lenin himself" (Gaz. "Izvestia", April 21, 1962). Sofia Markovna, through N. Sukhanov, found Martov and gave him Lenin's order. Martov availed himself of the service of a friend-enemy, left by the aforementioned train, and set about publishing the anti-Leninist journal Socialist Herald in Berlin. Interestingly, the heirs of Stalin and Khrushchev, retroactively, on behalf of the Central Committee and the Soviet government, approved this clearly anti-Soviet act of Lenin. The "Soviet Historical Encyclopedia" for 1966 says that Martov "in 1920, with the permission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the Soviet government, went abroad" (SIE, vol. 9, M., 1966, p. 151). Of course, such permission was never given and could not be given, as is clearly seen from the story of this "true incident."

It turned out to be more difficult for Lenin to get rid of the Socialist-Revolutionary leaders. They did not want to think about any emigration. Lenin, according to him, was not so afraid of the Russian bourgeoisie headed by Milyukov, as were the leaders of the "petty-bourgeois democracy" Martov and Chernov, who act, according to Lenin, "partly out of stupidity, partly out of factional malice against us, and mainly according to the objective logic of their petty-bourgeois democratic position" in favor of Miliukov (Lenin, 4th ed., vol. 32, p. 481).

Much harder and longer was the struggle against the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, whose members killed Volodarsky, Uritsky, wounded Lenin, raised uprisings. The Kremlin decided to decapitate the Socialist-Revolutionary Party with a crushing blow. On February 28, 1922, the GPU makes general arrests and brings to trial by the Supreme Tribunal 47 members of the Central Committee and active figures of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party on charges of "conspiracy" against the Soviet government. This meant that all the most prominent leaders of the two Russian revolutions arrested - 1905 and 1917. - inevitably faces the death penalty. The democratic and workers' press throughout the world launched a wide campaign against this. The "Foreign Delegation of the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries" published in the newspaper "Voice of Russia" in Berlin of March 1922 an appeal "To the socialist parties of the whole world." In an appeal

it was pointed out that the Bolsheviks decided to physically destroy their opponents by falsifying the accusation of counter-revolutionary activities of the most revolutionary of all Russian revolutionary parties. The appeal was picked up by the entire world press. Even some Western leaders of the Comintern joined the protest (K. Zetkin and others).

Lenin had to agree to the convening of a joint conference of the three Internationals - P, P 1/2 and III of the International - on the question of the court. Bukharin and Radek participated in the conference on behalf of the Comintern and the Central Committee of the RCP. The leader of the British Laborites MacDonald, on behalf of the P International, demanded from the representatives of the Comintern and the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party a guarantee that the death penalty would not be applied to those arrested and that the chairman of the P International, Vandervelde, would be admitted to court as a defender of the defendants. Bukharin and Radek accepted these conditions, which aroused Lenin's decisive displeasure. In the article "We Paid Too Much," Lenin wrote that "our representatives did wrong in accepting these two conditions," but nevertheless, Lenin, well aware of the indignation of public opinion throughout the world at the trial of the old Russian revolutionaries, added: "But I think that we should not tear up the signed agreement" ("Pravda, April 11, 1922).

But before judging the Social Revolutionary leaders and in order to generally legitimize the terrorist system of Bolshevik rule, Lenin personally introduced the notorious Article 58 into the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. to our conversation, I am sending you a draft of an additional paragraph. The main idea is clear: to openly expose the fundamental position that motivates the essence and justification of terror, its necessity. The court should not eliminate terror, but explain and legitimize it in principle..." (Lenin, Soch. t. XXUP, p. 297).

The trial took place in Moscow on June 8-August 7, 1922. The Socialist-Revolutionary leaders turned the trial into a platform for promoting their program and exposing the terrorist practices of Bolshevism. The leader of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the head of their Central Committee, Gotz, declared: "We will fulfill our duty, no matter what fate awaits us here," Gendelman, a member of the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, said: "Both the dead and the living, we will be dangerous to you," the third member of the Central Committee Timofeev, as if addressing to the leaders of Bolshevism, made a challenge: "You will receive our heads to put them at the feet of the Comintern, but you will not receive our honor (M. Vishnyak, Gody

emigration. Noouer p\$Chianop Prez\$, Zap og Oshkhueg\$Tsu).

The court sentenced 12 people to death, including Gotz, Gendelman, Timofeev, Donskoy, Ratner. The Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee approved the verdict, but the Bolsheviks still did not dare to carry it out. Trotsky offered Lenin a more than brilliant way out. Here is the exit in the story of Trotsky himself: "Bringing it (the death sentence. - A. A.) into execution would mean an inevitable reciprocal wave of terror. To confine oneself to a prison, even if it was for a long time, would mean simply to encourage the terrorists, because they least of all believed in the longevity of Soviet power. There was no other choice but to make the execution of the sentence dependent on whether or not the party (Socialist-Revolutionaries. - A.A.) would continue the terrorist struggle. In other words: turn the leaders of the party into hostages. My first meeting with Lenin after his recovery took place just in the days of the trial of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. He immediately joined the decision that I proposed: "that's right, there is no other way out" (L. Trotsky, "My Life", part P, pp. 211-212).

In this way, Lenin also got rid of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. For the final consolidation of the mono-party dictatorship regime, it was necessary to neutralize two more social groups that played an outstanding role in the history of the Russian state and Russian society: these are the intelligentsia and the Orthodox clergy. In the spiritual preparation of all three Russian revolutions, the influence of the Russian radical intelligentsia is in no way inferior to the influence that the Encyclopedists had on the preparation of the Great French Revolution. But the encyclopedists fought against monarchical absolutism not at all in order to replace it with another, revolutionary absolutism. At the focus of all their passions stands the free man as the highest value of all values. When the revolution, sweeping away the old foundations, began to create a new order of permanent terror of the Jacobins, those of the Encyclopedists who were still alive found themselves in the camp of the enemies of the new absolutism. This happened to the Russian not only democratic, but also radical intelligentsia. She spiritually prepared the revolution of 1905, but when she saw her bloody face, she largely turned away from it ("Milestones"). She spiritually prepared the February Revolution and accepted it, but she condemned and resolutely turned away from the October Revolution. Nothing Lenin despised so deeply as this anti-Bolshevik intelligentsia. Therefore, it provides complete

the hands of the "knight of the revolution" for bloodshed - Dzerzhinsky - to deal with the Russian intelligentsia at the discretion of his institution. As a result - persecution, arrests, executions, flight and mass deportations abroad of the elite of Russian politics, science, art, religion.

But people can be evicted, but there are still historical monuments and treasures of religious architecture that remind of the power and grandeur of the former "damned time", you can't evict them, they simply begin to destroy them. If this vandalism, unparalleled after the barbarians, did not end with the total destruction of all ancient monuments and all Russian cathedrals, it was only because of the efforts of several "bollytsiks" of the old culture and architecture among the Bolsheviks, like Lunacharsky and Maxim Gorky. When the "bollytsiki" tried to save not only things, but also the people who created them or serve them, Lenin chastised them with irritation. What is worth, for example, a letter that Lenin wrote to M. Gorky on September 15, 1919 about the Russian intelligentsia. Lenin writes that the Russian intelligentsia are only "intellectuals, lackeys of capital, who imagine themselves to be the brains of the nation. In fact, this is not a brain, but a city" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 51, p. 48).

The Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee did not hesitate to publish this rude, obscene letter from Lenin, but he did not dare to publish another letter, although completely censored, but monstrous in its anti-humanity and arbitrariness. This is a letter from Lenin dated March 19, 1922 to the Secretary of the Central Committee Molotov for members of the Politburo. In the Chronology to the Works of Lenin there is a direct reference to this letter:

March 19 (1922). Lenin, in a letter to members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), writes about the need to resolutely suppress the resistance of the clergy to the implementation of the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of February 23, 1922 on the seizure of church valuables ... "(Lenin, PSS, vol. 45, pp. 666-667).

Now, thanks to the efforts of Samizdat in Moscow, this letter of Lenin itself has been published. For our purpose, it will suffice to quote from it only the following extracts:

known political goal to commit a series of cruelties, then they must be carried out in the most energetic way and in the shortest possible time, because the masses of the people will not endure the prolonged use of cruelties ... The Politburo gives a detailed directive to the judicial authorities, also verbally,

so that the process against the Shuya rebels (in the city of Shuya, believers did not allow the authorities to rob church valuables. - A. A.) be carried out with maximum speed and end only with the execution of a very large number of the most influential and dangerous Black Hundreds of the city of Shuya, but opportunities also not only of this city, but also of Moscow and several other spiritual centers "(Journal of the Russian Student Christian Movement, No. 98, 1970, pp. 55-56, Paris-New York).

Let us return, however, to internal party affairs.

In full agreement with Lenin, but without using Lenin's authority, on October 8, 1923, Trotsky wrote in a letter to party members (including members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission) that the apparatus regime of dominance over the party that had developed within the party was more cruel than during the period war communism could not be more tolerable. It is necessary to introduce in the party that inner-party "workers' democracy" demanded by the Tenth Congress and the September (1923) plenum of the Central Committee. The Party must be placed above its apparatus. Irrespective of this letter from Trotsky, a group of old Bolsheviks, active leaders of the revolution and the civil war, many of whom were members of the Central Committee or people's commissars, wrote a letter on October 15, 1923 to the Central Committee of the Central Control Commission ("letter 46") on the same subject. It began with the words: "The extreme seriousness of the situation compels us (in the interests of our Party, in the interests of the working class) to tell you openly that the continuation of the policy of the majority of the Politburo threatens grave troubles for the entire Party." Numerous facts have been cited to support this thesis.

There is no formal legal connection between Trotsky's letter of October 8 and Letter 46, but the Troika itself establishes this connection in order to accuse Trotsky of creating the "Left Opposition". Between the state of health of Lenin and the attacks of the "troika" against Trotsky, a certain pattern is visible - better for Lenin, then the "troika" goes behind the scenes, worse for him - then attacks against Trotsky become more frequent. The same is true now that Lenin's condition has worsened again. The more Lenin's illness progressed, the more decisively the "troika" forced the withdrawal of Trotsky and his supporters from active politics. It comes to the point that every public speech by Trotsky, completely orthodox and based on the decisions of the party and the instructions of Lenin, the Politburo begins to qualify as anti-Leninist, and criticism of mistakes as "factional speech." To give weight and party credibility to their actions

against Trotsky, the Politburo widely practices convening all kinds of local party activists with criticism of Trotsky's "mistakes". The expanded plenums of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in the center serve the same purpose. Thus, the October (1923) joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission with the "active" issues a resolution in which it is said that they "recognize Trotsky's speech at the most crucial moment that the international revolution and the party are going through is a profound political mistake, especially because Trotsky's attack, aimed at The Politburo, objectively, took on the character of a factional action ... To raise the questions he raised, Trotsky chose the path of addressing individual members of the party instead of the only acceptable way - the preliminary presentation of these questions for discussion by the collegiums of which Trotsky is a member.

The path chosen by Trotsky served as a signal for a factional grouping (statement of the 46th) (" CPSU in Res. ", 1954, part T, pp. 767-768). The voting results of this resolution indicate the balance of power between the "troika" and Trotsky: 102 votes against Trotsky, 2 in favor, 10 abstentions. Under these conditions, Trotsky's battle was lost even before he started it. The only hope was for Lenin's recovery, but then the question arose: would Lenin himself have been able to defeat the "troika"?

Already at the January plenum of the Central Committee (1924), a week before Lenin's death, the Politburo finally formalized the members of the Central Committee Trotsky, Radek, Pyatakov and others into the official "opposition", "fraction", and all this hastened to be published in the press (Pravda, 16 January 1924).

The XIII conference urgently convened on January 16-18, two days before Lenin's death, passes an already detailed resolution on Stalin's report condemning the "Trotskyist opposition." It says:

1. After the September plenum of the Central Committee (1923), Trotsky and the "Group 46" wrote letters widely distributed in the party, in which they criticized the policies of the Politburo and the internal party regime.

e: The Politburo found it necessary to reach an agreement with Trotsky, and as a result of this agreement, on December 5, 1923, the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission unanimously adopted resolutions on inner-party democracy and on the prohibition of factions.

3. Two days later, Trotsky issued a new New Course letter against the Central Committee.

4. Representatives of the opposition are sent all over Russia -

"the struggle is assuming unheard-of sharp forms," the military cells and cells of higher schools are in favor of opposition against the Central Committee.

s, "The opposition, headed by Trotsky, came up with the slogan of breaking up the party apparatus and tried to shift the center of gravity of the struggle against bureaucracy in the state apparatus to "bureaucracy" in the party apparatus."

6. The opposition opposes the party youth to the Central Committee (Trotsky: "the youth is the party's barometer"). "The Bolshevik view of the party as a monolithic whole,

the opposition substitutes a view of the party as the sum of all possible currents and factions.

8. The opposition threatens the unity of the party and the security of the state. 9. The core of the opposition was the former "decists" or those members of the Central Committee,

who, at the suggestion of Lenin, were not re-elected (Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov, Smirnov).

10. The entire platform and accusations of the Trotskyist opposition against the Central Committee -

the essence of the "petty-bourgeois deviation" ("CPSU in Res.", part D, pp. 778-782).

How did Lenin react to this decision of the conference?

In January 1924, Lenin again felt well. On January 7, he was at a children's Christmas tree at the Gorki state farm, on January 19 he rode a sleigh into the forest to watch the hunt. On January 17-18, N. Krupskaya reads to him a report on the course of the 13th conference, published in Pravda. On January 19-20, she reads the resolution of the conference from Pravda to Lenin.

This "news" about an internal party fight that has begun has a terrifying effect on Lenin. His mortal enemy - the disease - has found the most faithful ally: the "troika" has become it. Doctors believed that any unrest would catastrophically worsen Lenin's condition. Since Lenin even considered life to be a continuous politics, nothing could have worried him so deeply as what was happening in the party and what would be the fate of his political legacy. That is why the doctors forbade him to be interested in politics, read newspapers, write articles. But the "troika" had long ceased to control Lenin's "medical regime"; Lenin could freely read newspapers, follow politics "second hand" (but did not have the right to read Central Committee materials and communicate with the outside world). From the newspapers, the experienced politician Lenin easily learned that a most acute factional struggle for the throne, which was now politically empty, had broken out in his party. His "faithful" disciples from

The "troikas" are artificially heating up the situation, leading things to what Lenin was so afraid of: to a split. The students mindlessly or deliberately spur Lenin's illness by their actions. Yes, the "troika" is the most loyal ally of Lenin's fatal illness. Perhaps, not so much physical suffering as the deepest spiritual despair was the reason that Lenin asked Stalin, during his next visit, to give him poison to poison himself. Stalin reported this fact at a meeting of the Politburo at the end of February 1923. If we recall that Lenin's archive contains a "Testament" with a postscript dated January 4, 1923 on the removal of Stalin, then we can quite agree with Trotsky that Lenin knew who should be asked for poison (Thom\$K1, ZbaPn, pp. 376-377).

The heroic body of Lenin, as his relatives paint him, is still struggling with death, but the inner-party fever mercilessly shakes his sick and decaying brain. The main "supervisor" of Lenin's illness from the Central Committee - Stalin - just on the eve of the XIII Party Conference (January 16-18, 1924), to the surprise of everyone, removes the "information quarantine" around Lenin. At this conference, Trotsky and Trotskyism are condemned, Stalin and Stalinism triumph. The conference and the plenum of the Central Committee, which approved its decisions, disavowed Lenin with his "Testament". All this Lenin can freely learn from Pravda.

Let us return to the question posed: what is the reaction of Lenin? Cautious and supervised (the overseer, after all, Stalin), Krupskaya still dared to tell us a little that says a lot. Here is what is recorded in the chronology "Dates of the life and work of V. I. Lenin", attached to the 45th volume of the Complete Works of Lenin: "January, 19-20 (1924) - "N. K. Krupskaya reads to Lenin the resolutions of the 13th Conference of the RCP(b), published in Pravda. Krupskaya herself writes: "We spent Saturday and Sunday reading resolutions. Vladimir Ilyich listened very attentively, sometimes asking questions," but "when on Saturday Vladimir Ilyich apparently began to get agitated, I told him that the resolutions had been adopted unanimously," that is, Lenin had to believe Krupskaya that Trotsky recognized himself as an anti-Leninist "petty-bourgeois deviationist and voted

for your condemnation! But Lenin, probably, was not so naive even at death.

If Lenin, during the reading of these resolutions, condemned Trotsky and praised Stalin, then Stalinist historiography would not have passed over in silence.

this fact.

If on January 20 Lenin was only "agitated," then he experienced "an unexpected sharp deterioration in his state of health on January 21," and at 6:50 p.m. Lenin died (Lenin, PSS, vol. 45, pp. 716-717).

You don't have to be a doctor to state that the nightmarish psychological poison that Stalin injected into Lenin's brain in the form of the resolutions of the January conference hastened the fateful denouement. The doctors' diagnosis read: "The basis of the disease was a pronounced sclerosis of the brain vessels from excessively intense mental activity. The immediate cause of death is cerebral hemorrhage" (V. I. Lenin, Biography, 4th ed., 1970, p. 682).

We pointed out above that if Lenin had condemned Trotsky during his acquaintance with the materials of the January conference, Party historians would not hesitate to inform posterity of this. However, what even Stalin failed to ascribe to Lenin the condemnation of Trotsky, Stalin's heirs are now trying to do in a 1970 biography of Lenin, published on the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth. It says there, as if in passing: "There is every reason to believe that, not without Lenin's knowledge, N.K. Krupskaya opposed Trotsky" (ibid., p. 682). When she spoke, where she spoke, what documents are available on this score - not a word about this. Yes, this is understandable. There are no documents in nature that speak of Krupskaya's speeches against Trotsky during Lenin's illness or death, just as there are no documents saying that Lenin instructed his wife to defend the one with whom he broke off personal relations because of her (0b this we wrote) or to condemn Trotsky, whom he recruited into allies against Stalin. On the other hand, Trotsky's archive contains another document that decisively refutes the new "suggestion" of party historians. This is a letter from N. K. Krupskaya to L. Trotsky a few days after Lenin's death. Here it is:

"Dear Lev Davidovich, I am writing to tell you that about a month before his death, while looking through your book, Vladimir Ilyich stopped at the place where you characterize Marx and Lenin, and asked me to reread this passage to him, listened very carefully, then looked it over again.

And here's what I want to say: the attitude that Vladimir Ilyich developed towards you when you came to us in London from Siberia did not change with him until his death. I wish you Leo

Davidovich, strength and health and a strong hug. N. Krupskaya "(L. Trotsky, My Life, part P, pp. 251-252).

Trotsky comments on this letter: "In the book that V.I. looked through, I compared Lenin with Marx ... I was gratified that Lenin, shortly before his death, read my lines about him with attention, because the scale of Marx was in his eyes the most a titanic scale for measuring the human personality. I was now reading Krupskaya's letter with no less emotion. She took two extreme points: an October day in 1902

and the end of December 1923. Two decades elapsed between these two points, first joint work, then fierce factional struggle, and again joint work on a higher historical basis. According to Hegel: thesis, antithesis, synthesis. And Krupskaya testified that Lenin's attitude towards me, despite the long period of antithesis, remained "London": that is, an attitude of warm support and friendly affection, but on a higher historical basis. Even if there were nothing else, all the tomes of the falsifiers would not outweigh before the court of history a small note written by Krupskaya a few days after Lenin's death" (ibid., pp. 252-253).

But Trotsky manages to make a mistake, which in politics cannot go unpunished. On January 21, 1924, Trotsky, who was in Tbilisi, on his way to the resort of Sukhumi, received an encrypted telegram from Stalin about the death of Lenin. In response to Trotsky's direct wire request, the Kremlin replied to Trotsky that Lenin's funeral was scheduled for Saturday (Lenin died on Monday) and that since Trotsky "wouldn't make it in time for the funeral anyway," the Kremlin recommended that he "continue his treatment." Trotsky remarks: "In fact, the funeral took place only on Sunday, and I could well have been in time for Moscow. Incredible as it may seem, I was deceived about the day of the funeral. The conspirators, in their own way, correctly calculated that it would not occur to me to check them ... "(L. Trotsky, My Life, part P, pp. 249-250).

Yes, Trotsky was deceived, but sometimes it also happens that someone who wants to be deceived is being deceived. It is also striking here that Trotsky has clearly lost the scale of the distance: the Tbilisi-Baku-Moscow train runs this distance in three days, and Trotsky had five days at his disposal, even if the funeral was scheduled for Saturday. In addition, military

the minister could also be delivered to Moscow by military aircraft. In all cases, Trotsky had to take into account that his vacation in a sunny southern resort, when in Moscow, in a fierce winter, the party buries its leader, this was just what the "troika" needed. Stalin turned this physical absence of Trotsky into his political absence from the throne, which the "troika" has now seized legally as well. An emergency plenum of the Central Committee on January 21-22, 1924, in the absence of Trotsky, nominated the "neutral" A. I. Rykov as Lenin's successor as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the RSFSR, and L Kamenev. This was the result of a clear compromise within the "troika", since the members of the "troika" could not agree on nominating someone from among themselves for the post of head of government. At the same time, it was decided to "strengthen" the military department, which was led by Trotsky. The Central Committee now decided to appoint M. Frunze as Trotsky's first deputy to Unshlikht, a supporter of the Troika, who had already been appointed there, removing Sklyansky, Stalin's longtime enemy, from this post.

Trotsky reports: "A Central Committee delegation consisting of Tomskey, Frunze, Pyatakov and Gusev came to see me in Sukhumi to coordinate with me the changes in the personnel of the military department. Basically, it was pure comedy. The renewal of personnel in the military department had long been carried out at full speed behind my back ... The first blow fell on Sklyansky. First of all, Stalin took revenge on it for his failures at Tsaritsyn, his failure on the Southern Front, his adventure near Lvov" (L. Trotsky, ibid., p. 253).

These were, of course, digging under Trotsky himself, in order to warn

potential Bonaparte, which he did not intend to become.

The Plenum of the Central Committee adopted the appeal "To the Party. To all workers." In this address, among other things, it was said:

"Never since Marx has the history of the great liberation movement of the proletariat brought forward such a gigantic figure as our late leader, teacher, friend... a fearless mind, an iron, unbending, stubborn will that overcomes everything, a sacred hatred... for slavery and oppression, revolutionary passion that moves mountains, boundless faith in the creative forces of the masses, tremendous organizational genius - all this found its magnificent embodiment in Lenin ...

Lenin was able, like no one else, to see both great and small, to predict

enormous historical turning points and at the same time take into account and use every small detail; he knew how, when necessary, to attack furiously and, when necessary, to retreat in order to prepare a new offensive. He did not know any fixed formulas; there were no blinkers on his wise, all-seeing eyes...

Comrade Lenin contributed a lot of precious things to the treasury of Marxism. It is to him that the working class is indebted for the development of the doctrine of the proletarian dictatorship, of the alliance of workers and peasants, of the full significance of the national and colonial questions for the struggling proletariat, and, finally, of his doctrine of the role and nature of the party...

Lenin was never as great as in moments of danger. With a firm hand, he led the party through the array of these dangers, advancing towards his goal with incomparable composure and courage. There was nothing more disgusting, more disgusting, more vile than alarmism, confusion, embarrassment, hesitation for Lenin" ("VKP(6) in rez.", part G, 1933, pp. 809-810).

The Plenum of the Central Committee instructed Stalin to speak at the opening on January 26, 1924 of the F All-Union Congress of Soviets with a speech "On the death of Lenin." Delivered as a sermon by a priest from a church pulpit, this speech was full of religious pathos and mysticism, and established new canons of idolatry by party shamans who appealed to the spirit of Lenin in the same church language. A former pupil of the theological seminary spoke up, but Stalin knew what he was doing. That was the "politics of the long run." Stalin said: "We Communists are people of a special type. We are cut from a special material. We are those who make up the army of the great proletarian strategist, the army of Comrade Lenin...

Departing from us, Comrade Lenin bequeathed to us to hold high and keep in purity the great title of a member of the Party. We swear to you, Comrade Lenin, that we will fulfill this commandment of yours with honor!" (. highlighted by me. - A. A.). And Stalin counted five more such "oaths" - about the unity of the party, about the dictatorship of the proletariat, about the union of workers and peasants, about strengthening and expanding the USSR, about strengthening and expanding the Comintern. Each "oath" ended according to the same canon: "We swear to you, Comrade Lenin, that we will fulfill this commandment of yours with honor!" (Stalin, Works, vol. 6, pp. 46-51).

The same 2nd congress, at the suggestion of Stalin, confirmed the decision of the "troika" not to bury Lenin's corpse, but, after embalming, put

him as a shrine in the Mausoleum on Red Square. Stalin himself explained why the atheist and revolutionary Lenin was embalmed like an ancient Egyptian pharaoh: "During these days you have seen tens and hundreds of thousands of workers pilgrimage to the tomb of Comrade Lenin. After some time, you will see the pilgrimage of representatives of millions of working people ... You can be sure that representatives of millions will then be followed by representatives of tens and hundreds of millions from all over the world "(ibid., p. 51; emphasis by me. - A. A.). The words that Stalin now introduced into Bolshevik jargon meant, according to the "Dictionary of the Modern Russian Literary Language" published by the USSR Academy of Sciences: "commandment" - "a biblical or gospel saying", and according to Dahl: "to swear" - "to take an oath, to swear "," pilgrim "-" a pilgrim who was worshiping at the tomb of the Lord. Stalin deliberately turned Lenin's mausoleum into the "Holy Sepulcher" in order to sanctify his future inquisition with his name. Lenin, of course, wanted his students to continue his work, but he would hardly have agreed to the creation of a cult of a new god for him. Knowing Lenin too well in this regard, Trotsky wrote: "The attitude towards Lenin as a revolutionary leader was replaced by an attitude towards him as the head of the church hierarchy. At my protests, a mausoleum unworthy and offensive to the revolutionary consciousness was erected on Red Square. Official books about Lenin turned into the same mausoleums. His thought was cut into quotations for false sermons" (L. Trotsky, My Life, part P, p. 257).

Since Lenin's death, the history of the regime marked a gradual transition from one phase to another: from mono-party dictatorship to mono-party tyranny, from Lenin to Stalin. However, this was a change of leaders, as psychological types, but not a change of ideas. All Stalin in the embryo was in Lenin himself. All the fundamental components of the future Stalinist tyranny were worked out by Lenin. Another question is whether Lenin himself would have become a Stalin if he had lived longer and had to deal with the same dangerous oppositions in the Central Committee and the no less dangerous resistance of the peasantry to collectivization that Stalin had to fight. In principle, this question must be answered with an unconditional "yes", but the scale, methods and forms could be different. Nevertheless, without Lenin, Stalin would not have existed at all. Therefore, Stalin's heirs acted illogically and absurdly when they condemned Stalin, appealing to Lenin. One analogy is quite appropriate here:

if in a possible future war humanity will die due to the use of thermonuclear weapons, then who is responsible - the scientists who invented this monstrous weapon, or the rulers who used it? Leninism appeared in the hands of Stalin as that terrible weapon, using which for three decades he tyrannized the country, staged inquisitions and created the world communist system. We will talk about all this ahead of time. Let us return to summing up the results of Lenin's life and deeds.

Of all the characterizations that were given to Lenin in the first days and months of his death, two characterizations have stood the test of history. One of them belongs to Lenin's successor - Stalin, the other - to Lenin's enemy Viktor Chernov, leader of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. Stalin's characterization of Lenin is, of course, a purposeful panegyric, Chernov's characterization is a critical political-psychological portrait. In both descriptions, between the lines, we read: Stalin paints Lenin the way he wants to be, and Chernov the way a successful politician can be, but not a true socialist and humanist.

Stalin: I first met Lenin in 1903 through correspondence. She left an indelible impression on me and led to

the conviction that we have an extraordinary person in the person of Lenin ... It always seemed to me that Lenin's comrades-in-arms - Plekhanov, Martov, Axelrod were a whole head lower than Lenin, that Lenin was a leader of a higher type, a mountain eagle (Demyan Bedny remarked about this comparison: Stalin, as a native of the Caucasus mountains, compared Lenin with a "mountain eagle", but a resident of the North would probably compare him with the northern lights. - A. YES.) ... Lenin was able to write about the most intricate things so simply and clearly, concisely and boldly - when each phrase does not speak, but shoots ... I first met Lenin in December 1905 at a Bolshevik conference in Tammerfors. I hoped to see a mountain eagle, a great man, great not only politically, but also physically, for Lenin was drawn in my imagination as a giant, stately and imposing. What was my disappointment when I saw the most ordinary person, below average height, nothing, literally nothing different from ordinary mortals ... It is accepted that a "great person" usually has to be late for meetings, so that the members hearts were waiting for his appearance: "shh ... hush ... he's coming." This ritualism seemed to me not superfluous, because it favors them, inspires respect. What was my disappointment when I

I learned that Lenin had arrived at the meeting before the delegates and, hiding somewhere in a corner, was talking in a simple way with the most ordinary delegates. I will not hide the fact that this seemed to me some kind of violation of certain necessary rules... The simplicity and modesty of Lenin, the desire to remain inconspicuous, in any case not to be conspicuous and not to emphasize his high position - this feature is one of the strongest sides of Lenin, as a new leader ... The unusual power of persuasion, the simplicity and clarity of argumentation, short and understandable phrases, the lack of flair, the absence of dizzying gestures and effective phrases that hit the impression - all this favorably distinguished Lenin's speeches from the speeches of ordinary "parliamentary" orators. ... I was captivated by that irresistible force of logic in Lenin's speeches, which somewhat dryly, but thoroughly takes possession of the audience, gradually electrifies it and then captures it ... I remember how they said: "Logic in Lenin's speeches is some kind of omnipotent tentacles that envelop from all sides with pincers and from whose embrace there is no urine to escape: either give up or retreat to complete failure" ... The second time I met Lenin was in 1906 at the Stockholm Congress ... It is known that at this congress the Bolsheviks remained in the minority, were defeated. For the first time I saw Lenin in the role of the vanquished. He was not one iota like those leaders who whimper and lose heart ... On the contrary, the defeat turned Lenin into a bundle of energy ... At the next congress in 1907 in London, the Bolsheviks turned out to be victorious. For the first time I saw Lenin in the role of a winner. Usually, victory makes other leaders dizzy, makes them arrogant and arrogant... But Lenin was not one iota like such leaders. On the contrary, it was after the victory that he became especially vigilant and wary. Lenin persistently inspired the delegates: "The first thing is not to get carried away with victory and not boast, the second thing is to consolidate the victory, the third thing is to finish off the enemy" ... The leaders of the party cannot but cherish the opinion of the majority of their party ... But Lenin never became a prisoner of the majority. ... There were moments in the history of the party when the opinion of the majority came into conflict with the fundamental interests of the proletariat. In such cases, Lenin, without hesitation, took the side of principle against the majority of the party ... He was not afraid to speak in such cases literally one against all, counting on the fact that "a principled policy is the only correct policy" ... Theorists and leaders parties that know the history of peoples,

who have studied the history of the revolution from beginning to end, are sometimes

obsessed with one obscene disease. This disease is called fear of the masses, disbelief in the creative abilities of the masses... sometimes a certain aristocracy of leaders arises... fear that the elements might rage, that the masses might "break a lot of superfluous stuff"... Lenin represented the exact opposite of such leaders... I don't know of another revolutionary who could so mercilessly castigate the self-satisfied critics of the "chaos of the revolution" and the "orgy of unauthorized actions of the masses" as Lenin ... Faith in the creative forces of the masses ... gave him the opportunity to comprehend the elements and direct it into the channel proletarian revolution. Lenin was born for revolution. He was truly the genius of revolutionary outbursts and the greatest master of revolutionary leadership. He never felt so free and joyful as in the era of revolutionary upheavals... In the days of revolutionary upheavals, he literally flourished, became clairvoyant, foresaw the movement of classes and the probable zigzags of the revolution, seeing them at a glance. Not without reason is it said in our Party circles: "Ilyich knows how to swim in the waves of the revolution, like a fish in water." Hence the "astonishing" clarity of tactical slogans and the "dizzying" boldness of Lenin's revolutionary plans... Brilliant insight, the ability to quickly grasp and unravel the inner meaning of impending events - this is the very property of Lenin, which helped him to outline the correct strategy and a clear line of conduct at the turns of the revolutionary movement (Stalin, Works vol. 6, pp. 52-64, On Lenin, speech January 28, 1924).

On March 15, 1924, less than two months after Lenin's death, Viktor Chernov, leader of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, published an article about Lenin in the reputable American magazine Foreign Affairs. Although Chernov was an opponent of Lenin, during the First World War their positions became so close that together, as Russian socialist-internationalists, they participated in the famous Zimmerwald Conference of 1915, but even before the war, both being irreconcilable enemies of tsarism, entered into temporary contacts. After the revolution, Chernov was a member of the first coalition government (he resigned after the July days). He was chairman of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, in which his party had an absolute majority. The characterization of Lenin given by Chernov, despite a certain dose of subjectivism, like that of Stalin,

- a document of great historical value.

Numerous books by Lenin and about Lenin during these almost 50 years have not added anything fundamentally new to the portrait of Lenin painted by Chernov. This probably explains why the said journal reprinted Chernov's article on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth.

Chernov: Lenin was a big man, he was not just the biggest man in his party; he was the uncrowned but meritorious king of that party. He was her head, her will, I would even say, was her heart, if both - he and the party - did not imply heartlessness as a duty. Lenin's intellect was energetic but cold. It was above all an ironic, sarcastic and cynical intellect. Nothing was so alien to him as sentimentality ... moral or ethical considerations in politics for him were "a trifle, hypocrisy, priestly preaching." Politics to him meant strategy, pure and simple. Only victory deserved attention. The will to power and the implementation of the political program without compromise - only this was a virtue. Hesitation was the only crime. Lenin would have said that politics is the continuation of war by other means. Heartlessness towards the victim is commendable self-control, ruthlessness and inhumanity.

there is a debt.

In war all means are good, and the best of them are those which are generally condemned in normal human relations. Since politics is a modified war, the rules of warfare are also its principles. Lenin was often accused of not wanting to be an "honest rival", but the very concept of "honest rival" sounded to him like absurdity, like pure prejudice, like something that can sometimes be used in a Jesuitical way in one's own interests, but accept it it would be really stupid.

The defender of the proletariat is obliged to put aside all moral doubts when dealing with the enemy. Deliberately deceiving the enemy, slandering him, blackening his name - he considered all this to be normal. It would be difficult to surpass the cynical brutality with which he proclaimed all this. Lenin's conscience is to put himself outside the boundaries of human conscience in all actions with his enemy. And in this rejection of all principles of honor, he remained honest with himself. As a Marxist, he believed in "class struggle" as his own contribution to

this theory, he considered the Civil War as the apogee of the class struggle. We can even say that for him the class struggle was a civil war in the embryo. Differences in the party, small or large, he often tried to explain as an echo of class antagonism, and then he would eliminate elements undesirable in the party, resorting to the lowest means! Isn't the heterogeneous party itself a conglomeration of antagonistic class elements, and all antagonistic elements should be considered according to the recipe "in war in a military way." His whole life was spent in splits and factional battles within the party. A purposeful person and naturally endowed with a powerful instinct for self-preservation, he did not hesitate to declare the most incredible (sgedo, ola abzigayatl) to be faith ... After each defeat or fall, no matter how shameful or humiliating it may be, Lenin immediately jumps up, like a vanka get up and start again from the beginning. His will was like a good steel spring that hits harder the more you stretch it. He was a stern party leader of the type needed to inspire his followers and prevent panic among them by his personal example of unlimited self-confidence, as well as to bring them to a sense of reality in periods of supreme exaltation when the party is in danger of being "the party of the smug." His single-mindedness was the quality that commanded the most respect from his followers. Often, when Lenin managed to survive, thanks to some gross blunders of his enemies, the honor of his survival was attributed to Lenin's resolute optimism ... Thanks to his perseverance, he more than once led his party out of seemingly hopeless difficulties, but all this was attributed to his genius of foresight. However, foresight on a large scale was just what he was not given. He was a master swordsman first and foremost, and a swordsman needs very little foresight and simple ideas. In fact, he shouldn't have thought so much; he had to concentrate on his opponent's every move and master his own reflex with the speed of innate instinct so as to fend off every enemy move immediately. Lenin's intellect was perceptive but not broad, resourceful but not creative. Being a master at evaluating any political situation, he quickly grasps a new situation and demonstrates a great deal of political and practical

shrewdness in anticipating its immediate political consequences. This ideal and immediate tactical feeling is in complete contrast to the completely unfounded and fantastic nature of any extensive historical forecasts he has ever attempted to make - in any program that includes more time than today and tomorrow. For example, his agrarian program before the revolution or his grandiose program of action after the victory, designed for an entire historical epoch, collided with reality, shattered into dust, while his immediate offensive plans turned out to be very real. His "immediate political" diagnosis was unsurpassed, his "remote political" diagnosis suffered permanent bankruptcy. As a man who already had the truth in his own pocket, he did not attach any importance to the creative efforts of other seekers of truth. He had no respect for other people's convictions, just as he did not have an enthusiastic love for freedom, which characterizes any independent creative spirit. On the contrary, he was possessed by a pure Asiatic conception of the monopoly of the press, word, justice and thought, which is exercised by a single ruling caste in accordance with the Muslim proverb: "if the library of Alexandria contains the same things as the Koran, then it is useless, if it contains the opposite things, then it's bad." Absolutely devoid of creative genius, he was rather a skillful, bright and tireless interpreter of the theories of other thinkers; he was a man of such narrowness of mind that his intelligence must be called limited; nevertheless, he was capable of greatness and originality within these reservations. His strength lay in the extreme, absolute clarity of his evidence... He concretized and simplified ideas. He was not an outstanding orator. He was often vulgar and clumsy, especially in polemics, constantly repeating himself, but these repetitions constituted his system and his strength ... It was a constant, basic pressure, the monotony of which hypnotizes the audience. The same thought was repeated many times and in different ways, until it penetrated the consciousness of people. Lenin constantly felt his audience. He never rose too high above her level and did not lose sight of the need to descend at the right moment to the level of the audience itself ... More than anyone, he understood that the crowd is like a horse that wants to be firmly ruled and spurred so ,

that the hand of the master is felt. If necessary, he speaks like a helmsman, threatening and whipping his audience. "He is not a speaker, he is more than a speaker," someone said of him. Lenin's will was stronger than his intellect, the latter was the eternal servant of the former. Finally, when victory has been won after hard work, he does not begin to translate his ideas into action, as a constructive socialist who has thought over his creative work in advance would do, he rather turns to a new, creative phase of his life program using the same methods as he enjoyed in his destructive struggle for power. "First get involved in the war, and then we'll see," - these words of Napoleon were his favorite. Lenin was often portrayed as a blind dogmatist, but he was never one by nature. He wasn't the type tied to the good or bad of a complete symmetrical system, he was just getting things done in his political game, in which seizing the right moment meant everything. This explains why he often acts as a charlatan, experimenter, gambler; this proves why he was an opportunist, a concept opposite to dogmatism. Many critics think that Lenin was greedy for power and glory. The fact is that he was organically made to drive...and it was a matter of course for him. As for honors, he abhorred them. All enjoyment of the pomp was alien to his heart. A plebeian in his tastes and in his gut, he remained as simple in

his habits after the October Revolution, as he was before it. He was also often portrayed as a heartless, callous fanatic. This heartlessness is purely intellectual and is therefore directed against his enemies, that is, against the enemies of his party. With his friends, he was friendly, good-natured, cheerful and polite, as a good comrade should be, which found expression in the gentle, intimate name "Ilyich", by which his followers everywhere called him. Yes, Lenin was good-natured, but being good-natured does not mean being good-hearted. He devoted his entire life to the working class. Did he love the workers? He probably did, although his love for them was less intense than his hatred for their oppressors. His love for the proletariat was the same despotic, harsh and ruthless love with which, hundreds of years ago, Torquemada burned people to save them. Lenin, in his own way, loved those whom he valued as useful helpers. He readily forgave them their mistakes, although he once gave them a severe scolding. Malice or revenge were alien to him.

Even if his enemies are not alive, but still the known abstract factors must be destroyed. They will not excite his human interests, being simply mathematically fixed points where destructive forces can be applied. Simply passive opposition to his party at a critical moment was reason enough for him to shoot hundreds of people without consideration (Eogrein Aeonatt, M. W. Arg! 1970, pp. 471-476).

Chernov's comparison of Lenin with the head of the Spanish medieval holy inquisition, Torquemada, sounds an antediluvian anachronism today, and Torquemada himself, like an executioner, looks like a miserable apprentice when we know what the disciple and successor of Lenin's work, Stalin, did. It may be noted that Lenin is just as little to blame for the great inquisition of Stalin as Christ is for the small inquisition of Torquemada. However, Christ preached "love for one's neighbour", while Lenin preached hatred - class hatred, political hatred, physical hatred. After all, the "Great Inquisition" - the Cheka was invented not by Stalin, but by Lenin. Lenin himself admired this invention most of all, although in a fit of frankness he admitted that he would not want to test even the most harmless inventions of the Bolsheviks on himself. It was Lenin who wrote to M. Gorky: "To try the inventions of a Bolshevik on yourself is terrible!" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 48, p. 189).

So, a hundred years after his birth and 50 years after his death, what does the objective judgment of history say about Lenin's deeds and prophecies?

Lenin lived less than 54 years, 20 years less than Stalin. But it was a bunch of life, full of demonic efforts and phenomenal successes. Lenin, of course, is an epoch-making phenomenon.

However, in order to become a symbol of an entire era, he had to be born on time - if he had been born 50 years earlier, there would have been one more populist in the history of Russia; if he had been born 50 years later, he would have been just Ulyanov, a radical publicist or a provincial lawyer.

Lenin entered the political arena at that very critical epoch in the history of Russia, when, as a result of two unfortunate wars for her (the Japanese and the First World War), she went through two revolutions. Moreover, the second, the February Revolution of 1917, itself created all the prerequisites for its own death.

Lenin masterfully took advantage of them and organized a third,

October Revolution. Contrary to the philosophy of Bolshevism, the October Revolution itself was not a naturally inevitable and organically logical act in the development of Russia.

Unlike the spontaneous people's revolution in February against tsarism, the Bolshevik revolution in October against democracy was an artificial revolution of a conspiratorial party.

But even such a revolution would not have been possible, and only the historians of Russian socialism would have known Lenin's name, if the Provisional Government had not made two fatal mistakes: money to organize the revolution; 2) overestimated the danger on the right and underestimated the danger on the left, as a result of which the Bolsheviks were armed to defeat the campaign of General Kornilov, and their leaders were released from prison (Trotsky rightly wrote: "The army that rose against Kornilov was the future army of the October Revolution." - L. Trotsky, "My Life", part P, p. 39).

Even with these mistakes, Lenin would never have come to power if the Provisional Government had mustered the courage and wisdom to solve two problems that tormented the entire army and the country, namely: withdraw from the war and announce agrarian reforms.

Subsequently, the leaders of Bolshevism themselves admitted that if these problems had been solved by the Provisional Government, they would not have been in power. Therefore, the first two decrees that Lenin proposed to the Second Congress of Soviets on the second day after the seizure of power - October 26 (November 8), were the "Decree on Peace" and the "Decree on Land."

The latter was literally written off from the "kulak" party of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

However, all the above reservations refer to objective factors, and the greatness or insignificance of historical figures is judged by how they, firstly, knew how or are able to use them to achieve their goals, and secondly, how they are endowed with the gift of foreseeing events.

In such a formulation of the question, I think, it is necessary to approach the assessment of Lenin's personality and deeds. First, I have to say a few words about the scheme of Lenin's personality, which was invented in the Kremlin. According to this scheme, Lenin is a brilliant scientist in the field of all social sciences: philosophy, political economy, jurisprudence, history, and even

literary criticism.

All this, of course, from the field of Soviet myth-making. Lenin was not a scientist in these sciences and did not pretend to be. He was an educated Marxist who radically revised Marxism from the left.

True, in his 55 volumes of the Complete Works you will not find a single word, even a hint of criticism of Marx. In words, for Lenin, Marx is an indisputable authority, but in reality no one, even in the camp of Marx's personal enemies, allowed himself such liberties in handling Marx's political philosophy and economic doctrine as Lenin did.

And this becomes understandable if one bears in mind that without a revision of the fundamental propositions of Marxism it was impossible to create that new conception called Leninism.

Lenin treated Marx not with the academic manner of a learned pedant, but with the pragmatic approach of an exploiter of Marx's ideas. Lenin did not act in the manner of Marx, but he forced Marx to act in the manner of Lenin.

Only where Marx categorically resisted did Lenin boldly take on the role

"continuer" of Marx. But if at the same time he was caught in contradictions, then he calmly answered: "Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action."

Even the basic Marxian philosophical credo "being determines consciousness" was decisively turned over by Lenin: in Lenin, in fact, "consciousness determines being". With Marx, the famous "basis" determines the "superstructure", while for Lenin, the "organized will" of the chosen minority determines both the "basis" and the "superstructure".

If Marx, in his words, put Hegel's dialectic on its head, making it materialistic, then in this case Lenin calmly allows "dialectic" to walk on its head and determine actions on earth not by matter, but by reason, with the only difference that in Hegel it has an abstract, even mystical character - "world mind", while in Lenin it has a concrete, creative character - the mind of the omnipotent party elite.

Therefore, where for Marx the revolution is the result of the implementation of the immanent laws of the internal development of capitalism, there for Lenin the revolution is a creative act of the same party elite. Lenin is the greatest voluntarist, for whom Marxism serves as an instrument to substantiate his revolutionary actions.

All this found its expression in Lenin's famous dictum from What Is To Be Done? (1902): "Give us an organization of revolutionaries and we will turn Russia over." But just in Russia, from the point of view of Marx, the proletarian revolution was not on the agenda. Even more: any attempt to organize a proletarian revolution in a less industrialized country like Russia not only contradicted Marxism, but was also considered a crazy adventure.

In the preface to Capital, Marx wrote that "a country that is more industrially developed shows a less developed country only a picture of its own future ... Society can neither skip the natural phases of development nor cancel the latter by decrees" (K. Marx, Capital, 1931 edition, vol. 1, pp. XY, XY).

Lenin made it his life's goal to refute both of Marx's assertions in practice. But first it was necessary to create theoretical prerequisites for the refutation of Marx to proceed in a Marxist way.

This is the goal served by Lenin's work "Imperialism, as the highest stage of capitalism" (1916). Both in this work and in a series of articles that followed it, Lenin radically reversed Marx's scheme - the proletarian revolution need not start in the industrialized West, it can and even probably starts in the backward East.

This followed, according to Lenin, from the "immanent" laws of the uneven development of individual countries under imperialism, which were not known to Marx and Engels, since they did not live up to the age of imperialism (the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century).

Lenin argued that capitalism, at its present imperialist stage of development, is a chain of world political

and the economic system, which will break through in its "weak link", and then the whole chain will follow this "weak link".

In this case, Lenin considered Russia to be such a "weak link", prophesying at the same time that the proletarian revolution in Russia would be the beginning of a world revolution. Lenin believed that under imperialism wars were inevitable, and the result of a war would necessarily be a proletarian revolution.

Lenin wrote: "The horrors, calamities, ruin, savagery engendered by the imperialist war, make all this out of the level reached today.

capitalism to the era of the proletarian, socialist revolution" (Lenin, Works, vol. XX, p. 301).

Lenin himself did not really believe in the "immanence" of the new laws of imperialism he discovered. Therefore, as before, in his foreground was the "will to revolution", as an organized expression of the "will to power." Lenin tacitly admitted that 1) the proletarian revolution, even under imperialism, is not the inevitable end of the development of bourgeois society, but it can and must be organized artificially, and 2) the working class, called, according to Marx, to be the gravedigger of capitalism and the organizer of socialism, can never to be in itself neither one nor the other, if the ideas of revolution and socialism are not artificially instilled in it from outside ("What is to be done?").

These are all the prerequisites on the basis of which Lenin developed that main thing that is considered a specific product of his mind - the doctrine of a cadre party, the doctrine of the organization of the revolution, the doctrine of the dictatorship of mono-party power.

By October 1917, happy coincidences of circumstances and the favorable internal and external situation for Lenin in Russia made it possible for him to easily carry out his plan for organizing the revolution.

The moral philosophy of Bolshevism itself undoubtedly plays a role in Lenin's success.

Even Machiavelli knew that morality and politics are contraindicated to each other, in Lenin they are absolutely contraindicated. Absolute freedom from the moral norms of human society was the monopoly of Bolshevism. It was also their advantage over the unlucky knights of Russian democracy.

When Lenin and Zinoviev were accused (in a report from the Ministry of Justice) of receiving German money, it was the leaders of the Mensheviks (Chkheidze, Martov, Tsereteli, Sukhanov) who were most indignant at this accusation. They even passed a resolution in the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets in defense of Lenin as a victim of slander and, on behalf of the Central Executive Committee, asked the capital's newspapers not to print

government report on German money, while the Council is repeatedly taken on this charge.

The Soviet did not figure it out, because Lenin, contrary to his original written statement of July 7, refused to appear to give an explanation before the commission of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. But she figured it out

story. The publication of official documents from the archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the Second World War (Certapu apa Beuolaon sch Wisa, 1915-1918, easkea Bu 7. Chetap, Goon, Okhoga OshkhuerzTsu Prezs, 1958) no longer leaves any doubt that Lenin received German money.

However, as we have already written, not so much Lenin was a German agent, but on the contrary, the German General Staff was Lenin's agent for financing the Bolshevik revolution. In matters of Russia's defeat in the war, the interests of the Kaiser and Lenin went hand in hand.

Lenin directly wrote in March 1915 in a resolution of a conference of Bolshevik groups abroad: "The defeat of Russia under all conditions seems to be the lesser evil." ("The CPSU in Resolutions," Part 1, p. 239), and Lenin proclaimed the slogan "turning the imperialist war into a civil war" within Russia as early as November 1914 (ibid., p. 324).

Lenin rightly believed that it was not the class struggle within the country, but only one foreign policy catastrophe in Russia that gave him chances for
seizure of power.

While exalting Lenin's gift of foresight to the skies, the Kremlin's ideologists are silent about the fact that his scientific predictions regarding the prospects for world revolution and world socialism turned out to be a real utopia. At three cardinal points in the prospects for social development, Lenin's prophecy turned out to be false.

These points are as follows:

1. Lenin wrote that imperialism is the last, decaying phase of capitalism, that capitalist imperialism is doomed to a quick death. Here is his conclusion: "From everything that has been said above about the economic essence of imperialism, it follows that it has to be characterized as transitional or, rather, dying capitalism" (Lenin, Works, vol. XX, p. 173). For 70 years this capitalism has been "dying" and will never die! Moreover, the most epoch-making discoveries in the field of science, engineering and technology were made by this "dying, decaying" capitalism. Even His Majesty the world proletariat is no longer the same - it is becoming bourgeois, gradually turning into the middle class of an industrial society (only incorrigible Soviet dogmatists can still preach the theory of Marx and Lenin about the "absolute

impoverishment of the working class).

2. Lenin thought that he had scientifically proved that the Russian revolution would inevitably be the beginning and the first stage of the world revolution. Nothing like that happened. The communist regimes in Eastern Europe were brought on the bayonets of the Red Army and are still holding on to these bayonets, and in China Mao Tse-tung won by preaching the ideas

nationalism and agrarian reforms, that is, in essence, under the banner of the bourgeois revolution.

3. Lenin thought that there would be no borders between the communist countries and that they would constitute a "world Soviet republic" (Lenin, Works, vol. XY, p. 150), but what happened in reality? It turned out that the new communist states created by the Soviet Union itself not only did not want to enter the "world Soviet republic", but, on the contrary, they have to be occupied again and again so that they remain communist, and the "peaceful" coexistence between the two communist colossi - the USSR and China - based on periodic bloodletting on their borders. Moreover, they all swear by the name of Lenin!

Nor did Lenin's prophecies come true regarding the prospects for the internal development of Soviet society and the state. We will point out only the most important of them:

1. Lenin wrote in a resolution adopted at the April party conference in 1917 that the Soviet republic would be a new "type of state without police, without a standing army, without privileged officials" ("KISS in Resolutions", part D, p. 352). But it is precisely on these "three pillars" that the communist dictatorship has been based for more than half a century.

In his book *The State and Revolution*, published 15 months after the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, Lenin wrote that the process of the withering away of the state would take place in full accordance with the teachings of Marxism. "Instead of special institutions of a privileged minority, the majority itself can directly carry out this, and the more popular the performance of the functions of state power becomes, the less need for this power becomes ... Complete election, turnover at any time of all officials without exception, reduction of their salaries to the usual wages of a worker serve as a bridge to socialism" (Lenin,

Works, vol. XHT, pp. 398-399).

How fantastic and naive these statements of Lenin sound in relation to the existing unprecedented bureaucratic machine of government in the USSR and the system of remuneration in the country! The USSR is the only civilized power in the world where ordinary citizens are not supposed to know how much their rulers receive.

Apparently, the rulers have reason to hide the amount of their income in the country of "socialism".

3. In the party program of 1919, Lenin wrote: "that the deprivation of political rights and any restrictions on freedom whatsoever are necessary solely as temporary measures of struggle ... As the objective possibility of the exploitation of man by man disappears, the need to in these temporary measures, and the party will strive to narrow them down and to completely abolish them" ("CPSU in Resolutions", part I, p. 414; emphasis mine. - A. A.). For fifty-two years, the party oligarchy in the USSR has ruled the country with the help of these "temporary measures," although party ideologists assert that the "objective possibility of exploitation of man by man" has long been eliminated in the USSR.

However, the greatest of all the utopias of Marxism-Leninism must be considered

the basis of the foundations of this doctrine is the theory of building socialism.

More than half a century of experience in the USSR proved that the ultimatum alternative of Marx and Lenin - the inevitability of the transition from capitalism to socialism - is just a fantasy. Instead of one old class structure, with its privileges for the propertied classes, a new Soviet class structure with its privileges for the ruling classes was created in the USSR.

Wealth used to give power, but now power gives wealth. Lenin used to say that old Russia was run by 130,000 landowners, but now the new Soviet Russia is run by about five million top and middle bureaucrats.

The growth in the number of governors did not make the people feel better. In any case, this is not the kind of socialism under which, according to Lenin, a minister should not receive more than a worker.

This list of Lenin's unfulfilled prophecies could be continued, but the examples given are enough to say: before the court of history, Lenin passed only one exam - the exam of the gravedigger of democracy and the architect of a mono-party dictatorship, at the logical end

which Stalin's tyranny was supposed to stand.

The first congress of the party after the death of Lenin - the XIII Congress - took place on May 23-31, 1924. It was attended by 748 delegates with a decisive vote and 416 with an advisory vote, representing 735,881 party members and candidates (some of the candidates recruited into the party in response to Lenin's death - "Lenin's call" - there were 241,591 people). The congress was opened by Kamenev with a short speech dedicated to the memory of Lenin. He said that "our banner will be Lenin, our program will be Leninism." The congress visited Lenin's grave, where a parade of young pioneers ("young Leninists") was arranged. At the parade, speeches were made by Kamenev (protocol: "prolonged applause"), Bukharin ("prolonged applause"), Rykov ("applause"), Trotsky ("long non-ceasing applause"). Trotsky told the young pioneers: "Remember, Lenins are born for centuries. Nobody can become Lenin. But anyone can become a Leninist" ("Thirteenth Congress of the RCP (6). Verbatim report", 1963, pp. 707-709). The congress approved the following agenda:

Political report of the Central Committee - Zinoviev.

Organizational report of the Central Committee - Stalin.

Report of the Central Audit Commission - Kursk.

Report of the Central Control Commission - Kuibyshev.

Report of the Comintern - Bukharin.

Trade and cooperation - Kamenev, Krzhizhanovsky, Andreev. About work in the village - Kalinin, Krupskaya.

About work among youth - Bukharin. Party and organizational issues - Molotov.

10. Ryazanov's reports on the manuscripts of Marx and Engels and Kamenev on the opening of the Lenin Institute.

Neither Trotsky nor his supporters were allowed to make reports. Moreover, the congress confirmed the resolution of the 13th party conference condemning the Trotskyist "petty-bourgeois deviation in the party", that is, once again condemned the position of Trotsky and his supporters ("platform 46"). Trotsky demanded nothing more than the fulfillment by the Central Committee of the decision of the September plenum of the Central Committee (1923) on the development and strengthening of internal party democracy.

Zinoviev began his political report of the Central Committee with the poems of the poet A. Bezymensky, which were dedicated to this congress:

A

Slowly, menacingly and weightily
Someone interrupted the noise ...

- In the congress agenda ... Brothers,
failure! The word wanders, staggering It can be seen in
thoughts

The knees trembled

In the blur of the eyes

Sadness is lost. Political
report of the Central Committee...

Reads... reads

Not Lenin...

Judging by Zinoviev's report and by his own confession (Zinoviev: "here, indeed, he is truly captured"), the "failure" was very deep. But Zinoviev nevertheless evaluated the work done without Lenin optimistically, saying: "without Lenin, without a lamp, without the most brilliant head on earth, the Central Committee sums up the results of the past year with a plus."

The undoubted "plus" of the last year, from the point of view of maintaining power in the hands of the "troika", had to be attributed to the death of Lenin. Lenin's "testament", which she hid not only from the party, but also from the Central Committee until Lenin died and the "troika" finally sat in the saddle of power, was not so frightening to her now.

Still, the "troika" did not dare to announce it even at this 13th Party Congress. Its contents were privately brought to the attention of certain delegations, but without the right to familiarize themselves with it in the original, and even more so without the right to express or discuss it. It was said that Lenin gave characteristics in it to "individual members of the Central Committee" - to whom, what characteristics were given by Lenin, remained unknown until Stalin began, quoting passage after passage of the "testament", to smash group after group of his rivals.

Zinoviev and Kamenev closely connected the fate of their careers with the preservation of Stalin as "general secretary" as a weapon in the struggle against Trotsky, and they well understood that Lenin's "bomb" against Stalin could blow up the whole

"troika". Therefore, Lenin's letter to the KhP Congress was not read out and was not

accepted for leadership at the 13th Congress.

Zinoviev's report, as usual, was verbose, empty of content, without any glimpse of original thoughts, although not without cheap sarcasm. But it does have some places worth stopping by. Zinoviev spoke about the mood of the Russian intelligentsia from the words of a delegate at the Congress of Engineers in Leningrad. This non-Party engineer said: "Communists, like materialists, consider it necessary to give people first of all the basic necessities, but we intellectuals say that human rights are needed first of all ... This is all power. Now we do not have these human rights, and until we get them, we will be inert ... An intellectual is any person, be it a peasant, be it a worker, be it a person with a diploma, this is a person who puts human rights above all, believes that a person is the highest value in the state. Zinoviev answered the Leningrad engineers: "It is absolutely clear that they will not see such rights as their ears without a mirror in our republic" ("Thirteenth Congress", pp. 103-104). With vigilance in mind, Zinoviev told the congress: "Remember the petty-bourgeois enveloping that penetrates the ears, the eyes, imperceptibly penetrates the heart and brain." Addressing the opposition, Zinoviev suggested that they come to the rostrum of the congress and say: we were wrong, but the party was right! Zinoviev could not resist emphasizing his role as the main leader of the party: "We were told: at the KhP Congress, they say, Zinoviev predicted that 9/10 would be for the majority of the Central Committee, and he was right, but at the XIII Congress we will see. So look, comrades (prolonged applause)" (ibid., pp. 106-107).

At the end of Zinoviev's report, the protocol notes: "a stormy, warm ovation; long unceasing applause; the delegates stand up and sing the Internationale" - even Lenin never received such a reception!

At the end of the second report of the Central Committee - the report of Stalin - there is no indication of a "stormy ovation" in the protocol (the protocol will be written differently at the next congress).

On the other hand, Stalin outlined a clear and harmonious concept of the total power of the party at all levels and in all sectors of the life of society and the state. He placed personnel policy at the center of this concept, he demanded that the plenums of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission be turned "into a school for developing leaders of the working class", and the plenums of gubernia and district committees into a "school of leaders of a local and regional character" (ibid., p. 121). Stalin suggested

to systematically replenish cadres by promoting "party youth" from top to bottom. Of the opposition, Stalin said that the oppositionists, "who only recently croaked about the death of our party, are very reminiscent of people who should be called strangers in the party" (ibid., p. 127).

The "Troika" and the party apparatus led by it were very rude in their polemics with the Trotskyists and acted according to the method "slander, slander - let something remain." Such methods were considered unacceptable even during acute periods of struggle between the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions. Now the Central Committee was accusing Trotsky and the authors of the "Declaration 46", referring to the decision of the Tenth Congress, but not that they formed a faction, because there was none, but that they generally dared to write closed letters addressed to the party criticizing its executive organ - PC. Criticism of the party apparatus even with

party positions was declared a crime.

Of the critics or oppositionists of the Central Committee, four people spoke at the congress: Trotsky, Preobrazhensky, Radek, and B. K. Suvarin, a guest from the Comintern.

Trotsky promised to refrain from any polemic that might exacerbate the situation or introduce personal points into the discussion. It was, perhaps, the most informative and the most argumentative of all Trotsky's speeches at party congresses. At the same time, both in form and in tone, it stood in such sharp contrast to the crude, primitive, and cheeky polemics of the supporters of the Central Committee that, following Uglanov, Zinoviev called Trotsky's speech "parliamentary." He explained what he meant by "parliamentary" speech: "Parliamentary speech can be characterized by two features. The first is when a person says not quite what he thinks, or even not at all what he thinks. The second feature is when a person, speaking in parliament, "through the window" speaks to some other environment ... I think that Comrade Trotsky's speech contained both of these features" (ibid., p. 251). Trotsky's speech was so invulnerable from the point of view of party orthodoxy, from the point of view of Leninism, that Zinoviev, like Stalin and Kamenev, declared it insincere.

Since it was essentially impossible to criticize Trotsky's positions, he was criticized not for what he was talking about, but for what he did not talk about, but, in the opinion of the Troika, he should have. This unique method of polemic with the enemy was invented by Stalin.

Trotsky began by stating the fact that the Central Committee itself, in a unanimous decision of the Politburo of December 5, 1923, "openly proclaimed a change in internal party policy" in order to eliminate, as noted in this resolution, "the observed bureaucratization of the party apparatuses and the resulting threat of separation of the party from the masses" (ibid., p. 146).

It must be pointed out that this decision of the Central Committee was not an act of goodwill of the Central Committee - it was a compromise of the subcommittee of the PC consisting of Trotsky, Kamenev and Stalin (Stalin spoke about this at the 13th Congress). The Politburo was temporarily compelled to accept this compromise in view of the strong, growing pressure of the masses of the Party. Therefore, although the Central Committee published the decision of December 5, it was not at all going to be guided by this compromise decision (it is not for nothing that it was never included and still is not included in the party codification - in the "CPSU in resolutions").

However, Trotsky took advantage of this decision and three days later - on December 8 - he released his famous "New Course", which was, as it were, a commentary on the decision of the Central Committee of December 5.

Now party historians qualify the New Course as almost a counter-revolutionary document (Z. I. Klyucheva, "Ideological and organizational strengthening of the Communist Party ...", 1970, p. 129), although it was published with the consent of the Central Committee in Pravda, starting with December 11, 1923 Of course, Trotsky wrote there things that were very unpleasant for the Troika. There are only three quotes worth mentioning:

1. "The party lives on two floors: in the upper one they decide, in the lower one they only learn about decisions" (L. Trotsky, *Novy Kurs*, Moscow, 1923, p. 12);

I "The danger of the old course ... lies in the fact that it tends to increasingly oppose several thousand

comrades who make up the leading cadres, to the rest of the mass, as an object of influence" (ibid.);

3. "It would be a ridiculous and unworthy policy of an ostrich not to understand that the accusation of bureaucracy formulated by the resolution of the Central Committee is an accusation against the leading cadres ... The point is in the apparatus course, in its bureaucratic tendency. Does bureaucracy contain the danger of degeneration or not? It would be blindness to deny this danger. Bureaucratization threatens to break away from the masses, focusing all attention on issues of management, selection, displacement, narrowing the field of vision, weakening the revolutionary instinct, that is, more or less

degeneration of the older generation... This warning, which is based on an objective Marxist foresight, can be seen as some kind of "insult", "assassination attempt", etc., only in case of painful bureaucratic suspiciousness and apparatus arrogance" (ibid., p. 13).

Trotsky substantiated these theses of his at the Thirteenth Congress with references specifically to the decisions of the Central Committee of December 5th.

Since Bukharin was the most faithful supporter of the "troika" in the Politburo, Trotsky cited Bukharin's speech at one of the party meetings in Moscow as proof of the growth of party apparatus bureaucracy. Bukharin said there: "There are an infinite number of shortcomings that led to the well-known lucritical state of our party ... Usually the secretaries of the cells are appointed by district committees ... They come and ask: 'who is against it?' ", And since they are afraid to speak out against, then the corresponding individual appointed secretary of the bureau of the cell... In most cases, elections in our country turn into elections in quotation marks. With the order of the day, the same procedure ... A pre-prepared resolution is read out, which passes according to a template ... "Who is against it?" ... "No discussion!", "Who is against it?" it. etc., and a whole system of such methods nullifies inner-party life... I gave several examples from our cells. The same thing can be seen in a slightly modified form in the next ranks of our party hierarchy" ("The Thirteenth Congress ...", pp. 147-148).

Quoting Bukharin, "one of the prominent members of the Central Committee," Trotsky noted that the reasons given by Bukharin "prompted the Central Committee, with one or another internal disagreement, to make a decision as a whole of such exceptional importance," a decision which concluded: "the interests of the party ... demand a serious change in the course of the party in the sense of a real and systematic implementation of the principles of workers' democracy" (ibid., pp. 147-148).

Both the New Course and the Letter of the 46 (Pyatakov, Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov, Sapronov, Smirnov, Osinsky, Drobnis, and others) demanded the implementation of this very unanimously adopted resolution of the Central Committee. The absurdity of the current situation lay in the fact that the "troika" did not at all intend to put it into practice; "Troika" simply created for itself

an alibi against Trotsky on December 5, and Trotsky seriously thought that the old course of party bureaucratization was over and that the New Course was now beginning.

The Central Committee wanted to carry out inner-party "workers' democratization" in such a way that the party would be given broad rights to unanimously vote for the Central Committee, and anyone who criticized it could be brought under Lenin's sanctions from the resolution "on the unity of the party." X congress. Trotsky and 46 opposed this. Trotsky quoted at the Thirteenth Congress exactly that passage from the resolution of December 5, which says that "only a constant living ideological life can preserve the party as it was before and during the revolution, with constant critical study of its past, correction of its mistakes and collective discussion the most important questions. Only these methods of work can give real guarantees that episodic disagreements do not turn into factional groupings ... To prevent this, it is necessary that the leading Party bodies listen to the voice of the broad masses of the Party, do not consider any criticism a manifestation of factionalism ... "(ibid. , p. 152).

Having finished the quotation, Trotsky said: "This is an integral part of the same resolution of the Central Committee, and I think that we have neither the right nor the grounds to throw it out either from our memory or from the history of the party" (ibid.).

But the Central Committee threw all this out of memory and history, especially since, judging by the style of the text, Trotsky himself was the author of this resolution, which, however, later Stalin confirmed, stating that the Central Committee, despite and contrary to the decision of December 5, is considering any criticism against the Central Committee as a "petty-bourgeois deviation" (assessment of the position of Trotsky and the "46" at the thirteenth conference). Trotsky ended this part of the speech by pointing out that such a policy of the Central Committee aroused in him "great doubts and the greatest fears."

To Zinoviev's demand that Trotsky come to the podium and say that in the ongoing discussion the party (troika) was right, and he was wrong, Trotsky replied: "None of us wants and cannot be right against his party. The Party is always right in the final analysis, because it is the only historical instrument given to the proletariat for the solution of its fundamental tasks. Nothing is easier than to say: all the criticism, all the statements, warnings and protests - all this was a complete mistake. I, comrades, however, cannot say this, because it is not

Think. I know that it is impossible to be right against the party. One can be right with the party and through the party, because history has not created other ways to realize the rightness ... True or false at certain moments, but this is my party ... If, in the opinion of other comrades, I was drawing this or that danger in vain, then I, for my part, consider that I am only fulfilling the duty of a member of the Party ... Not only an individual member of the Party, but even the Party itself can make individual mistakes, such, for example, are individual decisions of the last conference "(ibid. , pp. 158-159).

Trotsky emphatically refuted the Troika's assertions that he was against factions, but for the right of groupings. He said that both are the same. Only the Central Committee should pursue a policy that does not give rise to factions and groups. Trotsky ended his speech with the words: "And if a party makes a decision that one or the other of us considers an unjust decision, then he says: it's fair or unfair, but this is my party and I bear responsibility for the consequences of its decision to the end" (ibid., p. .159).

We quoted Trotsky in such detail to show how invulnerable his position was from the point of view of Leninist orthodoxy, how difficult it was for his rivals to expose "Trotskyism", and this was all the reason why

the party apparatus fought not against what Trotsky says, but against what he himself ascribes to him. What the Troika attributed to him was not the desire to fight the bureaucratization of the party, but the intention, in Kamenev's words, "to try to make a revolution in the party" (ibid., p. 202). Even Trotsky's authoritative statements and refutations of all this before the entire congress, before the entire party, the "troika" does not accept and does not recognize. Here is one example about "factions" and "groups". Kamenev joked about this: "T. Trotsky declared that he did not and does not recognize the freedom of groupings, because groupings are another name for a faction. Here's where to repeat the proverb: an egg is expensive for Christ's day! If Trotsky had given us Muscovites and me personally this wording or published it in November, how much effort and energy would have been saved by Comrade Preobrazhensky and I" (ibid., p. 208).

But Stalin, in his concluding remarks, continued to insist that Trotsky was in favor of groupings and that, allegedly, for this reason, the resolution of December 5 "limited itself to referring to the resolution of the Tenth Congress, which at that time Comrade Trotsky apparently did not read it, for it speaks not only of the prohibition of factions,

but also about the prohibition of groupings" (ibid., p. 231).

For such a gifted strategist as Stalin, the assertion that the "troika" deceived Trotsky, taking advantage of his ignorance of party politics, must be recognized as a completely unconvincing trick. Incidentally, the whole chain of evidence about the alleged treachery of Trotsky and the Trotskyists consisted of such tricks, which, as the critical point of the struggle for power approached, took on the character and scale of a gigantic Party Dreyfusiade.

The speeches at the congress of "Bolshevik-proletarians" that followed Trotsky's speech showed that the "troika" thoroughly prepared the thirteenth congress as an anti-Trotskyist congress, regardless of what Trotsky himself would say at this congress.

One of these "proletarians" from the provinces, Uglanov, calling himself one of the "illiterate, leading the province," repeated Stalin's words that Trotsky did not know the party, that "the party lives from 1917 to 1919 ... the party is not preparatory class ... the party does not govern the state in the same way as in 1918-1919" (p. 160), in other words, the "troika" governs the state better than Lenin and Trotsky ruled (the grateful "troika" in a month or two appointed "illiterate" Uglanov as the first secretary of the Moscow Party Committee instead of the literate but hesitant Zelensky).

Another "proletarian" delegate, Ivanov, said that "comrade Trotsky really cleverly avoided the question of the old and the young, but for us, proletarians, who are not experienced in these lofty matters, it is still very clear ... that the so-called Trotsky 'turned down' and very thoroughly" (ibid., p. 168).

The third "proletarian" delegate, Zakharov, said that the Socialist-Revolutionaries had the kind of democracy that Trotsky is talking about, and because of this democracy, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party perished, so "I would like Comrade Trotsky to come out and confess" (ibid., p. 171).

It was at this political level that the "proletarians" argued with Trotsky. Krupskaya, Lenin's widow, decided to point out to the delegates the harmfulness of artificially inflating disagreements. She stated that Zinoviev formulated the question incorrectly when he demanded of Trotsky "tell from the rostrum that

you're wrong". Krupskaya said:

"Psychologically, this is impossible ... The opposition's statement about the desire to work together is enough, and it was in what Comrade Trotsky said ..."

(ibid., p. 225).

Krupskaya expressed her obvious dissatisfaction with the artificial aggravation of the question of opposition. She said: "It would not be right to repeat here the discussion that was ... (this) introduces unnecessary sharpness in relations between the former opposition and between the core of the party" (p. 225).

Krupskaya obviously did not understand that for the "nucleus of the party" the opposition was not at all "former" until Trotsky was politically buried. In their concluding remarks, Zinoviev and Stalin made this clear even to Krupskaya. Zinoviev, responding to Krupskaya, said that we (the Central Committee) put the question before Trotsky and his supporters in this way "not because of the aesthetic pleasure of defeating the enemy ... We wanted them to make this statement in order to calm the congress, so that the comrades who had dispersed to the places, they could say: it's over, they stopped buzzing ... I ask you, did their statements reassure you? (From the seats: "No, no!"). Did they satisfy you? (From the seats: "No, no!"). What will you have to say when reporting on the congress in the localities? Wouldn't you have to say that they are beginning the old history anew... Questions concerning the foundations of Bolshevism, we cannot consign to oblivion" (ibid., pp. 256-257).

A resolution was introduced which "entirely and completely" approved the line of the Central Committee, condemned the opposition, attached to the decisions of the 13th Congress the resolutions of the 13th Party Conference condemning Trotsky and the "46" opposition. The presiding officer asked if there was another resolution and, stating that there was no other resolution, proceeded to vote: "Who is for the resolution? Who is against? Counting is redundant, since there are none. Who abstained? There are none. The resolution was adopted unanimously" (ibid., p. 263).

Such unheard-of unanimity was quite understandable. Not a single member of the opposition, including Politburo member Trotsky, was admitted to the congress with a decisive vote.

Kuibyshev delivered a report from the Central Control Commission. Stalin's staunchest supporter and protege, Kuibyshev made the Central Control Commission an auxiliary tool of the party apparatus for cracking down on any shade of oppositional thought in the party. The Central Control Commission gradually became the party's secret police, performing the same functions of a police investigation and criminal court within the party as the OGPU does among the people. Kuibyshev even boasted about this role of the Central Control Commission, saying that "the Central Control Commission defended the Central Committee against attacks from the opposition." He said,

that "they tried to get some kind of independent line from us ... to judge all those fighting impartially, calmly ... We were flattered: "You are an organ elected by the congress, you are equal in rights with the Central Committee." We were persuaded that we must be impartial, that we must be the authority standing above the ongoing struggle—this seductive position did not tempt the Central Control Commission" (ibid., pp. 263-264).

Whether the opposition was right, how weighty its arguments were, was of no interest to the Central Control Commission, although it was conceived by Lenin as a judge of the party independent of the Central Committee. Even in his last article, How do we

to reorganize the Rabkrin" Lenin wrote: "The members of the Central Control Commission must form a close-knit group, which, 'regardless of persons', will have to ensure that no one's authority, neither the general secretary nor any of the other members of the Central Committee, can prevent them from making a request, check the documents and generally achieve "the strictest correctness of affairs"

(Lenin, PSS, vol. 45, p. 387). The word of the Secretary General - for the Central Control Commission was the law, contrary to the direct instructions of Lenin.

Bukharin's report on the Comintern repeated the well-known principles of tactics and strategy of the Central Committee in the world communist movement. In this report, Bukharin put forward the rather paradoxical proposition that Trotsky's left opposition is supported in the parties of the Comintern by "the most right-wing elements." For example, in the German Communist Party its leaders, led by Brandler, were considered right-wing, and they were accused of "Trotskyism." When they were expelled from the party in April 1924, the left-wing group of Ruth Fischer and Maslow became the leader of the party. But soon this group was also declared "Trotskyite"! Bukharin also gave an interesting and original interpretation of the "united front" tactics of the Communists with the Social Democrats. He declared on behalf of the Central Committee of the RCP(b):

"We considered the tactics of the united front as a well-known maneuver for agitation, mobilization of the masses and for wresting the working class from the influence of social democracy. On the other hand, the comrades who stood on the right wing of the German Communist Party, and who found a response with our opposition, clearly saw a whole theoretical construction. To them the tactics of the united front seemed like a real bloc with the Social-Democrats" (ibid., pp. 317, 320).

When discussing Bukharin's report, two oppositionists spoke - Karl Radek and Boris Souvarine (Comintern, Communist Party of France). Radek in

in very polite words he criticized the leadership of the German Communist Party, which, with the help of Zinoviev and Stalin, came to power in the party instead of Brandler; but the example given by Radek about the low theoretical level of the new leadership was very crude. Radek quoted from an article by a member of the Politburo of the KKE in the party's central organ:

"To fight Brandler's opportunism by referring to the organizational principles of Rosa Luxembourg is to treat gonorrhea with an injection of syphilis" (ibid., p. 443).

The sharpest, and for the directors of the congress, was simply deadly was the speech of one of the then leaders of the Comintern and the French Communist Party, Boris Souvarine. Souvarine had been a member of the French Socialist Party since 1914, belonged to its left wing, corresponded with Lenin, was among the organizers of the French Communist Party, and was a leading publicist for L'Humanité. When the debate on Bukharin's report was terminated, the congress urgently asked him to speak. Souvarine spoke and, referring to the topic of Trotsky, said:

"A significant part of the French Communist Party was extremely agitated by the sharp tone of the polemic ... It seemed to them that the matter was reduced not to principled arguments, but to various types of attacks ... The name of Comrade Trotsky has international significance ... it seemed to them that this kind of degradation of dignity was wrong this great revolutionary figure. Therefore, a resolution was adopted by 22 votes to two, instructing the French representation at the Comintern ... to intervene in this struggle

with the proposal of an agreement and an end to this polemic... The accusation of Comrade Trotsky of Menshevism is completely unfounded... No fundamental disagreements could be seen in this struggle... A lot of slander and lies were spread against Comrade Trotsky" (ibid., p. 354).

Souvarine added that it was this whole campaign against Trotsky, based solely on slander and lies, that made him come out in defense of Trotsky. Although he knows that everything is set up in such a way that the Central Committee will win at this congress, he, Souvarine, still does not regret having taken his present position. At the end of B. Souvarine's speech, the protocol notes: voices: "Shame!" Obviously, Souvarine did not say what the congress expected from him. It was a speech in which things were called by their proper names - the Stalin-Zinoviev-Kamenev Central Committee is waging an ideologically unprincipled campaign against Trotsky,

according to the arguments, a slanderous, but politically purposeful struggle - a struggle for power. Therefore, the congress knew how, by whom and why it was convened. It made absolutely no difference to the congress whether Trotsky was right or wrong. Only one argument mattered: in whose hands is this very power. Power was in the hands of the Troika. Therefore, she was right, and not Trotsky. Hence the complete triumph of the Troika line on all questions.

Such was the congress, among whose delegates the "troika" finally dared to announce Lenin's "Testament". However, even at such a congress the Troika did not dare, as we have already pointed out, to read out Lenin's Letter to the Congress. She acquainted only individual delegations with the contents of the "Letter to the Congress", while Lenin wanted the letter to be read out at the congress and his proposal to remove Stalin from the post of general secretary put to a vote. However, this is not of decisive importance. It is unlikely that Lenin himself would have been able to carry his will through this Stalinist congress. It was not for nothing that Lenin suggested to Trotsky, even on the eve of the last KhP congress, to conclude with him a "Lenin-Trotsky bloc" against one "Secretary General" Stalin with his "immense power". Now, a year later, she has become even more "immense", but most importantly, she has now become unshakable.

The outward trappings of this power of Stalin are absolutely not to be seen at the congress. Stalin made only an organizational report at the congress. The congress was opened by Kamenev. The political report of the party leader is made by Zinoviev. The final word at the end is delivered by Zinoviev. Kamenev declares the congress closed. And what about Stalin?

The tragicomedy lies in the fact that Zinoviev and Kamenev themselves do not know that they are here at the congress playing the role of wedding generals for the real master: Stalin. 53 members and 34 candidates were elected to the Central Committee. Trotsky and Pyatakov were re-elected from the oppositionists. Radek was expelled from the Central Committee. 14 new members were elected to the membership of the Central Committee, the candidate's number was doubled. The membership of the Central Control Commission has been increased from 50 to 151. All the newly elected are full-blooded Stalinists, about whom, perhaps, Zinoviev and Kamenev think that they are supporters not of Stalin alone, but of the entire "troika". This misunderstanding will be cleared up very soon, so soon that it will be too late. Until that very last moment, Stalin never let the head of the Comintern, Zinoviev, know what he really thought of him. It must be assumed that Stalin thought the way one contemporary thought of Napoleon III: "Of course, he is not a great man, but his mistakes are brilliant."

One small detail: there was an established rule in the party that a person is considered a member of the communist party from the day

joining the RSDLP or a social democratic circle. Therefore, Lenin was considered a member of the party from 1894, Trotsky from 1897, Stalin from 1898, Radek from 1902. In all the protocols of party congresses under Lenin, this is indicated. The minutes of the 13th Congress indicate that Trotsky and Radek have been in the party only since 1917.

The Politburo remained in its old composition, including Trotsky. Instead of Lenin, Bukharin was introduced to the Politburo. Frunze, Dzerzhinsky and Sokolnikov became the new candidates for the Politburo.

The secretariat of the Central Committee became as ideal as Stalin wanted to see it from the very first days of his arrival here: the General Secretary - Stalin, the second secretary (deputy secretary general) - Molotov, the third secretary (personnel) - Lazar Kaganovich. All three became members of the Orgburo. From now on, instead of the old "troika" - Zinoviev-Kamenev-Stalin - this new "troika" - Stalin-Molotov-Kaganovich - has become the actual helmsman of the party and the state.

Zinoviev and Kamenev did not even notice how they found themselves out of power. Stalin did not touch them at all. He only himself left the "troika", taking with him at the same time one technical "trifle": the apparatus of the Central Committee. With the help of this "trifle", Stalin very quickly and painlessly politically castrated the Politburo. When Zinoviev and Kamenev noticed this, it turned out that Stalin had performed an irreversible operation on them.

Chapter 25

Zinoviev's New Opposition

After the decision of the Tenth Congress to ban opposition factions, no one dared to fight the party apparatus by organizing any groups of like-minded people. Therefore, not a single opposition, starting with the opposition of Trotsky in 1923, was created by itself - each time it was artificially created by Stalin by declaring the business proposals of party leaders as an "anti-party deviation", collective statements -

formation of "anti-Party factions". Then, according to the logic of things, a struggle was played out. Trotsky's New Course was addressed to party members, Statement 46 to Politburo members. The Troika, on Stalin's initiative, united them and declared them to be the "Left Opposition" on a factional basis. In exactly the same way Stalin creates, as we shall see, the "new opposition" of Zinoviev and the "right opposition" of Bukharin. Even the names of all oppositions are given by Stalin himself.

Contemporaries paint Grigory Evseevich Zinoviev as an extremely unbalanced, emotional, arrogant person, an alarmist in times of danger, an enthusiast in times of triumph, and in power - cruel to the point of callousness. The palm in the Red Terror in the first years after the revolution belongs not to Lenin, not to Stalin, but to him. What Dzerzhinsky and his Cheka did on an all-Russian scale, Zinoviev, relying on Chekist Uritsky, did in Petrograd, for which Uritsky had to pay with his life in the summer of 1918. What Lenin, together with the Central Committee, decided for the entire party, Zinoviev single-handedly decided for party organization of Petrograd and the northwestern provinces. At times, he even decided for the entire party, giving the "initiative" from the first capital of the revolution, as we saw during the trade union discussion in 1920. After all, the "Ten" group in this discussion was nominally headed by him, and not by Lenin, so what?

As far as Stalin is concerned, he was listed as Zinoviev's assistant in Moscow in the "Ten" group.

Lenin not only forgave him for his anti-Leninist behavior during the coup and his constant vacillations after the victory towards the creation of a government of all Soviet parties (Bolsheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks), but also appointed him chairman of the Petrograd Soviet instead of Trotsky, and after the creation of the Comintern (1919) - Chairman of its Executive Committee. For the convenience of Zinoviev, Lenin even agreed to create a parallel residence of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in Petrograd. As a political strategist, Lenin knew how to use not only the strengths, but also the weaknesses of his students. He knew that people like Zinoviev and Stalin were driven by bottomless ambition, coupled with an equally bottomless thirst for personal power. Therefore, Lenin shared power with them in order, firstly, to constantly oppose them to Trotsky (whom he mistakenly considered a potential rival), which he succeeded in, and secondly, to make them more handy in this way, which he clearly failed (see chapter " CONSPIRACY

"triples").

But Lenin kept Stalin at a certain distance from himself and only got to know him closely from 1917, while he considered Zinoviev to be his man. During the war, Lenin and Zinoviev jointly published the book *Against the Current*, and on the title page Zinoviev's name comes before Lenin's name. It is difficult to explain for what personal qualities Lenin valued him. True, in exile, for about ten years, Zinoviev was almost a constant assistant to Lenin as secretary of the editors of his endless emigre publications. As a publicist, Zinoviev is more of an apprentice than a master, as an analyst he is completely helpless, as a speaker he was recognized only as an "agitator". When you read his speeches and writings (and he, together with Lenin and Trotsky, in the early twenties began to publish his *Collected Works*), then not only do you not find any original ideas or simply literary brilliance in them, but you do not find the most important thing - do not you find explanations of how such an ordinary writer could exert such a great ideological influence on Lenin and the party. Even the last and mature work of Zinoviev, the book *Leninism* (1925), is considered by the American professor Daniels to be an "incredibly boring book" .

However, you can be a bad speaker, a mediocre journalist, and just a person of little intelligence, but an outstanding master in the political game. He, too, was not Zinoviev. Evidence of this is the entire history of the rule of the "troika" and the struggle of the "new opposition". Only one assumption remains - Zinoviev was part of that narrow circle of party leaders who decided on behalf of the Bolshevik emigrant center to accept German money from Dr. Parvus-Gelfand. According to all the information related to this story, this circle included only four people: Lenin himself, Zinoviev, Radek, and Ganetsky, who was directly connected with Parvus. In this matter, Lenin was, as it were, in the hands of Zinoviev, just as both of them - Lenin and Zinoviev - were in the hands of Stalin, when the latter, together with Kamenev, found out where the money was flowing to them to finance the newspaper *Pravda* edited by both of them.

His friend and associate Lev Borisovich Kamenev, on the contrary, was made of a completely different material. A peer of Zinoviev (born 1883), in the party since the same year as he (1901), a Jew, like him (D. Shub writes that Kamenev is half-Jewish, see his very valuable book "Politicians

Russia", 1969, p. 372), a continuous collaborator and co-editor of Lenin in exile, like him, but, unlike Zinoviev, returned to Russia for underground work in 1912 as the editor of Pravda and the head of the Duma faction of the Bolsheviks, - Kamenev belonged to the educated intellectual elite of the party. Before returning to Russia in 1912, on behalf of and with a preface by Lenin, he wrote the book Two Parties, directed against Trotsky and Martov's August Bloc. He was a well-read Marxist, a thoughtful publicist and a tolerant polemicist, which favorably distinguished him in this role and from Lenin. Lenin considered him a "smart politician" and, as if with annoyance, added - "but what kind of administrator is he?" At critical moments in his life, Kamenev showed not only personal courage, but also presence of mind. Only by his restraint and the most intelligent defense tactics at trial (1915) was the Duma five of the Bolsheviks saved from the death penalty, with whom he was sued as a representative of the Bolshevik Central Committee and with whom he was exiled to an eternal settlement in Siberia. Returning from exile after the February Revolution, he led Pravda and the Central Committee until the return of Lenin from abroad. Stalin was his comrade-in-arms both in Pravda and in the PC. Under the leadership of Kamenev and Stalin, the entire Central Committee, PC, MK and the editorial board of Pravda unanimously rejected Lenin's April Theses, continuing to stand on the point of view of "conditional support" of the Provisional Government, since "the bourgeois-democratic revolution is not yet over."

By mid-April, Stalin, seeing that Lenin's victory in the Party was inevitable, betrayed Kamenev and went over to Lenin's side. At the end of April, at the All-Russian Party Conference, only Kamenev fearlessly and consistently defended the line of the old Central Committee and the old Pravda. Being outnumbered, he submitted to discipline. He was elected a member of the Central Committee, which then included only 9 people. When the order was given for the arrest of Lenin and Zinoviev for receiving German money, and they preferred to hide instead of appearing at the trial of the revolution and democracy, Kamenev again stood at the head of the party. He not only declared himself in solidarity with Lenin, but also organized a broad movement of workers, soldiers, intellectuals, even the Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary Petrograd Soviet for the abolition of the order for the arrest of Lenin and Zinoviev and for bringing "slanderers" to justice. On behalf of Kamenev, Stalin negotiated with his fellow Georgians, the chairman of the Petrograd

Council of Chkheidze and the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets Tsereteli on the action of the Soviets in favor of Lenin. At the same time, Kamenev set about reorganizing the party in order to continue underground work. Fearing to be killed during his arrest, Lenin appointed him his executor for the publication of his main work, The State and Revolution.

The provisional government ordered the arrest of Kamenev as well. But he did not hide, but preferred to stand before a democratic court. (This was all the easier for him because, having been in Russia since 1912, Kamenev was not directly involved in obtaining German money.) Nobody thought to touch Stalin. He didn't even go underground. But now the overall leadership of the party has passed to him as a senior member of the Central Committee.

At the decisive meetings of the PC on October 10 and 16, 1917, Kamenev, together with Zinoviev, voted against the uprising, but on the night of the uprising - from October 24 to 25 - he, together with Trotsky from Smolny, led the uprising, with which he did not agree. After the uprising, he became chairman of the Soviet parliament - the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. After the coup, Kamenev, along with a number of other members of the Central Committee and people's commissars, proposed the creation of a coalition government.

government from all Soviet parties. Lenin flatly refused to accept such an offer. Then Kamenev resigned from all posts.

Only in 1919 did he return to the Central Committee and was immediately elected a member of the Politburo. During all subsequent discussions in the party, Kamenev was in the same group as Lenin, Zinoviev and Stalin. During Lenin's illness in 1922, 1923 and early 1924, he was acting chairman of the Politburo and the government.

Nou Kamenev had one "vice" that doomed him in advance to a passive role in the "troika": he did not have the ambition of Zinoviev and the strong-willed qualities of Stalin. Standing head and shoulders above both in intellectual terms, however, he did not know how to use their methods: neither political demagoguery, like Zinoviev, nor complex intrigue, like Stalin. Every time Kamenev found himself at the head of a party in Russia (1912, 1917), this happened not because of his personal ambitions, but because of objective events. If we ignore the October episode, Zinoviev and Kamenev, together with Lenin, constituted in the life of the party that "triangle of Bolshevism" which laid the foundation for the organization and ideology of the entire party. All the main works, platforms, resolutions of the official organs of the party bear the signatures of this "triangle". Stalin, co-opted in absentia to the Central Committee in 1912, was in

too little known to the party, and as a party journalist completely unknown (except for his article on the national question in 1912), for the "triangle" to become a "quadrilateral".

To what has been said about Zinoviev and Kamenev, it must be added that neither one nor the other possessed those qualities of leaders - organizers of power, which were needed under the conditions of a communist dictatorship. Back in 1924, that is, during the reign of the Troika, Stalin outlined what these qualities should be: "To be an organizing leader in our conditions means, firstly, to know the workers, to be able to grasp their advantages and disadvantages, . . . secondly, to be able to arrange workers like this:

- 1) so that each employee feels at home;
- 2) so that every worker can give the revolution the maximum of what he is generally capable of giving according to his personal qualities;
- 3) so that this kind of arrangement of workers would result not in interruptions, but in coherence, unity ...
- 4) so that the general direction of the work organized in this way serves as an expression and implementation of that political idea in the name of which the placement of workers is carried out according to posts "(Stalin, Soch. vol. 6, pp. 277-278).

Beginning in 1922, Stalin acted precisely with such a "concept of the leader", skillfully placing his people in the state, military, Chekist, ideological and, of course, primarily in the party apparatus, while Zinoviev and Kamenev hoped more for their halo of the apostles of Lenin and did not even notice at all what the dying Lenin noticed (in the "Testament"): "Stalin, having become General Secretary, concentrated immense power in his hands."

After that, a year and a half passed, two party congresses were held, at which Stalin turned the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission into his own dominions. Stalin's "immense power" became an invulnerable power. And only after that

Stalin for the first time let Zinoviev and Kamenev know who the real master of the party was.

True, already after the XII Party Congress (1923), at which Stalin expanded the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, securing an absolute majority for himself, after the XIII Party Conference, at which Trotsky was once again condemned politically, after the death of Lenin (January 21, 1924), when Damocles fell away sword, Stalin was free to show his cards and dissolve the "troika", but he

does not do it deliberately.

Methodical, patient Stalin is in no hurry. He thinks that Trotsky has only been beaten, but not finished off. At the Thirteenth Congress, at the first congress after the death of Lenin, it is necessary to put an end to Trotsky, to put an end to it at the hands of the unlucky chairman of the Comintern, Zinoviev. Therefore, Stalin concludes an agreement with Zinoviev and Kamenev - Zinoviev will again make the political report of the Central Committee, but Zinoviev and Kamenev agree not to discuss Lenin's "Letter to the Congress" at the congress before his death and re-elect Stalin again as the general secretary of the party. Stalin is ready for one more concession - he agrees to convene the next 16th Party Congress at Zinoviev's residence - in Leningrad.

Everything happens according to this plan. Trotsky is condemned once again, Stalin is re-elected, the next congress is scheduled in Leningrad.

However, the delegates of the 13th Congress had not yet left when a sensation occurred: 16 days after the closing of the 13th Congress, on June 17, 1924, speaking with a report on the results of this congress at the courses of secretaries of district committees under the Central Committee of the Party, Stalin told the party absolutely amazing things:

The members of the unspoken "troika" and the leading members of the vowel Politburo - Zinoviev and Kamenev - are guilty of major theoretical errors before the party. The first one says that we have a "party dictatorship", and the second one is not "NEP Russia", but "Nepman Russia", "i.e. i.e. such a Russia, headed by the Nepmen. Stalin is indignant at the "theoretical carelessness" of Zinoviev and Kamenev. The name of the first is not named (but the party knows who it is), the name of the second is named - the report is published in Pravda (Stalin, Soch. vol. 6, p. 257). Now everyone who has the least bit of a Party scent understands that the theoretical criticism of Stalin is not a literary exercise - it is a conditional password for the start of a political offensive against Zinoviev and Kamenev. "The Moors have done their job - the Moors can be removed!" As was to be expected, the spontaneous reaction of the local organizations headed by the new, "independent" members of the Central Committee of the Stalinist selection unanimously condemned the "new sortie" of the falsifiers of Leninism; to this, of course, the whole province quickly joins. Then, without risk and in violation of the directive of the highest body of the party - the congress - Stalin passes through the plenum of the Central Committee a new decision: to convene the XV Congress in Moscow. The purpose of the decision is clear: Zinoviev's claim to receive final recognition in Leningrad

his successor Lenin as party leader - relegated. The new development was quite natural. Trotsky fell away as a pretender to Lenin's heirs, then the anti-Trotskyist "troika" also disintegrated. At the helm of the party is the one who was its true motor: Stalin.

Everything was already prepared both organizationally and psychologically (resolutions of local party organizations) in order to put an end to

Zinoviev and Kamenev, having formalized them into the "new opposition", as two completely unexpected events took place that temporarily upset Stalin's entire strategic plan and saved the "troika", that is, Zinoviev and Kamenev.

In August 1924, a powerful popular uprising led by the Georgian Mensheviks took place in Georgia, which threatened to spread to the entire Caucasus. The democratic program and anti-Bolshevik slogans of the insurgents were too reminiscent of the spirit of Kronstadt for Stalin to fear that the uprising might resonate in Russia itself. The second event was just as unexpected, at least in this form, even more unpleasant in terms of the explosive force of exposure that it carried. On the seventh anniversary of the October coup, Trotsky published a book of his articles from the period of preparation for this coup - "1917", prefixing it with a preface that has become more famous than all of Trotsky's books. It was called: "The Lessons of October." His main thesis was that the old Central Committee of the Bolsheviks in Russia, headed by Stalin and Kamenev, until the return of Lenin from abroad in April 1917, pursued a right-wing opportunist, anti-revolutionary, conciliatory policy towards the Provisional Government. Lenin opposed the old Bolshevism and this opportunist leadership. Lenin accomplished the "re-armament of Bolshevism" and in fact adopted the point of view of Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution" ("without a tsar, but a workers' government"). The old leaders of classical Bolshevism became cowardly in the decisive days of the uprising. Just as the German leaders of the Social Democracy degenerated from Marxists into reformist opportunists, so the leaders of Bolshevik Marxism are not guaranteed against degeneration. Revolutionaries are tested in the revolution itself, as the skill of swimmers is tested while swimming. Trotsky did not name a single name, but the party knew that it was about Kamenev and Zinoviev and their ally Stalin. This again reunited the sprawling was

"troika". How unexpectedly these events upset Stalin's strategic calculations was also shown by his reaction to them. In a speech at a meeting of secretaries of village party cells on October 22, 1924, referring to the danger of a Georgian uprising, Stalin said: "The events in Georgia must be considered indicative. What happened in Georgia may be repeated throughout Russia" (Stalin, Soch. v. 6, p. 309).

Hence, in view of this danger, we must still preserve the coalition with Zinoviev and Kamenev.

Stalin's reaction to the "Lessons of October" was such that he immediately achieved three goals: 1) reduced the role of Trotsky to the role of a simple member of the Political Bureau of seven people to lead the uprising; 2) defending Zinoviev and Kamenev in words, in fact exposed them, for the first time publishing excerpts from the minutes of the Central Committee on October 10 and 16, where they voted against the uprising, 3) gave a list of members of both the Politburo and the "Practical Center for the Leadership of the Insurrection", where in both centers, Stalin was listed as a member, while Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev were listed as members of only the first center (Stalin, Soch. vol. 6, pp. 326-327), which, according to Trotsky, never met. As if casually saying that Zinoviev and Kamenev had indeed voted against the decision of the Central Committee on the coup, Stalin declared that Trotsky also did not play any "special role" in the uprising in Petrograd, because he was not "part of the practical center called upon to lead uprising... Talk about the special role of Trotsky is a legend..." (ibid., p. 329). We point out immediately that there was no "Practical Center", but a "military revolutionary center" was created.

center" with its inclusion in the "Revolutionary Soviet Committee, headed by Trotsky" (Lenin, Works, vol. XHT, p. 507).

This statement by Stalin was in contradiction not only with historical facts, but also with what Lenin said about the book by the American communist John Reed, "Ten Days That Shook the World", which describes the Bolshevik uprising under the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky. In an enthusiastic preface, Lenin called John Reed's description true. Now Stalin also attributed this book to the genre of literature from the field of "Arabic fairy tales" (Stalin: John Reed was far from our party ... "having fallen, in view of this, into the bait of gossip coming from the Sukhanovs" - *ibid.*, p. 325), Someone then reminded Stalin that he himself wrote in Pravda of November 6, 1918 about Trotsky's "special role": "All work on the political

organization of the uprising took place under the direct supervision of the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet Trotsky. It can be said with certainty that the party owes the quick transition of the garrison to the side of the Soviet and the skillful organization of the work of the Military Revolutionary Committee, first of all and mainly to Comrade Trotsky.

Trotsky notes that when Stalin was pointed out to this obvious contradiction in his assessments of Trotsky's role, "he responded with double rudeness, and nothing more" (L. Trotsky, My Life, Part II, p. 234). Stalin agreed with Trotsky that before Lenin's arrival, the Central Committee preached the line of "pressure on the Provisional Government" instead of putting forward the slogan about the power of the Soviets, that "this was a deeply erroneous position ... I then shared this erroneous position with other party comrades and abandoned it completely only in mid-April... Did the party have disagreements with Lenin at that time? Yes, they were" (Stalin, Op. vol. 6, pp. 333-334). But then, at the end of April, the whole party admitted its mistake by joining Lenin, while Trotsky was still preaching a "permanent revolution" - a revolution without the peasantry ("without a tsar, but a workers' government").

When Trotsky wrote about the "right wing" in the party and about the old, conservative Bolsheviks who opposed the ideas of the April Theses, he had Stalin in mind, of course. But Stalin diplomatically reduced the matter only to Zinoviev and Kamenev. Stalin said: "Trotsky assures us that in October, in the person of Kamenev and Zinoviev, we had the right wing of our party ... It is only incomprehensible how it could happen that the party managed in this case without a split ... There was no split, and the disagreements lasted only several days, because and only because we had in the person of Kamenev and Zinoviev Leninists, Bolsheviks" (*ibid.*, pp. 326-327).

In defending them, Stalin defended himself, defended the Central Committee, which he headed together with Kamenev until Lenin returned from abroad, defended the majority of the Central Committee, which for almost two months (September-end of October) resisted Lenin's demands to call an uprising, and finally defended the party, to whom he assigned the main role in organizing and conducting the uprising, and not to Trotsky, and not even to Lenin. In fact, this is what Stalin said on this score: "Having listened to Trotsky, one might think that the Bolshevik Party, during the entire preparatory period from March to October, did nothing but mark time ... and interfered with Lenin in every possible way, and if

If it weren't for Trotsky, it's not known how the cause of the October Revolution would have ended ... It's funny to hear these strange speeches about the party from Trotsky, who announced in the same Preface (Lessons of October. - A. A.), ... that

"the main instrument of the proletarian revolution is the party", that "without the party, apart from the party, bypassing the party, through the surrogate of the party, the proletarian revolution cannot win", and Allah himself will not understand how the revolution could win if "its main instrument" became useless" (ibid., pp. 331-332).

In order to prove that it was not individuals who decided the fate of the revolution (not Trotsky's "shack", not Lenin's "Mont Blanc" - Stalin's metaphors), but the party, Stalin makes a bold note that leaves no doubt: "I must declare with all decisiveness that the high honor organizer of our victories does not belong to individuals, but to the great collective of advanced workers of our country - the Russian Communist Party "(ibid., p. 336, emphasis mine. - A. A ..).

Nothing so vividly characterizes Trotsky's tactical helplessness as the timing, subject and manner that he chooses for his next discussion with Stalin. With his absolutely worthless literary exercises on the subject of the history of the revolution, he prevented the already clearly visible split in the "troika" and threw Zinoviev and Kamenev back into the arms of Stalin, giving Stalin another whole year of time to thoroughly prepare for the reprisal against the "New Opposition" planned by Stalin himself. . Trotsky so angered Zinoviev and Kamenev with his ill-fated "Lessons" that the Leningrad party organization unanimously demanded that he be expelled from the party. In a strange way, it was Stalin who categorically rejected this demand in a cunning calculation to have in the Politburo for the time being a counterbalance to the Zinovievists. The Zinovievists accused Stalin of sympathy for Trotsky and a conciliatory attitude towards Trotskyism. On this basis, a new crack appeared in the "troika", which the multi-volume "History of the CPSU" considers the beginning of the emergence of the "New Opposition".

Here is how the official historian draws this beginning: "Trying to use the communists in connection with the appearance of Trotsky's "October Lessons", Zinoviev and Kamenev demagogically accused the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) of a conciliatory attitude towards Trotskyism. They expected to give battle to the Politburo at the January (1925) plenum of the Central Committee, which discussed the question of Trotskyism. However, the plenum unanimously supported the Politburo. Then

Zinoviev and Kamenev embarked on the path of forging a secret factional group in the ranks of the RCP (6) ... This group began to be called the "new opposition" ("History of the CPSU", vol. 4, book G, 1970, p. 360). It was, of course, not a "group", but the entire party organization of Leningrad, headed by Zinoviev. Groups supporting the Zinovievites appeared in the party organizations of Moscow, the Urals, Siberia and Ivanovo-Voznesensk, but their Stalinist apparatus quickly and without any discussion suppressed, throwing some out of work, sending others to distant lands.

Things were more difficult in Leningrad. If here, too, one embarked on the path of repression, then the entire Leningrad organization of the Party would have to be evicted to Siberia, but Stalin had not thought of that yet. The Leningrad Provincial Committee of the Komsomol also became in opposition to the Stalinist apparatus because of the usurpation by this apparatus of the functions of the Central Committee of the Komsomol. The Leningrad Provincial Committee of the Komsomol was preparing to convene an all-Russian conference to prevent the transformation of the Komsomol into an instrument of the dictatorship of the Stalinist faction. Since the central theoretical organ of the Central Committee - the journal "Bolshevik" - Stalin and Bukharin had already managed to turn into their personal factional organ, the Leningrad Provincial Party Committee issued a resolution on the creation of a new theoretical journal of the party in Leningrad, but the Central Committee banned it, having no statutory right to do so. . From now on - from the spring of 1925 - Stalin begins

to the creation of a "New Opposition" by declaring every practical proposal of Zinoviev and Kamenev "Trotskyist", every their theoretical remark an "anti-Leninist" heresy. At a meeting of the Politburo in April 1925, when discussing the economic plan, Kamenev and Zinoviev declared that in the presence of a capitalist encirclement, the final victory of socialism in such a backward country as Russia, without the support of the revolution in the West, is impossible" (ibid., p. 361).

Stalin, Bukharin and their supporters replied that this was a repetition of Trotsky's well-known thesis. Then Zinoviev and his supporters cited the following passage from Stalin's pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism*: "Is it possible to achieve the final victory of socialism in one country without the joint efforts of the proletarians of several advanced countries? No impossible. The efforts of one country are enough to overthrow the bourgeoisie. For the final victory, the efforts of one country, especially such a peasant country as Russia, are no longer enough - for this, the efforts of the proletarians are necessary.

several advanced countries" (Stalin, Works vol. 8, p. 61).

Anticipating the victory over the exposed Stalin, as over the founder of Trotskyism in this matter, the Zinovievists put the question before Stalin - what does he have to say about this assertion of his?

Stalin got out of the situation in a purely Stalinist way - what he wrote above was correct then, in April 1924, when he wanted to prove to Trotsky that we would stay in power, but this is wrong now, in April 1925, when we may well build socialism in one country, if we ignore world capitalism and the danger of its intervention (ibid., pp. 61-62). The wit Karl Radek joked about Stalin's new thesis: in the cold of January, you can walk naked along Tverskoy Boulevard in Moscow, if you ignore the winter and the Moscow police, but will they abstract from you? If socialism can indeed be built in one country, Radek commented on Stalin, then it can then be built in "one district," as Shchedrin's hero wanted to build "liberalism in one district."

His own, it seems, the only time unforeseen fall into sin in the spirit of classical Trotskyism, Stalin laid on Zinoviev himself because the latter dared to remind not only Stalin, but also the KhPU Congress of this. Here is what Stalin said: "Zinoviev finds it possible in his concluding speech at the Tenth Congress (December 1925) to pull out the old, completely inadequate formula from Stalin's pamphlet, written in April 1924, as a basis for resolving the resolved question of the victory of socialism in one country, - but this peculiar manner of Zinoviev only says that he is completely confused on this issue" (ibid., p. 65). Not Stalin, who radically changes his position a year later, is "confused", but Zinoviev, who, without changing his position, reminds Stalin of his inconsistency.

Stalin's preparations for the 15th Congress were distinguished by the same methodical and thoroughness as the preparations for the 12th and 13th Party Congresses. Since this congress will be about the founders of Bolshevism themselves, about Lenin's personal friends, among whom was Lenin's wife, behind whom stood such an important party organization as Leningrad, Stalin decided to prepare this congress even more carefully. For this, more time was needed. Therefore, the Stalinist majority of the Central Committee decided, obviously

violating the charter, to postpone the next MU congress for nine months - instead of the spring of 1925, it was scheduled for the end of the year - December 18-31, 1925.

In the course of the same preparation, in the autumn of 1924, a supporter of Zinoviev and Kamenev - the secretary of the Moscow Committee, the secretary of the Central Committee and a member of its Organizing Bureau Zelensky was relieved of these posts and sent as secretary of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee to Tashkent. Zinoviev's enemy, Uglanov, was appointed in his place. Stalin tried to do the same with regard to the party apparatus in Leningrad, but he succeeded only partially. A close associate of Zinoviev, the secretary of the Leningrad Provincial Party Committee, Zalutsky, was removed, who openly accused Stalin and Bukharin of a "state capitalist" line and spoke of the danger of the triumph of Thermidor in the country. He was replaced by another enemy of Zinoviev - Komarov. In both cases, Zinoviev and Kamenev submitted to the dictates of the Central Committee apparatus, formalized through the Stalinist majority in the Central Committee. Undoubtedly, in connection with the same preparations for the congress, there was also a decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee to propose to a candidate member of the Politburo, Trotsky's successor as chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the People's Commissar of the Military Sea - M. Frunze - to undergo an operation, and contrary to the wishes of the patient. Frunze - the legendary commander of the civil war - was a supporter of Zinoviev and Kamenev. Stalin wanted to put his personal friend, Voroshilov, in his place. People who knew Stalin were afraid that Stalin's surgeons would guess what Stalin expected of them, and without much fuss they would make room for Voroshilov. Be that as it may, Frunze died on the operating table, and Voroshilov became Minister of War. The party rumor about the "surgical" murder by Stalin of the most dangerous person for him in the "New Opposition" was so widespread that the Soviet writer Boris Pilnyak even wrote the story "Red Tree" about it, published abroad (albeit with some delay, Stalin shot Pilnyak in 1937), and the Great Soviet Encyclopedia was forced to note: "an unsuccessful operation completely unexpectedly took Frunze away from us" (BSE, Vol. 59, 1st ed., 1935, p. 226).

The place, time and agenda of the 15th Congress were approved at the plenum of the Central Committee on October 3-10, 1925. For the first time at this plenum, in violation of the traditions of the previous two congresses, the political report of the Central Committee was entrusted not to Zinoviev, but to Stalin. Further, the question of convening a congress not in

Leningrad, as decided by the HT Congress, but in Moscow. Already at this plenum of the Central Committee, it became clear that this time Stalin decided to finally put an end to Zinoviev's claim to leadership in the party. Although at the same plenum of the Central Committee Kamenev made a report on economic policy, and Zinoviev on the work of the Comintern, Kamenev's theses were not approved, and Zinoviev's report was accepted only "for information" without any approval from him ("CPSU in Res.", part P, 1933, pp. 146-147).

The plenum decided to open a campaign in the party in preparation for the congress. Since November, in all party organizations, the Central Committee, through its rapporteurs sent to the places, has been opening a campaign against the "New Opposition", the existence of which the ordinary party masses knew nothing about. She knew even less about what her platform was - for no one anywhere said anything on behalf of such an opposition, either at conferences, or at plenums of the Central Committee, and, all the more, in the party press. Although the speakers often named members of the Politburo Zinoviev and Kamenev among the deviators, it was impossible to learn the platform of the "deviators" from the deviators themselves, since he

But the October plenum of the Central Committee forbade any "discussion", that is, it forbade the defendants to give explanations about their accusations of an "anti-Leninist" deviation. How all this was done, the official historian reports: "At the end of November 1925, the Central Committee, through its representatives ... informed the party organizations about the essence of the differences with the opposition. Certain provisions of the opposition platform were criticized in the pre-Congress theses of the Central Committee, in the party press, including on the page "To the XV Congress", which was specially published in Pravda ... CPSU, vol. 4, book G, 1970, p. 411). Here, to put it mildly, two inaccuracies crept in: firstly, the "platform" of the opposition could not be criticized, because it did not exist at all, and secondly, there was no "polemic" with representatives of the opposition, because not a single polemical note from the opposition appeared anywhere. How difficult it was for Stalin to form the Zinovievites into a "new opposition" with a platform against the Central Committee, is evident if only from the fact that the KhKhPI Leningrad provincial conference under the direct leadership of Zinoviev on December 1, 1925 decided that it "entirely and completely approves the political and organizational lines of the Central Committee" ("Leningradskaya Pravda", December 4, 1925).

After all this, the Stalinist majority of the Central Committee proposes to Zinoviev and

Kamenev to speak before the HPU Party Congress ... with an acknowledgment of his mistakes.

Such was the general atmosphere in the Party when the 15th Party Congress opened. It was attended by 665 delegates with decisive votes and 641 with deliberative ones. The order of the day of the congress: 1. Approval of the place of work of the congress (instead of Leningrad appoint Moscow); 2. Political report of the Central Committee (Stalin); 3. Organizing report of the Central Committee (Molotov); 4. Report of the Audit Commission (Kursk); 5. Report of the Central Control Commission (Kuibyshev); 6. Report of the Comintern (Zinoviev); 7. Immediate questions of economic construction (Kamenev, the report was later withdrawn); 8. On the work of trade unions (Tomsky); 9. On the work of the Komsomol (Bukharin); 10. About change of the party Charter (Andreev); 11. Elections of the central institutions of the party.

In the political report of the Central Committee, Stalin, without naming names, argued with Zinoviev and Kamenev. He said that last year the party had a discussion with Trotskyism, but "today, unfortunately, we have entered a period of a new discussion. I am sure that the Party will quickly overcome this discussion as well, and nothing special can happen. In order not to anticipate events and not to provoke people, I will not at the moment touch on the essence of how Comrades behaved. Leningraders at their conference ... I think that the members of the congress will say this themselves, and I will sum up the results in the concluding speech" (Stalin, Soch., vol. 7, p. 348).

On the second day of the congress, this obviously provocative trick of Stalin provoked the demand of the Leningrad delegation to give the floor to Zinoviev for a co-report on the report of the Central Committee. Zinoviev was given the floor to give a co-report, but he clearly failed in his task of subjecting the factional policy of Stalin's apparatus to reasoned criticism and of proposing an alternative policy to the congress. Zinoviev started a fruitless, purely dogmatically scholastic polemic about the world revolution, about state capitalism, about NEP, and only, as if in passing, spoke about the main and decisive thing - about the fate of the collective leadership, that is, about the "troika". Zinoviev began by enumerating the main difficulties in the work of the party. They, in his opinion, are the essence: the first difficulty is the belatedness of the world revolution ("starting the October Revolution, we were convinced that the workers of other countries of us

support for months, or at least for several years”), the second difficulty is the construction of socialism in a backward country with a huge predominance of the peasantry; the third difficulty is the creation

collective leadership in the party after Lenin's death. Zinoviev, who enthusiastically praised and defended the collective leadership (the “troika”) when he himself nominally headed it at the XII and XIII Congresses, only now noticed that he was only a pawn in the hands of Stalin on his chessboard. Noticing this, he did not even become particularly furious, but simply continued to philosophize melancholy: “only now, it seems to me that this (the difficulty of creating a collective leadership. - A. A.) has come to light with complete clarity. This difficulty is not unimportant, because the leadership of the party means at the same time the leadership of the state. This is not only an organizational question, but a political problem of the deepest importance.”

All these fruitless dogmatic tricks, theoretical disputes, endless quotations from Lenin were precisely intended to cover up the fact that the sides, Stalinists and anti-Stalinists, fought not for this power over the party and the state, but for the purity of Leninism. Having declared state capitalism the predominant form of industry in the USSR, Zinoviev began to say that there are people who declare NEP to be socialism, that there is an idealization of NEP and capitalism, NEP is the path to socialism, but it is not socialism ... At this point, the protocol of the congress notes loud cries from hall - “who thinks so?”, - “these are questions of political literacy”, etc. Confused and not accustomed to such an irreverent reaction of the same people who at the KhP Congress shouted “Long live Lenin, Trotsky and Zinoviev”, and not the previous XIII Congress, due to the physical death of Lenin and the political death of Trotsky, only he was honored as the leader of the Comintern and the world revolution, Zinoviev left the podium to the cries of indignation of the congress and with the approval of only the Leningrad delegation (Fourteenth Congress of the CPSU (6). Verbatim report, 1926, pp. 98-109).

If Zinoviev in fact spoke more about Bukharin's theoretical sins than about Stalin's practice, then Kamenev finally remembered Lenin's "Testament" and directly raised the question of removing Stalin from the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee. Kamenev declared that "we are against the theory of a 'leader', against the creation of a 'leader'. We are against the Secretariat (CC), which in practice combines both politics and organization, becoming above the political body... only the technical aspects of his decisions ... I personally affirm that our

the general secretary does not belong to the category of people who can unite the old Bolshevik headquarters around him. Kamenev put forward the slogan: "Back to Lenin!" Kamenev added that since he had spoken about this many times not only to Stalin personally, but also to Lenin's other comrades-in-arms, he wanted to repeat here at the congress once more: "I have come to the conclusion that Stalin cannot fulfill the role of a unifier of the Bolshevik headquarters" - at this point, the Congress protocol notes the reaction of the audience: “Wrong!”, “Nonsense!”, “He showed his cards!” Noise. Applause from the Leningrad delegation. "We will not give you commanding heights!" "Stalin! Stalin! The delegates stand up and honor Stalin. Stormy applause. "Long live Comrade Stalin!" (ibid., pp. 273-275).

What is Trotsky doing? He sits throughout the entire discussion in the presidium of the congress in deathly silence, and in the depths of his soul, probably angry

rejoices at how Stalin is now burying those with whose hands he buried him at the last congress.

Only a year and a half ago, at the XIII Congress, where the delegations discussed Lenin's "Testament" on the need to remove Stalin, at the very first organizational plenum of the Central Committee of the same congress, where they discussed Stalin's own statement about his dismissal from the post of General Secretary, it was Zinoviev and Kamenev declared Lenin's "Testament" the fruit of a sick fantasy, and Stalin - an indispensable general secretary. It is entirely probable that the new "troika" Zinoviev-Kamenev-Trotsky at this thirteenth congress would have been able to remove Stalin, although it is impossible to assert this categorically. Now, however, even if Trotsky had joined Zinoviev and Kamenev at the Tenth Congress, Stalin's position would have remained absolutely unshakable. Nevertheless, Stalin took every measure to prevent such a union at the congress from happening. Through his supporters (Ordzhonikidze, Mikoyan, and others), he set as an example to the Zinovievists the same Trotsky, who, after his condemnation, submitted to the discipline of the party and stopped criticizing the Central Committee. Moreover, Stalin recalled that it was precisely Zinoviev and Kamenev who, back in the autumn of 1924, demanded that Trotsky be expelled from the party, but he and the Politburo did not agree with this. Stalin's two statements turned out to be the most hypocritical: 1) it is impossible to engage in bloodletting in the party, 2) after Lenin, not one person, but only a collective leadership, can lead the party. These passages from Stalin's concluding remarks are worth quoting here in their entirety. Here is the first statement:

Stalin asked:

"How did our fight start? It began with the question of "how to deal with Trotsky." It was at the end of 1924... The Leningrad Provincial Committee issued a resolution expelling Trotsky from the party. We, i.e., the majority of the Central Committee, did not agree with this ... when the plenum of the Central Committee met with us and the Leningraders, together with Kamenev, demanded the immediate expulsion of Trotsky from the Politburo, we did not agree with this proposal either ... We did not agree with Zinoviev and Kamenev because they knew that the policy of cutting off was fraught with great dangers for the Party, that the method of cutting off, the method of bleeding—and they demanded blood—is dangerous, contagious: today one was cut off, tomorrow another, the day after tomorrow a third—what will we have left in the Party? ? (Applause)" (Stalin, Op. vol. 7, pp. 379-380).

We already know that Stalin acted exactly according to this recipe himself, attributing it to his rivals.

Here is Stalin's second statement: "It is impossible to lead the party outside the collegium. It is foolish to dream about this after Ilyich (applause), it is foolish to talk about it. Collective work, collegial leadership... that's what we need now" (ibid., p. 391).

Although the Stalinists attributed an entire political platform to the leaders of the New Opposition, the opposition had neither a platform nor even any single concept. Even their speeches at the congress were not coordinated among themselves. They bear a clear imprint of improvisation, confusion, superficiality, inconsistency. Stalin immediately took advantage of this weakness of the opposition. Stalin said: "It's time to talk about the platform of the opposition. She's pretty original. Many varied speeches have been made by the opposition. Kamenev said one thing, pulled in one direction, Zinoviev said another, pulled in the other direction, Lashevich a third, Sokolnikov a fourth... What did they agree on? What is their platform? Their platform is reform

Secretariat of the Central Committee. The only common thing that completely unites them is the question of the Secretariat" (ibid., p. 386). In this regard, Stalin also told the history of the emergence of this issue. In 1923, after the KhP Congress, just in those months when Lenin was fighting death and Stalin was speeding up the Stalinization of the party apparatus, Zinoviev, while on vacation in Kislovodsk, had a private meeting with members of the Central Committee Bukharin, Voroshilov, Evdokimov, Lashevich. The question of politicization was discussed

Secretariat of the Central Committee, turning it into the highest decision-making body of three persons: Stalin, Trotsky and Zinoviev ("triumvirate"). The purpose of such a reorganization is clear - to deprive the "general secretary" of the monopoly of power. Stalin easily guessed this goal and rejected the plan. A skilled tactician, Stalin explained the motives for his refusal differently. Here are his words: they "worked out a platform for the destruction of the Politburo and the politicization of the Secretariat, that is, for the transformation of the Secretariat into a political and organizational governing body composed of Zinoviev, Trotsky and Stalin. What is the purpose of this platform? What does it mean? It means leading the party without Rykov, without Kalinin, without Tomsy, without Molotov, without Bukharin. Nothing came of this platform...because without these comrades it is impossible to lead the Party" ("Fourteenth Congress. Verbatim Report", pp. 504-508). In the new edition of his report, Stalin omitted the names of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy from the text (Stalin, Soch. vol. 7, pp. 386-387), when it became clear that it was not only possible to lead the party without them, but it was also possible to shoot them.

Now, said Stalin, the same people demand the technicalization of the Secretariat, not the abolition of the Politburo, but its absolute power: "Well, if the transformation of the Secretariat into a simple technical apparatus is a real convenience for Kamenev, perhaps one should agree with this. I'm only afraid that the party will not agree with this... But when they talk about a full-fledged Politburo, then such a platform is worth giving it to chickens to laugh at... Aren't the Secretariat and the Orgburo subordinate to the Politburo? What about the plenum of the Central Committee? Why is our opposition not talking about the plenum of the Central Committee? Doesn't she think of making the Politburo more powerful than the plenum? (Stalin, Works vol. 7, pp. 387-388).

In a word, the opposition has long wanted to establish a "triumvirate" dictatorship in the party, but he, Stalin, has fought and is fighting for the collective leadership of the entire Central Committee. Deeply convinced that Stalin was sincere in these arguments, he was supported not only by the congress delegates who knew little of Stalin, but also by members of the Central Committee who knew him well, including the right wing of the Politburo in the person of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy.

Stalin perfectly understood that the defeat of the "New Opposition" was not only a political action, but also a major ideological problem. In such a dogmatic, ideocratic party, it is precisely the ideological substantiation of each political action that is of great importance. Constantly

one must appeal to Marx, Engels, Lenin in order to convince the party of Leninist fanatics that the Central Committee (Stalin) is right and the opposition is wrong. In the ideological exposure, first of Trotskyism, and now of Zinoviev's "Leninism", Bukharin's role was outstanding, moreover, exceptional. Even in Lenin's eyes, he was the only and outstanding theoretician, albeit with flaws. Stalin also highly valued Bukharin's theoretical abilities and used them with might and main both against Trotsky and now against Zinoviev and Kamenev. That is why the opposition concentrated all the fire of its dogmatic criticism on Bukharin. Stalin with done

he asked indignantly: "Why don't they (the oppositionists) stop persecuting Comrade Bukharin?... What exactly do they want from Comrade Bukharin? Do you want Comrade Bukharin's blood? We will not give it to you" ("Fourteenth Congress ...", pp. 504-508). In the new edition of his report (1947), Stalin deleted from the text "comrade Bukharin's blood," for he himself shed it later, in 1938 (Stalin, Soch., vol. 7, p. 384).

The eternal aggressor by his inner nature, in the fight against his rivals, Stalin always acts in the mask of a "peacemaker". True, his position as general secretary obliged him to do this, but Stalin put on this mask for tactical reasons - it was necessary to create in the party the impression of his impeccable loyalty even to those of the party leaders who openly, in front of the whole party, demanded his own, Stalin's "blood". From the very first days of Lenin's illness, especially after Lenin's break with him, Stalin made it a rule to answer indirectly to Lenin and his accusations in the "Testament" with the most orthodox defense of Leninism even against Lenin. He continues this tactic in the fight against the opposition. The draft of his famous "Questions of Leninism" was published exactly one week after he received Lenin's letter about the severance of personal relations (see "Pravda" of March 14, 1923, I. Stalin "On the Question of Strategy and Tactics"). Two months after Lenin's death, he published the pamphlet On the Foundations of Leninism (April 1924). In November 1924 he published the pamphlet Trotskyism or Leninism, and in December 1924 the pamphlet The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists, as a preface to his book On the Roads to October. In all these works, one general idea is the canonization of Leninism in its own interpretation. It must be said that Zinoviev, Trotsky, Bukharin wrote on the same subject; Zinoviev - cheeky, Trotsky - brilliant, Bukharin -

thoughtfully, all three, like Stalin, canonized Leninism (Trotsky also boasted that he was the first to call Lenin a genius), but only Stalin understood Lenin. That is why Stalin's Fundamentals of Leninism became a "bestseller" in the party in the 1920s. Declaring Lenin infallible and Leninism a new religion, Stalin knew what he was doing, but Stalin's rivals, who knew well that Lenin was not a "saint" at all, and that Leninism itself bears the poisonous features of party apparatus tyranny, which can easily degenerate into tyranny state, accepted Stalin's challenge to create a cult of Lenin's holiness. Both Stalinists and anti-Stalinists began to compete in the ascension and deification of Lenin. Lenin made an atheistic god out of a man and a politician. However, Stalin believed least of all in the holiness of this god, but better than his rivals, he exploited such a belief among the indiscriminate army of party apparatchiks. It turned out that by canonizing Lenin, who had not only been mistaken many times, but also corrected many times by the congresses of the Party and the Central Committee, all oppositions against Stalin had doomed themselves to death. Stalin proved this both in the fight against Trotsky yesterday, in the fight against Zinoviev today, as he will prove it in the fight against Bukharin tomorrow.

After analyzing all the writings of Zinoviev in 1925 (the articles "On Bolshevization" and "Philosophy of the Epoch", the book "Leninism"), Stalin came to the conclusion that Zinoviev's policy was not only hostile to the spirit of Leninism, but it was a "constant wobble." The whole career of Zinoviev, both under Lenin and after him, was distinguished, according to Stalin, by a continuous vacillation away from Leninism. Stalin asked the congress: "What is the guarantee that Zinoviev will not waver one more time? But it's pitching, not politics. This is hysteria, not politics." How to be with such a Zinoviev? Stalin announced the appeal of the majority of the Central Committee to Zinoviev and Kamenev dated December 15

1925, three days before the congress, which proposed "peace" and "compromise" with the opposition, if the opposition admits its mistakes, removes the most active Zinovievites from their posts in Leningrad, none of the opposition, especially the members of the Politburo, will speak against the line of the Central Committee (Stalin). For all this, the Central Committee agrees to include one of the opposition members in the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Stalin declared: "This is the compromise we proposed, comrades. But the opposition did not come to an agreement ... Basically, even now we remain on the point of view of this document "(Stalin, Soch. vol. 7, p.

389). Zinoviev quite reasonably noted at the congress that Stalin did not propose a compromise, but demanded the complete capitulation of the opposition. In his closing remarks, Stalin once again demonstrated his peacefulness and condemned the intractability of the opposition. At the same time, Stalin assured the congress: "We must have unity, and it will be if the party, if the congress shows character and does not succumb to intimidation. (Voices: "We won't give in, the people are shot here")" (ibid., pp. 390-391). (Of this "shot people" - 1,306 delegates, together with Zinoviev and Kamenev - Stalin shot about 80% in Yezhovshchina).

The congress passed a resolution on the political and organizational reports of the Central Committee, in which it was said: "The Tenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks fully approves the political and organizational line of the Central Committee" ("CPSU in Res.", part P, 1954, p. 73).

559 delegates voted for the resolution, 65 against (The Fourteenth Congress..., p. 524). The congress also wrote down a warning addressed to the "new" or any future opposition: "The congress instructs the Central Committee to wage a resolute struggle against all attempts to undermine the unity of the party, no matter where they come from and whoever they are headed" ("KPSS in Rez.", ibid. , p. 81). The whole platform of the "New Opposition" was strongly condemned as an anti-Leninist position. A special appeal was made to the Leningrad organization, full of compliments addressed to it and with a sharp condemnation of its leaders. For the first time at the 15th Congress, Stalin, Rykov, Bukharin proclaimed the program of industrialization of the country, developed together with Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky, "to turn the USSR from a country importing machinery and equipment into a country producing machinery and equipment."

In the same way, for the first time at the 15th Congress, a word appears that symbolizes the bloodiest epoch in the history of the peasantry: "kolkhoz" (ibid., pp. 75, 79). The next congress - XU - will already be called the collectivization congress.

True to his "peacemaker" tactics, Stalin showed a certain "generosity" during the Central Committee elections. Although the most active supporters of the "new opposition" were expelled from the members of the Central Committee (Kuklin, Zalutsky, Kharitonov, Lashevich - the latter was left as a candidate), but Zinoviev, Kamenev, Sokolnikov and Evdokimov themselves were re-elected to the Central Committee, and N. Krupskaya - to the CCC.

Due to the most distinguished functionaries in the fight against the "new opposition", the membership of the Central Committee was increased from 53 to 63 people, and the candidate staff - from 34 to 43 people. The Central Control Commission was increased from 151 to 163 people, and the Central Audit Commission from 3 to 7 people. The organizational plenum of the Central Committee on January 1, 1926, elected the governing bodies of the Central Committee: members of the Politburo - Bukharin, Voroshilov (for the first time), Zinoviev, Kalinin (for the first time), Molotov (for the first time), Rykov, Stalin, Tomsky, Trotsky. Candidates:

Rudzutak, Dzerzhinsky, Petrovsky, Uglanov and Kamenev. Members of the Secretariat: Stalin (Secretary General), Molotov, Uglanov, Kosior S. and Evdokimov (Zinovievite). Candidates: Bubnov, Artyukhina.

Members of the Orgburo: Stalin, Molotov, Uglanov, Kosior, Evdokimov, Bubnov, Artyukhina, Andreev, Dogadov, Smirnov A.P. and Quiring. Candidates: Mikhailov, Lepse, Chaplin, V. Schmidt and Ukhonov. Bukharin was appointed editor of Pravda, and Manuisky was his deputy. The delegation of the CPSU (b) in the Executive Committee of the Comintern was elected as part of Zinoviev (chairman of the delegation and chairman of the Executive Committee of the Comintern), Bukharin, Stalin, Kamenev and Rykov; candidates for members of the delegation were also elected: Trotsky, Sokolnikov, Lozovsky, Pyatnitsky, and from Ukraine: Manuisky and Shumsky ("CPSU in Res.", Part II, p. 235, 1953).

However, Stalin's "peacefulness" lasted only five days. On January 5, 1926, the new Politburo removed Zinoviev (chairman of the Leningrad Soviet), Kamenev (chairman of the STO and deputy chairman of the SNK) from their posts, and replaced the entire Leningrad leadership.

In gross violation of the Party Rules and against the will of the party organization itself, without even convening a provincial party conference, the Central Committee dismissed the entire provincial committee of the party and appointed a new composition headed by S. Kirov.

Members of the Politburo, Central Committee, Central Control Commission, Central Committee of Komsomol were sent to Leningrad to complete the defeat of the regional party organizations of Leningrad. This entire campaign was carried out under the slogan of "deployment of intra-Party democracy." How great was the effect of the psychological terror of the Stalinist apparatus, says the result of the named campaign: in December 1925, the Leningrad party organization unanimously, that is, 100% voted for the "new opposition", and two weeks after the XV Congress - in mid-January 1926. only 3.2% voted for the "new opposition", 0.5% abstained, and 96.3% voted for Stalin against Zinoviev

(History of the CPSU, vol. 4, book T, p. 432). The official historian of the party explains such a "rapidity" of the transition of the Leningrad party organization from Zinoviev to Stalin by the fact that the "deception" of the opposition was revealed so quickly and suddenly. This is not a compliment to the organization that carried out the October Revolution. However, things were not at all the way the official historian describes. Speaking at the 15th Congress, a Leningrad delegate who had withdrawn from the opposition, Minin testified how members of the Politburo declared the decisions of the majority against the Central Committee to be decisions of the "majority" for the Central Committee (see the next chapter).

If we are talking about "deception", then the official historian is well aware that October itself in Petrograd turned out to be a great deception for its organizers. Here are the data: out of 24 members of the Central Committee who politically led the October Revolution in Petrograd, 7 people died of natural causes, 2 people were killed by enemies, 14 people were killed by Stalin; out of 60 members of the Military Revolutionary Committee (VRC) of the Petrograd Soviet and its commissars, who led the October Revolution militarily-operatively, 5 people died of their own accord, one person was killed by enemies, 54 people were killed by Stalin, including such prominent leaders as Trotsky, Krylenko, Antonov-Ovseenko, Unshlikht, Nevsky, Bubnov, Mekhonoshin, Dybenko, Smilga, Gusev, Latsis and others.

Summing up the overall results of the 15th Party Congress, we must state the following historical fact: the 14th Congress was the last

sovereign congress in the history of the party, at which it was still possible to criticize the Central Committee, at which the Central Committee still reported to the congress, at which the Central Committee was still elected by a valid secret ballot. All subsequent party congresses, up to the present day, are such only in name. At none of these congresses has there ever been, nor can there be, a single critical word addressed to the Central Committee or even to its individual leaders. At these congresses, the Central Committee does not report to the congress, but these congresses themselves report to the Central Committee. These congresses do not choose the Central Committee, but the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee inform the next congress of the composition of the new Central Committee. The Congress, of course, has one indisputable right: to vote unanimously for this new composition of the Central Committee. The Party Congress has turned into, although very imposing in outward form, but in essence the purest fiction of power. Therefore, Stalin was quite logical when he convened the last congress in his life (the 20th congress) only through

fourteen years, although the Charter stated that the congress should be convened at least once every three years.

There were no changes in the nature and functions of the congresses even after Stalin, they only began to be convened in general. Although Stalin's heirs constantly claim that after Stalin they returned to the "Leninist principles of party life," their prerogative to elect and replace the leadership of the PC has not been returned to the party congresses. All changes in the leadership of the Central Committee after Stalin took place not at congresses, as required by "Leninist principles", but through conspiracies of the Central Committee apparatus - a conspiracy against Beria (1953), a conspiracy against Malenkov (1955), a conspiracy against Molotov and the Molotovites (1957), a conspiracy against Khrushchev (1964). It is not at all necessary to have the gift of foresight to know that the same thing will happen in the future. It may be said that some congresses after Stalin did have "historical" significance, for example, the 20th and 20th congresses. Such a statement would be incorrect. The historical significance of these congresses lies not in the fact that they exposed Stalin, but in the fact that the DC exposed Stalin at them. The congresses unanimously voted for the proposal of the Central Committee to condemn Stalin under Khrushchev. The congresses would have voted unanimously for the Central Committee's proposal to rehabilitate Stalin if it had been proposed by Khrushchev's heirs at subsequent party congresses. Such is the price of party congresses after the KhSU congress.

Chapter 26

UNITED BLOC OF OPPOSITION

At the Tenth Congress, Zinoviev, still refusing to oppose Stalin's factional dictatorship with his own faction, proposed to the party that those whom he, along with Stalin, excluded from political life, be returned to active party work. Zinoviev said:

"Avoiding factions, remaining on the old positions on matters of factions, at the same time instruct the Central Committee to enlist in the work all the forces of all the former groups in our party" ("Fourteenth Congress. Verbatim Report", 1926, p. 467).

Stalin assessed this passage in Zinoviev's speech as "a signal to draw up all opposition currents and unite them into one force" (Stalin, Soch., vol. 8, p. 234). If this was really Zinoviev's call to the former oppositions, in particular to the Trotskyist one, to unite against Stalin on

congress, he did not find a response. The Trotskyists did not even know whom to support in the newly flared up struggle - Stalin against Bukharin or Zinoviev against Kamenev. The Trotskyite Karl Radek definitely demanded support for Stalin against Zinoviev (Zinoviev, as we have seen, nominated Radek from the Comintern), and the Trotskyist Mrachkovsky generally proposed fighting on two fronts - both against Stalin and against Zinoviev. There were also serious disagreements among the Zinovievites about the possibility of a blockade with Trotsky. After all, since 1920, since the trade union discussion, the main profession of Zinoviev and Kamenev was the exposure of Trotsky and Trotskyism. Nine-tenths of the party's anti-Trotskyist literature against Trotsky belonged to them.

Trotsky did not remain in debt. Mistakenly considering Zinoviev the motor of the "troika" and Stalin only a "gray beast" and narrow-minded mediocrity, Trotsky thought that Stalin in the apparatus of the Central Committee carried out only the will of Zinoviev and Kamenev. It is incomprehensible how Trotsky underestimated Stalin even after Stalin had finished with all his rivals: from Trotsky and Zinoviev to Bukharin and Rykov, and Trotsky himself found himself in exile. In his autobiography, published in 1930, Trotsky described Stalin as follows:

"Tell me," Sklyansky asked, "what is Stalin?"

Sklyansky himself knew Stalin well enough (Marshal Eremenko says in his memoirs that Stalin told him that, being twice People's Commissar, he, Stalin, in the Civil War had to obey Deputy People's Commissar Sklyansky. - A. A.). He wanted me to define his personality and at the same time explain his successes.

"Stalin," I said, "is the most outstanding mediocrity of our party... The victorious counter-revolution can have its big people. But its first step, Thermidor, needs mediocre people who do not see beyond their own noses" (L. Trotsky, "My Life", part P, pp. 254-255).

Alas, starting at least from the KhP Congress (1923), it was precisely those who in 1926 united against

Stalin - Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, plus Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy, plus the entire Central Committee, plus the entire party. They didn't see it because, considering Stalin to be "mediocrity" or wanting to use him as a party apparatus tool in the fight against each other, they did not agree to remove Stalin from the post of "secretary general" even when it was proposed not only by Lenin, but Stalin himself asked for it. It was Stalin himself who reminded his rivals that they did not see "beyond their own nose", leaving him in this post. Here is Stalin's statement at the October plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission (1927):

"At the very first meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee after the 13th Congress, I asked the plenum of the Central Committee to release me from the duties of general secretary. The congress itself discussed this issue ... and all the delegates unanimously, including Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, obliged Stalin to remain in his post ... A year after that, I again submitted an application to the plenum for release, but I was again obliged to remain at the post" (Stalin. Works ..., vol. 10, pp. 175-176).

If Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev had granted this "persistent" request of Stalin, they would probably have died of natural causes, and millions of Soviet citizens would have been spared their lives. But now, in the spring of 1926, after Stalin, in alliance with the Zinovievites, defeated Trotsky

(1924), and in alliance with the Bukharinites defeated Zinoviev (1925), a "united bloc" of Trotskyists and Zinovievites was created. His main goal: the overthrow of Stalin. However, to achieve this goal by peaceful means in the present conditions, in contrast to 1923-1924, was almost a hopeless affair. If in 1923 the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc, relying on Lenin's "Testament", could easily overthrow Stalin, if in 1924 the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc, relying on the Leningrad organization (Zinoviev) and the Moscow organization (Kamenev, Zelensky) and based on Stalin's statement, still had chances (though only chances) to get rid of Stalin within the framework of party legality, then in 1926 it was possible to overthrow Stalin only by force. The united opposition took up a form of struggle that was not only hopeless, but even aimless. They wanted to convince the party of the disastrous policy of the Stalinist Central Committee by means of propaganda, discussions and endless assurances of loyalty to Leninism, win it over to their side, and thus, on the basis of the Charter of the tsar, remove Stalin. This task was hopeless and aimless because the party, which, by the will of Lenin since 1921, was in a permanent state of siege, after the 15th Congress, in fact, ceased to be a party.

After all, the same Trotsky notes this: "A regime of pure dictatorship of the apparatus over the party has reigned. In other words: the party has ceased to be a party" (Trotsky, My Life, Part II, p. 257).

This means that the party is a fiction, and the real force is the party apparatus. To whom, then, did the united opposition appeal? She appealed to fiction and complained to her about the "dictatorship of the apparatus." "Do to others what you don't want them to do to you," is the law of chess, they say. Opposition leaders neglected it, Stalin used it classically. Stalin methodically, systematically prepared for the physical liquidation of his rivals. The first person who noticed this back in 1925 was the secretary of the Leningrad Gubernia Committee, a member of the Central Committee, Zalutsky, when he spoke about the forthcoming Thermidor. Then, in 1926, all the leaders of the opposition spoke about the danger of Thermidor in the party. Moreover, Zinoviev and Kamenev were convinced even then that Stalin was capable of organizing even a terrorist act against them.

Analyzing later events and recalling the stories of Zinoviev and Kamenev, Trotsky wrote that the fact that Stalin would become a tyrant could have been foreseen even during the years of the opposition's struggle with him. Here is the relevant passage from Trotsky's account:

"Is it possible to draw a conclusion regarding 1924 on the basis of 1936-1938, when Stalin had already become a tyrant? In 1924 he was only fighting for power. Was he then capable of such a coup? All the data from his biography make us answer this question in the affirmative..."

Ink and the printed word seem to him too insignificant a thing in the political struggle. Only the dead do not alarm him. After Zinoviev and Kamenev broke with Stalin in 1925, both of them put in a safe place the letters: "If we die suddenly, then know that this is the work of Stalin." They advised me the same. "You think that Stalin is preoccupied with how to respond to your arguments. Nothing happened. He expects to liquidate you without punishment"

Zinoviev added to this: "He would have liquidated you back in 1924 if he had not been afraid of retribution - terrorist acts by some of the youth. This is the reason that Stalin decided to start with the destruction of the opposition cadres and postponed your assassination until such time as he

feel unpunished. He hates us, especially Kamenev, because we know too much about him, but he is not yet ready to kill us" (ibid., p.

417).

These words would have to be recognized as prophetic if they were not based on an accurate knowledge of the psychology of Stalin as an innate criminal. In addition, the murder of political opponents was a legitimate right of the Bolshevik revolution, recognized not only by Lenin and Stalin, but also by Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev. Here it is only important to record: in the event of the final triumph of the Stalinist dictatorship, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev knew that they would be destroyed physically, they knew precisely in those years when they fought against Stalin with a flood of ink and verbal waste paper. To prevent this, and therefore to prevent Stalin's tyranny with its millions of human lives, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev were not capable of a violent coup by the physical elimination of Stalin himself with half a dozen of his closest comrades. Whatever sociological considerations about the "system" or philosophical arguments about the unknown laws of the revolution may be brought against me, I still affirm: without Stalin, the history of the USSR would have gone differently.

However, both the Trotskyists and the Zinovievists, and later the Bukharinites, were organically incapable of embarking on the path of revolutionary, forcible removal of the dictatorship of Stalin's apparatus by virtue of their ideology. They were slaves of communism, and Stalin was its master. They were deathly afraid that the attempt to overthrow the Stalinist regime by force would spark a popular revolution against communism in general. The history of Kronstadt was too fresh in my memory. In their eyes, Stalin was a communist, albeit a mistaken one, and in Stalin's eyes they were enemies whom he was going to, by their own admission, kill at the first opportunity. People who, in blind imitation of historical parallels, invented the bogey "Thermidor" for themselves, were more likely to be capable of suicide (as the old Bolsheviks - members of the PC had already done because of Stalin: the Trotskyist Ioffe, the Bukharinite Tomsy, the "national deviationist" Skrypnik, even Stalinist Ordzhonikidze) than to kill Stalin. In addition, the Trotskyists and Zinovievites considered themselves people of an idea and a high revolutionary conscience, and Stalin had power as the focus of all ideas, as for conscience, he had a very utilitarian idea of it: enemies with a moral brake are good - the more likely you can deal with them settle down. The conscience of the opponent is good, to rather use it

shameless. If we are already talking about the revolutionary conscience of Stalin himself, then, paraphrasing one Polish writer, one could say: Stalin's conscience was always clear, since he never used it. If Machiavelli's politics and morality are contraindicated, if Lenin's moral norms are subordinated to his goal, then Stalin's immorality in politics was of an absolute class. This is one of the all-conquering secrets of Stalin's tactical skill in the political struggle. Trotsky, on the other hand, had a pre-Chiavellian idea of morality. He wrote:

"Only a policy that is in the service of a great historical task can provide itself with morally impeccable methods of action" (Trotsky, My Life, Part II, p. 228).

Such, of course, he considered his policy and his methods. But this already predetermined the victory of Stalin. True, in the eyes of the profane, the external whole

Stalin's wisdom and his emphasized loyalty to his comrades-in-arms can only be compared with his revolutionary asceticism and demonstrative indifference to his personal interests. Stalin's deliberate underestimation of himself, his captivating "modesty", his disarming "sincerity" in the struggle "for the Party, through the Party, in the name of the Party", his reckless "determination" to sacrifice himself if the interests of the cause require it - all this produces in those years an exceptional impression. In this role, he is a sharp antipode to Trotsky and Zinoviev, who so loudly, so rudely climb into the "historical figures" in the foreground. What is worth only one speech of Stalin in 1926 in Tiflis, when they first began to create a "cult" for him. Stalin said:

"I must tell you, comrades, in all conscience, that I did not deserve a good half of the praises that were given to me here. It turns out that I am the hero of October, and the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the leader of the Comintern, a miracle hero and whatever. All this is nonsense, comrades, and an absolutely unnecessary exaggeration. In this tone they usually speak over the coffin of the deceased revolutionary. But I am not going to die yet" (Stalin, vol. 8, p. 173).

Stalin added that he was a "student of the revolution" with his old workers-teachers present here at the meeting, was an "apprentice of the revolution" with the workers-masters in Baku, and "there, in Russia, under the leadership of Lenin, I became one of the masters revolution" (ibid., pp. 173-175). Such a manner of speaking and such "modesty" were alien not only

grandiloquent Trotsky, but also the arrogant Zinoviev, and Stalin not only defiantly averted all honors and ranks in his address, but also threw out the slogan: "Modesty adorns the Bolshevik." What this "modesty" then resulted in, of course, is known, but at that time the struggle for power against the "newspaper leaders" (as Stalin called Zinoviev and Trotsky), Stalin's "modesty" appealed even to his enemies.

Let us return to the history of the formation of the "United Bloc" of the opposition of Trotsky and Zinoviev.

Let us first listen to the characterization that Trotsky gives to his colleagues in the "bloc", as well as the history of the emergence of the "bloc" itself. Trotsky writes: "During the first period of the struggle, the Troika was opposed to me. But she herself was far from unity. Both Zinoviev and Kamenev were theoretically superior to Stalin. But they both lacked that little thing called character. A more international outlook than that of Stalin, acquired by them in exile under the leadership of Lenin, did not strengthen, but, on the contrary, weakened them ... The attempt of Zinoviev and Kamenev to at least partially defend international views turned them into second-class "Trotskyists" in the eyes of the bureaucracy. All the more furiously did they try to wage a campaign against me in order to strengthen the confidence of the apparatus in themselves along the way. But these efforts were in vain. The apparatus more and more clearly revealed in Stalin the strongest bone of its bones. Zinoviev and Kamenev soon found themselves hostilely opposed to Stalin, and when they tried to transfer the dispute to the Central Committee from the troika, it turned out that Stalin had an unshakable majority. Kamenev was considered the official leader of Moscow. But after the defeat that, with the participation of Kamenev, was inflicted on the Moscow party organization in 1923, when it came out by the majority in support of the opposition, the rank and file of the Moscow Communists was gloomily silent. At the first attempts to resist Stalin, Kamenev hung in the air. Things turned out differently in Leningrad. From the opposition of 1923, the Leningrad communists were

protected by the heavy cover of the Zinoviev apparatus. But now it's their turn. The Leningrad workers were agitated by the course towards the kulak and socialism in one country. The class protest of the workers coincided with Zinoviev's dignitary opposition. So a new opposition arose, which at first included N. K. Krupskaya. To the great surprise of everyone, and above all to themselves, Zinoviev and Kamenev were forced to

repeat in parts criticism of the opposition (Trotsky) and were soon enrolled in the camp of "Trotskyists". No wonder if in our midst the rapprochement with Zinoviev and Kamenev seemed at least a paradox. Among the opposition there were quite a few who opposed this bloc. There were even those who considered it possible to enter into a bloc with Stalin against Zinoviev and Kamenev. One of my close friends, Mrachkovsky, an old revolutionary and one of the best military leaders of the civil war, spoke out against a bloc with anyone, and gave the classic justification for his position: "Stalin will deceive, and Zinoviev will run away." But in the end, questions of this kind are decided not by psychological, but by political assessments. Zinoviev and Kamenev openly admitted that the "Trotskyites" had been right against them since 1923. They accepted the foundations of our platform. Under such conditions, it was impossible not to conclude a bloc with them ... At the very first meeting with me, Kamenev declared: "As soon as you and Zinoviev appear on the same platform, the Party will find its real Central Committee ..." Kamenev clearly underestimated the work of disintegrating the Party which the "troika" produced within three years" (Trotsky, "My Life", part P, pp. 263-265).

Trotsky correctly assessed the situation: the absence of a thinking party, liquidated by the "troika" in favor of the apparatus, the spinelessness of Zinoviev and Kamenev, the cunning of Stalin, the hopelessness of the struggle by conventional methods; but he drew a strange and inexplicable conclusion from this - to conclude a bloc with the spineless leaders of the "new opposition" in order to fight Stalin by the methods of speeches and exhortations. Trotsky philosophized about the prospects for such a struggle:

"We were heading towards immediate defeat, confidently preparing our ideological victory in the more distant future. The use of material force has played and is playing a huge role in human history; sometimes progressive, more often reactionary... But from here it is infinitely far from the conclusion that by force it is possible to resolve all questions and cope with all sorts of obstacles" (ibid., pp. 276-277).

This statement contains the key to unraveling Trotsky's catastrophe - in the fight against Kerensky's weak democracy, "the use of material force" is a categorical imperative, and in the fight against the asserted tyranny of Stalin - a categorical taboo! For Trotsky to go down in history as a great revolutionary, the straightforward prisoner of democracy Kerensky and his weak regime were needed, but in order to prove that from a revolutionary

it may turn out to be a belated Don Quixote, we needed "kinto" - Stalin and his all-powerful party-police regime. The history of the United Bloc is very instructive in this respect. It is also instructive in ideological terms - the united opposition with its program of accelerated liquidation of the NEP, tax retaxation of the peasantry, artificial incitement of the class struggle, intensification of revolutionary repressions of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" against the "rightist danger" within the country, with its stake on the world "permanent revolution" for account of the vital interests of the peoples of the USSR - with this whole program, the opposition repelled not only the "decayed party", but also the broad strata

urban and rural populations. The only positive point in its program - the struggle against the dictatorship of the party apparatchiks - the people, and the party itself, was regarded as a fight between the oligarchs for power.

Stalin, upholding the NEP, rejecting repression, condemning the artificial incitement of the class struggle; Stalin is an ally of the "right-wing opportunist" Bukharin with his preaching of the "peaceful growth of the kulak into socialism" and the incendiary capitalist slogan addressed to the peasantry - "Get rich!" (True, Stalin made his own reservations here, referring to the future plan to defeat Bukharin), who rejected Trotsky's adventurist policy of "pushing the world revolution"; Stalin, who preached "socialism in one country", meaning, according to his interpretation, the construction of a society of material abundance and a high standard of living; finally, Stalin, preaching peace not only with the capitalists, but also with the socialists (the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Committee) and with the nationalists (the entry of the Chinese Communist Party into the Kuomintang Chiang Kai-shek), this moderate, calm, peace-loving Stalin impressed the people much more than forever restless, aggressive "permanent revolutionary" Trotsky. Even the world bourgeoisie sympathized with the "National Communist" Stalin, and not with the internationalist Trotsky. Rakovsky said at the 15th Congress: "I have the New York Times in my hands. It reads: 'To preserve the opposition means to preserve the explosive substance which has been laid under the capitalist world.'"

Trotsky lived on yesterday's day of revolution, and Stalin lived on today's day of comfortable power. Another era began, which needed other slogans. There was another elite that needed others

leaders. Trotsky himself saw this when he wrote:

"The ideas of the first period of the revolution imperceptibly lost power over the consciousness of that party stratum that had direct power over the country. In the country itself there were processes that can be covered by the general name of the reaction. The layer that made up the apparatus of power had its own self-sufficient goals ... A new type was being created ... When the nomads of the revolution switched to a settled way of life, philistine features, sympathies and tastes of self-satisfied officials awoke in them, came to life and unfolded ... " Not everything and not always for the revolution, it is also necessary for oneself," this mood was translated as follows: "Down with the permanent revolution!" (L. Trotsky, *ibid.*, pp. 242-246).

Yes, the country wanted to take a break from the "permanent revolution", and the party apparatchiks wanted to reap the fruits of the already accomplished revolution: to turn the conquered power into a source of prosperity and glory. On the waves of this element, the star of Stalin rose, and the star of Trotsky rolled.

Trotsky's first quarrel with Stalin after the 15th Congress and his first "docking" with Zinoviev and Kamenev took place at the April plenum of the Central Committee (1926). It began not with politics, but with the economy. During the discussion at this plenum of Rykov's report on economic tasks, Kamenev, Zinoviev and Trotsky made a number of amendments and practical proposals: to eliminate the commodity hunger in the country by increasing the production of consumer goods, to impose a high tax on the prosperous part of the village (this proposal concerned about 15% of the peasant population), to outline a more accelerated pace of industrialization than was proposed in the draft of the Central Committee (for this proposal, the Trotskyists were called by Stalin "super-industrializers"), and in order to stimulate the rise

labor productivity, to raise the nominal and real wages of workers. The Stalinists qualified these demands at the plenum ... as "Menshevik", and the demand for a pay increase as "demagogic" ("History of the CPSU", vol. 4, book D, pp. 446-447). However, the fundamental tactical shortcoming of the entire platform of the united opposition lay in the fact that it did not contain precisely "demagogic demands" designed to win sympathy and popularity among the people, while the entire program of the Stalinists was thoroughly demagogic. We give only two examples. On the decisive question of the sources of financing for industrialization ("initial socialist accumulation")

the opposition (Preobrazhensky, G. Sokolnikov, L. Shanin) believed that it should be financed by pumping money out of the countryside, and Stalin believed that this would be a robbery of the peasantry. Speaking with a report on the results of the April plenum in Leningrad, Stalin said:

"We have people in the Party who regard the peasantry ... as an object of exploitation for industry, as something like a colony for our industry. These people are dangerous people... We cannot agree with those comrades who demand increased pressure on the peasantry in the sense of an excessive increase in taxes, in the sense of raising the prices of industrial products" (Stalin, Soch. vol. 8, p. 142).

Even the latest post-Stalinist "History of the CPSU", after Stalin, having fully accepted the program of the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, carried out industrialization through the "military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry" (Bukharin), wrote:

"Their proposals led to the creation of industry incompatible with socialism by robbing the peasantry" ("History of the CPSU", vol. 4, book I, p. 446).

As if Stalin's "solid collectivization" based on the liquidation of the prosperous peasantry and the total confiscation of their property, the free forced labor of this peasantry in concentration camps, the beggarly wages of the remaining peasants in the collective farms - as if all this was not a "robbery of the peasantry"!

Another example. The opposition proposed by increasing the export of agricultural products to import the necessary machinery to accelerate the pace of industrialization. Stalin, by analogy with the American plan of reparations for Germany, called this proposal of the People's Commissar of Finance Sokolnikov the "Dawes Plan" for the USSR, which is directed against the interests of workers and peasants. "Concerned" about their high standard of living, Stalin spoke at the plenum:

"We cannot say, as they used to say in the old days: "We ourselves are undernourished, but we will take it out." We cannot say this, since the workers and peasants want to be fed humanly, and we fully support them in this" (Stalin, Soch. vol. 8, p. 128).

Even more. Stalin suggested that the workers should receive agricultural products, and the peasants should receive industrial products cheaper and in abundance. Here is his offer on the same April

plenum:

"Measures must be taken to reduce retail prices for industrial and agricultural products" (ibid., p. 127).

But Stalin did exactly the opposite of what he said. This double-dealing nature of Stalin was witnessed to us not by any anti-Soviet organ, but by the organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU itself, when it wrote:

"Stalin's work was followed by a break between theory and practice. In many cases, he did exactly the opposite of what he said and wrote quite correctly" ("Kommunist", No. 5, 1956, p. 25).

That Stalin wanted peace with the opposition least of all, and only maneuvered at the Moscow Congress, not being sure of such an easy victory over the "new opposition" in Leningrad, is shown by Stalin's refusal to compromise the January plenum of the Central Committee (1926).

At this plenum, as indicated, G. Evdokimov, one of the leaders of the "new opposition" from Leningrad, was introduced to the Orgburo and appointed one of the secretaries of the Central Committee, while Zinoviev remained a member of the Politburo. Now, at the April plenum, the results of the successful defeat of the Zinoviev leadership in Leningrad are summed up and at the same time a resolution is issued: "The Plenum releases Comrade Evdokimov, according to his request, from the duties of secretary of the Central Committee," although, of course, there was no request from Evdokimov ("VKP(b)" in res., Part P, 1933, p. 937). It is much safer to keep Zinoviev in the powerless Politburo than to have his assistant as a witness in the all-powerful Secretariat.

This only accelerated the process of uniting the Zinovievites both with the Trotskyists and with other opposition currents in the party. In May/June, a new "United Bloc" of the opposition is already being formed. This includes leaders and active representatives of the "new opposition", the "left opposition", the "workers' opposition", the group of "decists", the group of "left communists", the "working group". It was a bloc of disarmed party generals, even without a disarmed army. It was a block of generals who disarmed each other in favor of Stalin, without knowing it. It was a block of those who saw the light: it turns out that there was only one real enemy of all -

Stalin.

The insight, however, came too late. History has turned a new chapter. Stalin entrenched himself in the saddle of power so firmly that he was not afraid of any oppositional criticism, especially since they agreed not to

resort to the "use of material force" against Stalin. That is why Stalin rightfully called this Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc a bloc of the "castrated" (Stalin, Works, vol. 8, p. 243). It was, finally, a bloc of dogmatists with an incredible ideological amalgam, gross tactical miscalculations, complete ignorance in understanding the nature and functioning of the new party-police machine that Stalin created before their very eyes. The ignorance of the opposition in this fact of world historical significance was so great that even in 1940 Trotsky continued to persist: "Stalin seized power not by virtue of his personal qualities, but with the help of an impersonal machine. He did not create the machine, but the machine created him" (1).

The historical untenability of this thesis is so obvious that in my *Technology of Power* (1959) I limited myself to the following remark on this subject: "In this book I come to the opposite conclusions: firstly, as a master of power (this is the main thing in politics) Stalin surpassed

not only Trotsky, but also Lenin; secondly, it was Stalin who created the "machine", and then the machine created Stalin. Before this happened, Stalin completely destroyed the Leninist party machine and the Leninist party cadres. Only through this lay the path to autocracy" (A. Avtorkhanov, "Technology of power", Preface, TsOPE, Munich, 1959).

The tragedy of the "United Bloc" was that he continued to consider the newly created party-police machine Stalin still "Leninist", which cannot be destroyed, but whose "mistakes" must and can be corrected with the help of magical quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin and even Stalin himself. When Zinoviev organized such a heap of quotations against Stalin at the enlarged plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in December 1926, Stalin gave an answer in which cynicism is in complete harmony with common sense. Here is his answer:

"I would like to say a few words about Zinoviev's special manner of quoting the classics of Marxism ... (Zinoviev) separates the individual propositions and formulas of Marx and Engels from their living connection with reality, turns them into dilapidated dogmas ... What Zinoviev did not do to pull up a whole pile of quotations from Lenin's writings and "stun" the listeners. Zinoviev apparently thinks that the more quotations, the better... The question is: why did Zinoviev need such quotations? Apparently, in order to "stun" the listener with a pile of quotes and

muddy the waters" (Stalin, Op. vol. 9, pp. 86, 94, 95-96).

To justify a pile of quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin means, according to Stalin, "to muddy the water!" Stalin drummed into the unlucky heads of the opposition that he was ready to throw any principles from the "holy scriptures" of Marx and Lenin overboard the party ship, if because of them the ship would run aground or they would begin to conflict with the interests of his personal power. Stalin gave an example of how he, along with other delegates to the Stockholm Congress of the RSDLP (1906), "laughed until you drop", how in the Crimea the Social Democrats were looking for a quote from Marx. Stalin said that the sailors of the Black Sea turned to the party committee with a proposal: you, the Social Democrats, called on us to rise up against tsarism, now we have decided to follow this call and ask for your advice and guidance. Stalin continued: "The sailors and soldiers left in anticipation of directives, and the Social Democrats convened a conference to discuss the issue. They took the first volume of Capital, they took the second volume of Capital, they finally took the third volume of Capital. They are looking for instructions about the Crimea, Sevastopol, about the uprising in the Crimea. But not a single, literally not a single indication is found in the three volumes of Capital either about Sevastopol, or about the Crimea, or about an uprising of sailors and soldiers. They leaf through other works of Marx and Engels, looking for instructions, but still there were no instructions. How to be? And the sailors have already come, waiting for an answer. And what. The Social-Democrats had to admit that in this state of affairs they were not in a position to give any kind of instructions to the sailors and soldiers" (ibid., pp. 93-94).

Stalin admitted that there were exaggerations in this story, but he slyly mocked the leaders of the opposition, who slavishly bind themselves with quotations and, without looking into the "saints", do not dare to fight even with him, with Stalin. Stalin concluded: "This story quite aptly captures the basic disease of Zinoviev's manner of quoting" (ibid., p. 94).

Unlike the leaders of the united opposition, its rank-and-file leaders understood much better that Stalin could not be convinced by any quotations. Stalin actually created a new party. She could also be opposed

just a new batch. This idea was substantiated by an article by J. Ossovsky in the Bolshevik magazine, which Stalin allowed to be published, obviously for provocative purposes against the opposition. Deliberately distorting her thoughts, the official historian writes: "He demanded the legalization of factions in the CPSU (6), the right to create other parties, the restoration of a smaller party

Sheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries" ("History of the CPSU", vol. 4, book D, p. 452).

The first attempt to create a new Bolshevik party was made after the April plenum of 1926 by a responsible worker of the Comintern, Gr. Belenkiy and a candidate member of the Central Committee, Deputy People's Commissar for Military Affairs and the Revolutionary Military Council M. Lashevich. Here is what the official document of the Central Committee of July 23, 1926 says about this:

"The opposition could not hold out in its struggle on the basis of the legal defense of its views within the framework of the Party Charter ... resorting in its struggle with the party to attempts to create an illegal factional organization opposed to the party ... Particularly noteworthy is the illegal factional meeting in the forest, near Moscow arranged by an employee of the ECCI Gr. Belenky, ... according to all the rules of conspiracy ... At this meeting, secret from the party, Lashevich, a candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, makes a report, urging those present to organize for the struggle ... The growing factionalism of the "new opposition" led it to play with the idea of two parties" ("CPSU in Res.", part P, pp. 161-162).

Of course, neither Zinoviev, nor Kamenev, nor even Trotsky played with such an idea. The idea came from the middle link of the opposition through the head of its leaders. The chairman of the Central Control Commission, speaking at the July joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, accused Zinoviev of actually directing oppositional activities to create a second Bolshevik party, using the apparatus of the Executive Committee of the Comintern for this purpose. For the first time at the same July plenum, the creation of the "United Bloc" of the opposition became a political and legal fact. Trotsky spoke there with "Declaration 13" signed by Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Sokolnikov, Pyatakov, Evdokimov, Radek and others. Its main content was as follows.

1. The immediate cause of the worsening crises in the party is bureaucracy, which flourished especially after the death of Lenin and continues to flourish. The Central Committee of the ruling party has at its disposal not only ideological and organizational means, that is, party means, but also state and economic means for action in relation to the party. Lenin always considered that the concentration of administrative power in the hands of the party would lead to bureaucratic pressure on the party. It was from this that Lenin's idea was born to create the Central Control Commission (CCC), which, without having

administrative power, will have all the power necessary to combat bureaucracy, to protect the rights of party members to freely express their opinions and vote, guided by their conscience and without fear of any penalties. Meanwhile, the Central Control Commission has become in fact not only a purely administrative organ that helps to carry out reprisals against other bureaucratic organs, but the Central Control Commission also fulfills the role of a punishing organ, crushing any independent thought in the Party, any critical voice, any critical remarks addressed to certain leaders of the Party. Non-fulfillment of the unanimously adopted resolution of the Central Committee of December 5, 1923 on the development of inner-party democracy, on the freedom of party members

expressing one's opinion freely leads to the creation of factions. This is confirmed by the case of Lashevich, Belenky, Chernyshev. It would be criminal blindness to present this case as the result of the evil will of the Party of individuals and groups. In fact, we have before us a completely obvious consequence of the existing course of the Central Committee, when people can speak freely only at the top of the Party, while at the bottom, in the Party itself, they are forced to share their thoughts secretly or keep them to themselves. No one dares to speak critically at party meetings. The mass of the Party only listens to the speeches of the representatives of the Party apparatus, and resolutions are adopted only "unanimously."

2. It is quite obvious that the Party does not consider the decisions taken by the leading centers to be its own decisions, ignoring the methods of party democracy. The discrepancy between the direction of economic policy and the direction of the feelings and thoughts of the proletarian vanguard inevitably gives rise to repressions and gives the entire policy an administrative bureaucratic character.

The lag of industry in the economic development of the country lowers the role of the proletariat in society. The lagging influence of industry in agriculture and the rapid growth of the kulak in the countryside diminishes the influence of wage-workers and the poorest peasantry, as well as their faith in the state and in themselves. The fact that the wages of the workers lag behind the rise in the standard of living of the non-proletarian elements in the city inevitably means a decline in the political and cultural self-respect of the proletariat as the leading class.

3. The current year has once again testified that state industry is lagging behind... Development towards socialism is ensured only if the pace of industrial development does not lag behind the general pace

economic development, systematically raising the country to the technical level of the more developed capitalist countries. Every thing must be subordinated to this task, which is equally important for both the proletariat and the peasantry.

4. Meanwhile, the Party is watching with concern that the decision of the 15th Congress on industrialization is not being carried out, just as the decision on intra-Party democracy has not been carried out either. In this fundamental question of life and death of the October Revolution, the Party cannot and does not want to play hide-and-seek... The Party wants to know, think, verify, decide. The existing regime does not want to allow this. From here comes the secret distribution of party documents, as was the case in the Lashevich "case".

Under the guise of strengthening the alliance between the poor peasantry and the middle peasantry, we observe the constant and regular political subordination of the poorest peasantry to the middle peasantry, and through it to the kulak.

b. The proletariat in our state does not reach even two million people; together with the transport workers, it amounts to less than three million. Soviet, trade union, cooperative and other employees taken together make up a number not inferior to that of the proletariat. This alone testifies to the colossal political and economic role of the bureaucracy. From this it is quite obvious that the state apparatus, in its composition and the standard of living of its bearers, is overwhelmingly bourgeois and petty-bourgeois, moving away from the proletariat and the poorest peasantry in the direction of satisfying the interests of the new bourgeoisie and kulaks. How many times did Lenin warn us against the bureaucratic perversion of the state

of the apparatus and the need for the trade unions to defend the interests of the workers against this apparatus, while the Party bureaucrat is infected with the most dangerous self-deception precisely in this area.

7. In 1920, at a party conference led by Lenin, it was decided that when transferring communists, it was unacceptable to be guided by other considerations than business: any repressions against party members because they were on this or that issue or on what -or the decision of the party think otherwise. All current practice is contrary to this ruling. Instead of discipline - the subordination of party members to the party apparatus. The comrades on whom the Party could rely in difficult moments are being removed en masse from

governing bodies, many are transferred to distant lands, exiled, persecuted, and random but obedient people are recruited in their place. Now these bureaucratic sins of the party regime have resulted in accusations against Lashevich and Belenky, whom the party has known for more than two decades as disciplined and devoted members. In fact, there is an accusation against them, therefore an accusation against the bureaucratic rotation of the party apparatus.

The importance of the tightly knit centralized apparatus of the Bolshevik Party needs no explanation. Without it, the proletarian revolution is impossible. For the most part, it consists of people devoted to the working class. With proper leadership and a proper distribution of forces, many Party workers will help to implement Party democracy.

8. The bureaucratic regime is spreading in the life of plants and factories, like rust. While party members are in fact deprived of the right to criticize the district committee, the regional committee, or the Central Committee, then in the enterprises they are deprived of the right to criticize their leaders. Party members are intimidated. An administrator who, as a loyal person, is able to secure the support of a higher party organization, thereby insures himself against criticism from below and often shields himself from responsibility for bad management or even stupidity.

In the socialist economy that is being built, the main condition for the economical expenditure of national resources is the effective control of the masses, above all workers in enterprises. As long as they cannot openly criticize shortcomings and disorders, naming the perpetrators by name, without being expelled from the cell or removed from work as oppositionists, the struggle for austerity and labor productivity inevitably turns into a bureaucratic undertaking for account of the vital interests of the workers. This is exactly what is happening now.

9. To straighten the party line means to straighten its international line. We must cast aside all dubious survivals of innovation, which make it appear that the victory of socialism in our country is not inseparably connected with the struggle of the European and world proletariat for power. We are building socialism and will continue to build it. The colonial peoples are fighting for independence ... Socialism will triumph in our country in direct connection with the European and world revolution and

struggle of the East against the imperialist yoke.

10. The idea that by mechanical agreement with the so-called

the opposition can expand the scope of party democracy, there is a gross self-deception. On the basis of all its experience, the Party cannot believe this. The methods of mechanical condemnation will prepare new splits and splits, new withdrawals, new exclusions, new pressure on the entire Party. Such a system will inevitably narrow the top leadership, diminish its authority and force it to replace its ideological authority with double and triple pressure. The Party must put an end to this destructive process. Lenin proved that firmly leading the Party does not mean strangling it.

11. There is not the slightest doubt that the Party is in a position to resolve its difficulties. The idea that there is no path to Party unity is nonsense. There is such a way. Healthy collective leadership is possible only on the basis of party democracy. There is no other way. In the struggle and work on this one and only correct path, the Central Committee has our full and complete support. Trotsky archive, my abridged reverse translation. - A. YES.).

A careful analysis of "Statement 13" shows that, with regard to criticism of the party apparatus regime, it only repeats what was said on this subject in the unanimously adopted decision of the Politburo of December 5, 1923. The last decision, according to the intention of its authors, in particular Trotsky and partly Zinoviev and Kamenev, was aimed at returning the party apparatus under the control of the party, depriving Stalin of that "immense power" that, according to Lenin, Stalin seized when he became the head of this apparatus. Zinoviev's goal was the same when, in the same 1923, he presented a project on the creation of a triumvirate "Trotsky-Stalin-Zinoviev" instead of the General Secretary. Having guessed the true intention of Zinoviev, Stalin then answered with a decisive refusal, expressing at the same time a threat of resignation, which was neither sincere nor serious. Here is his answer: "I am ready to clear the place without noise, without discussion, open or hidden, and without demanding guarantees for the rights of the minority" (Stalin, Soch. vol. 7, p. 387).

The authors of Statement 13 now want Stalin to fulfill his promise and "clear the place without noise." At the same time, the united opposition deems it necessary to curtsy to that great

army of party apparatchiks, on whom Stalin relies, in the false hope of tearing it away from Stalin. It was a futile attempt. The party bureaucracy understood only too well that the fall of Stalin was its historical defeat.

The most sensational and, perhaps, unexpected for Stalin was that in this opposition document, for the first time since the revolution, stood next to the signature of Trotsky and the signatures of Zinoviev and Kamenev, Trotsky's long-term implacable enemies. No less sensational were their explanations. They amnestied each other, renounced their old mutual accusations and political doctrines. This catastrophic tactical oversight, not caused by circumstances, was used by Stalin not without success. Stalin spoke of a bloc of unprincipled people. First of all, let's listen to the leaders of the block, what was their "mutual amnesty". We have at our disposal a collection of documents "The Party and the Opposition", published by the printing house of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) in 1927. The title page of the collection bears the stamp: "Top secret. Only for members of the CPSU (6)". Although the selection of documents of the opposition uses the then usual method of juggling, the value of this collection is still exceptional, especially since even after almost half a century the "Protocols of the Central Committee" are not published.

For this chapter, we use these official documents with the attention they deserve as an invaluable primary source.

On June 26, 1926, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, Zinoviev made the following statement:

"It was such a sad time. Instead of us - two groups of real proletarian revolutionaries - uniting together against the slipping Stalin and his friends, we, due to a number of ambiguities in the state of affairs in the party, beat each other on the heads for a couple of years, which we very much regret and hope that this will never happen again "(" Party and opposition according to documents. Materials for the XNUMXth Congress of the CPSU (6) ". First issue. Edition of the Agitprop of the Central Committee of the CPSU (6). Only for members of the CPSU (6). Moscow, 1927, p. 23).

Speaking at the July plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission (1926), Zinoviev declared that in the struggle against the "troika" in 1923 Trotsky's "left opposition" proved to be right. Zinoviev:

"I made a lot of mistakes. I consider two of my biggest mistakes. My first mistake in 1917 is known to all of you. do you know how

it was sharply condemned by Comrade Lenin, but you know that Comrade Lenin believed that I had corrected this mistake ... I consider the second mistake more dangerous, because the mistake of 1917, made under Lenin, was corrected by Lenin, as well as us with his help in a few days, and my mistake in 1923 was that ...

Ordzhonikidze. Why did you fool the whole party?

Zinoviev. We say that now there can no longer be any doubt that the main core of the opposition in 1923, as the evolution of the faction now leading has revealed, correctly warned of the dangers of a shift from the proletarian line and of the menacing growth of the apparatus regime. Meanwhile, dozens and hundreds of leaders of the opposition in 1923, including numerous old Bolshevik workers, hardened in the struggle, alien to careerism and servility, despite all the restraint and discipline they showed, remain to this day suspended from party work ... Here is the evolution (the noise, the call of the chairman) of Bukharin, Smirnov, Tomsky and a number of other comrades fully justified what Trotsky said about the slipping of some comrades and what is indicated in those points that we cite in the declaration about your slipping and your opportunism. Yes, Trotsky was right against you on the question of slippage and the question of apparatus-bureaucratic clampdown" (ibid., p. 24).

Speaking after Zinoviev, Trotsky admitted that in The Lessons of October he was shooting at the wrong address: Zinoviev and Kamenev. As the experience of the ideological struggle within the Central Committee testifies, this was a gross mistake. The explanation for this mistake lies in the fact that I was not able to follow the ideological struggle within the Seven and establish in time that the opportunist shifts were caused by the group headed by Stalin, against the so-called. Zinoviev and Kamenev" (ibid., p. 23).

This mutual amnesty between the Trotskyists and the Zinovievists we called a catastrophic tactical mistake, because without any

The victory made it possible for Stalin and his group to accuse Trotsky and Zinoviev of unscrupulousness and vividly illustrate this accusation on the documents of the rich polemical literature of Trotsky and Zinoviev against each other. Stalin's propaganda machine is now engaged in intense,

mass reprinting of this literature. Party propaganda, not very bright in the finer points of "high politics", hammered into the head of the Party propaganda a very intelligible, undoubtedly true thought: Trotsky and Zinoviev have no other idea than that they simply want to take the place of Stalin and Bukharin! In the struggle for this personal power, official propaganda proved, Trotskyists and Zinovievites are ready to sacrifice any of their former principles. In a party that had been brought up on Lenin's thesis "a principled policy is the most correct policy", unscrupulousness was considered the gravest sin. Stalin played on this feeling of a Party fanatic when he answered Trotsky and Zinoviev by accusing them of precisely this unscrupulousness. Stalin said:

"Tov. Trotsky, renounces his "Lessons of October", refuses to "link the opportunist shifts in policy with the names of comrades Zinoviev and Kamenev." Trotsky needs this unprincipled amnesty from Zinoviev and Kamenev in exchange for a similar amnesty from Trotsky on the part of comrades Zinoviev and Kamenev. It turns out that Lenin was wrong in calling the October mistakes of Zinoviev and Kamenev "no accident," and Comrade Trotsky now undertakes to correct Lenin" (ibid., p. 24).

But the first person to "unscrupulously" amnestied Zinoviev and Kamenev and "corrected" Lenin was Stalin himself, when they were his allies against Trotsky. Speaking in November 1924 against the "Lessons of October" and in defense of Zinoviev and Kamenev, Stalin said that with Zinoviev and Kamenev in October 1917 "the differences lasted only a few days, because and only because we had in the person of Kamenev and Zinoviev Leninists, Bolsheviks" (Stalin, Works. vol. 6, p. 327).

The united opposition tried to ward off accusations of "unscrupulousness" by referring to its ignorance of the behind-the-scenes game and the true goals of the Stalinist group in the leadership of the Central Committee. In the mouths of people who sat next to Stalin in the Politburo from the day it was organized, such arguments were simply ridiculous. The mere admission that Trotsky and Zinoviev fought among themselves because of ignorance of the situation in the party and the country was enough to disqualify them as politicians. But it was precisely in this "ignorance" that they confessed in their platform. Here is the relevant passage from it: "We dismiss, as an attempt with unsuitable means, the striving of the Stalin group to "block" the views of the opposition set forth in

this platform, referring to the old differences that existed between the groups in 1923 and 1924. These differences have now been eliminated on the basis of Leninism.

Mistakes and exaggerations committed by both groups of Bolsheviks (i.e., Trotskyists and Zinovievites. - A. A.) in disputes of 1923-1924. due to a number of ambiguities in the state of affairs in the party and in the country, have now been corrected and are not an obstacle to the friendly joint struggle against opportunism for Leninism" ("The Party and the Opposition According to Documents", p. 24).

Generally speaking, "Statement 13" in a normal party and with an ordinary "general secretary" would not represent anything sensational or illegal. But

since it was a "party of a special type," in the terminology of the Bolsheviks themselves, and Stalin also turned out to be a "general secretary" of a "special type," this statement was interpreted not as a criticism of the policy of the party apparatus, but as preparation for the creation of a new party to seize power. The chairman of the Central Control Commission - that surest tool of the Stalinist leadership against the opposition - Kuibyshev and his assistant Yanson told the plenum the facts that were supposed to prove the thesis about the emerging "second party". Kuibyshev said that the oppositionists were creating a new conspiratorial organization on the same principles on which the Bolsheviks created it under the conditions of tsarist absolutism - with their own secret connections, appearances, patrols. Janson even announced the cipher that Gr. Belenky for secret correspondence with grassroots opposition groups. For example, for a group in Odessa, according to Janson, Belenky established the following cipher:

Real names: Provisional: Trotsky Tolstoy

Zinoviev Zlatovratsky Kamenev
Korolenko

Krupskaya Nadezhdina
Sokolnikov Sibiryakov

PK Tsemakh

Polysh Politburo

Patriot Party

Komsomol resort

(ibid., pp. 27-28). At the plenum, it was announced, obviously fabricated by the apparatus of the Central Committee,

statement by Lenin's former secretary Gessler that she was invited by the opposition to go to Berlin, Paris, Rome and inform the leaders of the Western Communist Parties that "within a short time the mood in the party will change and that, at least within two months, big foreign parties should not speak out for the Central Committee of the Russian Party" (ibid., pp. 28-29). It was also reported that two leading officials of the Comintern, supporters of the "new opposition", Guralsky and Vujonovitch, using the name of Zinoviev, tried to send their agent for the same purpose of information and communication with foreign Communist Parties in favor of the opposition (ibid., p. 29) .

The growing dissatisfaction of the communists with the dictatorship of the apparatus and the really anti-Stalinist acts of conspiracy of individual old Bolsheviks were attributed to Zinoviev and Trotsky, although the latter not only did not give their supporters any instructions at that time, but even learned about their anti-Stalinist actions from the Stalinist apparatus.

Zinoviev and Trotsky were also blamed for the statements of representatives of the former Workers' Opposition, who, not without malice, congratulated them on the fact that they had finally "seen the light", although they had not drawn all the necessary conclusions. The plenum quoted a letter to Zinoviev from the leader of the former

"Workers' opposition" Medvedev. In itself, the fact that this letter fell into the hands of the Stalinist police before it reached its addressee, a member of the Politburo, spoke of more than its content. Still, some of Medvedev's thoughts are interesting:

"Now you are advocating intra-party democracy and standing on the basis of a one-party form of government ... This is an internal contradiction ... If criticism does not have a point of view, a platform ... then this is just a bunch of words, chatter. There is no criticism without groupings. But a grouping is a potential opportunity for a new party. And how can this be reconciled with a one-party form of government... The fact that the bureaucracy disposes of the entire sum of wealth gives it state power unprecedented in the party. Let this bureaucracy look at itself and inspire everyone that it is the "iron cohort", the "old guard" and that it is leading the proletariat straight to communism - this does not change the facts. It would be strange if she didn't say this... So, you felt that not everything is all right, that not everything is calm on the proletarian Shipka... You are moving away from the line that forced you to fight my criticism with disgusting

means. This is good. Better late than never" (ibid., pp. 42-43).

The July joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission ended with the condemnation of the united opposition. The resolution of the plenum stated that "the growing factionalism of the 'new opposition' led it to play with the idea of two parties", that supporters of the opposition were sending secret Politburo documents around the cities of the USSR, creating a network of opposition groups on the ground, and sending their secret agents to instruct them, they organize a properly adjusted conspiracy technique with their own ciphers, appearances, etc. Moreover, the oppositionists are beginning to get in touch with foreign communist parties.

Although not a single fact of Zinoviev's physical or ideological leadership of the opposition forces after the 15th Congress was cited at the plenum, he was nevertheless made morally responsible for them, since "there was not the slightest attempt on the part of Zinoviev to condemn these like-minded people and dissociate themselves from them" ("CPSU in res.>, part I, pp. 162-164).

The Plenum decided, referring to Lenin's resolution at the Tenth Congress, to expel Zinoviev from the Politburo, "while warning all the oppositionists, regardless of their position in the Party, that their continued work on creating a faction opposed to the Party, will force the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, in order to protect the unity of the Party, to do and in relation to them the corresponding organizational conclusions" (ibid., p. 164).

The names of Trotsky and Kamenev were passed over by the resolution in complete silence. Every vegetable has its time. Instead of Zinoviev, Rudzutak was elected a member of the Politburo, and the candidate staff of the Politburo was expanded to eight people: Petrovsky, Uglanov, Ordzhonikidze, Andreev, Kirov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Kamenev.

Trotsky describes the further development of events as follows:

"The struggle during 1926 unfolded more and more sharply. By autumn, the opposition made an open sortie at meetings of party cells. The apparatus gave a furious rebuff. The ideological struggle was replaced by administrative mechanics: telephone calls from the party bureaucracy to meetings

working cells, a frantic crowd of cars, the roar of horns, well-organized whistling and roaring when the oppositionists appeared on the podium. The ruling faction pressed with the mechanical concentration of its forces,

threat of reprisals. Before the masses of the Party had time to hear, understand and say anything, they were afraid of a split and catastrophe. The opposition had to retreat. On October 16, we made a statement in the sense that, considering our views to be correct and reserving the right to fight for them within the Party, we renounce such actions that give rise to the danger of a split. .274).

However, from the "Declaration of October 16" Stalin subtracted something more than Trotsky is pleased to admit. In fact, this is what Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Sokolnikov and Evdokimov wrote in it:

"We categorically reject the theory and practice of "freedom of factions and groupings", recognizing that such a theory and practice is contrary to the foundations of Leninism and the decisions of the party. We consider it our duty to carry out the Party's decisions on the inadmissibility of factionalism in practice. At the same time, we consider it our duty to openly admit to the Party that in the struggle for our views, we and our like-minded people, in a number of cases after the XT/U Congress, have taken steps that are a violation of party discipline and that go beyond the framework of ideological struggle established by the Party on the path of factionalism. Considering these steps unquestionably erroneous, we declare that we resolutely renounce factional methods of defending our views, in view of the danger these methods pose to the unity of the Party, and call on all comrades who share our views to do the same. We call for the immediate dissolution of all factional groupings... We consider the resolutions of the KhP Congress, the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission unconditionally obligatory for ourselves, we will unconditionally obey them and put them into practice... Each of us undertakes to uphold his views only in the forms established by the rules and the decisions of the congresses and the Central Committee..." ("The Party and the Opposition According to Documents", pp. 31-32).

Finding themselves between the anvil of the opposition activists, who demanded that the leaders switch from words to deeds, and Stalin's heavy hammer hanging over their heads, the leaders of the united opposition preferred capitulation. Trotsky calls this capitulation the conclusion of a "truce." In fact, there was no "truce", because the Stalinist apparatus used the statement of October 16 as documentary evidence of the opposition's recognition of its anti-Party activities. The Stalinist apparatus took the second, most important step towards the liquidation of the opposition. If up to now all the opposition has been required to do is stop the factional

struggle, now they began to demand the abandonment of their views.

Exactly one week after the announcement of October 16, a new joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission was convened. The plenum discussed three reports on the opposition: the reports of Molotov from the Politburo and Yaroslavsky from the Presidium of the Central Control Commission on the situation within the Party, and Stalin's theses for the 15th Party Conference "On the Opposition Bloc".

Stalin, in his theses, raised the question not only of the organizational, but also of the ideological capitulation of the opposition. Stalin proposed, and the plenum approved, the following decision: "To ensure that the opposition bloc recognizes the fallacy of its views" (Stalin, Soch. , vol. 8, p. 233).

Zinoviev, Trotsky, Kamenev and their supporters in the Central Committee refused to acknowledge the fallacy of their platform. This did not discourage Stalin. Stalin assessed their non-recognition of the fallacy of their views as disobedience to the decision of the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, and, therefore, a gross violation of party discipline, which they themselves wrote about in the "Statement of October 16". Kirov, on behalf of the members of the PC - Leningraders (in fact - on behalf of the Politburo) submitted a draft of a new resolution on the opposition for approval by the plenum. The Plenum approved this draft as its resolution. It said:

"1) In view of the violation of party discipline by members of the Central Committee Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Yevdokimov, Sokolnikov, Smilga and candidate member of the Central Committee comrade Nikolaeva, the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission issues a warning to all these comrades ...

2) In view of the fact that Zinoviev does not express the line of the CPSU (6) in the Communist International ... The Central Committee and the Central Control Commission do not find it possible for Zinoviev to continue his work in the Communist International "(CPSU in Res.>", Part II, pp. 290- 291).

Stalin did not stop there. Despite the capitulation of October 16, or rather, taking advantage of the fact of this surrender, in which the opposition pleaded guilty to factional struggle, the plenum passed a resolution: to exclude Trotsky from the Politburo members, and Kamenev from the candidates for the Politburo membership. The most zealous allies of Stalin were also rewarded: Kuibyshev was introduced to the Politburo and at the same time appointed chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR, and Sergo Ordzhonikidze was appointed chairman of the Central Control Commission to replace Kuibyshev. The candidates for membership of the Politburo included St. Kosior

and Chubar, and Bukharin, instead of Zinoviev, was put at the head of the Executive Committee of the Comintern as a "political secretary" (the title of "Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Comintern", which Zinoviev used, was eliminated by the jealous Stalin).

At the XV Party Conference (November 1926), Stalin delivered a report "On the Social Democratic Deviation in Our Party", and the leaders of the united bloc repeated their accusations against the Central Committee.

Stalin's report noted the disintegration of the bloc that had already begun. Stalin spoke about the contradictions between the Trotskyists and the Zinovievites, as well as about the departure from the opposition bloc of the former leaders of the "Workers' Opposition" Medvedev and Shlyapnikov. In particular, it was reported at the conference that Medvedev and Shlyapnikov had abandoned Medvedev's "Baku Letter". In this letter (written at the end of the discussion in 1923-1924), Medvedev characterized the entire domestic policy of the Central Committee as anti-proletarian, and its international policy as adventurist. The Baku Letter condemned the splitting policy of the Comintern and the Western Communist Parties, which the Baku Letter assessed as "hordes of petty-bourgeois servants supported by Russian gold" (Em. Yaroslavsky, "A Brief History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks", 1930, pp. 455-456).

Stalin's prediction that the bloc would disintegrate between the Trotskyists and the Zinovievites, and his expectations that such a disintegration would affect the conference itself (for the apparatus was intensively working in this direction) were not entirely justified. Only Krupskaya withdrew from the opposition, which Stalin announced solemnly in his closing speech. But she withdrew not because she considered Stalin's policy Leninist policy, but because

"the opposition has gone too far in its criticism." She was afraid that from the criticism of the opposition against the Central Committee and the Soviet government, the people might draw anti-communist conclusions and oppose the communist dictatorship in general. But in what torment, how reluctantly, under what heavy apparatus pressure it departed from Zinoviev and Kamenev, is shown, for example, by the fact that the statement about this withdrawal appeared in the press only six months after the XV conference (Pravda, May 20, 1927).).

Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev still insisted that they were right, they still proved the impossibility of building "socialism in one country", but at the same time they assured the Central Committee (Stalin) that they would loyally carry out the decisions of the party and its Central Committee, all the more that an ally of Stalin -

Prime Minister Rykov reminded the opposition at the 15th Party Conference that the Party would not allow anyone to test its patience endlessly (Pravda, November 5, 1926). Stalin's right-hand man in the theoretical substantiation of the party apparatus struggle against the opposition, Bukharin, at the same conference, reminded the opposition leaders that they still had not abandoned their accusation of the Central Committee of "bureaucratic degradation" and that if they continued to shout about "Thermidor", then the party deal with them completely (Pravda, November 10, 1926).

The former Menshevik, and now the most vociferous Stalinist, Yu. Larin, demanded that an end be put to the opposition immediately, expelling it from the party, or the question would be decided by machine guns in the streets, as was the case with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in 1918 (V. Zoyourshe, Zap, p. 439, SeeKer ana \V/arbara, Hop4on). In this atmosphere of the predetermined expulsion of the opposition from the party, in conditions where it was clear to everyone that the question was not that the opposition would be expelled, but when it would happen, it is completely impossible to understand the defensive tactics of the opposition. After all, it was Stalin who told the conference that "recently at a plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, Trotsky declared that the adoption by the conference of the theses on an opposition bloc must inevitably lead to the expulsion of the leaders of the opposition from the party" (Stalin, Soch. vol. 8, p. 293). But Stalin diplomatically reassured the party: "I must declare, comrades, that this statement by Trotsky is devoid of any foundation, that it is false" (ibid.). Why did Stalin need this really false statement? The answer is clear from Stalin's report: by admitting its guilt in creating a faction, the opposition took only the first step (Stalin: "This, of course, is not enough. But this is not enough"), now it must take the second step: to admit its guilt in preaching anti-Leninist ideology. In the meantime, according to the exact distribution of functions among the members of the Politburo and the Central Committee, Stalin himself played, as usual, the role of a peace-loving "general secretary", and his associates unanimously argued that the "first step" of the opposition - the "Declaration of October 16" - was not sincere. It is not enough to beat the opposition, it is necessary to finish it off. The former leader of the Comintern, the proud and swaggering pretender to Lenin's successor, Zinoviev, was helpless in his defense and miserable in his fall two years ago when he answered the Stalinists at the XV Conference. Here is Zinoviev's justification:

"We consider this tag (Statement of October 16. - A. A.) obliging us and that everything that we declared there will be unconditionally fulfilled by us ...

It is not an agreement between any parties. For this alone, there can be no place for what is called diplomacy, "moves," etc. This is an obligation of subordination openly declared before the masses of the Party, the Party and its leading institutions.... In the statement of October 16 we say that we

we, as a minority of the party, have been defending lately... You know that the Politburo, having discussed our statement, recognized this statement as sufficient, at least to ensure party unity... Some comrades think that this part of the statement heralds a new struggle.. I declare to the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission that we will use absolutely every effort, will do everything possible to ensure that such fears are not justified. In no way is this a loophole for trying a new discussion.

Vote. Military maneuver!

Zinoviev. There are no maneuvers, no moves.

Voice. A break is needed.

Zinoviev. You will soon see that this is not so" ("The Party and the Opposition According to Documents", pp. 31-32).

This essentially ideological capitulation of the opposition, Zinoviev's pleading fawning over the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, his cries for peace made no impression on the imperturbable Stalin. Finishing off Zinoviev, his yesterday's ally in the fight against Trotsky (by the way, at the same conference, Stalin said that the resolution of the Central Committee of January 17, 1924, as well as the resolution of the XIII Congress against Trotsky, were written by Zinoviev), Stalin decided to publicly mock him. Stalin replied to Zinoviev:

"Zinoviev once boasted that he knew how to put his ear to the ground (laughter), and when he puts it to the ground, he hears the steps of history. It may very well be true. But one thing, nevertheless, must be admitted, that Zinoviev, who knows how to put his ear to the ground and hear the steps of history, sometimes does not hear certain "trifles" ... Perhaps the opposition really knows how to put his ears to the ground and hear such magnificent things, like the steps of history. But it must be admitted that, being able to hear such magnificent things, she failed to hear that "trifle" ... that the opposition remained aground. She did not hear this "(Stalin, Works. vol. 8, pp. 355-356).

In other words, the party apparatus conducted things in the party and the country in such a way that

created all the necessary political, organizational and psychological prerequisites for the opposition to find itself "aground", and this "little thing" the Zinovievists and Trotskyists "did not hear." Either complete not only organizational but also ideological capitulation, in which case the oppositionists have some chances to extend their stay in the party for some more time, or stubbornness in their views, in which case the days of the opposition are numbered. That is how Stalin put the question in his concluding remarks.

Now Stalin spoke to the opposition not on behalf of the party, but as the party itself. If at the initial stage Stalin, not without reason, identified his party regime with that of Lenin, now, at the new stage, he boldly and confidently identified himself with the party. Not as Stalin, not even as a "general secretary", but as a party, Stalin gave the opposition an ultimatum of total surrender. He formulated this ultimatum in the following paragraphs:

"Do you want to know what the party requires of you? Listen:

1) The Party can no longer tolerate and will not tolerate you

went out into the street and shook the party ...

The Party cannot and will not tolerate you picking up and accumulating all sorts of dissatisfied elements as material for a new pair of tee...

3) The Party cannot and will not tolerate the fact that you, defamatory of the Party leadership apparatus and breaking the regime in the Party, ... unite all and sundry trends condemned by the Party into a new Party, under the flag of freedom of factions...

4) ... The Party cannot and will not tolerate you making attempts to use the difficulties (of building socialism) to attack the Party ...

5) ... The Party cannot tolerate the fact that the opposition takes to the streets with a demagogic statement about an immediate rise in wages by 30-40% ...

6) The Party cannot and will not tolerate the fact that the opposition continues to undermine the foundations of the bond between workers and peasants, propagating the idea of raising selling prices and intensifying tax pressure on the peasantry, ... trying to "construct" relations of exploitation of the peasantry by the proletarian state.

p) The Party cannot and will not tolerate oppositionists

continued to sow ideological confusion in the Party, exaggerate our difficulties, cultivate defeatist sentiments, preach the idea of the impossibility of building socialism in our country, and undermine

thus the foundations of Leninism...

8) The Party cannot and will not tolerate you continuing to harass the Comintern, disintegrate its sections and debunk the leadership of the Comintern..." (Stalin, Soch. vol. 8, pp. 351-353).

Stalin ended his speech with the following warning:

"Either you fulfill these conditions, or you don't, and then the Party, having beaten you yesterday, will begin to finish you off tomorrow" (ibid., p. 3540).

It is impossible to imagine a more severe demand than the demand for a revolutionary to sign his utter lack of ideas. Nothing stuns others more than the act of a revolutionary who anathematizes his yesterday's convictions. This is exactly what Stalin demanded of the opposition.

However, the opposition still did not give up. There was pressure on her from that part of the party, which considered the "Statement of October 16" an act of cowardice, playing into the hands of Stalin. At one of the opposition meetings in Moscow, for example, "those present were indignant that the leaders had gone rogue, that to go to a truce now would mean discrediting themselves", at this meeting it was decided to "conspire, go underground" ("Party and opposition according to documents", page 33). Sapronov Smirnov's group, which was part of the bloc, published Statement 15. This statement sharply criticizes the capitulation of the leaders of the bloc and emphasizes the need to intensify the political struggle not only legally within the party, but also illegally outside the party, among the working class.

In the presentation of the Stalinist historian, the Sapronov-Smirnov group stated that "at the time of the struggle, the entire army of officials will be on Stalin's side, the working part of the party will be on the opposition's side," that "the struggle cannot be limited to the internal party framework" ... The only way to overcome the Stalinist group is in the event that the opposition secures for itself the active support of the working class, that for this, it is necessary now "to form a core that will defend the cause of the proletarian revolution", that "in exposing Stalin and his policy, it is also necessary to expose the vacillations of the opposition leaders" (Em. Yaroslavsky, "A Brief History of the CPSU (6b)", pp. 468-469).

Statement 15 also noted a new factor of force, which

Stalin introduced into the struggle: "The GPU directs its activities to combat the legitimate discontent of the workers, and even the intra-Party opposition" (ibid., p. 469). It should be noted right away that the leaders of the bloc simply overlooked then that many of the anti-Soviet actions that Stalin attributed to them were actually organized by Stalin himself through Menzhinsky (GPU) in order to discredit the opposition as an instrument of the White Guard counter-revolution (for example, sending agents into the opposition provocateurs of the former White Guards Shcherbakov and Tverskoy to organize an underground printing house).

In December 1926, Stalin raised the question of the opposition for discussion by the UP of the expanded plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. The moral support of this forum of the "world proletariat" was important to Stalin. The foreign leaders of the Comintern, whom Trotsky called "the Kremlin's hangers-on," Stalin presented at this plenum with a choice: "There are two forces before you. On the one hand, our Party, which is confidently leading the proletariat of the USSR forward, building socialism and calling on the proletarians of all countries to fight. On the other hand, the opposition hobbles along behind our party like a decrepit old man, with rheumatism in his legs, with pain in his lower back, with a migraine in his head, an opposition that sows pessimism all around and poisons the atmosphere with chatter that we have nothing to do with socialism. The USSR will not come out that everything is fine with them, with the bourgeoisie, but with us, with the proletarians, everything is bad.

Such, comrades, are the two forces before you.

You must make a choice between them" (Stalin, Soch. vol. 9, pp. 149-150).

Of course, the prudent "Kremlin hangers-on" chose their bread-giver - Stalin. At this plenum, Kamenev, Trotsky, Zinoviev defended their views, but these were truly "voices crying out in the wilderness." Nobody listened to them, perhaps, except for Stalin himself, who in his lengthy concluding speech (it contains about 90 book pages) accused the opposition that by the mere fact of its speech at this plenum, it had violated the promise of the "Declaration of October 16" to stop the factional struggle against Central Committee. The opposition's defense of its views against the Stalinist leadership was henceforth considered a factional struggle. This already clearly smelled of applying the resolution of the Tenth Congress "On Unity" to the factionalists. Final word

Stalin contained a number of obvious distortions of historical facts (albeit known at that time only to members of the Central Committee and delegates to certain congresses); It also contained rude personal attacks.

Let's give some examples. Thus, Stalin denied Trotsky's statement that until mid-April 1917 he, Stalin, was in the same group with Kamenev and opposed Lenin's "April Theses" (Stalin: "The trick here is that Trotsky confused me with Kamenev"), or rejected Trotsky's other statement that "on the national question, Stalin made a rather big mistake," for which Lenin called him a "great-power bully" (Lenin's letter and article "On Autonomization"). Stalin said that "this is gossip. I never had any disagreements on the national question with the party or with Lenin" (ibid., pp. 64-65). Stalin denied Trotsky's statement that he, Trotsky, had anticipated Lenin's "April Theses", as a result of which he, not being in the Bolshevik Party, found himself in the same camp with Lenin, while Stalin himself, being in Lenin's party, opposed these theses, calling them "bare scheme". This statement infuriated Stalin so much that he compared Trotsky himself to ... a fly! Stalin said: "Trotsky, 'anticipating' Lenin... The peasants are quite right when they usually say in such cases: 'Compared a fly to a watchtower'" (ibid., p. 68). Since Kamenev reminded Stalin of his many sins against Lenin, Stalin did not remain in debt here either. He reminded Kamenev that when he was in exile in Siberia, after the February revolution, "together with eminent merchants in Siberia (in Achinsk) he took part in sending a telegram of greetings to the constitutionalist Mikhail Romanov, the same Mikhail Romanov to whom the tsar ... handed over the "right to the throne"" (ibid., p. 77). Stalin indignantly asked: "Why are Trotsky and Kamenev poking such mistakes in the nose of their party opponents? Is it not clear that by doing so they are only forcing us to recall the numerous mistakes of the leaders of the opposition?" (ibid., p. 77).

The intra-Party struggle has entered a stage when the parties put into circulation everything they had at their disposal: sensational revelations, archival documents, fakes, insinuations, intrigues, personal insults. Historical objectivity requires us to note that here, too, the palm belonged to Stalin. It is worth mentioning only two of his actions from the field of history, which produced historically and

politically ignorant party (out of a million-strong party, only about two tens of thousands of members joined it before 1917)

impression:

The Apparatus of the Central Committee collected and published everything that Trotsky wrote against Lenin and everything that Lenin wrote against Trotsky before 1917, including private letters.

r The apparatus of the Central Committee published Lenin's secret letter to the Central Committee against Zinoviev and Kamenev, in which Lenin calls them "revolutionary strikebreakers" (for their letter to Novaya Zhizn against the uprising) and demands their expulsion from the party.

In addition, using their monopoly, the party press (Pravda, the Bolshevik magazine, etc.) launched articles, correspondence, notes, reviews, in which grossly falsified theses, slogans, and statements were attributed to the opposition. The opposition had no opportunity to refute them. If the opposition tried to refute the slander by sending out its real platforms and speeches, then it was accused of continuing the same "factional struggle".

The first open action of the opposition among the masses against

The party apparatus was in June 1927 in connection with the expulsion to the Far East, under the guise of "assignment to work", member of the Central Committee L. T. Smilga, one of the most active military organizers of the October Revolution among sailors and soldiers in the Baltic, now the most dangerous enemy of Stalin. Trotsky and Zinoviev came to see him off at the Yaroslavl railway station, and crowds of workers from various factories and plants in Moscow came to the same place when they learned about it. According to Janson, deputy chairman of the Central Control Commission, "it must be admitted that this resulted in a kind of street demonstration directed against the Central Committee ... Here the role of Comrade Trotsky was more active than the role of Comrade Zinoviev, since Comrade Trotsky made a speech here" ("Party and opposition according to documents", p. 34).

This open demonstration of thousands of workers under the slogan of the opposition made Stalin, Bukharin and Rykov feel that the leaders of the opposition were not at all "generals without an army", but a very dangerous potential force if it appealed to the street or to what the Central Committee called the "third force". Signals from Leningrad, where Zinoviev's influence was still strong among the workers, as well as alarming information from various industrial centers of the country, forced the Central Committee to raise again the question of

opposition to the discussion of the new joint plenum of the PC and the Central Control Commission (July 29-August 9, 1927).

The agenda of the plenum was drawn up in such a way that the entire range of questions about the party's foreign and domestic policy was entirely devoted to criticism of the opposition's platform. The speakers were Bukharin (on international politics and criticism of the opposition), Rykov (on economic policy and criticism of the opposition), Ordzhonikidze (on Zinoviev and Trotsky). Stalin did not make a report, but his speeches in the debate were longer than reports. The new leader of the Comintern, Bukharin, sharply criticizing the opposition, justified the policy of the Soviet government in international affairs and the line of the Central Committee in the Comintern. Bukharin spoke about the economic stabilization of European capitalism, accompanied by the militarization of industry, about the intrigues of conservative England (severance of relations with the USSR) with the aim of organizing an economic blockade and a military encirclement of the USSR because of the "powerful revolutionary influence of the USSR." Bukharin argued that England was preparing a war against the USSR and that in this preparation she was supported by "international social democracy together with the ultra-left renegades of communism" and that "under these conditions, the preaching of the opposition of the CPSU (6) is of a particularly false and criminal nature." "On the question of an attack on the USSR, all the capitalist countries (England, America, France, Germany, Italy, Japan) are unanimous, only their internal contradictions delay their attack on the USSR, but do not destroy its ever greater likelihood and inevitability" ("VKP (6) in resolutions, part P, 1933, pp. 339-341).

Incidentally, this Marxist analysis and forecast of the Stalinist-Bukharinist Central Committee was brilliantly refuted by the events of the Second World War, when the entire capitalist Western world, led by the United States, Britain and France, united with the communist USSR against Stalin's yesterday's ally in the division of Poland - against Hitler. The failure of the policy of the Comintern, the Profintern and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the course towards the legal conquest of the labor movement from within through an agreement with the Amsterdam International or through the creation of the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Committee (by agreement between the General Council of Trade Unions and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions) Bukharin and Stalin attributed not only to "the betrayal of Purcell, Hicks and company", but also to Trotsky and Zinoviev, who sharply criticized precisely this, in their opinion, opportunist policy of the Central Committee. Even in Chinese

question, on which the opposition categorically demanded the withdrawal of the Communist Party from the Kuomintang, the proclamation of the slogan "the hegemony of the proletariat in the people's revolution and the national liberation movement" and the creation of Chinese Soviets, because, the opposition argued, the Chinese bourgeois Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai-shek would change alliance with the communists - even on this issue, when Chiang Kai-shek's "treason" became a fact (his break with the communists on April 12, 1927), the Central Committee laid the blame on Zinoviev, Trotsky, Radek and on the "leadership of the Chinese Communist Party" itself, systematically rejecting the directives of the Comintern" (ibid., pp. 347-348).

In the course of his struggle with the opposition, Stalin systematically resorted to what Lenin had taught him: that the most effective means of disarming the enemy was to put into practice his own program. (Russian democracy in 1917 denied the idea of a separate peace with Germany, Lenin included this denial in his program, but when he came to power he concluded a separate peace. The Social Revolutionaries put forward at the [Congress of Peasant Soviets in the summer of 1917 Lenin unanimously supported this idea. convocation of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, Lenin called it - January 1918 - in order to take him into custody and outlaw). This tried and tested tactic of Lenin's is now being used by Stalin against the Left Opposition with the help of his new allies, the sucker from the right wing of the Central Committee (Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Uglanov, Ugarov). Thus, now the plenum, in a resolution on Bukharin's report, writes that although the slogan of Soviets in China yesterday was incorrect, now "the Communist Party must develop an energetic propaganda of the idea of Soviets" (ibid., p. 349). The opposition now had to live with memories, how right it was yesterday, but it could no longer criticize the present line of the Central Committee in the Chinese revolution, for that was its line. Stalin-Rykov acted in exactly the same way on the questions of the demands that the opposition made regarding economic policy in the city and countryside: to beat the opposition, accepting its own demands (in the next chapter on the right opposition, we will see that Stalin, in fulfilling the demands of the left opposition, went much further than its most extreme

settings).

The plenum, at the suggestion of Rykov, approved a resolution stating that the opposition's forecast of the inevitability of a general economic crisis was not confirmed, plans are being implemented, industrialization is proceeding at the planned pace, there is no inflation predicted by the opposition, agriculture is developing successfully and the party will pay special attention on the rise of the poor-middle peasant individual farms. However, the plenum, like the opposition, states that "the growth of the kulak strata of the countryside is taking place," therefore the task of the party is "the maximum restriction of the exploiting tendencies of the kulak." Both for this purpose and to limit the growth in the number of Nepmen, the plenum decided to increase the taxation of the well-to-do and wealthy strata and to ease the burden for the weak (ibid., pp. 349-355).

This is what the opposition wanted. It also demanded stabilization, and partly also an increase in procurement prices for agricultural products, a decrease in retail prices for manufactured goods, so that in this way

contribute to raising the standard of living of workers and peasants. The plenum passed a resolution precisely in this spirit.

It should be noted that, in anticipating the opposition's demand, the Central Committee has already reduced prices by 10%. When this question was first discussed at the April Plenum of the Central Committee in 1927, the opposition voted for the Central Committee. Yaroslavsky says that she "voted for the sake of maneuver so as not to alienate the workers and peasants," but the leftmost part of the bloc, the Sapronov-Smirnov group, qualified this behavior of the bloc's leaders as an "unprincipled maneuver" and moved away from it (Em. Yaroslavsky, op. pr., pp. 474-475).

But the plenum wrote down one point on the basis of Rykov's report, which clearly disagreed not only with the demand of the opposition, but also with Stalin's desire. This paragraph reads: "The joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission rejects the absurd, demagogic proposals of the opposition on the forcible removal of natural grain surpluses and on such extra taxation of private trade, which should lead to its immediate liquidation ... The Central Committee and the Central Control Commission consider that these proposals aimed, in fact, at the abolition of the new economic policy established by the party under the leadership of Lenin" (ibid., p. 357).

Stalin will fulfill these "demagogic proposals" of the opposition in exactly one year on a scale and scale that the most

daring fantasy of left-wing extremists. This, in fact, was the beginning of a new split in the Politburo - the formation of a group of "right opposition TsII" in it.

The question of the opposition was preliminary discussed at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission on June 24, 1927, where Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev were vainly persuaded to sign a new document ending all criticism of the Central Committee. The opposition, through the mouth of Trotsky, replied: "The party course is the main danger ... In the party, the stake is now on the secretary, and not on the ordinary party member. Such is the whole regime of the Party," and when the Presidium of the Central Control Commission began to threaten that Trotsky and his like-minded people would place themselves outside the Party by such criticism of the Party apparatus, Trotsky turned to the Presidium with the question: "Do you really think to put a muzzle on the Party?" ("Party and opposition according to documents", p. 9).

When the leaders of the opposition - Trotsky and Zinoviev - refused such a "muzzle", the Presidium of the Central Control Commission decided to raise at the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission the question of excluding them both from the members of the Central Committee. This decision was defended by the chairman of the Central Control Commission S. Ordzhonikidze at this plenum. After long discussions, in which political accusations again alternated with personal attacks, the plenum presented all the opposition members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission (there were only 13 of them now: Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Rakovsky, Evdokimov, Smilga, Bakaev, Muralov, Avdeev, Peterson, Lizdin, Solovyov) an ultimatum on only three points, namely, the opposition must refuse:

1) from Trotsky's "Clemenceau thesis" (if an external enemy is on the outskirts of Moscow, then the current leadership must be overthrown);

1) to refuse a split in the Comintern;

2) "refuse the attempt to create a second party and dissolve the faction."

The opposition again rejected these demands. Kamenev did not deny that events could lead to the creation of a second party, but he blamed the Central Committee for this: "I maintain that you can still turn the wheel of events in order to prevent the path to a second party and what follows from this second party" ("Party and opposition on documents", p. 38).

The further course of the discussion of the question is described in the official document as follows: Zinoviev and Trotsky

from the Central Committee—only after this did the opposition find it necessary to retreat, renounce a number of their mistakes, and agree in the main, albeit with reservations, to the proposal of the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, issuing a corresponding "statement."

In this "statement of August 8," opposition leaders wrote: "We strongly condemn any attempt whatsoever to create a second party.

Just as resolutely and categorically we condemn the policy of split. We will carry out all the decisions of the CPSU (6) and its Central Committee. We are ready to do everything decisively to destroy the elements of the faction that have formed due to the fact that, under the conditions of the distortion of the inner-Party regime, we were forced to fight to convey to the Party our real views, which were completely incorrectly expressed in the press, read by the whole country" ("The Party and the Opposition According to Documents", page 37).

The opposition was ready to defend its views within the framework of the party charter, without resorting to the creation of a faction. In view of such a statement, the plenum decided to withdraw from discussion the question of expelling Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee, declaring them a "severe reprimand with a warning" ("VKP (6) in res.", 1933, part II, p. 366).

Thus, a new "truce" was concluded, which lasted exactly one month - from August 8 to September 7, 1927.

Two events blew a new storm into the inner-party discussion: the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution and the preparations for the Tenth Congress.

These events will be analyzed in the next chapter.

Chapter 27

SOLUTION OF THE ALTERNATIVE: STALIN OR TROTSKY

The KhSU party congress took place with a delay of nine months, which directly violated the party charter (the party charter required the congress to be convened at least once a year and, therefore, the annual re-election of the "general secretary"). There was only one reason for this: Stalin was busy creating political and apparatus-organizational prerequisites for liquidation at the XNUMXth Congress

"new opposition" of Zinoviev and Kamenev. The congress showed that Stalin's preparation was thorough, the "new opposition" was condemned, the winner was re-elected "general secretary".

The 15th Congress of the Party Stalin appointed this time with a delay of a whole

a year, that is, one term for convening the congress, Stalin missed and, from the point of view of the "basic law of the party" (charter), he was already an illegal "general secretary". The reason for the failure to convene the 15th Congress within the statutory period was also the same: Stalin decided to put an end to the opposition bloc even before the Congress.

The August plenum appointed the 15th Congress for December 1927. Usually before the congress the theses of the Central Committee on the agenda of the congress are published, as well as the counter-theses (platforms) of groups of communists or individual communists who disagree with official policy. Guided by this inner-party law, the opposition presented a very lengthy platform on the most important debatable issues as its theses for the 15th Party Congress and demanded that they be printed along with the official theses.

By the decision of the Politburo of September 8, 1927, this right of the opposition was denied. This was the first case of such a gross violation of the party charter, which only the congress had the right to change or violate.

This unprecedented arbitrariness of the Politburo (a decision without the request of even a submissive plenum of the PC) again aggravated the internal party situation. The opposition had no choice but to print and distribute its platform illegally, which was done under the leadership of the old Bolshevik Mrachkovsky in one of the Moscow printing houses, where the "White Guards" slipped there by the GPU ended up. The party press launched a frenzied campaign, asserting that the opposition had finally merged with the White Guards and bourgeois intellectuals, who were thinking of a military conspiracy in the USSR. The accusation was falsified from beginning to end. It sounded wild even to the most die-hard Stalinists in the party, but it was well seasoned with propaganda, which made the right impression.

The indignant opposition sent a special letter to the Central Committee on this matter. It said: "The politically bankrupt Stalin is going to follow the path of Kerensky, Pereverzev, Aleksinsky. If we have to deal with this Stalin affair, it is only because there are many young, politically inexperienced people in the million-strong party.

revolutionaries who will not immediately understand everything. During the French Revolution it was called "amalgam". Revolutionaries and monarchists, left Jacobins and speculators were united in one trial in order to confuse the cards and deceive the people. The Thermidorian era of the French Revolution is full of such "amalgams". In the July days of 1917, Aleksinsky, Pereverzev, Kerensky and Tsereteli tried to resort to the same "tested" means against Lenin, putting forward officer Yermolenko as a witness, inventing espionage in favor of Germany ... We, the disciples of Lenin, are ready if the proletarian cause so requires, go through such a stage" (ibid., p. 39).

In order to create such an "amalgam" in order to put the organizers of the October Revolution in the dock next to the "White Guards", "monarchists" and "bourgeois intellectuals", the GPU arrests all employees of the state printing house, now declared illegal. Since the opposition, even after the smashing of the printing house, took care to distribute the above-quoted letter widely in the party and abroad, through the opposition groups of the Comintern, the Central Committee hastened to respond with new accusations against the opposition. The Central Committee accused the opposition of not only violating the "Declaration of August 8", but actually preparing the overthrow of the existing regime.

On September 27, 1927, the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission addressed the party activists with a response letter to the leaders of the opposition, which, among other things, stated the following: "The opposition is playing with the idea of overthrowing the existing regime in the USSR. In response to the uncovering of the threads of the military entanglement of the Chistsky organization around non-Party "workers" of the illegal opposition printing house, Zinoviev, Smilga and Peterson declare that we now have a situation in the USSR similar to the July days of 1917 ... This means considering the CPSU (6) counter-revolutionary party ... The leaders of the opposition, contrary to their statement of August 8 ... took a number of further steps towards formalizing their faction into a party consisting of an opposition bloc with bourgeois intellectuals, who, in turn, are blocking with elements thinking of a military conspiracy in the USSR (ibid., pp. 39-40). In a word, the opposition is preparing to overthrow the communist dictatorship in the USSR through the creation of a new party and through a "military conspiracy"!

It was such a monstrous lie, in comparison with which the famous

the case of Captain Dreyfus seems to be the invention of real laymen. This was the whole tragedy of the opposition, that it kept repeating only about the danger of Thermidor and about the possible stage of "amalgams", while Stalin had already actually carried out a counter-revolutionary coup, which was supposed to lead to the establishment of his personal tyranny. Stalin, as it were, suggested to the leaders of the opposition that he could be overthrown only by force, through a political or military conspiracy. But Stalin was deeply wrong when he considered the opposition capable of this. Of course, he himself did not believe in his accusation against the opposition. After all, it was the same Stalin who said at the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission just a month ago: "You can judge how deplorable the situation of the Trotsky group is, if, working in the sweat of their brow for four months, they barely managed to collect about a thousand signatures. I think that any group of oppositionists could collect several thousand signatures if they knew how to work. I repeat: it's funny when this small group, where there are more leaders than armies (laughter) ... threatens a million-strong party: "I'll sweep you away." (Laughter) (Stalin, Op. vol. 10, pp. 53-54).

Why did Stalin consider such a "small group", which does not even know how to work, so dangerous, capable of preparing a conspiracy? Stalin attributed to her what he himself would have done in the place of the opposition. Fortunately, he dealt with "political donquixotes" (this definition belongs to Stalin himself), who fought, alas, not with windmills, but with Stalin, but by spewing an endless stream of "verbal ore" in the form of theses, letters, memorandums, platforms. It is simply impossible for a historian who has carefully studied this stage in the history of the party to understand what miraculous power the opposition attributed to the word addressed to the party, which, after all, no longer existed, as Trotsky himself admitted.

The oppositionists, although Bolsheviks, were unconditionally ideologically convinced people, and in the understanding of duty, honor and honesty they were direct antipodes of Stalin. They believed that the employees of the printing house were arrested by Stalin only because he still did not dare to arrest the leaders of the opposition, whose orders were executed by the arrested. Protecting Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev for the time being as members of the Central Committee, the leaders of the opposition outside the Central Committee, but who under Lenin and before Stalin were secretaries of the Central Committee - Serebryakov and Preobrazhensky - wrote a letter to the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on August 15, in which they declared that for the destroyed printing house and for the arrested employees

they are responsible, since they carried out only their order. The letter further stated: "We declare to you that we are politically responsible for this affair and its organizers, and not non-party people accidentally connected with this. Having in your hands all the printing presses, the entire press, all the resources of the Party, you do not allow us old Bolsheviks to defend our views before the Party on the eve of the Congress and force us to resort to these handicraft methods of multiplying our pre-Congress materials... You know us well. You know that we, like the old party members, cannot refuse to defend our views... We will look for other similar means available to us... We demand the immediate release of all those arrested in this case, since we are responsible for all this. E. Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov, Sharov" ("The Party and the Opposition According to Documents", p. 37). Zinoviev also sent a statement to the Central Committee in which he writes that although he does not know those arrested, although he admits that there could be former white officers among them, nevertheless, they only carried out the task of Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov and Sharov, therefore he, Zinoviev, agrees with their letter and demands the immediate release of the arrested.

Stalin decided to expose the "counter-revolutionary" connections of the opposition before the "world proletariat" - before the Comintern (the Comintern and the Central Control Commission - institutions that were powerless and completely dependent on Stalin's apparatus, nevertheless, used, according to tradition, a certain moral capital, which Stalin skillfully exploited). At a meeting of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on October 14, 1927, Bukharin accused the opposition of having direct links with the counter-revolution and was indignant at its demand to release the arrested. Bukharin said:

"What does Comrade Zinoviev write in his statement? He writes that it may happen to every Bolshevik that he finds himself in company with the Whites. He admits in his statement the possibility of such a case... Everyone has read it. (Trotsky: "And they were in the army"). Yes, there have been, comrade Trotsky, but, excuse me, I go further. But Zinoviev says that they do not know who the arrested people are. At the same time, Preobrazhensky and others make demands:

"release all those arrested." Here is a picture of your total irresponsibility... Now a few words about the printing press and about the connection with the non-party and counter-revolutionaries... Trotsky shares his solidarity with Zinoviev's letter, which says that illegal printing

admissible, and with Preobrazhensky, who has reached the point of "naivety" and tells us: "Return our equipment to us" (j. "Communist International", No. 41, 1927, pp. 14-15).

Stalin, Bukharin, Rykov, who headed the new Politburo, accused the opposition that, in fact, they contacted the White Guards in order to "organize an underground printing house, involving people who are thinking about a coup d'état in our country on the model of Pilsudski's coup" (Em. Yaroslavsky, op. cit., p. 483).

Of course, the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, as at all previous meetings of this institution, unanimously condemned the opposition for allegedly preparing a coup "of Pilsudski's model." It did not matter whether the foreign members of the Comintern believed that their former chairman, Zinoviev, wanted to become a Russian Pilsudski, and that Trotsky, the organizer of the defeat of the White Army in the civil war, now wanted to recreate this White Army and lead its struggle against that

Red Army, the organizer of which was himself. In this regard, one cannot fail to recall the famous Italian writer, former communist I. Silone. When Trotsky, after the anti-communist coup by Chiang Kai-shek, presented his well-known "Memorandum on the Chinese Revolution" to the Politburo of the Central Committee, criticizing the pro-Chang Kai-shek policy of Stalin and Bukharin in China, the Politburo in May 1927 submitted a proposal to the Executive Committee of the Comintern to condemn Trotsky for this memorandum. The chairman of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Comintern put the question of this condemnation of Trotsky to a vote. But the Italian delegation (Silone and Togliatti) wanted to see Trotsky's document before judging it, but the chairman (the German E. Telman) remarked quite coolly: "We, the members of the presidium, did not see him either." Silone, thinking that he did not hear Telman's words, asked him to repeat his words. Telman repeated word for word what he had said. Then Silone, backed by Togliatti, declared that it was quite possible that Trotsky's document deserved condemnation, but the Italians could not do this without reading it.

Stalin came up with an explanation why the translation of Trotsky's Memorandum was not distributed to members of the Presidium of the Comintern: it contains hints of the secrets of Soviet state policy (in fact, there was one "secret": on April 15, 1927, Stalin at the session of the Moscow Council highly praised the merits of Chiang Kai-shek and defended the Kuomintang, and a week later was

the coup of Chiang Kai-shek, the victims of which were thousands of murdered communists, which Trotsky wrote about). Stalin saw the threat of failure of the "unanimous condemnation" of Trotsky by the Comintern; to prevent this, he proposed to postpone the meeting, and in the meantime "inform" the Italians not about Trotsky's memorandum, but about the internal situation in the USSR and about the position of the CPSU ().

This role of "informant" was entrusted to the leader of the Bulgarian communists V. Kolarov. And Kolarov played it classically. Inviting the Italians to his hotel "Lux" (foreign leaders of the Comintern lived there), Kolarov, over a cup of tea, outlined to the Italians the essence of the matter in a very sensible, albeit somewhat cynical way. The meaning of Kolarov's arguments boiled down to the following: firstly, I also did not read Trotsky's document; secondly, if Trotsky secretly sent it to me for review, then I would refuse to read it, because, frankly, it is of no interest to me; thirdly, we are not busy searching for historical truth, but we are stating the fact of the struggle of two forces in the CPSU (6) - this is the Politburo headed by Stalin and the opposition headed by Trotsky. In this struggle, power over the party and the USSR is in the hands of Stalin. Therefore, we support Stalin, not Trotsky.

Kolarov still did not convince the Italians, and at the new meeting they again refused to vote for the condemnation of the memorandum and the expulsion of Trotsky. They were joined by French and Swiss delegates. Stalin then declared that the Central Committee was holding back its resolution on Trotsky because there was no "unanimity." The meeting ended without condemning Trotsky. When, passing through Berlin, Silone bought a fresh German newspaper, he read the false news not without surprise: Moscow reported that the Comintern condemned Trotsky for his memorandum on China ("Te Soa Traf KaPea", ech. Bu V.N. Mem/ Work, Hagreg & Bromer, pp. 106-111).

In the case of the printing house, the Central Control Commission expelled 14 people from the party - leaders of the opposition outside the Central Committee, headed by Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov, Mrachkovsky. However, this did not stop the printing of the opposition platform, because, as Yaroslavsky reports, "the opposition used, through bribery and deceit, individual employees of Soviet printing houses to

publish their Menshevik platform, which was printed and sent to the localities" (Em. Yaroslavsky, op. pr., p. 483).

Exceptional activity, getting out of the control of opposition leaders, is shown by local opposition groups, creating new subdivisions.

full printing houses near Moscow, in Leningrad, in Ukraine, forcibly seizing audiences for their meetings (Yaroslavsky: "Things got to the point that the audience of the Moscow Higher Technical School was forcibly seized, where the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission who came to this meeting were not allowed in order to dissolve it - *ibid.*, p. 484). It was then that a new, this time a massive wave of expulsion from the party began, not only for oppositionists, but also for those who did not openly take the point of view of the Central Committee. Now they again took up the leaders of the opposition from the Central Committee.

Stalin again decided to call on the help of the Comintern. On September 27, a joint meeting of the Presidium of the Executive Committee and the International Control Commission was held, devoted to the opposition. At this meeting, Trotsky openly accused Stalin that his group in the Central Committee, through illegal combinations of party apparatus, had illegally seized power over the party and usurped power over the country. Now Stalin has created a fundamentally different regime in the party than the regime of Lenin, so the opposition, fighting against the party apparatus bureaucratic regime of Stalin, is thereby fighting for the restoration of the Leninist regime. Stalin decided to prove before the Comintern the untenability of this assertion. From the sharp dialogue between Trotsky and Stalin at a meeting of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, it became clear that although the Stalinist group had usurped power, the Stalinist regime itself was indeed a very logical, most consistent continuation of the regime that Lenin proclaimed at the Tenth Congress. Stalin's arguments were indeed convincing. Stalin published this speech of his, timed to coincide with the October Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of 1927, at which the question of the opposition was again raised. Stalin rightfully declared his regime to be orthodox Leninist, and Trotsky himself an alien element in Bolshevism. Stalin said:

"Trotsky does not understand our party. He does not have a correct idea of our Party.

He looks at our party in the same way as a nobleman looks at the mob or like a bureaucrat looks at his subordinates. Otherwise, he would not have argued that in a party of a million people, in the CPSU (b), it is possible to "seize" power, to "usurp" power to individuals ... Why, in this case, Trotsky failed to "seize" power in the party .. ? How can this be explained? Is Comrade Trotsky more stupid or less intelligent than Bukharin or Stalin? Is he a smaller ora

tor than the current leaders of our party? Would it not be more correct to say that, as an orator, Trotsky is superior to many of the present leaders of our party? How, then, is it to be explained that Trotsky, in spite of his oratorical skill, in spite of his will to lead, in spite of his ability, was cast aside from the leadership of the great party called the CPSU (6)? Trotsky is inclined to explain this by saying that our party, in his opinion, is a voting ram, blindly following Stalin and Bukharin? ("The Party and the Opposition According to Documents", pp. 10-11) Stalin excluded the words I highlighted from the text when his Works were republished in 1949 (see Stalin, Soch. vol. 10, p. 159).

As to whether his regime differed from Lenin's, Stalin replied to Trotsky in the following way:

"Trotsky portrays the matter in such a way that the current regime in the party ... is something fundamentally different in comparison with the regime in the party that was established under Lenin. He wants to portray the matter in such a way that he has no objection to the regime established by Lenin after the Tenth Congress, and that he is actually fighting the present regime in the Party, which, in his opinion, has nothing in common with the regime established by Lenin. .

I affirm that Trotsky is telling a direct lie here.

I affirm that the present regime in the Party is the exact expression of the very regime that was established in the Party under Lenin, during the Tenth and Tenth Congresses of our Party ... Trotsky and the opposition ... demanded the admission of factional groupings in the Party and the abolition of the corresponding resolutions of the Tenth Congress ... (Trotsky: "I did not speak about the Tenth Congress, you are making it up"). Trotsky cannot but know that I can prove this documentarily. These documents remained intact, I will distribute them to my comrades, and then it will be clear which of us is telling a lie "(Stalin, Soch. vol. 10, pp. 161-162).

Of course, Stalin did not present any documents from which it would be clear that Trotsky demanded the annulment of the decisions of the Tenth Congress. On October 3, 1927, Stalin sent to the Political Secretariat of the Comintern an excerpt from the "Declaration of the 46" of October 15, 1923, which Trotsky never signed. But even this statement by Pyatakov, Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov and others only said the following: "The regime of factional dictatorship within the party that objectively took shape after the 10th Congress has survived

yourself" (ibid., p. 163, highlighted by me. - A. A).

This was precisely the helplessness of the "Bolshevik Leninists" opposition (as it later began to call itself) that it considered "sacred" and inviolable everything that Lenin did, including this obviously draconian "exceptional law against the party" - the decision of the Tenth Congress, and Stalin consistently applied it on the path to the liquidation of the thinking, reasoning and criticizing party, in order to move from "factional dictatorship" to personal dictatorship. The opposition saw this, fought with heroic words against Stalin, but was terribly afraid of the shadow of Lenin. In this situation, a new joint plenum of the PC and the Central Control Commission met (October 21-23, 1927) with the agenda:

1. The first five-year plan (Rykov),

2: Work in the countryside (Molotov),

In Information of the chairman of the OGPU Menzhinsky about the connections of the opposition with the counter-revolution,

4. On the exclusion of Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee (the Politburo of the Central Committee and

Presidium of the Central Control Commission).

Party propaganda, and indeed Western literature, the idea

the industrialization of the country has always been attributed to Stalin. Meanwhile, there is nothing more erroneous than such an assertion. The industrialization plan was a collective creation, developed by a special commission of the Politburo headed by the chairman of the government, Lenin's chief deputy for the economy of the USSR - Rykov. All the main guidelines for the general plan of industrialization, its proportions, its pace, its priorities (the predominant development of heavy industry, especially the production of means of production) were presented by Rykov's commission to the Politburo of the Central Committee on the eve of the 15th Congress, that is, when it included Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev. This plan was unanimously approved by the Politburo, and then just as unanimously it was approved at the 15th Congress in the resolution of the Congress on the work of the Central Committee. The first five-year plan was also developed by a new Politburo commission chaired by Rykov with the participation of Gosplan chairman Krzhizhanovsky.

It was precisely about the directive directives of the first five-year plan that Rykov reported to the plenum. The resolution of the plenum, written by Rykov, states that in drawing up the five-year plan, "in accordance with the policy of industrialization of the country, first of all, the production of means of

production ... The fastest pace of development should be given to those branches of heavy industry that raise the economic power and defense capability of the USSR in the shortest possible time," but, at the same time, the resolution emphasizes: "In the field of relations between the development of heavy and light industry, equally it is necessary to proceed from the optimal combination of both elements ... The industry that produces consumer goods must bring the quantity and quality of its products to such a limit that a significant increase in the per capita consumption rate of the working people is ensured," and, in response to the opposition, the resolution reads:

"It is wrong to proceed from the demand for the maximum transfer of funds from the sphere of peasant economy to the sphere of industry, because this demand means not only a political break with the peasantry, but also undermining the raw material base of the industry itself, undermining its internal market, undermining exports and upsetting the balance of the entire national economic systems" ("VKP (6) in res.", Part P, pp. 371-376).

The only creative contribution that Stalin made to the industrialization plan, when he got rid of Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsy, was that he radically revised the guidelines and decisions of this five-year plenum on maintaining the correct proportion in the development of the economy and made "military-feudal exploitation peasantry" (Bukharin) as the basis for financing industrialization, which we will discuss later.

The rural policy of the Central Committee, as presented by Molotov, was presented as a mixture of the ideas of Stalin and Bukharin, there was nothing originally Molotov there (Molotov, whom Lenin aptly dubbed the "stone ass", was not a politician of a large format, but was and remained a party apparatchik of the Stalinist school - not reasoning with acceptance of Stalin's plan, scrupulous in its interpretation and cruel to the point of callousness in its implementation).

The central item on the agenda was the third question - the question of the opposition, namely, the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee. For this, according to the decision of the Tenth Congress, 2/3 of the votes of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission were required, and candidates for members of the Central Committee also had the right to decide

votes at such a plenum. Since out of the 269 members and candidates of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission elected at the last congress, only

13 people, the fate of the opposition leaders was sealed. Two questions were at the center of the discussion:

1. accusation of the Politburo against the opposition of its continuation of factional activities and of its links with the counter-revolution; e: the opposition's demand for the publication of Lenin's "Testament" and

removal of Stalin from the post of general secretary.

After the report of the Politburo, opposition leaders spoke. Zinoviev and Kamenev were very aggressive in their speeches.

Zinoviev said: "What can the Stalinist leadership boast of? Error upon error, defeat after defeat: as a result, political bankruptcy" ("The Fifteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6). Stenograph, report", part D, p. 385).

Kamenev said: "We declare that no matter what position the headless group of Stalinist splitters puts us in, we will defend the cause of the Leninist Party against the grave-diggers of the revolution" (ibid., p. 386),

Trotsky added that "the Tenth Congress will be the highest triumph of the apparatus mechanics of the Stalinist faction" (ibid., p. 387).

Lenin's "testament" letter was addressed to the KhP Congress (1923). The people who were now at the head of the opposition then had a majority in the Central Committee and could painlessly remove Stalin if they wished and agreed among themselves, but they refused to remove Stalin and fulfill Lenin's last will, moreover, together with Stalin, they then decided to hide from the party it is a "testament". Now, when the matter of removing Stalin was hopeless, and the publication of the "testament" depended solely on him, the opposition unexpectedly decided to raise this demand at the plenum. But Stalin would not have been Stalin if he had not taken measures in his time to insure him against the accusation that he or the Central Committee concealed Lenin's "testament". These measures are very useful to him now. Stalin argued that if anyone hid the "testament", it was precisely Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev who did it, who, you see, were more interested in hiding Lenin's "testament", since in the "testament" Lenin speaks of their political mistakes, but does not say anything about Stalin's political mistakes.

Stalin began his answer by explaining why the opposition focused their fire on his personality. He spoke about himself, as usual, in the third person: "You heard here how diligently the oppositionists scold Stalin, sparing no effort. This does not surprise me, comrades. The fact that

the main attacks are directed against Stalin, this fact is explained by the fact that Stalin knows, perhaps better than some of our comrades, all the tricks of the opposition, it is perhaps not so easy to fool him, and now they direct the blow primarily against Stalin. (Stalin, Soch., vol. 10, p. 172). In order to prove that the "hooligan persecution" of the leaders of Bolshevism is Trotsky's historical profession, Stalin again pulled out into the light of God the works of Trotsky from the period of emigrant fights between Trotsky and

Lenin. In particular, he quoted Trotsky's personal letter to the chairman of the Social Democratic faction in [At the State Duma, Chkheidze. The letter, written in April 1913, reflects the era of the fight between Trotsky's August bloc and Lenin's new Central Committee, established in Prague in January 1912. This letter was intercepted by the tsarist police department and fell into Stalin's hands during Lenin's lifetime. Lenin did not attach any importance to it, because the dispute between Trotsky and Lenin was decided by the absolute unity of their views at the decisive moment on the decisive question - the organization and conduct of the October Revolution. In addition, entering into a bloc with Zinoviev and Kamenev, Trotsky openly declared that in everything that separated him from Lenin before the revolution, Lenin turned out to be right, and not he, and that "the mere fact that I entered into the Bolshevik Party ... proves that I laid down on the threshold of the party everything that until that time had separated me from Bolshevism" (Stalin. Works. vol. 9, p. 83).

But all this did not matter to Stalin. It was important for him to stun the members of the million-strong party, who had no idea either about the old émigré squabbles, or that Lenin was not at all the party "saint" that both the Stalinists and the Trotskyists announced him retroactively, each in their own interests. Before reading this letter, Stalin said: "Why, Stalin, Stalin is a small man. Take Lenin. Who does not know that the opposition, led by Trotsky during the August bloc, waged even more hooligan persecution against Lenin. Listen, for example, to Trotsky ... "

Bold in tone and piquant in content, Trotsky's letter stunned even his supporters. Trotsky wrote:

"The wretched squabble that Master Lenin, that professional exploiter of every kind of backwardness in the Russian working-class movement, seems to be some kind of senseless delusion... With dark money seized from Kautsky and Zetkina (we are talking about the cash

old united Menshevik-Bolshevik Central Committee. - A. A.), Lenin installed an organ, seized the firm of a popular newspaper for it (Trotsky published the newspaper Pravda in Vienna, Lenin assigned this name to his legal newspaper Pravda in St. Petersburg in May 1912 - A. A.) and, placing "unity" and "unofficiality" as its banner, he attracted working-class readers, who naturally saw their great achievement in the appearance of a workers' daily newspaper. And then, when the newspaper got stronger, Lenin made it a lever of circle intrigues and unprincipled schismatics. In a word, the entire edifice of Leninism at the present time is built on lies and falsification and carries within itself the poisonous beginning of its own decay" ("The Party and the Opposition According to Documents", p. 13).

Quoting this letter, ambiguously pointing out that back in 1913, "the opposition led by Trotsky carried out hooligan persecution against Lenin" (although Zinoviev and Kamenev were then Lenin's first comrades-in-arms against Trotsky, and Lenin knew about the existence of Stalin himself, but did not know him either). party nickname, no real surname. - See about this above), Stalin, becoming in a tragic pose, asked: "Is it possible to be surprised that Trotsky, who so unceremoniously treats the great Lenin, whose boot he is not worth, now scolds how much in vain one of the many students of Lenin - comrade. Stalin" (Stalin, Op. Vol. 10, p. 173).

Stalin then responded to Trotsky's accusation that he was hiding Lenin's "testament" from the party. That this is not so, Stalin called the same ... Trotsky as witnesses. Stalin reported that when Eastman, a supporter of Trotsky,

published in 1924 in America the book "After the death of Lenin", in which Lenin's "testament" was first cited and Stalin was first accused of hiding this "testament" from the party, the Politburo turned to Trotsky with a proposal to refute Eastman. Trotsky did this by publishing a corresponding article in the Bolshevik magazine. In this article, Trotsky wrote: "Eastman said that the Central Committee 'hid' from the party a number of extremely important documents written by Lenin in the last period of his life (the case concerns letters on the national question, the so-called 'testament', etc.), this can only be called a slander against the Central Committee... All these letters and proposals... were always delivered to their destination, brought to the attention of the delegates of the KhP and XIII congresses... and if not all of these letters were printed, it was because they were not intended by their author for publication. No 'testament' Vladimir

Ilyich did not leave ... Under the guise of a "testament" in the émigré and foreign bourgeois and Menshevik press, one of Vladimir Ilyich's letters is usually mentioned, which contained organizational advice. The 13th Party Congress took this letter into consideration as well ... and drew conclusions from it in relation to the conditions and circumstances of the moment. Any talk about a hidden or violated "testament" is a malicious fiction"... (Journal "Bolshevik", No. 16, September 1, 1925, p. 68).

After announcing this article by Trotsky, Stalin asked: "Is it clear? This is written by Trotsky, and not by anyone else. On what basis, then, are Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev now fooling around, asserting that the Party and its Central Committee are 'concealing' Lenin's 'testament'?" (Stalin, Op. vol. 10, p. 175).

However, Stalin admitted that there really is a "testament" of Lenin, and in it "Lenin suggested to the congress, in view of Stalin's 'rudeness', to consider the question of replacing Stalin in the post of general secretary with another comrade," but Stalin did not announce Lenin's entire text about him, for otherwise it would be clear that Lenin spoke not only of his "rudeness", but also of his disloyalty and tendency to abuse power. Moreover, Stalin, in essence, declared his rudeness to be a virtue in relation to the interests of the party, indirectly entering into a polemic with Lenin's characterization of him. Stalin said: "Yes, I am rude, comrades, towards those who rudely and treacherously destroy and split the Party. I did not hide it and I do not hide it. It is possible that a certain gentleness towards the schismatics is required here. But I can't do it" (ibid., p. 175). In a word, "good-natured" Lenin tolerated "schismatics" in the party, but here I, Stalin, cannot tolerate them!

Stalin brought arguments and more convincing. He said that at the very first meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee after the 13th Congress, he asked the plenum to release him from the duties of general secretary, but "all the delegations unanimously, including Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, obliged Stalin to remain in his post" (there same, p. 176). Stalin added that "a year after that, I again applied to the plenum for release, but I was again obliged to remain in office." Stalin quite reasonably asked: "What could I do? Run away from your post? It is not in my nature, I have never run away from any post... I am a person... a forced laborer, and when the party obliges me, I must obey" (ibid., p. 176).

Sticking out only facts that were beneficial to himself, Stalin had an amazing gift for manipulating and juggling facts that were unfavorable to him. Two such frauds, right in front of witnesses, the same leaders

opposition, he committed when he stated that:

1. Lenin's "testament" was addressed to the 13th Congress, while in fact it was addressed to the 20th Congress, which took place during Lenin's lifetime (we will analyze this issue in detail in Chapter 23), and that

the 13th Congress decided not to publish the "testament"; in fact, the 13th Congress did not consider this question at all (the Politburo of the Central Committee brought to the attention of individual delegations of the 13th Congress only the content of the "testament", adding its decision not to publish it).

Stalin pointed out that there was already a decision of the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in 1926 to ask permission from the XV Congress to print the "testament" (the XV Congress actually decided to publish the "testament", Stalin, however, never published it, it only happened after the Twentieth Congress), but immediately announced, without waiting for the congress, the entire part of the "testament" that concerned Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev. He prefaced this with the following statement:

The opposition is trying to trump Lenin's "testament". But one has only to read this "testament" to understand that they have nothing to trump with. On the contrary, Lenin's "testament" kills the current leaders of the opposition" (ibid., p. 177).

Lenin's words that "the October episode of Zinoviev and Kamenev is not an accident," but that "it can just as little be blamed on them personally as non-Bolshevism on Trotsky," Stalin interpreted as follows: "This means that politically one cannot trust either Trotsky, who suffers from "non-Bolshevism", nor Kamenev and Zinoviev, whose mistakes are not "accidental" and which can and must be repeated" (ibid., p. 177. My italics. - A. A. ").

This gross falsification by Stalin of Lenin's thought and the meaning of the Testament still roams from textbook to textbook of the official history of the party. Stalin ended his analysis of the "Testament" with the statement: "It is characteristic that there is not a single word, not a single hint in the 'testament' about Stalin's mistakes" (ibid., p. 177). Stalin was little interested in the lack of logic in such an assessment of the "Testament": "Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev, according to Lenin, "politically cannot be trusted", but they must be left

in his posts, only Stalin can be politically trusted, but he must be removed, although even "there is not a single hint in the 'testament' about Stalin's mistakes"!

As early as the July-August plenum, Stalin tried to accuse the opposition of participating in a "Pilsudski-type conspiracy." But then the materials presented by the OGPU turned out to be so "phony" that Stalin hastened to withdraw this accusation. Within two months after this plenum, both the apparatus of the Central Committee and the agents of the OGPU worked so well that Stalin took a step unprecedented in the history of the party: he put on the agenda of the plenum the report of the chairman of the Soviet secret police Menzhinsky (of course, in the published agenda and information report on the plenum nothing was said about this report). Menzhinsky reported to the plenum that his institution had arrested a whole group of oppositionists, as well as a group of "White Guards" and "bourgeois intellectuals" who were carrying out the task of the opposition to organize underground printing houses, and that these "White Guards were plotting a military coup." To this, Stalin added that the opposition leaders Trotsky, Zinoviev, Smilga, whom the Central Control Commission

acquainted with the testimonies of the arrested, made copies of these testimonies and sent them abroad to Maslov (the leader of the Trotskyists in Germany), and Maslov published them in Berlin. Thus, Stalin said, those White Guards who had not yet been arrested, but were participating in a conspiracy in connection with the opposition, were warned "according to the denunciation of the opposition." By this, Stalin also justified the fact why the head of the secret police was engaged in inner-party affairs: "That is why the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission considered it necessary to propose Comrade Menzhinsky to report on the facts" (ibid., p. 184).

However, Menzhinsky did not quite live up to Stalin's expectations, and the leaders of the opposition easily managed to prove to the plenum that it did not set and does not set as its goal the overthrow of the leadership by way of a conspiracy, all the more monstrous is the idea that it can participate in a military conspiracy of some Whites. Moreover, the opposition proved with facts and documents that those White Guards with whom the opposition is allegedly connected are agents provocateurs of the OGPU itself. Stalin could not fail to notice the unfavorable reaction of even his own supporters, that is, the majority of the plenum. So he decided to "retreat". Stalin said that the Central Committee had never accused any of the opposition of participating in a military conspiracy (Muralov: "They accused at the last plenum") (ibid., pp. 184-185).

But Stalin was forced to openly admit that the OGPU, on the instructions of the Central Committee, began to use not only the agent network within the pariah, but also its provocateurs (it must be said that Lenin was against the use of the OGPU agent network in the party and against the recruitment of communists as secret agents). Here is Stalin's statement about the then sensational case of the "Wrangel officer":

"They are talking about a former Wrangel officer serving the OGPU in the matter of uncovering counter-revolutionary organizations. The opposition jumps and plays, raising a fuss about the fact that the former Wrangel officer, who was approached by the allies of the opposition, all these Shcherbakovs and Tverskys, turned out to be an agent of the OGPU. But what's wrong with that, if this very former Wrangel officer helps the Soviet government to uncover counter-revolutionary conspiracies? .. it turned out that the Shcherbakovs, Tverskys and Bolshakovs, while establishing a bloc with the opposition, already have a bloc with counter-revolutionaries, with former Kolchak officers, like Kostrov and Novikov, as Comrade reported today. Menzhinsky" (ibid., p. 187).

When Trotsky and Zinoviev began to cite numerous facts about the arrests of old Bolsheviks on the eve of the congress just because they did not agree with the official line of the Central Committee, Stalin answered briefly: "Yes, we arrest them and will arrest them if they do not stop undermining the party and Soviet power" (ibid., p. 190).

How to be now with Trotsky and Zinoviev? Here it must be said about one manner of Stalin to play the role of "peacemaker", at the same time weaving a network of intrigues and inflaming passions against his rival. In 1924, Stalin set Zinoviev and Kamenev against Trotsky, but when they demanded that Trotsky be expelled from the Politburo and the party, Stalin disagreed, saying that peace was needed. At the July plenum, Stalin set the entire plenum against Zinoviev and Trotsky, but when the plenum wanted to remove them from its membership, Stalin did not agree, saying that peace was still needed. At the April plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in 1929, Stalin so sharply and uncompromisingly raised the question of the "right capitulators" - about Bukharin and Tomsky, that again the plenum demanded their immediate withdrawal from the Politburo, but Stalin declared that he did not agree with such requirement: "In my opinion, you can get by

without such extreme measures" (Stalin, Soch. vol. 12, p. 107). At this October plenum, Stalin spoke in flirtatious tones about his

"peaceful" weakness. He said:

"At the last plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission ... I was scolded by some members of the plenum for being soft on Trotsky and Zinoviev, because I dissuaded the plenum from the immediate expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee (Voices from the seats: "That's right!" ... Comrade Petrovsky: "That's right, we will always scold" ...). But now, comrades, after all that we have gone through in these three months ... there is no place for gentleness ... Now we must stand in the forefront of those comrades who demand the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee" (Stormy applause Voices: "That's right! That's right!" A voice from the seat: "Trotsky must be expelled from the party"). "Let the Congress decide that, comrades" (Stalin, Soch. vol. 10, p. 191).

The plenum passed a resolution on the exclusion of Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee for factional activities "bordering on the formation of a new anti-Leninist party together with bourgeois intellectuals." The plenum also decided to transfer to the decision of the 15th Congress "all data on the splitting activities of the leaders of the Trotskyist opposition, as well as the group of comrades. V. Smirnov-Sapronov" ("Pravda", October 25, 1927).

The entire period from the October plenum to the opening of the 15th Congress is characterized, on the one hand, by the extreme intensification of the struggle between the Central Committee and the opposition, and, on the other, by hitherto unprecedented scale of repressions against the opposition and those who sympathize with it in the party and the people. Mass expulsions from the party, dismissals from work, expulsions from schools, group arrests of old Bolsheviks by the OGPU - all this is becoming a common occurrence of the day. Under these conditions, not only signing opposition documents and voting for them at party meetings, but simply expressing one's sympathy for the opposition becomes a feat. It is all the more significant that the forces of the opposition during this period are not fading, but growing. The "Statement of the 83's" (72 printed pages) dated June 1927 collected thousands of signatures of active opposition figures (it spoke of the CPC's guilt for England breaking off diplomatic relations with the USSR on May 27, 1927, the Central Committee's guilt for the defeat of the Chinese revolution, and the degeneration "dictatorship of the proletariat" into a "bourgeois state", about the anti-worker, anti-poor, pro-kulak, pro-Nepman policy of the Central Committee, about the nationalist theory of "socialism in one country", about establishing the dictatorship of the Stalinist faction over the party, etc.). Party historian, chief master of the Stalinist purges of the Yeom party. Yaroslavsky wrote that this platform was

printed by an underground printing house in the amount of 30 thousand copies and signed by 5 thousand people (Em. Yaroslavsky, "A Brief History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks", p. 487; commentator on the minutes of the "Fifteenth Congress" (stenograph, report) retroactively reduced the number of signatures to three thousand, see part P, ed. 1962, p. 1644).

According to the reports of Rykov (On the Five-Year Plan) and Molotov (On Work in the Countryside), the counter-theses of the opposition were compelled by the decision of the October Plenum to publish the Central Committee in a Discussion List specially created for the congress under Pravda (from October 30 to 2 December 1927). Representatives of the opposition also spoke at party meetings of factories, factories, institutions, schools, military units, substantiating the counter-theses of the opposition in an atmosphere completely unknown and impossible in a civilized environment. At the party committees, on the instructions of the Central Committee,

special teams of "scandalists, whistlers, thugs" were created, which were also mentioned at the XV Congress ("Fifteenth Congress" ... p. 547).

As soon as a representative or supporter of the opposition appeared at any meeting, a team of "whistlers and thugs" was sent there, which, relying on the local party secretary and his activists, was supposed to disrupt the speech of the oppositionist. At the same XV congress, Trotsky's story was cited, how the secretary of the Moscow Committee, Uglanov, led the Moscow activists when the opposition spoke:

"Trotsky, instructing the circle, said that Uglanov saw off the Moscow activists and gave (these are his authentic words) a special command to the whistlers ... Uglanov sits on the presidium, and if he puts a piece of paper like this (shows), it means - whistle a little if he puts the piece of paper on the side, then whistle harder, and if he tears the piece of paper, then whistle and knock with your feet ... This is how the leaders of the opposition were met not only in the Moscow activists, but also in Ukraine" (ibid., pp. 185-186).

When the opposition members of the Central Committee and the communists following them demanded from the Central Committee that premises be placed at their disposal where they could present their views at party meetings, the Central Committees of the Central Control Commission denied them these elementary rights of party members. Yaroslavsky, telling that on November 4, on the eve of the congress, the opposition illegally seized the audience of the Moscow Higher Technical School for a meeting, quoted Smilga as saying that the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission "are obliged to provide from the housing stock that the party has at its disposal, clubs and premises at our request in any

area". When he announced the demand of the opposition, then from the hall of the XV Congress, as if on command, voices were heard: "Let Wrangel provide them!", "You can provide it at the Novodevichy cemetery!", "Beyond the Butyrskaya Zastava!" (that is, in prison. - A. A.), "On Lubyanka Square!" (that is, in the cellars of the OGPU. - A. A.) (ibid., p. 544).

Despite such psychological, political and police terror, the "counter-theses" of the opposition to the congress, according to official, clearly underestimated data, collected 13,300 votes in favor of the opposition (Yaroslavsky: "the opposition received one percent of the votes during the discussion and half a percent of those who hesitated", this is the said absolute number of 887,000 party members represented at the 15th Congress (Em. Yaroslavsky, op. cit., p. 488).

The opposition, especially its local groups, became very active by distributing leaflets. On the eve of the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution, the oppositionists published in Leningrad, signed by Zinoviev, Radek, Evdokimov, Bakaev, Peterson and Solovyov, an appeal "To the demonstration on November 7th." One Leningrad delegate to the 15th Congress considered it a de facto "call for insurrection", which, of course, was a distortion of facts. In this appeal, along with a list of the mistakes of the Central Committee and the demands of the opposition, only one "military" slogan was put forward: "Hands on the hands of the outrageous Stalinists, on the hands of those who are fighting against the opposition" ("Fifteenth Congress", p. 320).

On the eve of the holiday, Stalin resorted to a trick that shows him as a very inventive demagogue. At a special jubilee session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, he raised the issue of issuing a special "Manifesto" to the working people of the USSR and the whole world to commemorate the anniversary holiday. The Manifesto solemnly proclaimed:

1. From now on, a seven-hour working day is introduced in the USSR with the preservation of the existing salary; i 35% of peasant farms (i.e., all the poor and low-powered

middle peasants) are exempt from taxes.

The opposition called it all by its own name, that is, demagoguery, and voted against the Manifesto. This is exactly what Stalin needed. A powerful propaganda machine began to expose the opposition as enemies of the vital interests of the people. Such propaganda easily achieved its goal. The opposition, by its tactical error, isolated itself from

the proletariat, urban and rural, whose interests she considered herself to represent. In this setting, the tenth anniversary of October is being celebrated. The party apparatus, bearing in mind the possibility of open street demonstrations, prepared in advance from the party members special detachments, which the wits then called SBB ("Stalin's battalions of bashi-bazouks"), to be used if the opposition took to the streets. The opposition really staged a counter-demonstration - in Moscow led by Trotsky, in Leningrad led by Zinoviev. The official historian writes:

"Opposition leaders led small groups of their supporters to demonstrate in Moscow and Leningrad with anti-Party slogans and posters. Trotsky in Moscow and Zinoviev in Leningrad addressed the demonstrators with slanderous speeches... the demonstrators were dispersed, their posters and slogans were destroyed, and Zinoviev and his henchmen had to flee for their lives" (Fifteenth Congress., p. 1611). The bashi-bazouks worked so well!

Trotsky describes the demonstration as follows: "As the 15th Congress approached ... in spite of the monstrous terror, a desire arose in the party to hear the opposition. This could not be achieved otherwise than on an illegal path. Secret meetings of 20 to 200 people took place in different parts of Moscow and Leningrad. During the day I attended 2, 3, sometimes 4 such meetings. They usually took place in workers' apartments... Up to 20,000 people attended these meetings in Moscow and Leningrad. The opposition very skillfully prepared a large meeting at the Moscow Higher Technical School - over two thousand people crowded. A large crowd remained in the street ... Yai Kamenev talked for about two hours ... The Central Committee issued an appeal to the workers to disperse opposition meetings by force. This appeal was only a cover for carefully prepared attacks on the opposition by combat squads under the leadership of the GPU. Stalin wanted a bloody denouement. We have given the signal for the temporary cessation of large gatherings. This happened after the November 7 demonstration... The oppositionists decided to take part in the general procession with their posters. The slogans of these posters were in no way directed against the party:

"Let's turn the fire to the right - against the kulak, the Nepman and the bureaucrat",
"Let's fulfill Lenin's testament", "Against opportunism, against a split, for the unity of the party."
Today these slogans constitute the official creed

the Stalinist faction in its struggle against the right (written in 1930 vol. - A. A.). On the day of November 7, opposition posters were pulled out of their hands, the bearers of these posters were beaten by special squads ... In

as volunteers in the fight against the "Trotskyites" the directly fascist elements of the Moscow street rose to the aid of the apparatus. A policeman, under the guise of a warning, openly fired at my car... A drunken fire brigade official jumped up on the running board of my car with vulgar oaths and smashed the glass... A similar manifestation took place in Leningrad. Zinoviev and Radek were attacked by a special detachment, were locked up during a demonstration in one of the buildings" (L. Trotsky, "My Life", part P, pp. 277-280).

The masters of the October coup of 1917, led by Trotsky, showed themselves to be mere dilettantes when history sharply confronted them with the need to carry out a counter-coup against Stalin's "Thermidorian" coup. Their organization was miserable, their conspiracy was artisanal, their slogans were toothless. They did not so much want to win as to scare Stalin. Slaves to the doctrine of the "greatness of Bolshevism" and the "sanctity of Leninism", they underestimated neither the strength of Stalin's nerves nor his freedom from any ideals other than those of power. Declaring to the whole world that Stalin was capable of all meanness against them, they underestimated his one ability - the ability to physically cut out the entire Leninist guard, even led by Lenin himself (Krupskaya in 1926: "If Volodya lived, he would now sit in in prison." (T.. TgfzKu, "SfaPi", p. 381).

The unsuccessful demonstration of the opposition on November 7, 1927, was a long-awaited and fully justifying reason for Stalin to finally deal with it. By a resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of November 14, 1927, Trotsky and Zinoviev were expelled from the party. At the same time, Kamenev, Smilga, Evdokimov, Rakovsky, Avdeev and Muralov, Bakaev, Shklovsky, Peterson, Solovyov and Lizdin were expelled from the Central Committee (Pravda, November 15, 1927). This was done two weeks before the opening of the party congress in order to confront him with a fait accompli and prevent the leaders of the opposition from taking advantage of the rostrum of the congress. Of course, Stalin was not in any danger from admitting Trotsky and Zinoviev to the congress, but he always liked to act for sure. The XV Congress itself had to decide on the further stay in the party of the Kamenev group. The Central Committee even allowed this group

former members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission to attend the congress with an advisory vote. These were the results of the failed November 7 demonstration for the opposition. "The day of November 7, 1927, the future historian will note as an unsuccessful action by the proletariat for a new revolution," wrote Sapronov's supporter about this demonstration (Em. Yaroslavsky, op. pr., p. 485).

Following the exclusion of opposition leaders from the party, mass expulsions from the party and arrests began among those communists who had ever signed any opposition documents. Yaroslavsky reported at the 15th Congress on behalf of the Central Control Commission that "until November 15, only 2031 people were recruited for factional activities." ("Fifteenth Congress ...", p. 550). Facts were cited at the congress showing that, despite the terror, local groups continue their anti-Stalinist activities, organize underground meetings, issue and distribute leaflets in response to the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev from the party. One of the Leningrad delegates said that "oppositionists hung leaflets in factories, on apartment doors and on lampposts": "Leaders com. Trotsky and Zinoviev are expelled from the party. This is a fact of the greatest meanness... We call on all class-conscious workers to protest against this." Another leaflet wrote: "Comrades, our leaders, comrades. Trotsky and Zinoviev were expelled from the party thanks to the efforts of the Stalins, Bukharins, and Molotovs. The third leaflet demands freedom of speech,

freedom of the press for the entire party, because it is now used only by the "Stalins, Bukharins, Molotovs", the leaflet ends with the call "Down with the Central Committee, down with Stalin!" (ibid., pp. 320-321). The same leaflets were distributed in Moscow, the Urals, Ukraine. The Ukrainian "Group of Old Bolshevik-Leninists" wrote: "We call on you to the path of creating a Leninist party through organizational underground work according to the old methods of 1907-1911, to work underground for the freedom of factions, shades of opinion in the party" (ibid., p. 551).

The Moscow delegate said that after November 7 in Moscow, the opposition "distributed leaflets in thousands of copies." The leaflet of Sapronov's group said that, on Stalin's orders, "highlanders with machine guns stood for several hours in Moscow, on Sverdlov Square, to intimidate the obstinate workers, and the leaflet of the Trotskyist opposition stated that on the day of November 7, "30% of the workers took to the streets, the main, the mass of workers on the day of the tenth anniversary of October

refused the honor of greeting Bukharin, Rykov and Stalin; The workers responded to the greetings of the leaders with silence;

Such was the general situation in the Party when the 15th Party Congress opened (December 2-12, 1927). Now the concept of "Congress" of the Party is completely different from that which has existed in the Party up to now. In fact, the XV Congress was the last real congress of the Bolshevik Party. All subsequent party congresses are congresses only in name, but in reality they are well-organized all-Union conferences of party apparatchiks tested a thousand times over, plus the same number of extras, filtered by the political police, who must pretend to be "the masses", "the people". The 15th Congress itself, according to Trotsky's fair assessment, was the "All-Union Conference of the Stalinist faction" (ibid., p. 543). It had 898 voting delegates and 771 deliberative delegates, representing 887,223 members and 348,957 candidates. The party increased by 15% after the 15th Congress. This increase took place, on the one hand, by the organized recruitment of illiterate gray working masses into the party (after all, the CPSU (b) is the "vanguard of the proletariat"!), On the other hand, quite literate new Soviet bureaucrats and careerists poured into the party, about whom Lenin as early as 1920 year, he did not respond particularly politely: "We are afraid of an excessive expansion of the party, because careerists and rogues who deserve only to be shot will inevitably strive to cling to the government party" (Lenin, Soch. vol. 31, p. 29).

But Stalin accepted these careerists into the party under the slogan of "Lenin's call", while he put real Leninists in prison. Therefore, at the same 15th congress, they said what was happening: "Lenin's conscription and Stalin's dropouts."

The Congress listened to the reports of the Central Committee (Stalin, Kosior), the report of the Central Control Commission-RKI (Ordzhonikidze), the report of the Central Auditing Commission (Kursk), the report of the delegation of the CPSU (b) in the Comintern (Bukharin), directives on the five-year plan (Rykov), work in the countryside (Molotov), a report on the opposition (Ordzhonikidze), elections of the central institutions of the party.

The congress took place outwardly, according to the protocols of the congress, under the banner of the three new leaders of the party - Stalin, Rykov and Bukharin, but in reality under the hegemony and personal direction of Stalin alone. All three leaders received

Congress, at each of their speeches, "stormy, prolonged applause," but only Stalin "stormy, prolonged applause, turning into an ovation."

If at all previous congresses, after October, we read in the minutes numerous greetings from representatives of delegations of workers, peasants, and the army, ending with slogans: "Long live the leaders of the world proletariat Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev," but we never see the name of Stalin, now many greeting speeches of the delegations of the people at the 15th Congress mention only one name: "Long live the General Secretary Comrade Stalin!" However, Stalin himself does not stick out (unlike Khrushchev, who did not let anyone speak, or Brezhnev, who otherwise does not title himself as "General Secretary" with a capital letter, Stalin, being "General Secretary", never used this title itself). Stalin skillfully, with observance of the prescribed tact, distributes the roles at the congress among his allies and students. Like Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, he does not lay claim to either opening or closing words at congresses. Even more. He never chairs conventions. All this he gives to others. So it was at this congress. Rykov opened the congress with an introductory political speech, all members of the presidium except Stalin presided, and the same Rykov closed the congress with a closing speech. This emphasized "modesty" of Stalin impressed everyone.

In the political report of the Central Committee, Stalin summed up the discussions and the massacre of the opposition. Having once again formulated the main points of disagreement, Stalin reduced them to the following points:

1. The opposition denies the possibility of building socialism in one country.

- the opposition asserts that a Thermidorian degeneration took place in the USSR, the opposition denies a bloc between the working class and the middle peasantry,

- 3 the opposition denies the socialist character of the October Revolution,

4. the opposition denies the Leninist elastic tactics in the revolution in the colonial countries, "permitting a bloc and even an alliance with the national bourgeoisie of the colonial countries against imperialism" (China),

that the opposition denies the Leninist elastic tactics of a "united front" with the socialists, in order to win from within, over the heads of the leaders

masses of social democratic workers to the side of communism,

- b. the opposition "cleanly breaks" with Leninism on the question of the party apparatus, creating a "second party" and a new International.

To the question of what to do with the opposition, under what conditions its members could be left in the party, Stalin replied: "We have one condition: the opposition must be completely and completely disarmed both ideologically and organizationally" ("Fifteenth Congress .. .", pp. 82-90).

All the members of the Central Committee who spoke and the leaders of local party organizations supported Stalin's proposal to deliver an ultimatum to the opposition on organizational and ideological capitulation. Except the secretary

The Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of F. Goloshchekin, who stated that he did not agree with Stalin to put any condition for leaving the opposition in the party. He said: "We need to take a firmer line, we need to free the Party from opposition chatter... We need to establish a tough regime in the Party, a tough regime in Soviet work, a tough regime in everyday life... We accept no conditions from the opposition, no We do not set conditions for them... We are done with them" (ibid., pp. 194-196).

Formerly a member of the opposition, Krupskaya delivered a very mild speech; referring to the opposition, she remarked that she would not talk about her "big mistakes" because others had said enough about them. Her diagnosis of why the opposition was defeated must be admitted, however, to be absolutely correct: "the opposition has lost its intuition, its understanding of what the working class breathes" (ibid., p. 196). Indeed, the opposition has long lost not only the flair, but also the sense of understanding of the new party and police reality created by Stalin, as for the working class, it breathed an atmosphere of deep disappointment with the fruits of the October Revolution, and Trotsky now wanted to make the second October Revolution in its most leftist version. . This disappointment was the reason for the failure of all attempts by the opposition to find spiritual contact and support in the working class, and meanwhile the opposition made a fetish of the working class, turned it into an idol and made it the judge in its struggles for power with the Stalinists. The reaction both in the working class and among the people could be completely different if they were called for the liquidation of any dictatorship, especially the communist one, as the Kronstadters wanted. "Instead of the communist dictatorship of Stalin - the communist dictatorship of Trotsky" - this was essentially

opposition alternative. But His Majesty the Russian proletariat decided that truly "radish horseradish is not sweeter"! In this sense, and only in this sense, Krupskaya was right when she said that the opposition had lost its intuition, its contact with the working class and the people.

Muralov, Evdokimov, Rakovsky, Bakaev and Kamenev spoke for the opposition in the debate on Stalin's report.

Before speaking about the conditions in which the opposition was forced to act, especially at this 15th Congress, we must once again recall the statutory laws and the historical experience of the Party. Stalin, the Stalinists and their allies (the Bukharinites), forbidding criticism of the Central Committee, suppressing any freedom of opinion on controversial issues, constantly referred to the decision of the Tenth Congress on the prohibition of factions. However, the Stalinists deliberately ignored one fundamental fact, who was the supreme judge and authentic interpreter of Lenin's decision of the Tenth Congress "On the Unity of the Party". They had only one supreme body: the Politburo. The Politburo of the Central Committee, elected at the 10th Congress, consisted of the following five members: Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin (listing order according to the number of votes received by each member in the elections of the plenum of the PC). Of these five, Lenin died, having managed to write a "Testament" about the removal of Stalin. Two "factions" remain; one "faction" of three people: Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev, the other "fraction" of one: Stalin himself. Of course, the right to authentically interpret the decision of the Tenth Congress belonged precisely to this majority of the Leninist Politburo, and not to Stalin alone. Therefore, in the eyes of the opposition, and indeed in the light of all historical facts, it was Stalin who, since Lenin's illness, methodically worked to create his own faction of party apparatists both in the Central Committee and outside it. By 1927, the Stalinist faction constituted such an impressive force under the old name "Party" that it was the former Leninist majority not only of the Leninist Politburo, but also

Central Committee, easily declared an anti-party faction. In addition, Lenin himself considered the decision "On the Unity of the Party" to be a decision caused by the situation in the country (Kronstadt) and in the party ("Workers' Opposition" and opposition of the "Decists"), he expressed at the same congress the conviction that it would not have to be applied, and the point concerning the exclusion of members of the Central Committee was even declared not to be published at all (it was published by Stalin). But in the same decision, as if foreseeing the abuse of the party apparatus in terms of repression, Lenin wrote that "on issues that attract special

the attention of party members to purge the party of non-proletarian and unreliable elements, to fight against bureaucracy, to develop democracy... business proposals must be considered with the greatest attention... to fight by all means against bureaucracy, for the expansion of democracy..." (Highlighted by me. - A. A.) ("KPSS in Res.", 1953, part G, p. 529). Moreover, Lenin did not cancel, but deliberately kept in force the decision of the Party Conference of 1920, which he personally edited, and the Central Committee approved. It says: "Any kind of repression against comrades for being dissidents on this or that issue decided by the Party is unacceptable" (ibid., p. 509). Further, it was the founder of Bolshevism himself who considered it quite natural and normal that each congress is an arena of "open, free struggle" of ideas, opinions, groups, until decisions are made. Lenin wrote about the struggle and the atmosphere at the 2nd Congress: "What a heavy atmosphere prevails at our Congress!" - he complained to me ... "What a wonderful thing our congress is!" I answered him. Open, free fight. Opinions have been expressed. The shades have faded. Groups have emerged. Hands are raised. Decision is made. Stage passed. Forward! - that's what I understand. This is life" (Lenin, PSS, 1968, vol. 8, p. 333, as well as "Memoirs of Lenin", vol. G, p. 280).

How did Lenin feel about obstructions at party congresses? His Soviet biographer notes that at the same 2nd Congress "due to the fact that Lenin was interrupted several times by Martov, Trotsky and Zasulich, he protests and asks the secretaries to note in the protocol how many times he was interrupted" (V. I. Lenin, Biographical chronicle, vol. G, 1970).

In addition to all this, the party statute, edited by Lenin and adopted by the KhP party conference in August 1922, that is, after the Tenth Congress, says: "within the party, discussion of all controversial issues of party life is completely free until a decision is made" (Highlighted by me. - A. A.) ("KPSS in Res.", 1953, part D, p. 662). Since, according to the charter, the congress is the sovereign supreme body of the party, and until it makes a decision, "the discussion of all controversial issues is completely free," the opposition had both the legal (according to the charter) and the traditional ("precedent") right to speak at the congress and present its views. Zinoviev and Trotsky were expelled from the party right on the eve of the congress, but all the other oppositionists were expelled from the party at the same congress only because they "quite freely" wanted to express their opinion on politics

Central Committee before the decision of the congress.

Now let's return to the speeches of Evdokimov, Rakovsky, Bakaev, Muralov and Kamenev.

Nothing speaks so loudly of the savagery of morals, of the insanity of political culture, of the criminal degeneration of the Stalinist party, as the obstruction of the opposition at the 15th Congress. By publishing the minutes of the 15th Congress, Stalin and the Stalinists erected for themselves a "not-made-by-hands" literary monument.

nickname of bashi-bazouks of pogrom art of a unique class. First, the presiding officers arrange the cheapest demagogic performance with the opposition speakers - almost every one of them is called to the podium when the called person has left the hall or has not yet appeared. The chairman asks again if there is such and such in the hall, and voices from the hall almost unanimously answer him: "He ran to Trotsky for instructions!" This procedure is repeated twice with Kamenev, and repeated with others.

As we saw above, Lenin demanded freedom of opinion at party congresses and was indignant when the orator was interrupted by remarks. What would he have said if he had been present at the 15th Congress? Five speakers from the opposition spoke at the congress, but during their speeches from the presidium and the hall there were so many shouts, voices of insult, sometimes turning into violent and wild noise (all this is noted in the minutes), that their speeches in the transcripts are more filled with these remarks, than oratorical text: Muralov's speech contains 2 1/2 pages, he was interrupted 48 times; Bakaev's speech (4 pages) - interrupted 64 times; Evdokimov's speech (3 pages) - interrupted 76 times; interrupted less (in terms of the number of pages) Kamenev - 56 times (on 6 pages) and Rakovsky - 106 times (on 8 pages).

The dictionary of "strong expressions" shouts contains all shades of insult from almost lyrical metaphors like "insignificant worm", "stray cat" and "stubborn donkey" to accusations of treason: "defector", "traitor", "counter-revolutionary". All these insults are interspersed with personal attacks: "You are talking!", "You are lying!", "You are cheating!", "Get down!", "Get out of the podium!" Once, during Bakaev's speech, the audience went into such a frenzy of swearing, apparently raising an unimaginable uproar, that even the chairman, who up to now had himself taken part in insulting speakers, now issued the following statement: "The opposition is spreading provocative lies that delegates

they are deliberately drowned out here so that the party does not hear them (Voice from the seat: "They lie out of habit!")" ("The Fifteenth Congress ...", p. 374).

Here are brief excerpts from the speeches of the opposition speakers (we have excluded all remarks from the text):

Bakaev: "... In Stalin's report there is not even a hint of a "forced attack on the kulak" (as Bukharin proclaimed) ... Did Comrade Bukharin thump here, without first looking at the "saints" ... The 11th Party Congress on on the issue of regulating the social composition of the party, he gave the directive "to ensure that over the next year the party has more than half of its composition of workers from the machine tool" ... The Stalinist line won at the XNUMXth Congress, and as a result we see a sharp decrease in the percentage of workers from the machine tool .. If before the XV Congress there were 42% of them, then by the XV Congress, according to Comrade Molotov, there were 31% of workers from the machine tool in the party ... We must say that before the XU Congress, only workers, only farm laborers, and only rural poor" (ibid., pp. 374-377).

Minin (a former oppositionist, now for the Central Committee): "The campaign that was carried out in Leningrad pushed many, even workers, into the opposition ... This is what made the strongest impression when Comrade Kalinin said: "What do you need for the Central Committee declare white black and black white?"... One of two things: either to adopt in the same resolution of the HPU Congress a decision to implement democracy, or to carry out the campaign in the same way as it was carried out in Leningrad, when the resolution rejected by the majority, declared to have been accepted by "overwhelming majority"

votes. These are the facts that many workers ask: "What is happening?" when people conduct democracy in this way" (ibid., pp. 235-236).

Yevdokimov: "Here at the congress they say that the workers demand our exclusion from the party. Not true. There are few workers who will believe that such leaders of the party as Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky can be enemies of the working class... Along with this, the workers, of course, want that within the party both the majority and the minority should be allowed to speak. The workers want to listen to both sides. Out of 100 people, 99 want this... The working class wants unity to be preserved, but at the same time it does not want the majority to prevent the minority from obeying the decisions of the 15th Congress by making unacceptable demands" (ibid., pp. 259-262) .

Kamenev: "Comrades, I am coming to this podium with the sole purpose of

find a way to reconcile the opposition with the party... The struggle in the party has reached such a degree of intensification that it confronts us with the question of choosing one of two paths. One of these paths is the second party... This path is excluded for us by our entire system of views, by all of Lenin's teachings... The second path remains. This path - after a cruel, stubborn, sharp struggle for one's views - is to completely and completely submit to the Party. We are choosing this path because we are deeply convinced that the correct Leninist policy can triumph only in our Party and only through it... To take this path means for us to submit to all the decisions of the congress, however difficult they may be for us... But if to this unconditional submission to the decisions of the congress, to the complete cessation of all factional struggle and to the dissolution of factional organizations ... if we add to this the renunciation of views, that would be un-Bolshevik. This demand for the renunciation of views has never been raised in our Party. If on our part there was a renunciation of the views that we defended a week or two weeks ago, then this would be hypocrisy, you would not believe us ... I am talking, of course, about those views that are truly ours, and not about those exaggerations that were often attributed to us" (ibid., pp. 279-281).

Kamenev, citing examples by which the views of the opposition were justified in foreign affairs (failure of stakes on the Anglo-Russian Committee, on the Kuomintang), and in domestic policy (strengthening of the kulak, commodity shortage, disruption of exports, industry lagging behind the general course of the country's development) , said that the opposition is required to renounce even these views, which are confirmed by life. Kamenev ended with the following statement:

"On a number of issues, our views have been confirmed in life, and in a number of cases the Party has assimilated them to one degree or another... Under such conditions, it is impossible, unacceptable to demand that we renounce our views... Our like-minded people openly spoke out in defense of our platform ... They behaved like courageous revolutionaries and put their views above their position ... they were ready to sacrifice their position for the sake of what they considered right, regardless of what awaited them. Why would you deny it, it can't be denied! Such a situation, when people like Mrachkovsky are in prison, and we are free before your eyes, is unstoppable. We are responsible for all their actions" (ibid., pp. 280-285).

Muralov: "... A lot of trouble happened because the congress did not

was going to ... the Central Committee pursued the wrong policy ... There was an abnormal

situation ... for two years there was a one-sided discussion, one-sided coverage ... In relation to those who did not agree with the policy of the Central Committee, such methods were adopted that are unheard of in our party. If anyone from the opposition said that the workers needed to increase their wages, they shouted: this is demagoguery ... if they said that the fist is growing, the poor man is abandoned, they shouted: this is demagoguery ... When we said that for construction Socialism requires industrialization, but for this it is necessary to use the maximum amount of funds for the development of industry, we were called super-industrializers and appealed to the peasantry ... (then they said) that we want to rob the peasantry ... When we said that it was necessary to free 40-50 % of poor peasants from the tax, we were told that this was demagoguery ... Thus, all the questions that we raised turned against us into the greatest demagogic tricks and slander. It came to extreme, the greatest, unheard of in the party repression against the loyal old members of the party, the revolutionaries ... accusing them of being Chamberlain's agents ... Comrades, if any of you are told that you killed your wife, ate your grandfather, ripped off your grandmother's head, how will you feel, how will you prove that this did not happen? (ibid., pp. 340-342).

In view of the great impression made by the speeches of the opposition orators, the Central Committee immediately brought its heavy artillery into battle - the members of the Politburo, the leaders of the Central Control Commission, and the secretaries of the regional committees began to speak. The meaning of all their speeches fits perfectly into the following words of Rykov: "Vol. Kamenev ended his speech by saying that he does not separate himself from those oppositionists who are now in prison. I must begin my speech by saying that I do not separate myself from those revolutionaries who imprisoned supporters of the opposition... I think that one cannot guarantee that the population of prisons will not have to be increased somewhat in the near future" (ibid., p. 285, 291).

In his closing speech, Stalin repeated his ultimatum of organizational and ideological capitulation. In essence, he did not even reject the accusations of the opposition, but the speeches of Rakovsky and especially Kamenev nevertheless touched him, he was concerned that they would not find a resonance in the party. Stalin said: "About the speeches of Comrades. I don't have Evdokimov and Muralov

to say anything on the merits... Only one thing could be said about them: may Allah forgive them their sins, for they themselves do not know what they are talking about," but Stalin finds Kamenev's speech "the most pharisaic, the most cheating, the most fraudulent and most deceitful of all the speeches of the opposition" (ibid., pp. 411-413).

Why? Because, firstly, that Kamenev proposed peace, which Stalin did not want; because, secondly, that Kamenev recalled that Leninist Bolshevism never denied the right of a communist to have his own convictions about the policy of the Central Committee and defend them within the party. Stalin, not without reason, referred to the decisions of the Tenth Congress (Rykov also did this in his speech), which forbid communists to have their own views that differ from those of the party apparatus, that is, the Central Committee. Stalin was frank: "If the opposition disarms, that's good. She does not want to disarm - we will disarm ourselves" (p. 419).

On December 18, the congress "disarmed" the opposition. He adopted a resolution in which, having confirmed the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev from the party, he also expelled Kamenev, Rakovsky, Evdokimov, Muralov, Bakaev, Radek, Pyatakov, Rafail, Sosnovsky, Smilga, Smirnov, Zalutsky from the party,

Vaganyan, Vardin, Lashevich, Eshba E., Lilin 3. I. (Zinoviev's wife), a total of 75 active opposition figures (all old Bolsheviks without exception). The congress also expelled Saprnov's group of 23 people from the party. The resolution states that "belonging to the Trotskyist opposition and propagating its views are incompatible with belonging to the CPSU (6)" ("Fifteenth Congress ...", vol. P, p. 1468).

On December 19, a day after the decision of the congress on the opposition, the following statement was addressed to the congress:

"... The congress found the statement of December 10 about the refusal to propagate our views to be insufficient and unsatisfactory. We therefore accept the demand of the congress for ideological and organizational disarmament. We undertake to defend the views and decisions of the party, its congresses, its conferences, its Central Committee... Kamenev, Evdokimov, Zinoviev, Bakaev, Kuklin, Lashevich, Avdeev, Solovyov, Gessen, Pekar-Orlov, Gr. Fedorov, 3. Lilina, Zalutsky, Kharitonov, Babakhai, Sharov, Ravich Olga, Lukyanov, Elkovich, Reingold, Belyais, Furtichev, Minichev.

After listening to Ordzhonikidze's report on this statement, the congress decided:

1. Do not consider applications of those who have been expelled from the party. Kamenev, Zinoviev and others, in view of the fact that the congress has already exhausted the question of the opposition to the CII;

2. Propose to the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission to accept applications from active members of the former opposition expelled from the party only on an individual basis six months after the submission of applications (ibid., p. 1418).

Mrachkovsky's prediction came true exactly: Zinoviev fled, but even in this case, Stalin let him down by appointing him a trial regime. The capitulators of the Zinoviev part of the bloc passed this test at their dachas near Moscow, while the Trotskyist part, led by Trotsky, preferred the Siberian tundra and Kazakh sands to the dachas of the capitulators.

Thus ended the epic of Stalin's four-year struggle for power, first with the "left opposition" of Trotsky (1923-1924), then with the "new opposition" of Zinoviev and Kamenev (1925-1926), now with the united opposition bloc of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev - ended with a complete his triumph. It was, however, a triumph not of the idea, but of the machine, that colossal party machine which Stalin, having inherited from Lenin, rebuilt, updated and perfected to virtuosity on the go.

In this struggle, Stalin showed a skill worthy of admiration, and his opponents - incomprehensible amateurism. Stalin rightly noted at the same 15th Congress that in this struggle he was not dealing with opponents of his own class. He said: "The opposition claims to lead the party, the country. The question is - on what basis? Have they proved in practice that they are capable of directing anything at all... Is it not a fact that the opposition, headed by such people as Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, has been leading their group for two years now? Is it not a fact that, while leading their group, the leaders of the opposition led it to its final collapse? .. Is it not clear: people who have gone bankrupt on the leadership of a small group, no one will dare to entrust the leadership of such a big deal as a party, a country" ("Fifteenth congress ... vol. G, p. 412).

In this regard, it is interesting to recall what Mikha Tskhakaya said,

an educated Marxist, a party member since 1898, who in exile was the closest associate of Lenin, returned with him, but disliked Stalin because of his political immorality, and simply adored Bukharin. In his speech at the congress on the opposition, Tskhakaya did not say a single word about Stalin's report, he did not even mention it.

name, but about Bukharin's report, he said that he "brilliantly covered all questions, starting with the ideological front and our current tactics ... I took the floor so that, under the projector light of this report, I still return to that painful phenomenon that is being eliminated" After this introduction, Tskhakaya gave a description of the leaders of the opposition. Tskhakaya said: "There is no doubt that during the turbulent period of the civil war, Trotsky, voluntarily or involuntarily, always submitted to the party, but no one ever thought that he could be the helmsman. He could be a good commissar... No one could think that he could be a leader. Because this is a man whom we have driven, since the 2nd Congress, to the left of the Mensheviks, and whom Lenin succeeded in driving into our Party only in the July days. We old Bolsheviks regarded Trotsky in a certain way. But we wanted to use everyone and everything in the interests of the revolution. As for the other half of the bloc - Kamenev and Zinoviev - yes, their fall is sad. Still, they merged from the very beginning with the Bolshevik Party... I know the beginning of their political birth. And I won't say that I exaggerate their importance to a high degree, but they were good "workhorses," as Ilyich liked to put it (Voices: "That's right!"). But the examination in the October days showed that they, as leaders, can never be counted on. It must be said frankly that even fifty people could not listen to Zinoviev's report in exile. The Great Revolution of 1917 brought him forward, and he especially came forward on his own, constantly repeating at all meetings: "My dear teacher, my friend Lenin" ... As for Comrade Kamenev, I am too familiar with his political past, with his political birth. In 1903-1905 he was still underground at my disposal. And then I transferred it for finishing to the great master - Lenin. We have no doubt that Kamenev could have been a good worker, but again, not some kind of world leader" (ibid., vol. P, pp. 705-708).

Stalin turned out to be a rare strategist who planned history, a phenomenal tactician who organized victories under someone else's banner and by someone else's hands. Only Party Pharisees or inveterate ignoramuses can paint Stalin's struggle with the opposition as a struggle for the purity of Marxism-Leninism. Stalin, having declared Lenin his teacher, embalmed his corpse (despite Trotsky!) Not at all because of faith in any shrines, not because he was going to kneel before the mummy of the Bolshevik pharaoh, but so that others, praying to Lenin, would most prayed to Stalin.

When Lenin was dying, the names of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev were widely known in the party and the country, and Stalin was known only at the top of the party. Stalin decided to outdo his popular rivals by declaring himself Lenin's executor and Leninism an indisputable party dogma. In addition to all this, he declared himself the sole judge on the question: "What is Leninism?" Therefore, he declared each of his articles, speeches, letters "Questions of Leninism."

The calculation turned out to be correct, so correct that to this day in party textbooks Stalin's enemies are called "the bitterest enemies of Leninism." Meanwhile, Stalin had little faith in the "sanctity" of Leninism, while the opposition not only endlessly crucified its loyalty to laziness, but also perished because of its slavish adherence to obsolete norms.

and false saints. In Stalin's hands, Leninism was only what he wanted to make of it. But he nevertheless remained true to one component of Leninism: the doctrine of the total dictatorship of the party apparatus over the party and the state. He developed Leninism by introducing a new component into it: criminality. This just sealed his victory, opening the way to his personal tyranny. The Party itself recognized at the Twentieth and Twentieth Congresses that Stalinism is a criminal chapter in the history of Bolshevism.

The congress ended with the election of new bodies of the central institutions of the party - the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. The following were elected to the Central Committee: 71 members, 50 candidates; the composition of the Central Control Commission - 195 members; the Central Auditing Commission - 9 members. These were not people from the "Leninist guard", but representatives of the "second draft" of Bolshevism, "October Bolsheviks", heroes of the civil war, newly nominated secretaries of regional committees, regional committees and central committees of national republics. But I wonder how their fate turned out after they helped Stalin with such enthusiasm to defeat the "Leninist guard" in the face of the opposition? According to verifiable information, it went like this:

Out of 71 members of the Central Committee, 58 people were shot, out of 50 candidates - 48 people. 13 members of the Central Committee survived: Stalin, Andreev, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Kalinin, Krzhizhanovsky, Manuilsky, Mikoyan, Molotov, Petrovsky, Shvernik, Skvortsov-Stepanov (died before the purge). Of the 50 candidates, only two survived: Zhdanov and Nikolaeva.

Of the 195 members of the Central Control Commission, only five survived: Zemlyachka, Makharadze, M. I. Ulyanova, Yaroslavsky, Milchakov (the latter was in

concentration camp for 17 years). Not all 190 members of the Central Control Commission were shot: who was shot, who was exiled and who died a natural death - cannot be verified here, since they were mostly completely unknown people in the party, put forward by Stalin as the "proletarian" facade of the party.

Of the 9 members of the Central Audit Commission, 7 were shot, 2 survived (Vladimirsky and Lyadov).

In the resolutions of the congress, on the report of the Central Committee and on economic questions, the liquidation of the New Economic Policy was actually a foregone conclusion and the course towards the collectivization of agriculture was announced. The relevant passages read: "The 15th Congress considers that in relation to the elements of the private capitalist economy that have increased in their absolute mass, a policy of even more decisive economic ousting ... further ousting private capital in the city must and can be applied," and in the countryside: "It is necessary to put as a priority task on the basis of further co-operation of the peasantry, the gradual transition of scattered peasant farms to the rails of large-scale production ..." (ibid., vol. P, p. 1432).

The special resolution on work in the countryside says even more precisely: "At the present period, the task of uniting and transforming small individual peasant farms into large collectives must be set as the main task of the party in the countryside," on the basis of "a more decisive offensive against the kulak" (there same, pp. 1456, 1459).

Thus, having crushed the left opposition of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin proceeds to put into practice its program for the liquidation of the NEP. This will cause a new, "right" opposition in the party.

Chapter 28

HOW THE "RIGHT" OPPOSITION WAS CREATED

One of the main accusations of both the "left" and "new" opposition against Stalin was that Stalin was allegedly indulging the kulaks, not taxing the peasantry sufficiently high, and not erecting strong barriers against the elements of the NEP. In one of the statements of the Trotskyists ("Statement

15") said: "After two years, during which the Stalin group actually determined the policy of the central institutions of the party, it can be considered completely proven that the policy of this group was powerless to prevent:

1) the exorbitant growth of those forces that want to turn the development of our country onto the capitalist path;

2) the weakening of the position of the working class and the poorest peasantry against the growing strength of the kulak, the NEPman and the bureaucrat" ("The Party and the Opposition According to Documents", an edition of the Central Committee of the Party only for party members, Moscow, 1927, p. 53).

The "Appeal" of the "Working Group" (1923) stated even more clearly: "our peasantry has become the only politically vigilant force ... having subordinated all organs of power, the party, trade unions and Soviets to the service and revival of capitalism" (ibid., p. 63) .

The political statements of Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev on the peasant question were similar. Trotsky declared at the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in July 1926: "We are in danger of deviating towards the kulak."

Kamenev said at the same plenum: "The flooding of the lower level of Soviet power by the peasantry is a fact."

A year later, in June 1927, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, Zinoviev was even sharper: "Capitalism has grown in the countryside both absolutely and relatively - that is a fact. Capitalism in the city did not grow relatively, but grew absolutely" (ibid., pp. 52-57).

Proceeding from all this, the Trotskyists and Zinovievites demand an attack on capitalism and the kulaks.

Two years later, Stalin proved that his own plans for attacking both the peasantry and the New Economic Policy surpassed the most "leftist" fantasies of the most "leftist" oppositionists.

Stalin was secretly preparing to carry out a gigantic plan, which even Lenin did not dare, which Trotsky would hardly have dared to do - to nationalize peasant land, peasant property and peasant labor under the name of "complete collectivization."

Stalin's new plan is an unprecedented in conception, grandiose in scale and exceptionally bold political program of simultaneously carrying out from above two closely interconnected political and economic revolutions -

the industrial revolution in the city (XV Congress - 1925) and the anti-peasant, collective farm revolution in the countryside (XV Congress - 1927). What their costs would cost, even Stalin hardly imagined, but what their final results should be - this was taken into account with scientific and mathematical accuracy. To transform agrarian Russia into industrial Russia on the principles of economic autarky, to transform the village of private peasant farms into a village of complete collectivization—such are the tasks of both revolutions. On the basis of this whole process, the NEP as an economic policy was to be liquidated, and the NEPmen (private merchants, small entrepreneurs of the NEP period) and the kulaks had to be liquidated physically as well, in order to "unfold the class struggle."

How many people, therefore, should have become victims of this "class war" can be seen from the figures announced by Stalin at the height of the NEP at the KSU Congress. So, in 1923-1924. the share of private capital in the internal trade of the USSR was 35%, and in retail trade the share of private capital was even higher than the state and cooperative sectors combined - it was 57% (Stalin, Soch. vol. 7, pp. 318-319). There were kulaks, according to the Agitprop of the Central Committee, about 8-12% (ibid.). If we take the average figure of 10%, and translate these percentages only for a part of the villages into the language of absolute figures, then it turns out that out of the 25 million peasant families available, about 2 were subject to liquidation as kulaks and, therefore, deportation to remote places in Siberia. 5 million peasant families.

When asked why he spoke out against the opposition, when last year or two ago he demanded the same thing, perhaps only in a milder form and on a limited scale, Stalin replied:

"In 1926-1927. The Zinoviev-Trotskyist opposition vigorously imposed on the party a policy of an immediate offensive against the kulaks. The Party did not embark on this dangerous adventure, for it knew that serious people could not afford to play the offensive. An offensive against the kulaks is a serious matter. It must not be confused with the policy of scratching against the kulaks, which the Zinoviev-Trotskyite opposition was strenuously imposing on the Party. Attacking the kulaks means breaking the kulaks and liquidating them as a class... This means preparing for the cause and hitting the kulaks, but hitting them so that they can no longer get back on their feet.

p. 291).

There was great truth in this purely "dialectical" answer - before embarking on the implementation of this gigantic economic plan for industrialization (to do as much in 10-15 years as the West did in 100-150 years) and an equally daring plan, unprecedented in the history of mankind, forced collectivization of people - it was necessary to fulfill two conditions: first, to strengthen, expand and bring to mobilization readiness the military punitive authorities (the army, the police and police troops, the court, the prosecutor's office); secondly, to radically purge the entire hierarchy of the state and the party of any unreliable elements that could resist the implementation of the new plan. The unparalleled idea, which from the outside was considered either a utopia or adventurism, was not at all based on normal economic calculations of the country's capabilities. Stalin proceeded not from what was possible, but from what was necessary to preserve the dictatorship of the party. Lenin went to his grave, unleashing the element of economic freedom in the form of NEP. Stalin thought that the Leninist regime would follow its founder, if not, by turning Engels over, "a jump from

realm of freedom into the realm of necessity. Only then will the regime be invulnerable inside the country. But there always remains an external danger - it can be reduced to a minimum by the accelerated industrialization of the country, by the autarchy of the economy. Even more: only a highly industrialized USSR can not only pursue an active foreign policy, but also become a real base for the world proletarian revolution.

This very plan demanded from Stalin not only the reprisals against the old romantics of the revolution, but also the creation around him of such a staff of people who are capable not of reasoning, but of executing. Although Stalin himself said that after Lenin there could no longer be individual leadership in the Party, Stalin's disciples long ago learned to correctly understand the teacher - this one-man leadership is impossible except through Stalin himself.

If, contrary to expectations, Stalin himself sincerely believed in the possibility of "collective leadership" under a dictatorship, then soon the practice of government in the USSR should have confirmed to him the correctness of his own words: "the logic of things is stronger than the logic of human intentions."

The new economic program meant a turn, a revolution against Lenin's NEP. It also meant - and this is the most important - the transformation of the countryside into the main source of financing for industrialization.

"Initial socialist accumulation" (a theory entirely borrowed by Stalin from the Trotskyist E. Preobrazhensky) was conceived by pumping out, as Stalin put it at the July plenum of the Central Committee of 1928, a kind of "tribute" from the countryside. Bukharin called this practice "military feudal exploitation" of the peasantry. Appointed instead of Kamenev by the People's Commissariat of Trade, Mikoyan received the task of raising the rate of this "exploitation" through the peasant grain market. Mikoyan was determined to prove that the hopes that Stalin placed in him when he was appointed People's Commissar of Trade were not in vain.

At a meeting of the Politburo on January 3, 1927, the new people's commissar announced his introductory program: "I must declare that the peasant element, the peasant grain market is entirely in our hands, we can lower and raise the price of bread at any time ("XNUMXth Congress of the CPSU (b) Verbatim record", p. 291).

How so? After all, the Soviet laws of NEP have not yet been repealed, why, then, can Mikoyan, at his own discretion, dictate the prices of free trade in the countryside? In the same speech, Mikoyan answers these questions quite frankly, not to say cynically: because, he says, "we have all the levers of influence in our hands ... because no one stands behind the peasant and does not interfere with us!" (ibid.). "No one bothers us" to do whatever we want in the countryside - these were bitter words, but not yet bitter truth. For this optimism of Mikoyan, the city will pay with the catastrophe of the grain crisis of 1928.

Here are some comparative data that show how Mikoyan found the peasant grain market and what he brought it to a year and a half after his appointment. The resolution of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of July 23, 1926, based on the report of Mikoyan's predecessor, Kamenev, stated that, according to preliminary data, the gross grain harvest would amount to 4,700,000,000 poods (400,000,000 grain for their own peasant consumption and the formation of stocks on the market will be thrown out a mass of grain from 900 million to 1

billion poods and "this mass should be removed from the market in order not to cause a decrease in crops in the future", and that we must prepare for the "maximum export" of Russian bread to the world market in order to keep the price of bread at a level that "stimulated would be peasant

agricultural production" ("VKP (6) in rez.", Moscow, 1933, part P, pp. 272-273).

Indeed, extraordinary bread has been produced, the peasant barns are full, the market is more than satiated, but famine is clearly approaching the city - what's the matter? Mikoyan began to stifle private urban capital, but he himself could not offer goods to the countryside. The famous "scissors" of prices were formed - there is a lot of bread, but there is not enough goods, so grain prices are low, and goods prices are high. The peasant refuses to sell bread for nothing, he creates stocks, and a famine catastrophe is approaching the city more and more densely. How to be? Mikoyan assured the Politburo that he had found a very real way out of the crisis. At the beginning of February 1927, Mikoyan made a special report at the Plenum of the Central Committee on the topic "on the reduction of selling and retail prices" for industrial goods in order to help eliminate the "price scissors". The resolution of the Central Committee stated: "The growth in the purchasing demand of the rural and urban population, not covered by industrial products, created an atmosphere of commodity hunger", which led to a further "development of price scissors" in the market between industrial and agricultural goods. As a way out, Mikoyan proposes to lower the prices of goods, to establish compulsory prices for bread, and in the future to eliminate private trade and cooperate with the peasantry ("KPSS in Rez.", Moscow, 1953, part P, pp. 224-235).

The XU congress believed that the new people's commissar with one stroke of the pen already? solved the problem of "squaring the circle" - instead of goods, Mikoyan's orders were sent to the village, as grain wagons would move from the village to the city. The decision of the congress stated: "The vast majority of agricultural products are procured without the mediation of private capital... These products are sold at prices set by state bodies... thanks to a certain price policy, the state has the ability to influence the conditions of agricultural production itself" (ibid.).

However, it soon became clear that the economic laws of the free market were stronger than Mikoyan's orders. After some time, Stalin himself stated the failure of Mikoyan's price dictatorship policy, saying: "The wealthy sections of the countryside, who have significant grain surpluses in their hands and play a commanding role in the grain market, do not want to give us the required amount of bread at prices determined by the Soviet government." And the result? It was announced by the same Stalin, stating that although the gross

grain production in 1927 amounted to 5 billion poods, "we produce half as much marketable grain, and export grain abroad twenty times less than before the war" (Stalin, "Problems of Leninism", p. 185).

Exit? What should be done to get bread, which is available in abundance in the village? From now on, the question of the fate of the NEP itself became on the order of the day, as can be seen from the answers given to this question in the Politburo of the Central Committee - Bukharin proposed raising the procurement prices for bread, throwing more goods on the peasant market and at normal prices, and stopping all attempts to "liquidate NEP on the left. Bukharin was supported by the head of government A. Rykov and trade union leader M. Tomsky - both members

Politburo.

Stalin and Mikoyan proposed another solution - to use "all levers of influence" on the peasants, in other words, to introduce a system of forced procurement of grain. The essence of this system boiled down to the fact that each peasant household received a firm task to hand over a certain norm of grain at fixed state prices. The non-deliverers of bread were to be judged as malicious speculators with the confiscation of all their property. Of this confiscated property, 25% was intended for distribution to the poor for their participation in the "class struggle" against the kulaks, "sub-kulakists" and "saboteurs". Stalin considered the new plan as a temporary emergency measure, caused by a temporary emergency situation. Thus, extraordinary or, as they were then called, "extraordinary measures for grain procurements" were introduced in 1927. If it was a question of providing the city with bread, even after quarreling with the peasantry, the Stalin-Mikoyan plan was a salvation.

But its practical implementation was fraught with very serious difficulties. Since the voluntary fulfillment of grain obligations by the peasants under the new plan was excluded, it was necessary to attach Chekist detachments to the grain procurement apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Trade, which were given an unlimited right to search, confiscate bread and arrest. Not all bread was subject to confiscation, but the so-called "surplus", that is, the bread that remains after deducting the food allowance of a given peasant family from it. So that such a grain procurement campaign does not outwardly look like a "police action" of authorized party and police officers when visiting peasant households

always accompanied by groups of local activists, who were given the name "komsodo" ("commission to promote grain procurement").

The norms for the delivery of bread were also established through these "communal committees". If the peasant did not fulfill the intended norm on time, then there was an order of fines - an increase in the norm to two, three, five times. If this also had no effect, then they were judged. Since the norms were established not according to the actual availability of bread for the peasant, but according to his belonging to one or another social group (poor, middle peasant, prosperous, kulak), hundreds of thousands of people were tried for not returning the bread they did not have. But if for such people their relatives or friends arranged a "pooling", that is, they collected bread among themselves and handed over the state for it, then the arrested person was immediately released, even if he was the most inveterate fist.

So Stalin's goal was not at all repressions for the sake of repressions, but only such repressions that bring bread.

And from this point of view, they turned out to be fully justified - the grain procurement plan of 1927 was carried out: 644 million poods of grain were collected instead of 617 million, collected in 1926 by Kamenev.

Reporting to the April Plenum of the Central Committee (1928) on how he succeeded, Mikoyan admitted that without "extraordinary measures" he would not have succeeded, and that such measures would probably not be possible in the future. The Central Committee openly admitted that it was not without extremes and "excesses" in the application of "extraordinary measures", for which, however, it is not Moscow that is to blame, but the local authorities. The well-known practice of the Kremlin is to give the local authorities plenty of "go too far" until the planned task is completed, and after it is completed, criticize, and sometimes even punish

"peregibchikov" - this practice was first born in those years, and then turned into a system of Stalinist leadership. In the resolution adopted by the April plenum of the Central Committee, for the first time, terms are introduced into party jargon that will later make an era: "perversions" and "excesses." These words signify those actions of local authorities which the central government tacitly allowed during the execution of plans, but from which it considered it necessary and useful to dissociate itself after their implementation.

In the decision of the plenum of the Central Committee, the situation that was created due to "perversions and excesses" is rather colorfully drawn. "These perversions and excesses, committed in places on the part of Party and Soviet organs,

are subject to the most categorical abolition... This includes all methods that, striking not only at the kulak, but also at the middle peasant, are in fact slipping onto the rails of the surplus appropriation, namely: confiscation of grain surpluses (without any judicial application of Article 107); the prohibition of the intra-village sale of grain or the prohibition of the "free" grain market in general; searches to "reveal" surpluses; defensive detachments; forced distribution of peasant loan bonds ..; cash payments for postal orders, when part of the parcels is issued by loan bonds or other papers; administrative pressure in relation to the middle peasants; the introduction of "direct product exchange," etc., etc. (emphasis mine. - A. A.) ("CPSU in res.", part P, p. 376).

However, the Central Committee does not at all think that in the future it will be possible to obtain agricultural products in the normal way. The Central Committee declares that "grain procurement difficulties" will continue in the future, because they are not accidental, but are connected with the existence of the kulak class and the private market. Therefore, if the Party wants to have enough grain and for next to nothing, it is necessary to attack the kulaks, "regulate the private market" and direct the peasants "in the direction of socialist construction." the difficulties in grain procurement that have taken place this year cannot be considered an accident... Therefore, since difficulties in grain procurement may still appear in the future, the Party should strive with all the more perseverance to ensure that the slogan of the 15th Party Congress of "a further offensive against kulaks," on the regulation of the private market and the systematic involvement of the individual peasant economy ... in the mainstream of socialist construction" (ibid., p. 377).

Therefore, the plenum accepts the proposal of the Politburo to continue the practice of forced procurement, only it is necessary to legalize the confiscation of surplus grain through the courts (the application of "Article 107" of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR) and avoid too far-reaching "excesses". If the peasants agree to donate their grain voluntarily, then the "extraordinary measures" will be abolished altogether. The relevant passage in the resolution reads:

"At the same time, the joint plenum considers that as the difficulties in grain procurements are eliminated, that part of the Party's measures that was of an extraordinary nature should disappear.

The joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission instructs the Politburo to take all measures to ensure the uninterrupted progress of procurement in the future grain procurement campaign ... "(ibid.).

History has proven that future agricultural harvesting

"uninterrupted" could be carried out only by applying "extraordinary measures".

Stalin called this method of harvesting the "Ural-Siberian method" (since he himself put it into practice for the first time in early 1928 in Western Siberia and the Urals) and turned it into a permanent system of harvesting all agricultural products. It still exists today, with the only difference that now all the peasants are in the "line of socialist construction" in the form of collective farms and state farms, therefore the procurements themselves are "automated" - the state automatically takes the amount of grain it needs, and the rest of the collective farmers divide among themselves according to called "workdays". The usual ratio between what the state took away almost free of charge and what remained for the collective farmers in the form of these "workdays" averaged 70:30, 70% to the state, and 30% to the collective farmers, and these 30% also included numerous indivisible funds (seed fund, insurance fund, inviolable fund, etc.).

It was precisely this new "extraordinary" policy of Stalin-Mikoyan in 1927 in grain procurements that was, as already indicated, the direct cause of a new split in the Politburo - Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy declared that Stalin's new program was the liquidation of the Leninist NEP and the restoration "war communism. Stalin declared them "right opposition" in the party.

The right opposition arose not only as a reaction to Stalin's practice, it was deliberately provoked by Stalin, because without the political isolation of the right leaders in the Central Committee it would have been absolutely impossible, firstly, to complete Stalin's ascent to sole power, and secondly, to put into practice the Stalinist concept of building socialism through violence. During the fight against the left oppositions of Trotsky and Zinoviev, Stalin based his tactics on Bukharin's concept of peaceful transformation, on the peaceful transformation of "NEP Russia into socialist Russia", in order to bury the left with the support of Bukharin's group. When this goal was achieved, Stalin revealed his cards: in order to

to build socialism in peasant, NEP Russia, it is necessary to carry out a third violent revolution from above, this time against the peasantry.

And here Stalin was not original. Contrary to the accusations of the rightists that Stalin ran counter to Leninism (Lenin said that the highest principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the preservation of the alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry, under the hegemony of the former, and that in relation to the peasantry one must show "arch-caution"), Stalin argued that all Leninist statements about the peasantry belong to the realm of tactics. In essence, for Lenin, the peasantry is a reactionary, hostile class, as Marx and Engels also considered it. Stalin was right. Here are the words of Marx and Engels: "... the craftsman and the peasant - they all fight the bourgeoisie in order to save their existence from death as the middle classes. They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Even more, they are reactionary, they seek to turn back the wheel of history" (Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, 1951, p. 41).

Here are Lenin's words: "First we support to the end, by all means, until confiscation, the peasant in general against the landowner, and then (and not even later, but at the same time) we support the proletariat

against the peasant in general" (Lenin, 4th ed. vol. 9, p. 213).

Stalin laid the foundations of a new revolution in the countryside already at the 15th Party Congress with the unanimous support of all the leaders and supporters of the future "right opposition", however, they did not know how skillfully Stalin fools.

In his report at this congress, Stalin for the first time raised the question of "the transition of small peasant farms into large and united farms", but in order not to frighten the rightists, not to provoke them to act prematurely, Stalin noted that collectivization would take place "not in the order of pressure, but in the order of demonstration and persuasion" (Stalin, Soch. vol. 10, p. 305). However, the prudent Stalin, in the resolution of the 15th Congress, wrote down a point to which at that time the Bukharinites did not attach any importance: "To develop further the offensive against the kulaks and take a number of new measures that limit the development of capitalism in the countryside and lead the peasant economy in the direction of socialism" ("VKP(b) in res., part P, p. 260). As for the collective farms, the resolution on the report

Molotov said that the creation of collective farms instead of individual farms is "the main task of the Party in the countryside" ("KPSS in Rez.", 1953, part II, p. 355), and elsewhere, in a resolution on Stalin's report, it is even more clearly stated: it is "the first priority" (ibid., p. 317).

The Bukharinites evidently believed that Stalin was engaged here, in response to Trotsky and Zinoviev, in Platonic exercises in "leftism," not at all thinking of moving from words to deeds, from threats to reprisals against the peasantry. If they thought so, then a very quick and bitter disappointment awaited them.

Stalin associated the grain crisis not with market conditions, not with "scissors" of prices, not with the mistakes of the leadership, but with the nature of the existing economic system. As long as the NEP exists with its free peasant economy, the Soviet state is doomed to dependence both on the peasantry and on the market forces. Stalin remembered how the tsarist autocracy fell. "Bread, bread, bread!" - this is the slogan with which the February revolution in Petrograd began. Stalin knew better than Bukharin that the same fate awaited the Bolshevik autocracy, under the same slogan, if he himself did not make a revolution from above in the countryside in order to prevent a revolution from below in the city. Stalin saw the Achilles' heel of the regime in the fact that the Soviet state was economically dependent on the peasantry, and he decided to reverse the formula - to put the peasantry on the dependents of the state. Stalin decided to take bread from the peasantry in order to feed not only the city, but the peasantry itself with this bread on behalf of the state. How can one not recall the reasoning from Dostoevsky's "Grand Inquisitor": "Receiving bread from us, of course, they will clearly see that we are their own bread, obtained by their own hands, we take from them in order to distribute it to them, without any miracle, they will see that we did not turn stones into bread, but truly, more than the bread itself, they will be glad that they receive it from our hands! After all, the average Soviet inhabitant, under the influence of the official philosophy of the regime, seriously thinks that it is not he who feeds the state, but the state feeds him. Here is an interesting piece of evidence from a Soviet magazine: "Each family knows its own budget, calculates when and what to buy. Much more difficult for the state. It must feed, clothe and shoe everyone" (j. Voice of the Motherland, No. 101, December 1966, editorial).

Stalin knew that there was no more ideal means to take away bread from the peasants, "in order to distribute it to them," as the total collectivization of agriculture.

economy through the confiscation of private peasant farms and the nationalization of peasant labor itself. The "extraordinary measures" were precisely to convince the peasants that it was better to receive back part of their grain from the state on the collective farm than, being outside the collective farm, to give all the grain to the state. Stalin decided to show in practice how he thinks about the implementation of his plan for the "agrarian revolution". For this purpose, three weeks after the 15th Congress, accompanied by a whole Chekist echelon, Stalin left for Siberia. The official commentator paints this trip of Stalin almost in lyrical tones, although Stalin was least of all a "lyricist". He says that Stalin visited the main grain regions of the region, participated in meetings of the bureau of the Siberian Regional Committee in Novosibirsk, the bureau of district committees, at meetings with local activists in a number of regions, and that "political and organizational measures" ensured the fulfillment of the grain procurement plan (Stalin, Soch., vol. 11, p. 356).

However, Stalin did not so much "meet" and "confer" with the activists as he acted and thrashed. From his very first speeches, he declared: "I traveled around the regions of your region and had the opportunity to make sure that ... your harvest ... is unprecedented. You have more grain surpluses this year than ever before, and the grain procurement plan is not being fulfilled. Why, on what basis?

You say that the kulaks do not want to hand over their grain, that they are waiting for a rise in prices ... why don't you attract them for speculation? ... I saw several dozen representatives of your prosecutorial and judicial authorities. Almost all of them live among the kulaks, are freeloaders among the kulaks, and, of course, try to live in peace with the kulaks. To my question, they answered that the kulaks' apartments are cleaner and better fed... It is only incomprehensible why these gentlemen have not yet been cleaned out... I suggest:

a) demand from the kulaks the immediate surrender of all surplus grain at state prices; 6) in case of refusal ... to confiscate their grain surpluses in favor of the state "(Stalin, Soch. vol. 11, pp. 2-4).

Stalin proposed distributing 25% of the confiscated bread to the poor peasants, which in Stalin's language meant "aggravation of the class struggle in the countryside", and in human language the setting of village couch potatoes and hoards on zealous owners, now declared "kulaks", to which, in essence, they included the upper layer of the middle peasants, for whom another term was invented - "prosperous". Since many, even among the poor, began to condemn this military and police arbitrariness, when artificially

set off one part of the village against another, then the inventive Stalin soon found a term for such poor people - they began to be called "kulakists" with all the ensuing consequences (confiscation of bread, trial, expulsion).

Stalin suggested that a purge should also be carried out in the apparatus of power, pointing out that "you will soon see that these measures will yield excellent results and you will be able not only to fulfill, but also to overfulfill the grain procurement plan" (ibid., p. 4).

Stalin, in conclusion, announced his main recipe for how the state can continue to provide itself with bread at the prices set by him. This prescription was clear and categorical: "We must cover all regions of our country, without exception, with collective farms" (ibid., p. 7), that is, we must abolish the New Economic Policy, which Lenin gave to the peasantry only six years ago.

back. At the same time, this Stalin's recipe also meant a return to the "surplus appraisal" (to the forcible seizure of grain surpluses).

Compare this speech by Stalin with what was written down at his own suggestion in the resolution of the united Central Committee and Central Control Commission against the Left Opposition only three months ago (August 9, 1927). This proposal by Stalin and the resolution of the plenum says: "The joint plenum of the PC and the Central Control Commission rejects the absurd ... demagogic proposals of the opposition on the forcible seizure of grain surpluses in kind and on such an overtaxation of private trade, which should lead to its immediate liquidation ... The Central Committee and The Central Control Commission believes that these proposals are essentially aimed at the abolition of the new economic policy established by the party under the leadership of Lenin" ("VKP(6b) in rez.", 1933, Part II, p. 357).

Why is it that the opposition's policy of liquidating the NEP, declared by Stalin himself only three months ago as an anti-Leninist policy, is today recognized by the very same Stalin as a Leninist policy? What important events took place for such a 180-degree turn in such a short time? Where are the principles here? And important events took place, and the principles were evident.

The main rivals on the left in the struggle for power - Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev - were thrown out of the party during this time, with an appeal to the right-wing Lenin and his NEP. Now it was necessary to eliminate the main rivals for power from the right, appealing to the left Lenin and to his installation - the NEP was only

"respite", "temporary retreat" to prepare a new offensive (Lenin's report at the HT! Congress).

Bukharin's group reminded Stalin of the Central Committee resolution quoted above and declared that they would appeal to the party if Stalin did not agree to repeat the statement that the NEP remained in full force. Since Stalin was not yet ready to take the fight to the rightists, he had no choice but to sign the following statement on behalf of the Politburo on February 13, 1928: "... are counter-revolutionary chatter ... The NEP is the basis of our economic policy, and remains so for a long historical period" (emphasis mine. - A. A.) (Stalin, Soch., vol. 11, p. 15).

By signing the Politburo statement, Stalin, as usual, was deceiving his own party: the NEP, designed for a "long historical period", was canceled the very next year, 1929.

In the meantime, Stalin continued his practice of "extraordinary measures" into 1928. The peasantry responded to this practice, as might be expected, with a sharp decline in the area under crops. Agriculture was clearly moving from a crisis of overproduction to another crisis, which would later become a permanent phenomenon in the Soviet countryside, to a crisis of underproduction. M. Frumkin, Deputy People's Commissar for Finance of the USSR, was the first to signal the trouble. Frumkin, as a "right opportunist", was immediately removed from his post. But this did not increase the sown area in the village. Therefore, the grain procurement campaign in the autumn of 1928 turned out to be a disaster. Even Stalin could not pump out bread from where it was not. Now Stalin faced a new problem: what to do next? Stalin continues to maneuver. For this manoeuvring, Bukharin called Stalin in a conversation with Kamenev "an unscrupulous intriguer,"

who subordinates his every action to the interests of "preserving his own power."

This remark is enough to see what kind of political children Stalin will have to deal with in the last stage of his struggle for a one-man dictatorship. Stalin changed principles, spit on his yesterday's convictions, intrigued, slandered, incited, but he did all this in the name of "preserving his own power." "Troika" was an unprincipled enterprise, but it saved Stalin from the "Testament"

Lenin. The alliance with Zinoviev and Kamenev against Trotsky was an unprincipled deal, but it helped Stalin topple Trotsky's main rival. A bloc with Bukharin and Rykov against Zinoviev and Kamenev was an unnatural combination even in Bolshevik politics, but it helped Stalin to topple these executors of Lenin. Today, Stalin concluded an alliance against the Bukharinites with that Central Committee, 70% of whose members he later shot together with the same Bukharinites, but this alliance led him to a final and absolute victory, to a one-man dictatorship.

The very unscrupulousness of Stalin in this sense was fundamental. If, say, the fanatic of communism, Bukharin, were faced with a dilemma: either his sole power over Russia without communism, or communism in Russia, but without his power, he would not hesitate to choose communism without his power. To the cynic Stalin, this dilemma would have seemed simply naive - he would not only have chosen power without communism, but he would also have begun to prove what a criminal impasse Lenin had led the country into by violating the laws of Marxism, according to which communism wins first in the advanced countries of the West, and then only in backward countries like Russia. Such freedom of Stalin from all honor and all ideological rubbish, called principles, only testifies to his superiority in the political struggle over all his Bolshevik rivals. After all, even Talleyrand noticed that if people emphasize the honesty and integrity of a politician too much, then one must doubt his abilities. As for intrigue, it was and still is a legitimate weapon in politics in general, in the arsenal of Bolshevism in particular. The fact that Stalin surpassed his rivals in this respect also speaks in favor of him as a "technologist of power."

Stalin's trip to Siberia must be considered the beginning of his campaign against the future right. Stalin was well aware that it was not only about isolating the next group of rivals to power, but about a new revolution from above, equal, as he wrote in the Short Course, in its significance to the revolution in October 1917. Until now, the inner-party struggle had little touched vital interests of the people, even more: it was carried out under the flag of protecting these interests (preservation of the New Economic Policy, improvement of the material situation of the people, renunciation of repressions). Now the fate of the whole country and the class that made up 80% of the country's population - the peasantry - was being decided. This required not only Stalin's personal ingenuity in intrigues against opponents in

composition of the leadership, but also the colossal exertion of all the forces of the apparatus of power against the people.

Stalin developed this work in three directions:

1. The propaganda apparatus was given the task of inventing a new bogeyman - the "right danger", which, after the left danger was overcome, became the "main danger" for the revolution;

O. the grassroots apparatus of the party was given the task of organizing in the countryside a spontaneous mass movement for "voluntary" entry into the collective farms; 5 command of the Red Army, leadership of the OGPU, the Supreme Court

and the prosecutor's office were instructed to put the punitive organs on "combat readiness" in order to suppress possible "kulak uprisings", sabotage and try their leaders (Stalin had this preparation in mind when he wrote in 1929: "To attack the kulaks means to prepare for cause" - "Questions of Leninism", p. 291).

Stalin's new doctrine of "criticism and self-criticism", put forward at the 15th Congress, lay along the same line of preparation for a revolution in the countryside. Under this slogan, an era of permanent purges was to begin: the party - from "deviators" and the state apparatus - from "alien elements" - purges, subsequently transformed into the general inquisition of the Yezhovshchina of 1936-1938.

But the spearhead of the new doctrine, after the reprisals against the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, was directed against the Bukharinites. Reporting to the Moscow activists of the party about the April plenum of the Central Committee of 1928, Stalin directly pointed out the need to criticize the "party leaders" who had become detached from the masses. Since Stalin did not consider himself such (after all, he had recently visited the "people", in Siberia, although this was his last "stay among the masses"), it is clear that he was talking about those whom he designated as next victims - about future leaders of the "right opposition". Here is Stalin's curious reasoning: "There is one more circumstance pushing us towards self-criticism. I have in mind the question of the masses and the leaders ... they are often afraid to criticize their leaders ... we must give the Soviet people the opportunity to "cover" their leaders, to criticize them for mistakes, so that the leaders are not arrogant" (Stalin, Op. vol. 11, pp. 31-32).

Since Stalin himself was the only "infallible" leader, besides, any of the old Bolsheviks who tried to criticize him immediately disappeared from the horizon (Stalin's former deputy for the people's commissar, Sultan-Galiev, was even shot in those years just for

criticism of Stalin), then party members, especially members of the party apparatus, correctly understood the new doctrine: you can criticize any member of the Politburo, except for the "general secretary" himself. Of course, it was possible and necessary to criticize any of the local leaders if he did not show sufficient zeal in fulfilling the directives of the central party apparatus. But the most sinister thing was that the new slogan was directed not only against the anti-Stalin officials, but also against the anti-Stalin people. The slogan "criticism and self-criticism" was a method of creating a mass army of official and unofficial "sexots", with the help of which the massacre of dissidents within the party and anti-Soviet elements outside the party began. Therefore, Stalin associated the new slogan with two events of political significance: with the so-called "Shakhty affair" and the "procurement crisis" by January 1928.

For the first time in this connection, Stalin puts forward another, truly epochal, slogan of the supreme policeman: to increase "revolutionary vigilance." Given the enormity of the tasks of the forced collectivization and liquidation of the NEP he had conceived, Stalin raised the question of involving "sexots" - "critics" of "hundreds of thousands and millions" of people into the army. This should be facilitated by all sorts of moral, material and

official encouragement of "sexots" - "critics". Such a formulation of the question inspired "criticism" (that is, denunciations) of careerist elements in the party and criminal types in society. Since the career and privileges for informers were directly proportional to their individual contributions to the cause of identifying "enemies", the informers did not so much identify Stalin's enemies as slandered people. When this slanderous wave aroused dissatisfaction in the most healthy part of the Party, when the idealists from the Party began to prove that nine-tenths of the "criticism" introduced now consists of slandering honest people, Stalin, giving a sharp rebuff to such "clamping down" criticism, bluntly declared: "If criticism contains at least 5-10 percent of the truth, then such criticism should be welcomed" (ibid., p. 33).

"Let there be 95-90% slander, as long as there is 5-10% truth" - isn't this the philosophy of a criminal? That this is exactly the case will be proved by Yezhovism when this slogan of Stalin becomes a guide to the action of millions of seksots to eliminate millions of "enemies of the people."

In the same speech at a Moscow activist, Stalin again emphasized how

Siberia, that the central task now is "to put full pressure on the development of large farms in the countryside, such as collective farms and state farms ... so far we have few collective farms and state farms, outrageously few" (ibid., pp. 41-42). The theoretical substantiation of his plan for the "third revolution" Stalin gave in a conversation with students of the Institute of Red Professors, Komakademii and Sverdlovsk University on May 28, 1928. The choice of place and audience was not accidental. The ICP and the Komakademiya were the most important fortresses of the then famous "Bukharin school". Declared by Lenin the legitimate favorite of the party and its most outstanding theoretician, Bukharin was the idol of the academic youth of the party. Although Bukharin was considered primarily an economist, but it was a universal talent - he was equally recognized as a sociologist, a lawyer, and a literary critic. Accordingly, the circle of the "Bukharin school" was also wide. Here are some of the most prominent people from this school, whom Stalin later shot: Stan (member of the Central Control Commission), Slepkov, Astrov (members of the editorial board of the Bolshevik magazine), Maretsky, Eichenwald, Goldenberg, Kraval, Karev, Bessonov, Magyar, Lominadze, Shchatskin (the latter are members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission and leading officials of the Comintern), Pashukanis, Berman, Vanag, Piontkovsky, Friedland, Lukin and others. These were theoretical stars of the first magnitude, whose writings differed from the current "theorists" in one undoubted advantage: they created and were not primitive, like the Fedoseevs and Suslovs. Pospelov, Mitin, Mints, Pankratova, Mekhlis also belonged to this Bukharin school, but they went over to Stalin's side in time and created an entirely new branch of "science" in Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, which I would call "citatology". "Citatology" was not only a kind of new branch in the Soviet Marxist science of the Stalin era, but also a rather subtle art of substantiating and legitimizing Stalin's criminal practices with quotations from the classics of Marxism-Leninism and Stalin himself. It was necessary to show Stalinism as the pinnacle of Marxism-Leninism, and Stalin himself as "the luminary of all sciences." But, God forbid, it was to try to make one's own creative contribution to Marxist theory itself, this is the prerogative of one Stalin. The task of this doctrine was reduced to a skillful selection of quotations from Stalin for the theoretical justification of the next zigzag of the "general line of the party", and then simply to a presentation of the unquoted Stalin. So it arose, as a counterbalance to the Bukharin school,

"Stalinist school" in Marxism. Describing the creative face of this school, the newspaper Pravda (the main mouthpiece of Stalinism for a quarter of a century) subsequently wrote:

"... If we take works on philosophy, political economy, history and other social sciences, then many of them represent a set of quotations from the works of Stalin and his praise. It was believed that only one person, Stalin, could develop, move theory forward, express something original and new" (Pravda, March 28, 1956).

In a conversation with "Red professors" and "Communist Academicians", Stalin theoretically substantiated his collectivization plan with references to Lenin. But the very first reference to Lenin was falsified. Stalin said: "Lenin called the party to organize collective farms from the very first days of the October Revolution" (emphasis mine. - A. A.) (Stalin, Soch .., vol. 11, p. 88), but such an important reference to Lenin Stalin did not back it up with a quote from Lenin, as he always did on other occasions. Everyone knew the reason - from the "first days of the October Revolution" Lenin could not call the party to organize collective farms, but called, on the contrary, to divide the land among the peasants on the basis of private ownership, according to the Socialist-Revolutionary program. Lenin did not call for the creation of collective farms also because Lenin did not know the term "collective farm" until the last days of his life. Only at the UP emergency party congress in March 1918, for the first time after the revolution, Lenin spoke about "communes" and "artels", but how? Lenin said: "In vain they attribute to us that we want to introduce socialism by force. We will fairly divide the land, from the point of view of predominantly small farming. At the same time, we give preference to communes and large artels" (Lenin, PSS, vol. 36, p. 56). Lenin's reports, speeches, and articles speak of communes, artels, and cooperatives, but "collective farms" are never encountered. It was important for Stalin to announce not so much to this audience as to the entire party and the country that Stalin's collective farms are Lenin's collective farms.

However, the reference to Lenin was still not accidental. Indeed, it was Lenin who, in June 1918, tried to transfer the "October Revolution" to the countryside, creating the notorious "kombeds". These commanders then did what Stalin's "komsodoms" did - in an organized manner, with the support of the state, they robbed wealthy peasants, requisitioning their bread, cattle, fodder, not so much for the benefit of the state, but for their own. At first, Lenin admired the development of this "proletarian

revolution" in the countryside, but then, realizing that it was not a deepening of the "class struggle", but simply robberies, he liquidated the Kombeds in November 1918, under the brand of eliminating the "dual power" of the Soviets and the Kombeds, transferring their functions to the Soviets. When the civil war began, Lenin again returned to the practice of "kombeds", but without the "kombeds" themselves. Their place was taken by special police troops called CHON (Special Purpose Units). The requisition of surplus agricultural products was now legalized by the state ("surplus appropriation"). The CHON detachments helped the government to carry out this requisition. After industry, large and small, was nationalized, all handicraft production was prohibited, banks were nationalized, the market was closed - in fact, the peasant small farms themselves were also nationalized. A direct "product exchange" was established, but only on paper, since the city could offer nothing to the countryside. Hence the growth of speculation. Speculation, however, was equated with counter-revolution and punished

brutally.

In a word, Lenin established total "war communism". At first

this "communism" was explained by the conditions and needs of the civil war, but the war ended victoriously, and the regime of "war communism" remained completely intact. Moreover, the Bolsheviks did not at all think of voluntarily abandoning the regime of "war communism", which, in their opinion, could be just the desired form of transition to direct communism in the countryside. Today party theorists deny this, but Lenin himself admitted that this was the case. Justifying the inevitability of abandoning the military-communist system and the need for a transition to the New Economic Policy (NEP), Lenin said:

"We made the mistake of deciding to make a direct transition to communist production and distribution. We decided that the peasants would give us the amount of grain we needed, and we would distribute it among the plants and factories - and we would achieve communist production and distribution.

I cannot say that it was in such a definite and vivid way that we drew up such a plan for ourselves, but approximately in this spirit we acted. This, unfortunately, is a fact" (Lenin, Soch. vol. 33, p. 40).

And Lenin, not only a flexible tactician, but also a sober politician, soon saw

that the Tambov uprising of the peasants and the Kronstadt revolution of the sailors could be the beginning of the end of his regime if he did not make a radical turn in economic, primarily in agricultural policy. Hence the NEP was born.

Alien to all dogmas, including Marxist ones, but ready to learn from his own mistakes (Lenin's current epigones made Lenin infallible saints), Lenin recognized the bankruptcy of his policy of a direct transition to communism and drew the appropriate conclusions:

"We must not count on a direct communist transition. We must build on the personal interest of the peasant ... Were we able to do this? No, they couldn't. We thought that production and distribution would be carried out at the communist command... If we tried to solve this problem directly, so to speak, by a frontal attack, then we failed. Such mistakes happen in any war... The frontal attack failed, we will go around, we will act by siege and glanders" (ibid., pp. 46, 47).

This "siege and glanders" was the NEP.

Let's return to Stalin's conversation. Stalin explained the grain crisis by the presence of small individual peasant farms in the country, which do not produce marketable products. Stalin again poses the same question that he posed to the Siberians: where is the way out? His answer is the same: collectivization. It has already been felt in wide circles of the party that Stalin is preparing for a fundamentally new turn in the countryside, which does not follow from Lenin's NEP and from the decisions adopted at recent congresses. It was obvious to everyone that the economic difficulties that have now arisen are the result of the violation of the directives of these congresses in relation to the countryside. This mood in the party was expressed by the Deputy Minister of Finance of the USSR, candidate of the Central Committee Frumkin in his letter to the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee dated June 15, 1928. Frumkin wrote:

installation in relation to the countryside ... We must return to the MU and XU party congresses "(Stalin, Soch. vol. 11, pp. 118, 120).

At the July plenum of the Central Committee of 1928, Stalin already officially, before the Central Committee and the party, outlined his new program for the agrarian revolution, which not only diverged from the line of the 15th Congress, but went much further than the decisions

XU congress. In a speech on July 9, Stalin stated:

1. The moribund classes (peasantry and NEPmen) never voluntarily gave up their positions, therefore "advance towards socialism ... cannot but lead to an inevitable intensification of the class struggle."

I "Extraordinary measures" are necessary under certain conditions and beyond. 3.
There are
no other sources of funding for high rates

industrialization, how to take "something like a "tribute", something like a supertax" from the peasantry, which overpays the state for manufactured goods and receives less for its products.

4. There is no other way out for obtaining marketable grain than the transformation of small peasant farms into collective farms (Stalin, *ibid.*, pp. 159, 172, 181).

Now Stalin's silent struggle against the Bukharin wing in the Politburo was for the first time transferred to the plenum of the Central Committee. Bukharin, in a soft-spoken, principled speech of July 10, rejected Stalin's four theses. Bukharin argued that the current policy was leading to a dangerous disproportion in the national economy. Voroshilov: Give us your recipe. Bukharin: To use Stalin's terminology, it must be said that there was a "threat for a link" between town and countryside, "but Lenin wrote that the main task of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, as well as the party as a whole, is to ensure that these disagreements do not grow to the level serious class differences... Should we straighten out the situation created as a result of grain procurements by granting concessions to the kulak or by weakening the offensive against him? Absolutely not. The problem of the present time is to eliminate the danger of a split with the middle peasantry, which now exists ... In no case should we identify "extraordinary measures" with the decisions of the 15th Congress ... "Addressing the Stalinists, Bukharin continued: Imagine that you are the proletarian power in a petty-bourgeois country, but you are forcibly pushing the peasant into the commune. Voroshilov: Let's say, as in 1918 and 1919. Bukharin: But then you will have an uprising of the muzhik, the petty-bourgeois element led by the kulak will rise up against the proletariat, and as a result of the fierce class struggle the proletarian dictatorship will disappear. Is this what you want?

Stalin: Terrible dream, but merciful God (laughter) ...

Bukharin: Under no circumstances should we return to practice

expanded reproduction of "extraordinary events".

Kosior: That's right.

Lozovsky: But it does not depend on us.

Bukharin: For the most part it still depends on us. Therefore, the center of our policy should be the following: under no circumstances should the bond be threatened. Otherwise, we will not fulfill Lenin's main testament" (from the Verbatim Report of the Plenum of the Central Committee, July 1928, Bukharin's speech, Trotsky's Archive, abbreviated reverse translation from "A Rositeschagu N1 \$ oru o Yo Sottiplezt", ea. Bu V. U. Rate { , pp. 306-308).

From the reaction of the plenum of the Central Committee to Bukharin's speech, Stalin saw that the moderate policy in the countryside, which Bukharin recommended by reference to Lenin's testament, was still very popular in the party. Stalin spoke a second time after Bukharin's speech in order to weaken the unfavorable impression left on him by Bukharin's speech. Stalin complained that "some of the comrades in their speeches ... did not touch upon such serious measures as the development of collective farms and state farms with a single word. How can one "forget" about such serious things as the task of developing collective farms and state farms," Stalin was indignant (Stalin, Soch., vol. 11, p. 190). Stalin did not achieve his goal. A very significant part of the plenum was clearly leaning towards Bukharin. Stalin had to come to terms with the adoption of a clearly anti-Stalinist resolution by the plenum of the Central Committee. The resolution stated that 1) the "extraordinary measures" ("extraordinary measures") were of a temporary nature and did not follow from the decisions of the 15th Congress, 2) the NEP remained in force, and talk of its abolition was counter-revolutionary, and that the struggle against the kulaks must be waged" by no means by means of dispossession" and therefore it is necessary: 1) "immediate elimination of the practice of bypassing courtyards, illegal searches" ... 2) "immediate elimination of all and any recurrences of the surplus appropriation and the destruction of any attempts to close the bazaars" ... 3) to carry out "a certain increase in the price of bread...", 4) "to ensure the timely delivery of manufactured goods to the grain-procurement regions" ("CPSU in Rez.", 1953, Part II, pp. 395-396).

Of course, Stalin did not even think of implementing this resolution. He voted for her solely with the aim of buying time to prepare an offensive against the new enemy in the party - against "right opportunism". Bukharin was, in Stalin's eyes, the ideologist of this new danger. Therefore, the general task of the party apparatus from now on was to

set in motion all the organizational and ideological levers of the Party against the "right danger".

Bukharin had severed personal relations with Stalin long before the plenum and daily expected a new trick on his part. Therefore, in search of allies against Stalin, he turned to those whom he and Stalin so mercilessly smashed yesterday - the Zinovievites. Even during the plenum, Bukharin asked Sokolnikov, a member of the Central Committee, to arrange a meeting for him with Kamenev. It took place on July 11th. There is a record of Kamenev's conversation with Kamenev in Trotsky's archive. Here is what Bukharin told Kamenev about Stalin: "We feel that Stalin's line is disastrous for the entire revolution. The differences between us and Stalin are many times more serious than the differences we had with you. Rykov, Tomsy and I agree on the following: "It would be much better if Zinoviev and Kamenev were in the Politburo instead of Stalin." I spoke quite frankly about this with Rykov and Tomsy. I haven't spoken to Stalin for several weeks now. He is an unprincipled intriguer who subordinates any business to the interests of maintaining his own power. He changes his theories according to who he wants to get rid of. In the "seven" (from the Politburo), our disputes with him reached the point where they tell each other "lie", "you are lying", etc.

e. Now he has made concessions so that he can shut our throats. We understand this, but he maneuvers in such a way as to present us as schismatics. Here is his line at the plenum: 1) capitalism developed through colonies, loans and exploitation of workers. We have neither colonies nor loans, so we must take "tribute" from the peasantry. You understand that this is Preobrazhensky's theory, 2) the more socialism grows, the higher and greater will be the resistance against it ... This is idiotic illiteracy. 3) Since "tribute" must be taken and resistance will grow, we need firm leadership. Self-criticism is not applicable to the leadership (the Politburo), except for those of its members who do not comply with the decisions. But self-criticism (of Stalin) aims at Tomsy and Uglanov.

As a result, we have embarked on the path of creating a police regime. This is not yet "the cuckoo has cuckooed", but it can decide the fate of the revolution. With such a theory, any business can be ruined ... Leningraders are mostly with us, but they get scared when it comes to the possibility of removing Stalin ...

Our potential forces are enormous, but 1) the average members of the Central Committee are still

since they do not understand the depth of disagreements, 2) the fear of a split is great. Therefore, when Stalin yields to us in regard to "extraordinary measures", he makes it difficult for us to attack him. We do not want to be schismatics, in which case they would quickly deal with us. But Tomsy, in his last speech, clearly proved that it was Stalin who was the schismatic" ("A Rositeschagu N13fogu oý Sotilip1\$t", ea. Bu V.U. Rate {, pp. 308-309, from Trotsky's archive, abridged reverse translation) .

Did Stalin find out at the same time about the conversation between Bukharin and Kamenev? It looks like he found out. Otherwise, it would be incomprehensible why Stalin took the measures by virtue of which he forced Bukharin to disavow himself. Some twenty days after the conversation with Kamenev, not only Bukharin, but also Rykov and Tomsy were to sign the following statement drawn up by Stalin addressed to the Comintern: "The undersigned members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party resolutely protest against the spread of any rumors about disagreements among the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" ("CPSU in Res.", 1953, part P, pp. 438-439).

Bukharin and his like-minded people, fearing accusations of plotting a split, signed a clear untruth, thereby helping Stalin and worsening their own position. Moreover, they completely disoriented the party and activists, who sympathized with Bukharin as an unshakable supporter of Lenin's NEP. In addition, with this statement, the Bukharinites assumed moral and political responsibility for the current, still ongoing Stalinist practice of repression, the forcible planting of collective farms, and the restriction of the NEP.

Stalin, meanwhile, began to indoctrinate members of the Central Committee and the Politburo against the Bukharinites. What is worth, for example, such a note that Stalin writes to one member of the Politburo against another member of the Politburo: "Hello, comrade Kuibyshev! ... I heard that Tomsy is going to offend you. He is an evil person and not always clean... I read your report on rationalization. Appropriate report. What else does Tomsy require of you?" (Stalin, Soch., vol. 11, p. 220). This is how the "clean" Stalin sets the still hesitant Kuibyshev against Tomsy.

In September 1928, Bukharin spoke openly against

the new course indicated in the article

"Notes of an Economist" in Pravda (September 30, 1928). It was,

however, a speech without the address of the one against whom it is directed. Since Bukharin, together with his like-minded people, declared that he had no disagreements with Stalin, the article was not understood not only by the party, but even by its activists. Only the Politburo knew what was going on. Meanwhile, the article contained a sharp and well-reasoned criticism of Stalin's voluntarism in economic policy, although the author presented his criticism as criticism of Trotskyism. The main content of the article was as follows:

Economic planning makes mistakes, some of which are inevitable under present conditions, but "even inevitable mistakes are also mistakes"; a gross violation of "fundamental proportions" in the development of the economy is allowed, and the resulting failures are not at all "inevitable mistakes"; even if a good plan is not an all-powerful means, then a bad plan and bad economic maneuvering can all the more ruin a good cause; The main mistakes in the management of the economy are reduced to the violation of the correct proportions between different branches of the national economy, which can result in unpleasant changes in the relations between classes, because the violation of economic proportions can lead to an upset of the political balance in the country. Bukharin also offers his own alternative to the policy of "commodity famine" and crisis violations of economic proportions: in order to achieve the highest level of social reproduction (free from crises), as well as the systematic growth of socialism, therefore, in order to create the most favorable position for the proletariat in its relations with other classes countries, it is necessary to achieve coordination of the main elements of the national economy, to "balance" them, to regulate their interconnection and interaction in such a way that they can best fulfill their promising functions, actively influencing the course of economic life and class struggle. In this way, a favorable balance and balance can be achieved in the national economy. The Trotskyists, in order to ensure a high rate of development of the industry, demanded the maximum pumping out of funds from the peasant economy. The growth of not temporary, but permanent rates of industry, on the contrary, must be based on the rapid growth of agriculture. The rapid growth of the industry, the significant growth of the population, and the growth in the demand of the population have not kept pace with the growth of grain farming. Is

it is not clear that under these conditions neglect of the grain problem is a crime. Isn't it clear that the Trotskyist "solution" of the problem (forcibly pumping agricultural products out of the countryside at the expense of wealthy peasants) will lead us not to an imaginary, but to a real catastrophe?

Stalin's "decision" was, in Bukharin's eyes, a Trotskyist decision, or rather Preobrazhensky's decision or recipe. Anyone who believes, continued Bukharin, that the growth of planned economy gives us the opportunity - as a result of the withering away of the law of value - to do whatever we like, simply did not understand the ABC of economic science ... At the center of all our planned calculations, Bukharin said, should be the constant development of industrialization, but it must not come at the expense of the plundering of the peasantry. There must be economic harmony, when the industry not only grows on the basis of the benefits of agricultural growth, but also

at the same time it helps to industrialize agriculture itself, which will pave the way for the elimination of contradictions between town and country.

Since Stalin did not have any reasonable arguments against this program of Bukharin, he transferred the dispute to another plane and even to another place. Stalin descended from the level of the Politburo to the level of the region. As Bukharin foresaw, Stalin set about destroying the Moscow base of the Bukharinites.

As early as February 1928, in a closed letter from the Central Committee to party organizations, the attention of the party was drawn to the fact that the "right danger" was growing in the party and examples were given of the expulsion of local village communists from the party "for bowing with the fist."

But Stalin's new course was opposed not only in the villages. Stalin said that "if you climb higher, to the county, provincial party organizations, ... then you could easily find here carriers of the right danger" (Stalin, Soch., vol. 11, p. 235).

But the provinces were not so terrible, where the party apparatus, without noise and without any legal elections, removed more or less suspicious party officials, but the capital became terrible, where the head of the Moscow Committee was a Bukharinite, secretary of the Central Committee and candidate of the Politburo Uglanov, and at the head Moscow City Council - another Bukharinite, member of the Central Committee Ukhonov. Before taking on Bukharin and his supporters in the Politburo, it was necessary to besiege and take the Moscow fortress of the Bukharinites. Stalin set about this task not

from above, along the lines of the Central Committee, and from below, along the lines of the Moscow district party organizations. Bypassing the Moscow Committee (MK), the Central Committee began to convene the "assets" of the districts, remove their secretaries of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Krasnopresnensky, Rogozhsko-Simonovsky, Khamovnichesky and other district committees). At the same time, these same "assets" appealed "in the manner of criticism and self-criticism" from below to the Central Committee, demanding to remove their secretaries of the Republic of Kazakhstan and eliminate the mistakes of the MK (3. I. Klyuchev, "Ideological and organizational strengthening of the Communist Party", Moscow, 1970, p. 260) .

When the indignant leaders of the Moscow Committee appeal to the Central Committee with complaints about its obviously illegal appeals to the regions over the head of the Moscow Committee, the imperturbable Stalin answered at the plenum of the Moscow Committee convened by him in October 1928: "I don't know how such discontent can be justified. What could be wrong with the fact that the regional activists of the Moscow organization raised their voice, demanding the liquidation of mistakes and hesitations" from the leaders of the MK? (ibid., pp. 236-237).

What were these errors and hesitations? In Stalin's long speech there is not a word about what these "mistakes and hesitations" of MK were. Only those in the know knew that the leaders of the MK had only one mistake: they supported Bukharin's point of view against Stalin at the July plenum. Of course, starting a fight with Bukharin, Stalin could not tolerate this fortress of the Bukharinites in his rear. Stalin suggested that the Bureau of the Moscow Committee should convene a joint plenum of the Moscow Committee and the IWC, together with the district "active" to discuss the situation that had arisen. Stalin came to the plenum with the entire secretariat of the Central Committee and his own like-minded people from the Politburo. He made a long speech here, in which, for the first time since the crackdown on the "Left deviation," he openly declares that a new deviation, the "Right deviation," has now formed in the Party, and that "the victory of the Right deviation in our Party would mean an increase in the conditions necessary for the restoration of capitalism in our country" (ibid., p. 226). Stalin believes that if

the party will not launch a broad ideological campaign against the right deviation, if it does not crush it in the same way as it crushed the "left deviation", then the revolution is in danger of ruin. He quotes Lenin: "As long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a stronger economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism" (ibid., p. 227). Therefore, Stalin proposes: whoever does not want the restoration of capitalism in the USSR must fight not only for the elimination of the right deviation, but also for

uprooting the roots of capitalism in the country, in other words, it is necessary to liquidate the Leninist NEP and carry out the Stalinist collectivization.

When the speakers posed before Stalin a question that was unpleasant to him under the given conditions: are there rightists in the Central Committee and the Politburo, Stalin replied that "there are elements of a conciliatory attitude towards the right danger in the composition of the Central Committee ...", but "we are not in the Politburo neither the right, nor the "left", nor the conciliators with them" (emphasis mine. - A. A. - ibid., pp. 235-236). Stalin explained that in addition to the "right deviation", there exists in the party, in its middle link, a no less malignant disease - "conciliation" with the right deviation. Stalin accused the MK, headed by Uglanov, of precisely this "conciliationism." At this signal, pre-selected activists from the districts began to cite numerous "facts" about the conciliatory mistakes of Uglanov himself. The speakers demanded that Uglanov come out with self-criticism and admit his mistakes frankly, "in a Bolshevik way." When Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich and others made the same demands, Uglanov realized that they had decided to simply remove him and defiantly left the MK plenum. It was a premature scandal, and it was not included in Stalin's calculations now. Stalin's assistants offered Uglanov a compromise: in the form of "self-criticism", he admits his mistakes, and then the Central Committee leaves him at the head of the Moscow Committee. Uglanov, in the false hope of retaining power, accepted a compromise. He declared that when he fought with Zinoviev, he won because he was right, and now he was beaten because he was wrong (ibid., p. 289).

What is Bukharin and his supporters doing in the Politburo? At the plenum of the Central Committee (November 16-24, 1928), they give Stalin a political mandate to deal with the Rights, that is, with themselves. The resolution on Rykov's report "On the Control Figures of the National Economy for 1928-29" says: "A Right (openly opportunist) deviation is emerging, which finds expression in the desire to slow down the pace and delay the further construction of large-scale industry, in a scornful or negative attitude towards collective farms and state farms, in underestimating and obscuring the class struggle, in particular the struggle against the kulak, in bureaucratic inattention to the needs of the masses, in underestimating the fight against bureaucracy, in underestimating the danger of war, etc. ... The Plenum states that at the present time the main danger in the CPSU is the danger of a right-wing, frankly opportunist deviation" ("CPSU in Res.", 1953, Part II, p.

419).

The points about "ignorance of the needs of the masses" and "underestimation of the fight against bureaucracy" Stalin dragged in here, as he always did, obviously for demagogic purposes. The introduction to this resolution says that it was adopted "unanimously", that is, members of the Politburo Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy, member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and candidate of the Politburo Uglanov, members of the Central Committee and active supporters of Bukharin A. Dogadov voted against themselves for this political death sentence, V. Schmidt, V. Kotov.

Taking advantage of this resolution and the recognition of Uglanov himself that he was a "conciliator" with a right bias, literally two days after the November plenum of the Central Committee - on November 27, 1928, the Central Committee removed the entire leadership of the MK, headed by Uglanov. Bauman was appointed secretary of the Moscow Committee, then Molotov, then L. Kaganovich. The first and most important stronghold of the Right fell without a fight and without glory.

At the same time, Stalin took preventive measures to "siege" the leaders of the right. Each member of the Politburo from among the right was seconded by the decision of the Orgburo of the Central Committee on the "political commissar": to the chairman of the government Rykov - Ordzhonikidze, to the chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions - L. Kaganovich, to Bukharin through Pravda - Savelyev, and through the Comintern - Molotov. "Political commissars" had the right to veto any order and action of these rightists, if these orders and actions were at odds with Stalin's line.

In the midst of an internal struggle in the Politburo, Bukharin published his speech delivered on the day of the fifth anniversary of Lenin's death - January 21, 1929. First published in Pravda, it was later published as a separate pamphlet under the intriguing title: Lenin's Political Testament. Bukharin analyzed Lenin's dying articles. Bukharin quoted precisely against Stalin the following passage from Lenin's article "On Cooperation":

"We are compelled to recognize a radical change in our entire point of view on socialism... Previously, we placed the center of gravity... on the political struggle... Now, however, the center of gravity... is transferred to peaceful organizational "cultural work" (Lenin, 3rd ed., vol. XXUP, pp. 396-397).

Proceeding from this statement by Lenin, Bukharin wrote that in the conditions of the USSR a new "third revolution" cannot and should not exist. Stalin

stood on the diametrically opposite point of view.

After the expulsion of the Trotskyists and Zinovievites and before the emergence of the "right opposition", the leading bodies of the Central Committee consisted (December 1927) of the Politburo - members: Bukharin, Voroshilov, Kalinin, Kuibyshev, Molotov, Rykov, Rudzutak, Stalin, Tomsy.

Candidates: Petrovsky, Uglanov, Andreev, Kirov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Chubar, Kosior.

Organizing Bureau members: Stalin, Molotov, Uglanov, Kosior, Kubyak, Moskvina, Bubnov, Artyukhina, Andreev, Dogadov, Smirnov A.P., Rukhimovich, Sulimov.

Candidates: Lyubov, Mikhailov V. M., Lepse, Chaplin, Schmidt.

Secretariat - members: Stalin (General Secretary), Molotov, Uglanov, Kosior, Kubiak.

Candidates: Moskvina, Bubnov, Artyukhina.

("VKP (6) in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee", 1933, Part II, p. 455).

As has already been pointed out, Stalin did not have a solid majority in any of the highest bodies. In the Politburo, out of nine votes (I count only members), Stalin had three votes - Stalin, Voroshilov, Molotov. Bukharin also had three votes - Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy. Three members - Kalinin,

Rudzutak, Kuibyshev - oscillated between these two groups, leaning at decisive moments now towards Stalin, now towards Bukharin.

In the Orgburo, Stalin had five votes - Stalin, Molotov, Kosior, Andreev, Rukhimovich, Bukharin also had five votes - Uglanov, Dogadov, Smirnov, Sulimov, Kubyak. Three votes - Bubnov, Artyukhina, Moskvina - were "neutral". In the Secretariat, Stalin had a relative but firm majority - Stalin, Molotov, Kosior against two - Uglanov and Kubiak.

Thus, in the highest body of the party, which led all the current work of the party and government - in the Secretariat - Stalin was the master. Before the Politburo and even before the Orgburo, Stalin brought only questions that had been predetermined in the Secretariat for their approval "post factum". Most importantly, Stalin usurped the power of the Orgburo on organizational issues. All questions of the appointment and dismissal of the highest ranks of the party apparatus, economy, army, trade unions, diplomacy, that is, questions of the competence of the Orgburo, were now decided by the Secretariat of the Central Committee. This usurpation of the Orgburo was ultimately a usurpation of the Politburo's power. The Politburo became only a screen for the all-powerful Secretariat. Members of the Politburo often learned the "news" of the Secretariat second hand.

The apparatus of the state - the apparatus of the party and administration - was selected without the knowledge of the Politburo, in full agreement with the new party charter. The charter stated that "the current executive and organizational work is managed by the Secretariat". And who should lead it, if not the Secretariat? After all, the Politburo and the Orgburo meet periodically and consist of persons who are outside the Central Committee, while the Secretariat is a permanent, living and active organ of the Central Committee.

If the Secretariat was Stalin's legal authority, then the apparatus of the Central Committee, selected by Stalin himself as General Secretary, was his powerful weapon in strengthening and maintaining this power. Gradually ousting the old Bolsheviks from the apparatus of the Central Committee, Stalin recreated it anew. Under Lenin, both the Secretariat of the Central Committee and its working apparatus had only technical and executive functions. The people put in charge of the Secretariat and the apparatus had only one task - to monitor the implementation of the decisions of the Politburo, the Organizing Bureau and the Plenums of the Central Committee.

Not a single independent decision not based on the directives of these bodies was taken either by the Secretariat, or even more so by the apparatus of the Central Committee. Therefore, people with a good reputation as "performers" were elected or appointed there. Stalin himself was elected there as such a "executor", though not at Lenin's suggestion, as the Stalinists later claimed, but at the conspiracy of Zinoviev-Kamenev-Stalin against Lenin Trotsky. But, having dealt with Trotsky, and then with Zinoviev and Kamenev, Stalin, preparing for the last showdown with Bukharin, imperceptibly but radically cleared, first of all, the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Bukharinites.

In order not to arouse suspicions among those who were being purged, and Bukharin's - protests, persons released from the apparatus of the Central Committee received large-scale appointments on the Soviet or economic lines. They were "upgraded" for a devastating downgrade.

Thus, by 1929, the reorganization of the apparatus of the Central Committee ended with the creation in the Central Committee itself, as they said then, of an "illegal cabinet of Stalin" (subsequently, this "Stalin's cabinet" received a legal name in party documents - "Comrade Stalin's Secretariat"). In the official resolution of the Central Committee of 1929 on the reorganization of the Central Committee and the apparatus

The Central Committee pointed out that the need to reorganize the Central Committee and the apparatus of local party organizations is caused primarily by the enormous complication of the tasks of party leaders in the conditions of the reconstruction period, especially in

the field of "selection, distribution and training of personnel" ("Party construction", 1930, No. 2). This reorganization apparatus of the Central Committee now had the following departments - the organizational instructor department, the distribution department (personnel department), the department of culture and propaganda, the department of agitation and mass campaigns. Members of the Central Committee devoted to Stalin (Kaganovich, Bauman, Stetsky, Vareikis, D. Bulatov) were placed at the head of the departments.

On the other hand, Stalin's "cabinet" consisted of young fanatics who were not members of the Central Committee. At first, no one attached any importance to these people. They are accustomed to be regarded as Stalin's technical collaborators, as servicemen devoted to their work without any pretense of "big politics". They take minutes at meetings of the Central Committee, give information on a variety of issues, bring tea and sandwiches for those sitting, and sharpen pencils for their boss. With all this, as befits lackeys, even if they are party members, they are outwardly submissive, obedient and cloyingly obliging to any member of the Central Committee:

- Would you like to call your car, Nikolai Ivanovich (Bukharin)?

- At your service, Alexei Ivanovich (Rykov)!

- Would you like a sandwich, Mikhail Pavlovich (Tomsky)?

_ Yes, comrade Stalin (to the owner)!

These were those of whom Stalin made up his "secret cabinet". Here are their names: Tovstukha, Poskrebyshev, Smitten, Yezhov, Bauman, Pospelov, Mekhlis, Malenkov, Peter, Uritsky, Varga, Umansky. Each of them also had an official title. Tovstukha was listed as an "assistant secretary of the Central Committee" (this was a purely technical position like the head of the office - the institute of assistant secretaries also existed in the localities). Poskrebyshev was the assistant to the assistant, that is, Tovstukha, in the accounting and information sector. After the death of Tovstukha, Poskrebyshev was appointed assistant secretary and head of the Special Sector, and Smitten, Poskrebyshev's assistant "in party statistics," took his place. Yezhov was in charge of the personnel sector, Pospelov was in charge of the propaganda sector (assistant to Mekhlis). Malenkov was Poskrebyshev's deputy for the Special Sector and protocol secretary of the Politburo. When Yezhov was transferred to the head of the personnel department of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture (1929), Malenkov was appointed head of the personnel sector.

I have already pointed out that this illegal "Stalin's Cabinet" subsequently received the official-legal name: "Secretariat of Com.

Stalin" (not to be confused with the "Secretariat of the Central Committee"!)). Any big or small issue of domestic and foreign policy, before being discussed at meetings of the leading bodies of the Central Committee, was processed and essentially predetermined in the "Stalin Cabinet", then it was already transferred to the corresponding official departments of the Central Committee, and with additional conclusions of the departments themselves (these conclusions are only officially reproduced the "predecisions" of specialists from the "Stalin Cabinet") the issue was submitted to the decision of the Secretariat, the Orgburo and the Politburo. If major disagreements arose at the meetings of these bodies, which, of course,

it often happened that the controversial issue was referred to existing or periodically created "Commissions of the Politburo". Such commissions, which consisted mainly of members of the Central Committee working outside its apparatus, were entirely dependent on the apparatus of the Central Committee (that is, on the same "Stalin's Cabinet") both in relation to the data for substantiating this or that project, and, most importantly, in relation to its subsequent implementation through the highest party body. It turned out a vicious circle, from which only Stalin, as the General Secretary of the Central Committee, found a way out: sabotage of a decision objectionable to him.

The entire organizational policy of the "Stalin Cabinet" was based on a tried and tested principle, which Stalin proclaimed as the slogan of the party only two years later - "Cadres decide everything!" The future biographer of Stalin, who will have access to the documents of Stalin's "Cabinet", with the greatest amazement will establish the simplest fact that not the Politburo, consisting of old Bolsheviks, but a technical cabinet, consisting of young, outwardly modest, unknown in the party and country, but the most capable performers the will of his master, directed the world and domestic policy of the USSR. And this - by "selection, distribution and training of personnel", since "cadres decide everything."

The "cabinet" selected the "cadres" of the party, the army, the state. The "Cabinet" was primarily a "frame filtering laboratory". The fate and career of a party member of any rank, from the secretary of the local party committee (later to the secretary of the district committee of the party, inclusive) and to the people's commissar of the USSR, depended on the corresponding "sector" of the "Cabinet". But in order to appoint new ones, it was necessary to remove the old ones, if possible without noise and scandals. This was taken care of by the "Special Sector", led by Poskrebyshev. Outwardly, it was not any "special" sector. His existence in the apparatus of the Central Committee,

previously under the name of "secret department", was a self-evident fact. He kept secret documents of the party and government and was, as it were, a simple party safe. When the "Stalin Cabinet" was finally formed, the secret department of the Central Committee simply disappeared in order to appear in the "Cabinet" under a different and even more mysterious name: "Special Sector". Yes, and it existed from now on, indeed, secretly. It was only after Stalin's final victory - after the 17th Party Congress - that his existence was reported.

What were its functions? You will look in vain for an answer to this question in the official party literature. Unofficially, the following was known about him. The "Special Sector" should be an organ of supervision over the tops of the party, the army, the government and, of course, the NKVD itself. To do this, he had his own network of agents and a special sub-sector of "personal affairs" for all nobles without distinction of rank. Stalin, sitting in his office or somewhere on vacation, had constant contact with the behind-the-scenes life of the party and state leaders in Moscow. Even the simple personal correspondence of people from the upper strata was subjected to vigilant censorship by the "special sector" network; an exception was not made for their own like-minded people, exactly as the "black cabinet" of the tsarist secret police or Metternich did. Thus, Stalin knew what his enemy and friend were breathing in his own environment. With the accumulation of "minus points" in the personal file of the nobleman, his fate was already sealed in the "Special Sector". Decided, but didn't decide. For an official decision, there were also official bodies of the Central Committee, depending on the rank of the next victim: if he was a member of the Central Committee, his fate was decided in the Secretariat and rarely in the Orgburo, if he was a high official, but not a member of the Central Committee, then he was simply removed by the appropriate department Central Committee. If

Stalin saw that the matter would not go without scandal, then he handed over part of the materials discrediting this or that high party member or even a member of the Central Committee to the official party court - the Central Control Commission (later the CPC). There were also their "irremovable judges" - Shkiryatov, Yaroslavsky, Solts, Janson, Ordzhonikidze.

So the "Special Sector" freed up places that were immediately filled by the "Sector of Personnel", first Yezhov, and then Malenkov. Is it any wonder, after all this, that people's commissars trembled in front of Tovstukha and Poskrebyshev, while members of the Central Committee crawled in front of Yezhov and Malenkov. And these people were in

list of the apparatus of the Central Committee only by "technical employees" of the Central Committee! "Technology during the period of reconstruction decides everything," Stalin said on another occasion. His own "technique" over the Central Committee in the hands of the Poskrebyshevs and the Malenkovs in Moscow sealed the fate of the party. Not chosen by the party, but appointed by the "Personnel Sector", the secretaries of the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the national communist parties in the field, the iron will for the sole power of the most important "designer" of this entire conspiracy - such was the situation in the party when Stalin moved to "the last and decisive battle" for "Lenin's legacy".

What could Bukharin and his group oppose to him? Very few: academic memorandums addressed to the Central Committee and Platonic incantations in their correctness at its meetings.

From the point of view of "the interests of the country and the interests of the party itself," the Bukharinites appealed both to the mind and to the feeling of the party.

In the interests of seizing all power and establishing a personal dictatorship both over the party and over the country, Stalin appealed to the innermost feelings of party careerists and the organized strength of the party apparatus.

Stalin, who knew his business, was in no hurry to draw conclusions. He gave the opposition the opportunity to speak at closed sessions of the Central Committee; moreover, he deliberately provoked them to speak. Sometimes he artificially created in his opponents the impression of his own impotence ... Or sometimes he completely went into the shadows, behind the scenes, leaving behind him the opportunity to retreat if necessary. But the apparatus acted all the more persistently, the more purposefully. "It's not about Stalin, but about the diabolical apparatus in whose hands he is," Uglanov himself said in the midst of the struggle. Only Stalin could create such an impression of himself among his enemies.

Already during the struggle against Trotsky in alliance with Zinoviev and Kamenev, and then in the struggle against Zinoviev and Kamenev in alliance with Bukharin and Rykov, Stalin had not only elastic tactics, but also a strategy developed in every detail - the elimination of the entire "Leninist guard" old Bolsheviks to create their own party - the party of Stalin. Two steps, two most important and decisive obstacles to this ultimate goal, were relatively easily overcome, and they were overcome mainly not so much with the help of their authority, but with the authority in the party of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky.

Stalin himself contributed to this fateful struggle his combinatorial organizational genius and the amazing instinct of the greatest detective in politics. His unfortunate allies in the fight against Trotsky and Zinoviev were also deprived of that moral and ethical advantage in the political struggle,

which Stalin possessed: absolute freedom from all morality, from any moral feeling. When, before the very eyes of these same allies, in the struggle against the "Left Opposition" (Trotsky) and the "New Opposition" (Zinoviev) Stalin used the methods of the most obvious falsification and deliberate provocation, the Bukharinites only admired the high class of Stalin's ingenuity. With the tacit consent of the Bukharinites, he resorted to the most virtuosic numbers of political drey-fusiad against the organizers of the October Revolution - Trotsky and the Trotskyists - on such a scale and forms that Lenin did not apply even to his political enemies. And he got away with it without a sound of protest from the Bukharinites. Stalin - "that wretched man with yellow eyes," according to the belated testimony of Krestinsky - so hypnotized his allies that they overlooked the internal revolution in the party that Stalin carried out and against them. I'm talking about the party apparatus. We have seen what was being done in the Central Committee of the Party. Even better, even more thoroughly, Stalin worked on creating his own apparatus on the ground - in the regions, territories, national republics. Beginning in 1928, there was no longer a single legally elected secretary of the party organization in the localities, as required by the "charter" of the party and the notorious "intra-party democracy". The old elected secretaries, under one pretext or another, were exempted from party work. Sometimes they were appointed, as I have already said about Moscow, to high administrative, diplomatic, and, mainly, economic positions, just to get rid of them in the party apparatus. In place of the filmed, the "Sector of Personnel" through the legal body of the Central Committee - the organizational instructor department - sent purebred Stalinists. When local party organizations, accustomed to the noise about inner-party democracy and the still nominally valid party charter, began to refuse to accept secretaries "recommended" by Moscow, the Central Committee introduced the practice (contrary to the same charter) of appointing local secretaries from above. In order to conduct them without scandal through local plenums of party committees, the Central Committee now, together with the appointed secretaries, sent to the place

and one of the instructors of the Central Committee. The instructors reported to the plenums that this was "the will of the Leninist Central Committee."

It was hard to argue with such a mighty "will". If, however, dissatisfaction was expressed anywhere about this new practice or against the imposition of a completely unknown person as a leader on this organization, then the "Special Sector" network quickly created a case of an "anti-party group" in such and such an organization, which usually ended with that hunters to make some noise were quickly expelled from the party by the decision of another auxiliary Stalinist organ - the party collegium of the Central Control Commission.

With regard to the selection and appointment of local secretaries, Stalin, as it were, was guided by Machiavelli's wise recipe - not to appoint local people as governors. Prone to "separatism", they can easily change the "sovereign". It is impossible to give them, moreover, to sit too long in the same place, they must often be shuffled. Stalin's organizational practice in the localities adhered to these principles very strictly.

By the end of 1928, this process of restructuring the grass-roots apparatus of the party according to the Stalinist model was also completed. From now on, the main cadres of the secretaries of the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the national communist parties consisted of people passed through the "Special Sector" and appointed by the "Personnel Sector" of the "Stalin Cabinet". In the local apparatuses themselves, starting with the regional committee, the institution of "special sectors" was also introduced under the name "special sectors", which were managed exclusively by persons sent from Moscow by the "Special

sector" and "Personnel sector". Formally, the head of the "special sector" reported to the secretary of the regional committee (the regional committee, the Central Committee of the local party), but in fact he was accountable only to the "Stalin Cabinet". At the disposal of this local "Special Sector" was a special network of "party informants" outside the party committee and a highly qualified staff of workers in the very apparatus of the party committee (from 3 to 10 people) - the head himself, one or two instructors, a cipher clerk, a protocol clerk, a special typist and etc. The "special sector" did not have any rights, and does not have it now. His whole task is to organize truthful and comprehensive information for the "Special Sector" in the Central Committee. The head of the "sector" constantly participates in all meetings of the bureau and the secretariat of the regional committee (regional committee, Central Committee) as a recorder, having with him a "special typist", who is also a stenographer. Directive communication of the Central Committee with the regional committees passes through this "special sector" - encrypted telegrams, secret

directives of the Central Committee come to the "special sector", and he brings them to the attention of the secretary in deciphered form. The secretary of the regional committee himself transmits to Moscow his secret reports, answers, decisions through the same sector. In addition to the usual postal communications and government wires, the "special sector" also has at its disposal a separate "courier service" through the NKVD (MVD), that is, a kind of internal "diplomatic couriers" who deliver to Moscow and from Moscow to the places of the most important party and government documents. These couriers are more inviolable persons than even any minister of the Soviet government. They are provided with personal mandates signed by the Minister of State Security, guaranteeing them not only personal immunity, but also extraordinary rights to any services from the party and Soviet authorities in the performance of their official duties. Such was the technique of organizing the party apparatus of the "Stalin Cabinet" on the eve of the open action of the so-called right opposition in early 1929.

Until mid-1928, the disputes between Stalin and the future rightists were more theoretical than practical.

The details of Bukharin's disagreements with Stalin on the most important issues of big practical politics in the Politburo, even in the circles of members of the Central Committee, were known to very few (on the other hand, the members of the "Stalin's Cabinet" in the person of Yezhov, Malenkov, Poskrebyshev, Pospelov and others not only knew about them, but also took close part in them on the side of Stalin).

Bukharin himself, at Rykov's insistence, refrained from bringing the dispute to the plenum of the PC. Tomsy, on the contrary, was in favor of a decisive denouement or, in any case, the collective resignation of the entire "troika" in order to demonstrate his disagreement with the Stalinist course. But Stal's goal was different - to prepare the party apparatus and party activists for the destruction of his opponents in open battles, presenting them as a new, this time "right opposition". The nickname "opposition" has always been in the history of the CPSU (6) that eternal desired target, against which it was always possible to mobilize both the unscrupulous party mass and the fully versed party careerists. Stalin led the matter towards this, but he led things in his own way, in the Stalinist way, that is, masterfully in the sense of conspiracy and virtuoso in the sense of provocation.

We have already written that by the beginning of 1928 the balance of forces between the Bukharinites and the Stalinists in the Politburo was the same. Under these conditions, there was no need to talk about any opposition within the Politburo or the Orgburo. There were two groups that were identical in strength, but diametrically opposed in their views on the current policy of the party. Such a position in the supreme organs of the party was far from favorable to Stalin. The emerging struggle in these bodies was a struggle between the parties, and not between the opposition and the legitimate majority. Stalin needed at any cost, with the help of any methods, precisely the "opposition", and not the parties. He led the matter towards this, moreover, not only along the line of his secret cabinet within the Central Committee, not only along the line of "ideological indoctrination", not only along the line of "secretary selection" in the lower classes, not only along the line of replacing the Politburo and the Organizing Bureau with the Secretariat of the Central Committee, which he held firmly, but - in his own terminology - "led along the entire front." While this front was passing along the above-mentioned borders, Stalin did not yet have any inner confidence that he would win the last battle on the path to autocracy. Some new reserves had to be found, powerful enough to impress the enemy. These reserves, long planned, selected and prepared (at worst!), were available - the Presidium of the Central Control Commission and the Presidium of the Comintern.

Neither by party rules nor by firmly established tradition were they judges of the Politburo and Orgburo of the Central Committee. On the contrary, since the time of Lenin, the Politburo (again, not according to the charter, but according to the unwritten law of Bolshevism) has been both the highest court and the supreme legislator for everyone. True, on paper, the CPSU (6) modestly called itself a "section of the Comintern", and the Central Control Commission - the guardian of "party unity." But that was only on paper. Now Stalin decided to commit these reserves into battle, and this decision turned out to be the most effective and most intelligent of all his organizational combinations in the fight against the Rights. The reserve of the first line for Stalin was, of course, his own domestic reserve - the Presidium of the Central Control Commission. In the charter

party, adopted at the 15th Congress (1925), it was said:

"The main task entrusted to the Central Control Commission is to safeguard Party unity and strengthen the ranks of the Party, for which the Central Control Commission assigned:

1. Assistance to the Central Committee of the AUCP (6) in strengthening the proletarian composition of the party ...
2. Struggle against violations by party members of the program, charter of the AUCP (6) and decisions of congresses.
3. Resolute struggle against all kinds of anti-Party groups and against the manifestation of factionalism within the Party, as well as preventing and helping to eliminate squabbles ...
4. The fight against non-communist offenses: economic fouling, moral licentiousness, etc.
5. Combating bureaucratic perversions of the party apparatus and bringing to justice persons who impede the implementation of the principle of inner-party democracy in the practice of party bodies "(" VKP (6) in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee ", Moscow, Partizdat, 1933, part P, p. 223).

The main points of the charter - 1, 3, 5 - directly and directly related to the practice of Stalin and his secret cabinet within the Central Committee, but it was precisely on these points that Stalin introduced his first reserve - the Central Control Commission - into the party battle. True, at first he did not use the entire composition of the Central Control Commission, since out of 195 of its members elected at the 15th Congress, at least half consisted of the people of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy, and not even the entire composition of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission (21 people), which also included Bukharinites. Stalin used only its selective head - the leaders of the Central Control Commission. In doing so, Stalin did not formally violate the rules of the party.

Recall that the charter stated: the Presidium of the Central Control Commission delegates three members and three candidates to the Politburo, and five members and five candidates from the Presidium to the Orgburo to participate in meetings of these higher bodies with an advisory vote. Subsequently, at the 15th Congress, the prudent Stalin introduced very inconspicuous but important changes to this clause of the Party Rules. Namely: the Presidium of the Central Control Commission delegates to the Politburo not three, but four of its members and four candidates with broader rights. The cardinal significance of the new changes was that, by expanding the composition of the delegation of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission to

The Politburo and canceling the old clause of the charter on this score, the Stalinists deliberately did not stipulate (as it was in the old charter) that the delegation of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission enjoys the "right of an advisory vote." This was the first change. The second change, outwardly also hardly noticeable, but in essence just as important, consisted in the following: in the old rules, the Presidium of the Central Control Commission was the only supreme governing body of the Central Control Commission between its plenums. As such, he directed both the Secretariat and the Party Collegium of the Central Control Commission. The Party Collegium (5 members and 2 candidates) actually represented the highest party court, but dependent and subordinate to the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, in which, as indicated, almost half were Bukharinites. Now Stalin made the party collegium independent of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, and its decisions were categorical.

The decisive significance of these changes for Stalin was later reflected in his struggle with Bukharin. To complete the picture, I will add that a completely new clause was also included in the Rules: "Party members who refuse to answer truthfully the questions of control commissions are subject to immediate expulsion from the Party" ("VKP(6b) in resolutions...", Part II, p. 451).

Sergo Ordzhonikidze headed the Presidium of the Central Control Commission. At the head of the highest and now "independent" court of the party were Em. Yaroslavsky, Shkiryatov, Solts, Zemlyachka, Janson. The permanent delegation of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission to the Politburo were the same persons - Ordzhonikidze, Yaroslavsky, Shkiryatov and Solts. Now, when, after the July and November plenums of the Central Committee (1928) and the fighting within the Politburo connected with these plenums, Stalin became convinced that there really was no "opposition" in the Politburo, but equal forces fighting among themselves, he brought his first reserve into battle.

Motivated by the fact that the Politburo does not have a firm majority on the most important issues of current politics, Stalin proposed that the Central Committee introduce joint meetings of the Politburo and the obviously Stalinist Presidium of the Central Control Commission into practice.

What measures did Bukharin's group take against such an open "organizational encirclement" (Bukharin's expression) by Stalin? If we do not talk about the ill-fated conversation between Bukharin and Kamenev, then it seems that none. And this despite the presence of an equal position in the Politburo, despite the sympathy and support - some openly, others

supposedly solid groups in the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, despite the sympathy and support of the entire apparatus of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Central Committee of the unions, despite the well-known

positions in the Red Army, despite the activity and support of the leading groups of party theorists and propagandists, despite, finally, the sympathy and possible support of the main population of the country - the peasantry. All objective factors spoke for Bukharin. But, alas, all the same, one factor was missing, which Lenin called the "subjective factor": the organization of sacrificial revolutionaries. Bukharin was too much of a theoretician for that, Rykov was a pedant, and Tomsy was one warrior in the field. The leaders of the right opposition were deathly afraid of violating the legality of the party framework, which Stalin broke so mercilessly, right in front of their own eyes. They were afraid of accusations of factionalism, while in their presence Stalin created his own faction - "a party within a party." The leaders of the right opposition were afraid of appealing over the heads of Stalin and his apparatus to the masses of the party, and Stalin, in incessant letters and instructions, not only appealed over the heads of the Politburo and the Orgburo to the masses of the party, but without the slightest hesitation smashed and smashed its local elected leaders in order to replace them appointed from Moscow.

Stalin did not have the objective factors of Bukharin, but he did have that same Leninist "subjective factor" - a dynamic organization of well-trained businessmen, capable of adventurism, unscrupulous in methods, greedy for power. Their strength lay in the fact that, in the interests of the struggle for power, they were ready to do more than Bukharin and Trotsky put together: to desecrate the mausoleum of Lenin, and to anathematize Marx and Engels, if only their victory depended on it. Anyone who does not understand this knows the Stalinists only from books.

Such was the situation within the party when the first denouement came. It began with Bukharin's famous statement of January 30, 1929.

Unfortunately, this most important program document of our Right Opposition was never published in the USSR. Abroad, as far as I know, he also did not get. Reading this document was forbidden by Stalin even for members of the CPSU (b). Only the leading party activists, who, according to the logic of the Stalinists, had already developed sufficient pro-Stalin immunity against "anti-party heresies", could get acquainted with him in the appendix "materials" to the verbatim report of the April joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the CPSU (b) (April 16-23

1929). Moreover. Even the decision of this plenum on the Bukharin group was kept secret until 1933. Only in 1933 was it published as the decision of the joint meeting of the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, as well as the decision of the said plenum on the case of the Rights, of course, again without Bukharin's statement of January 30 and the "platform of three" of February 9, 1929. To what extent these documents are also incomplete and obviously "cleaned up" after the fact, they show the omissions of all more or less striking quotations from Bukharin's statement. But even in this form, these documents help reproduce Bukharin's statement.

The main goal of Bukharin's statement of January 30 is the personality of Stalin, and of the leading bodies of the Central Committee - only the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Prudently fencing off criticism from the Politburo, Orgburo, and plenum of the Central Committee, Bukharin openly and with reference to data from the current practice of the Central Committee apparatus accused

Stalin is essentially in a conspiracy against the party line.

Bukharin's accusations boiled down mainly to the following points:

1. Stalin's peasant policy is based on the slogan proclaimed by him at the July plenum of the Central Committee "tribute, that is, the military feudal exploitation of the peasantry." Stalin's goal - based on the methodical, state-legalized robbery of the main class of the country - the peasantry, to head for industrialization. Stalin strives for this goal in two ways: one way - forced collectivization, the other - "tax retaxation".

2. Contrary to the repeated decisions of the party to stimulate the development of the peasant economy and raise its productivity through incentive measures, Stalin resorted to completely opposite measures: to the practice of introducing a new "war communism" in the countryside by applying extraordinary administrative repressions on grain procurements (the indiscriminate confiscation of peasant bread in case of refusal to the same time to produce consumer goods for the countryside, as required by previous decisions of the party).

3. In the whole policy of the country in general, in peasant politics in particular, "congresses, conferences, plenums, the Politburo of the party decide one thing, and the Stalinist apparatus carries out another."

1. In internal party politics in general, in the organizational policy of the party, in particular, "congresses, conferences, plenums of the Central Committee and the charter

the parties set the same norms, and the Stalinist apparatus adheres to its own norms. All this led to the fact that "intra-party democracy has become a fiction, and the appointment of party secretaries from above - the law." Therefore, "there are no elected secretaries in the party, but there are party officials appointed and replaced by the Stalinist apparatus." The purpose of this selection of secretaries is to create a Stalinist faction of selected officials in order to blow up the Leninist party from within ("a party within a party" or, in Bukharin's phrase: "secretary selection").

4. The same process of bureaucratization of the party was transferred by the Stalinists to the sphere of the state apparatus. The role of the Soviets has been reduced to that of an accessory mechanism of the party apparatus. Moreover, the bureaucratization of the state apparatus is carried out according to the same plan as the bureaucratization of the party. All this "bureaucratic degeneration" of the proletarian state and the Leninist party is not proceeding spontaneously, but in an organized manner according to the methodologically developed plan of the "Stalin Cabinet".

5: Where Stalin and the Stalinists fail to seize and paralyze the state, party or trade union apparatus with the bureaucratic pincers of their own faction, Stalin and his assistants resort to the systematic and calculated method of "organizational encirclement" - to the appointment of "political commissars" there (VTsSPS - Kaganovich, Council of People's Commissars - Ordzhonikidze, Pravda - Savelyev and Manuilsky, etc.). Moreover, this is not done by the decision of the party (plenum of the Central Committee, Politburo, Orgburo), but by the decision of their own "Stalin's Cabinet" with formal registration at meetings of the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

Me: The Stalinists are pursuing the same organizational policy of bureaucratization and selection of officials along the lines of the Comintern. At the heart of the selection

workers and leaders of the latter are not based on the Leninist principles of nominating professional revolutionaries, but on the Stalinist plan for the selection of hired officials. Devoted party cadres of the Comintern are expelled from the fraternal parties if they display independence in judgment and independence in work. Not persuasion, not upbringing, but a policy of diktat - that is the style of Stalin's work in the Comintern. If foreign communists dare to criticize the personal orders of the Stalinist apparatus, then they are immediately declared "oppositionists" or "conciliators", "social democrats" or "degenerates" and are expelled from the party not through their own parties, but through the Comintern in Moscow (Thalheimer, Brandler)

or, if their exclusions are connected with major troubles for Stalin personally, then they are simply recalled from their country to Moscow as "conciliators" (Ewert, Gerhardt).

8. If all this is being done by methods "normal for the Stalinist apparatus", then the other path, which Stalin now took, cannot be tolerated in any party of political like-minded people: this path is the path of monstrous provocation, falsification, extortion, blackmail of some leaders and members of the Central Committee against others, but all together against the organizational principles and ideological foundations of Leninism. Behind the back of the party and its higher organs, Stalin is pursuing a policy of liquidating the Leninist party. This "Stalinist regime in our party is no longer bearable."

The only way to improve the health of the party and restore Lenin's policy is to immediately remove Stalin with his entire "cabinet" in full accordance with Lenin's will.

Such was the main outline of the content of Bukharin's statement of January 30, 1929. That this is so, the reader can also be convinced by comparing my presentation of this statement with Stalin's documents on Bukharin ("VKP (b) in resolutions ...", 1924-1932, Ch. P, pp. 514-530).

Bukharin's statement was addressed to the next plenum of the Central Committee. The last plenum was in November, the next plenum was scheduled for the end of January. But Stalin suddenly canceled the plenum, and Bukharin's statement was submitted for consideration by the joint session of the Politburo and the delegation of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission. The calculation was very simple: after giving the members of the delegation of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission (four people - all Stalinists: Ordzhonikidze, Yaroslavsky, Shkiryatov and Solts) the right to vote, the balance of power in the Politburo changed dramatically in favor of Stalin - 7 against 3, even if Kalinin, Kuibyshev and Rudzutak will still be "conciliators". And this calculation justified itself: at a meeting on February 9, the seven organized against Bukharin, and of the three "conciliators", the already previously trained Kuibyshev joined the seven. Bukharin's letter was declared the "platform" of all three right-wing opposition leaders (Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky) and a slander against Stalin and the party (Stalin was first identified with the party). The meeting decided not to bring Bukharin's statement to the attention of the plenum of the Central Committee, and to forbid Bukharin himself to make such a statement at the plenum. Then Bukharin and Tomsky announced a second time that they

immediately leave their posts in order to retain the right to present their accusations against the Stalinist leadership at the plenum. Rykov refused to join this statement. This somehow cooled Bukharin, but Tomsky began to attack Stalin all the more sharply, accusing his friend Rykov of inconsistency as well. Tomsky was supported by the candidate

members of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee Uglanov.

Taking advantage of the resulting confusion among the leaders of the right opposition themselves, Stalin's troika (Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov) began to "strike while the iron is hot" - she made a proposal:

"1. Recognize Bukharin's criticism of the Central Committee as untenable. (By discrediting the line of the Central Committee and for this purpose using all sorts of gossip against the Central Committee, Comrade Bukharin vacillates in the direction of working out a new line).

2. Propose to Comrade Bukharin to dissociate himself from the line of Comrade Frumkin in the field of domestic policy, from the line of Comrade Humbert-Droz in the field of foreign policy. politicians.

3. Reject the resignation TT. Bukharin and Tomsy.

4. Offer Comrade Tomsy to loyally carry out all the decisions of the party and its Central Committee" ("VKP(b) in resolutions...", 1933, Part P, p. 529).

Stalin diplomatically bypassed the name of Rykov. The Bukharin "troika" turned out to be a "two", and Uglanov was not taken into account at all. Things were clearly moving towards an internal collapse of the opposition, since Rykov and on Rykov's side had many supporters in the most right-wing opposition, both in the Central Committee and in the middle levels of party and Soviet bodies. Then Bukharin, Tomsy and Uglanov, in an ultimatum form, offered Rykov to sign the previously prepared draft "statement of three members of the Politburo", which was initially taken back.

The ultimatum was sharp: either with Stalin or with us. Rykov, with a heavy heart, signed the general indictment against Stalin. Thus was born the statement of the "three" of February 9, which Stalin called the "platform of the right." Its content boiled down to the statement of 30 January. The new statement was attached to the minutes of the joint meeting of the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission and was intended for the archive. Since it was submitted towards the end of the meeting, Stalin tried to ignore it altogether. The rightists demanded the immediate convocation of a plenum to discuss their statement. Stalin promised, but did not convene.

He withstood the fight in the Politburo - it was necessary to prepare for the fight at the plenum. This needed more time.

The main thing was to qualify the criticism of Stalin by the Bukharin group as criticism of the Central Committee, and not just Stalin and the Stalinist apparatus. It was necessary to present in the eyes of the members of the plenum of the Central Committee Bukharin's criticism and revelations of Stalin's organizational practices as slander based on "all sorts of gossip." This was done in the lengthy resolution of the joint meeting. Since Stalin was convinced that no matter how he dragged out the convocation of the plenum of the Central Committee, the Bukharinites were determined to convey their views this time to the members of the Central Committee, Stalin, in a special "appeal to the plenum", attached to the same resolution, decided to explain to the plenum why he concealed from the Party and its Central Committee the presence of two hostile groups in the Politburo, when three months ago (at the October plenum of the Moscow Committee) he solemnly declared: "In our Politburo there are neither leftists nor rightists, nor conciliators with them." Now Stalin justified himself by saying that disagreements, it is true, did exist, but they turned out to be temporary and "therefore, the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission did not consider it necessary to report to the plenum of the Central Committee about the disagreements that had already been exhausted ..." or in the same place: "this is

circumstance made it possible to oblige all members of the Politburo to declare in their speeches at the plenum and outside it that there were no disagreements within the Politburo ... "(VKP (b) in resolutions ... ", p. 529).

In other words, Stalin twice deceived his Central Committee: the first time - the July plenum, the second time - the November plenum of the Central Committee (1928), closed Bukharin's mouth, and he himself declared that "everything is in order in the Politburo."

Another month and a half passed before Stalin bothered to convene a plenum of the Central Committee. The plenum was convened only on April 16 and lasted until April 23. Thus, five months have passed since the November plenum (and the statutes required the convening of the plenum, as I already wrote, at least once every two months). Stalin decided to convene it only after all the "preparatory" work had been completed. This preparation was carried out, as the reader saw, not only by public and collective "studying" of the Rights at party assets and in the press, but also by secret and individual recruitment against Bukharin of members of the Central Committee, the Central Control Commission and the leaders of the army.

It should be noted that in the Central Committee, and especially in the Central Control Commission, there was a fairly large group of members who had not yet formally revealed their attitude towards either Bukharin or Stalin. The political philosophy of this group was

is simple: "live yourself - let someone else live" or "my hut is on the edge - I don't know anything." Accustomed to the comfortable atmosphere of the new regime, they lived on a percentage of the old capital - on cutting the coupons of the "old Bolsheviks".

Their former enthusiasm and idealism have long since disappeared in the soft down jackets of Soviet apartments. From the revolution they got everything that the most desperate of them could crave: the right to rule over a vast empire as members of its legislative body. Everything else directly and directly depended on it. For this power - imposing in its external brilliance and valuable in its internal content - they were ready to hold on at any cost, even at the cost of sacrificing their own former ideals. In a word, these were people who are called in political language "swamp". In such a "swamp" Stalin knew how to swim superbly.

The heart of the "bog", of course, was impressed by Bukharin, but the sober instinct of party mammals told him that he had to hold on to Stalin. Otherwise, there is only one block from Red Square to Lubyanka. Too ominous were the memories of the Trotskyists. This "swamp" saved Stalin at the April plenum of the Central Committee. At this plenum, the Bukharinites for the first time made a thorough criticism of the Stalinist group on all the main questions of international and domestic politics. The criticism was built in the spirit of Bukharin's statement of 30 January and the statement of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky of 9 February. Personal attacks against Stalin were softened, especially by Rykov, but not the edge of the criticism itself. It was precisely in general criticism that Bukharin accused Stalin ... of "Trotskyism"! Such an accusation touched Stalin so deeply that he exclaimed with sincere indignation:

"And this is said by the same Bukharin who ... recently was a student of Trotsky, yesterday he was looking for a bloc with the Trotskyists against the Leninists and ran to them from the back porch! Well, isn't that funny, comrades?" (Stalin, Questions of Leninism, p. 253).

I want to make one small but important digression here. The statement of January 30 was a bombshell for Stalin. If it explodes in the meeting room of the plenum of the Central Committee, then it can blow off the head of more than one Stalin.

A possible explosion had to be prevented by any means, or at least delayed until the final concreting of one's own position. Stalin went on the defensive and persistently sought ways to compromise. The psychological gain of such a "defensive tactic" was obvious.

"Bukharin declared war, I propose peace, for even a bad peace is better than a good war," Stalin said, for the information of those who continued to consider him, Stalin, the main aggressor. But Stalin's "defensive tactics" were aggressive through and through. Under the veil of the party "peacemaker" hid the insidious plans of the eternal aggressor. So, immediately after Bukharin delivered his statement addressed to the plenum of the Central Committee, Stalin hastily creates a "Politburo Commission", which works out, apparently not without the participation of Stalin himself, the conditions for "compromise and peace in the Politburo." On February 7, this commission brings to the attention of the "sides" - the two "troikas" (Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov and Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy) its conditions for a "compromise". This document sheds light both on the dramatic nature of events and on Stalin's skill as a party tactician. Whether the Bukharinites accept the proposed compromise or not, in both cases Stalin remained the victor. In changing the alignment of forces in the Politburo and at the plenum of the Central Committee, the commission's proposals were to play a decisive role, which happened later. Having allowed this document to fulfill its purpose, Stalin later closed it in the iron safe of the Politburo. Only 20 years later, that is, in 1949, it was first published. Here is its content:

"From the exchange of opinions in the commission it became clear that:

1. Bukharin recognizes negotiations with Kamenev.

I Bukharin admits that the approval of his "statement" of January 30

1929 that the Central Committee is in fact pursuing a policy of "military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry", that the Central Committee is corrupting the Comintern and instilling bureaucracy in the party - all these assertions were made by him in the heat of polemic, that he no longer supports these assertions and considers that he has no differences with the Central Committee on these issues.

3. Bukharin recognizes on this basis that friendly work in the Politburo is possible and necessary. 4. Bukharin refuses to resign both along the lines of Pravda and

along the lines of the Comintern.

5. In view of this, Bukharin withdraws his statement of January 30.

Based on the foregoing, the Commission considers it possible not to issue to a joint meeting of the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, his draft resolution with a political assessment of Bukharin's mistakes and proposes

joint meeting of the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission to withdraw from use all available documents (transcripts of speeches, etc.).

The Commission invites the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission to ensure

Bukharin all the conditions that are necessary for his normal work as executive editor of Pravda and secretary of the ECCI" (Stalin, Soch., vol. 12, pp. 6-7).

The acceptance of such a "compromise" meant for the Bukharin group an open capitulation to Stalin and an admission that they were wrong in criticizing Stalin's policy and the Stalinist apparatus; the rejection of this "compromise" meant a demonstration of their aggressiveness against the "peace-loving Stalin", especially since Stalin offered "friendly work in the Politburo" and "normal conditions for Bukharin's work in Pravda and the Comintern".

Bukharin figured out the plan of a direct strike and rejected the "compromise". But he did not guess Stalin's roundabout blow. And Stalin took advantage of this classically. Stating the refusal of the Bukharinites to accept a "compromise", to "reconcile", Stalin cynically asked at the April plenum of the Central Committee:

"Why did the comrades from the Bukharin opposition, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, not agree to accept the compromise of the Politburo commission proposed by them on February 7 of this year? Isn't it a fact that this compromise gave Bukharin's group a perfectly acceptable way out of the impasse into which it had driven itself?... in order to eliminate the acuteness of the intra-Party situation and create an atmosphere of unanimous and friendly work in the Politburo? (ibid., pp. 6-7).

Having sharpened the question in this way, Stalin cited one quotation from Lenin's general discourses "on opportunism", then made a significant pause and, prefaced by an almost lyrical overture to the victorious march, answered his own question himself:

"Yes, comrades, one must be able to look reality straight in the eye, no matter how unpleasant it may be. God forbid (!) if we contract the disease of fear of the truth... And the truth in this case is that we do not actually have one common line. There is one line, the party line, the revolutionary, Leninist line. But along with this there is another line, the line of the Bukharin group, which is waging a struggle against the line of the Party by way of anti-Party declarations, by way of resignations, by way of slandering the Party, by means of disguised underminings against the Party... This second line is the line

opportunistic" (ibid., p. 9).

All the blows against the apparatus of the Central Committee, all the blows against his own, not imaginary, but real "undermining and slandering", all the criticism that concerned his own person as secretary of the Central Committee, Stalin met outwardly obscure, but internally very finely calculated, stoic calmness. He even made a reservation at the very beginning of his speech: "I will not touch upon the personal moment, although the personal moment in the speeches of some comrades from Bukharin's group played a rather impressive role. I won't touch on it, since a personal moment is a trifle ... "(emphasis mine. - A. A. - ibid., p. 1).

Bukharin says that Stalin is Genghis Khan of the party, and Stalin replies that this is a trifle. Bukharin says that Stalin is a conspirator against his own party, and Stalin replies that this is a trifle. Bukharin says that Stalin is a falsifier, Stalin replies that this is a trifle ... Stalin does not want to defend Stalin. Stalin is a trifle. Stalin wants to defend Lenin and the Leninist party, while Bukharin wants to lead him into the direction of "personal issues." "They want to replace politics with politicking. But this focus

will not work for them, "Stalin answers.

Such an emphatic disregard for one's own person, the absence of the slightest attempt at personal rehabilitation, a contemptuous and magnanimous attitude to "little things" and at the same time a hot, convincing and logically quite consistent "defense of Lenin and Leninism" from an ideological attempt on the part of Bukharin - all this itself creates a political alibi for Stalin in the eyes of the Central Committee. Stalin doesn't need more.

Stalin did not limit himself to accusing Bukharin of opportunism, of anti-Leninist theory. He reminded Bukharin of his "betrayal" in 1918, when, in connection with the conclusion of a separate Brest Peace with the Germans, he led the opponents of this peace, the so-called Left Communists...

"Bukharin spoke here about the absence of collective leadership in the Central Committee ... It should be noted that this is not the first time Bukharin has violated the elementary requirements of loyalty and collective leadership in relation to the Central Committee of the Party. The history of our party knows examples when Bukharin, during the period of the Brest Peace, under Lenin, remaining in the minority, on the question of peace, ran to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries ..., tried to conclude a bloc with them against Lenin and

Central Committee. What he was conspiring with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries then, we, unfortunately, still do not know "(emphasis mine. - A. A. - ibid., pp. 100-101. - The last phrase "still unknown", in all likelihood, is a later falsification - an insertion into Stalin's speech in order to retroactively show Stalin's "brilliant" instinct regarding Bukharin's "betrayal" in 1918 RE

If Stalin really said - "it is not yet known!", then this was not a polemical trick of Stalin's oratory, but an ominous reminder of the fate of the "Left SRs", and the "Left SRs" were shot.

Politically, Stalin did away with Bukharin, he decided to disavow him as a party theoretician as well. Stalin cited an excerpt from Lenin's Testament about Bukharin. This excerpt from Lenin said:

"As for the young members of the Central Committee, I would like to say a few words about Bukharin and Pyatakov. These, in my opinion, are the most outstanding forces (of the youngest forces), and with regard to them one should keep in mind the following: Bukharin is not only the most valuable and prominent theoretician of the Party, he is also legitimately considered the favorite of the entire Party, but his theoretical views are very great. doubt can be attributed to completely Marxist, because there is something scholastic in him (he never studied and, I think, never fully understood dialectics) "(Stalin, Soch. vol. 12, p. 69).

Stalin emphasized the last words and triumphed: "So, Bukharin is a scholastic theorist, a theoretician without dialectics, and dialectics is the soul of Marxism!"

Thus, Stalin turned the "case of Stalin" into "the case of the Bukharin group." Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsky were actively supported only by a small group of members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission (Uglanov, Mikhailov, Kotov, Ugarov, Rozit, Kulikov, Stan). "Swamp" reluctantly followed Stalin. The regional, regional and republican secretaries of the party appointed and dismissed personally by Stalin and his "cabinet" demanded, as before, the immediate expulsion of Bukharin and Tomsky from the Politburo. Stalin

again takes the pious posture of the "peacemaker":

"Some comrades," Stalin declares, "insist on the immediate expulsion of Bukharin and Tomsy from the Politburo. I do not agree with these comrades. In my opinion, we can do without such an extreme measure at the present time" (Stalin, Works, vol. 12, p. 107).

The Plenum decides:

"1. Remove Bukharin and Tomsy from their posts, warning them that in the event of the slightest attempt to disobey the decisions of the Central Committee, the Central Committee will be forced to remove them from the Politburo.

2. Do not publish the decisions and resolutions on the Bukharin group, informing them only of the party organizations" ("VKP(b) in resolutions...", pp. 520-521).

Stalin, angrily scolding Rykov for violating "collegiality" in government leadership and even for having his own Bukharin line against the party line, nevertheless did not demand Rykov's punishment. Moreover, Stalin appointed Rykov as the main speaker for the five-year plan for the XY, which opened on the same day! conference of the CPSU (b).

Rykov cooled off again. The more confident Stalin worked. The first victory over the Bukharin group had to be organizationally consolidated, and in order to do this, it was necessary to remove potential Bukharinites from the party and from the leading posts of the army. Stalin called for a "general purge of the party", with a direct order that it be completed by XY! party congress (there were then 1,500,000 members in the party).

The same party conference on the report of Em. Yaroslavsky adopted a corresponding resolution. The purge was to be carried out by the apparatus of the Central Control Commission under the direction of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The purge resolution explicitly stated:

"The ongoing verification and purge of the ranks of the Party should thus make the Party more homogeneous ... The purge must mercilessly throw out from the ranks of the Party all elements alien to it ... and supporters of anti-Party groups ... regardless of faces ..." ("VKP(b) in res., pp. 566-567).

The conference ended on April 29th. On the same day, the first plenum of the Central Committee was held to approve the decisions of the conference. The plenum approved them with only one amendment: Uglanov was removed from the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and Bauman, head of the village department of the Moscow Committee, was appointed in his place. Kubiak went over to the side of Stalin through the "swamp". The secretariat of the Central Committee has now become purely Stalinist.

Bukharin's days in the Politburo were numbered. Super-cautious in such matters, Stalin, however, was in no hurry. Seven months had passed since the April plenum and four months after Bukharin's expulsion from the Comintern, before Stalin decided to convene another plenum of the Central Committee. Finally, in November 1929, a new plenum of the Central Committee was convened. The plenary discussed two main issues:

1. On the collectivization of agriculture.

and: On the Bukharin group.

On the first issue, it was decided to speed up collectivization and to intensify the "attack on the kulaks." I note right away that there has not yet been any talk of "complete collectivization" and "liquidation of the kulaks as a class" on its basis. The resolution on the second question, published for the first time only in 1933, read: "Having heard the statement of Comrades. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy of November 12, 1929, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks establishes the following facts:

1. The authors of the statement, throwing accusations against the April plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission that he allegedly put them in an "unequal position", thereby achieve from the party the "right" to oppose themselves to the Politburo, as an equal side, to freely negotiate with the party, that is, they seek legalization factional grouping of Right deviators, whose leaders they are.

Comrades Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy, who are now forced - after the shameful failure of all their predictions - to acknowledge the indisputable successes of the Party and hypocritically declare in their statement about the "removal of differences", at the same time refuse to admit the fallacy of their views set forth in their platform of 30 January and February 9, 1929 and condemned by the April plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission as incompatible with the general "party line."

3% Throwing demagogic accusations against the Party of non-fulfillment of the plan in the field of wages and agriculture and asserting that the emergency measures "pushed" the middle peasants in the direction of the kulak, the leaders of the Right deviators (Comrades Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy) are thereby preparing a new attack on the Party and its Central Committee.

4. Statement vols. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy fundamentally disagrees with the resolution of the Tenth Plenum of the ECCI, which condemned Comrade Bukharin's views as opportunist and removed him from the ECCI Presidium.

Proceeding from these facts, the Plenum of the Central Committee is compelled to qualify the new document, Comrades. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy of November 12 as a factional document, as a factional maneuver of political bankrupts...

Rejecting in view of this the statement of vols. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy as a document hostile to the party, and based on the decisions of the Tenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on Comrade Bukharin, the Plenum of the Central Committee decides:

1. Tov. Bukharin, as a skirmisher and leader of right-wing deviators, should be removed from the Politburo;

2; Warn tt. Rykov and Tomsy, as well as Ugarov, that in the event of the slightest attempt on their part to continue the struggle against the line and decisions of the Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the party will not hesitate to apply appropriate organizational measures to them ("All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (6b) in resolutions .. .", Moscow, Partizdat, 1933, pp. 611-612).

This resolution was drafted by Stalin himself, but announced by Molotov on behalf of the "commission" on the Bukharin case (Stalin, Soch. vol. 12, p. 389).

In addition to what is said in this resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee, in party literature or opposition publications, no trace has been preserved of this last joint statement by Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy of November 12, 1929. However, even a cursory analysis of this plenum resolution

makes it possible to establish the following two important facts:

1. The Right continued to stand on the point of view of their statement of January 30 and the "platform" of February 9, 1929.

The Rightists demanded "equality of rights" (Stalinists and Bukharinites).

As for the resolution's reference to the fact that the Rights, speaking of the "removal" of certain differences, conceived a tactical maneuver, here the truth was probably on Stalin's side.

The rightists took into account the experience with the "lefts", which they carried out together with Stalin. After all, it was the right-wingers - Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky - on the initiative of Stalin, who did not allow the leaders of the united opposition, Trotsky and Zinoviev, to turn to the 16th Party Congress, excluding them from the party some month before the opening of the congress (December 1927). The rest, led by Kamenev, were expelled from the party by the congress itself, if only because their leaders were already listed as "enemies of the party." They wanted to apply the same Stalin-Molotov-Kaganovich procedure, which had fully justified itself, to the Rightists themselves. The Rights, on the other hand, did not want to give an external reason for this. Therefore, no. abandoning their programmatic views, they maneuvered tactically. They were obliged to do this by the most serious disagreements that existed among the lower masses of the right about tactics.

This maneuver, however, failed. Bukharin was removed from the Politburo. Rykov, Tomsky and Ugarov were warned in writing, while others were verbally warned.

The fact that Stalin-Molotov-Kaganovich still did not dare, having an obvious opportunity, to remove Rykov and Tomsky from the Politburo at the same time, showed their uncertainty in the final victory. Even more scandalous, and in the history of Bolshevism and simply unheard of, was another fact: Stalin Molotov-Kaganovich hid not only from the country, but also from their own party, the platform of the right opposition. And in this, from the point of view of their own interests, the Stalinists were right. If, following the example of the former oppositions in the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - under Lenin and after him ("left opposition", "new opposition") - the Stalinists had allowed the platform of the right to become public, then the whole country would have been convinced that:

1. The right is against carrying out predatory industrialization at the expense of the living standard of the working class.

- th. The rightists are against the implementation of feudal collectivization for the "military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry."

- . The rightists are against participation in international adventures at the expense of the vital interests of the peoples of Russia.

Trotsky's program, regardless of the subjective intentions of its author, looked like a program opposite to Bukharin's, and the Stalinists willingly allowed it to be published, and even to be freely discussed at party meetings. Trotsky lived in the yesterday of the revolution and in the depths of his soul was an anti-NEP man, and Russia, having become NEP, was going to take one more step - to become capitalist. This is where Trotsky got in the way. It was here that Trotsky broke not with Stalin, but with the country. Therefore, just as Lenin killed the internal counter-revolution with NEP, Stalin, on behalf of the same NEP, buried Trotsky, publishing his own platform for the attention of the whole country. Apply

so with the platform of people who wrote on their banners the magic slogan of the spirit of NEP Russia - "enrich yourself!", the Stalinists could not. That is why they did not dare to publish the Bukharin program. On the other hand, the entire press of the country shouted: the Bukharinites want to restore in Russia the old tsarist system of capitalists and landlords! At the same time, members of the Politburo Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy, who read this press, like the whole country, kept absolute "silence", and "silence", as they say, is a sign of consent. They are silent - that means they are seriously "restorers" - this is how ordinary people could argue. How was he to know that the mouths of the Rightists were artificially closed.

If in the program the Bukharinites used the advantage correctly

understood the spirit of NEP Russia, then in tactics, if it is understood not only as the art of passive maneuvering, but also as a weapon of sudden sabotage and decisive action at the turn of history, the Bukharinites were inferior to the Trotskyists. Trotsky and the Trotskyists were resolute, sacrificial and courageous people who were not afraid to appeal to the streets (demonstrations on November 7, 1927), but their "appeal" was not "consonant with the era", and therefore they lost. The Bukharinites were in "contact with the epoch," but they were no less than Stalin afraid of the same people, to whom it was necessary to "appeal." Stalin was right when he christened them with a new nickname - "opportunists". But, alas, it was "opportunism" for the benefit of Stalin himself.

After the withdrawal of Bukharin from the Politburo and warning the rest, the question of further tactics in relation to the Stalinists again became acute. Either complete capitulation, or the transition to active action, -

the Stalinists did not allow any other alternative. Stalin also agreed to convene a party congress only with the complete capitulation of the right. Stalin went even further in his demands. If earlier it was possible to express - in writing or orally - at meetings of the Central Committee views that differed from the views of the Stalinists on current policy, now even such an action was considered incompatible with the demand of the party. Moreover, any member of the party - from a member of the Central Committee to an ordinary communist - who did not publicly stigmatize the "right opportunists" - Bukharinites, was automatically included in the new category of "enemies of the party" - "conciliators". Stalin-Molotov Kaganovich deprived party members even of the advantage enjoyed by the leaders of the right - the right of "silence". The 1.5 million members of the party had to publicly condemn the "platform" of the Rights, which they had never seen, in exactly the same way that, according to Silone, the members of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern did in relation to Trotsky.

This is not enough. It was necessary to "reveal and expose" "opportunists in practice" everywhere and everywhere, as the party directive from the pages of Pravda and Izvestia read on the eve of the KhUT congress.

And this is not enough. Closed and open party directives demanded that "hidden opportunists" be "mercilessly exposed and exposed" who verbally agree with the Party, formally even carry out its guidelines, but remain "opportunists" in their hearts and keep a "stone in their bosoms." Such was the general atmosphere in the party towards the end of 1929.

It was not easy to choose tactics in such an atmosphere that would guarantee success, especially the tactics of active action, especially since the Stalinists, by skillful maneuvering, on the one hand, and moral and political repression, on the other, achieved the first open split in the leadership

right. Members of the Central Committee Mikhailov, Kotov, Uglanov and Kulikov at the same plenum filed an application "about a break with the Rights." The political "capitalist" Stalin very skillfully used this "capital":

On November 18, 1929, Pravda (No. 268) published statements by these four most prominent members of the Central Committee about their complete capitulation to Stalin and about their resolute condemnation of their program, previously shared with Bukharin.

Rykov, Tomsy, and Ugarov declared to the plenum that, while holding to their views, they were subject to the decision of the majority. Bukharin alone challenged Stalin - he declared that he did not recognize the decision of the plenum of the Central Committee and would not calm down until he brought his views to the attention of the entire party. But such a course of action Bukharin condemned together with Stalin and Rykov. Rykov, and to some extent Tomsy, believed that the tactics of "waiting inaction" should be continued in the future. It seems that not Stalin, but Rykov and Tomsy convinced Bukharin of the need to submit an application to the Politburo of November 25, 1929, on submission to the decision of the Stalinist majority of the PC.

On top of all this, at the end of 1929 the Stalinists began mass publication of anti-Bukharin literature, for which they had been secretly preparing since the middle of 1928. Manuscripts of such books had long been lying ready-made in the portfolio of the "Stalin's Cabinet", but were delayed until the organizational defeat of Bukharin. Now Bukharin was politically "exposed", organizationally defeated, but he had not yet been theoretically disqualified in the eyes of the party. The new "works of red professors", however, the same former students of Bukharin himself, were to complete the task of destroying all the glory of the "theoretician and favorite of the party." Such were the collection of articles Against the Right Danger and Conciliation (Moscow, Leningrad, 1929); V. Sorin: "On the disagreements between Bukharin and Lenin. A Brief Essay for Young Party Members (Moscow-Leningrad, 1930); "Falsified Lenin" ("Notes to the book 'Economics in Transition'") ("Leninsky Collection", vol. XG, 1929), etc. e. True, the Stalinists did not achieve anything by publishing a falsified Lenin. It was precisely from these "notes" by Lenin on Bukharin's book written in 1920, that is, a year before the New Economic Policy, that the party learned how highly Lenin valued Bukharin as a theoretician.

Among Lenin's numerous "correct", "good", "excellent", in the margins of Bukharin's book there were several critical remarks of Lenin. Thus, where Bukharin wrote: "Finance capital has destroyed the anarchy of production within the large capitalist countries," Lenin, emphasizing the word "destroyed," writes "not destroyed" on the side.

This view of the organization of modern "financial capitalism" was established by Bukharin even before the revolution; Bukharin defended it against Lenin at the UP party congress (1919) in his report on the party program; he did not reject it even under Stalin. But now Stalin elevated theoretical views to the level of criminal crimes and therefore forced the dead Lenin to fight against the living Bukharin. But here Lenin did Stalin a disservice. It only seemed strange that in releasing Lenin onto the stage, Stalin did not turn off, with all the other falsifications, Lenin's general conclusion about the book: Lenin congratulated the Komakademiya on "the brilliant work of one of its members" (see the titled "Lenin Collection", vol. X). Apparently, the old "damned disease - carelessness and rotten objectivism" (Stalin), from which Stalin himself was finally cured only after Yezhovshchina, when he began to prepare falsified editions not only of Lenin's, but even of his own old works (such is 4 th edition of the works of Lenin and the 1st edition of the works of Stalin, not to mention

scandalous "Short course of the history of the CPSU (6b)").

The Rights repented not so much of their mistakes as of their murderous frivolity when they formed a bloc with Stalin.

In order to understand Stalin well, one had to commit several crimes with him. But as soon as Stalin's allies began to repent of their oversight, it was always too late. Lenin realized that he had made a mistake by agreeing to the appointment of Stalin as the general secretary of the party; he repented of it and wrote a "Testament" about its removal, but it turned out to be too late - Stalin, the motor of the "troika", did not even allow Lenin's "Testament" to reach the XII Congress to which it was addressed.

Trotsky realized that he had made a mistake when, succumbing to Stalin's flattery and compliments (see his "My Life"), he did not demand that the KhP Congress carry out this will of Lenin, but, on the contrary, voted for the abandonment of Stalin, contrary to Lenin. Trotsky wanted to correct this mistake after HP

Congress, but it was already too late: Stalin managed to condemn Trotsky even before the 13th congress. The members of the "troika" - Zinoviev and Kamenev - took a leading part in this condemnation, but very soon, looking closer to Stalin, they realized that they had made a fatal mistake, repented of it and wanted to correct it at the XNUMXth Congress, but it was already too late: Stalin managed to convene a party congress that condemned Zinoviev and Kamenev themselves and the only delegation that supported them, the Leningrad one. Therefore, the "united bloc" of Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev in 1926 turned out to be a belated attempt to correct the irreparable. Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy and the first secretary of the Moscow Regional Party Committee Uglanov took a leading part in exposing and destroying the "new opposition" of Zinoviev and Kamenev, the "united opposition" of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, but when, looking closer at Stalin, they realized that they made a mistake no less fatal than the Zinovievites did in their time with respect to the Trotskyists, then Bukharin ran to the now retired Kamenev (July 1928) to conclude a "bloc", but it was already too late: by this time Stalin had a monopoly on the apparatus of power only in the center, but also in the field. Therefore, the condemnation of the "Right Opposition" and the declaration of its views "incompatible with belonging to the party" (April plenum of the Central Committee of 1929) for Stalin was only a matter of organizational and technical formality. That is why the November plenum of the Central Committee of the same year expelled Bukharin from the Politburo so easily (Rykov and Tomsy were expelled in 1930).

T

In the era of Stalin, even the criterion of truth changed. Truth has become "dialectical" through and through: what was true yesterday may turn out to be a lie today; that today is a lie, tomorrow it may turn back into the truth. Hegel had "everything that exists is true, everything true is true". It was possible to get to Stalin, and having made your way, to stay in his entourage, if you are the owner of this Hegelian truth, plus one more unpopular, but also purely "dialectical" quality: to love Stalin more than truth.

These are the laws of Stalin's "dialectics" that the Stalinists finally mastered precisely during the struggle against the "right opposition" of Bukharin in 1928-1930. They also learned another rule of Stalin, which he taught them at the KhP Congress: "In politics, you can't overdo it, but you can't undersalt it either!" The students undoubtedly "overdid it" when they demanded that Bukharin be immediately expelled from the Central Committee, who, in the eyes of the broad masses of the Party, was still

"a legitimate favorite and the most valuable and the greatest theoretician of the party," as Lenin attested to him in his "Testament." Such a one cannot be immediately thrown away without harming himself - such a one must be brought to hopeless despair by a correct and exhausting siege, and there he himself will surrender and raise his hands. Then you can put into his mouth such a terrible confession of a great sinner that now even you yourself will not dare to forgive him for his sins under the cries of the indignant party crowd: no pity - brand a traitor, burn a heretic!

Stalin managed to create such an atmosphere around the right-wing leaders only at the 15th Party Congress (1930). One by one, Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy come to the rostrum of the congress and repent of the mistakes they did not commit, of the crimes they did not commit. More than that, they sing praises to the "brilliant Stalin" and his no less "brilliant policy" (by the way, Zinoviev and Kamenev do the same thing at the congress). They now consider the policy that they once proposed to the party to be disastrous for the country, they recognize their criticism of Stalin's line and practice as right-wing opportunist, treacherous, they declare themselves the ideologists of the restoration of capitalism in the USSR! It is hard to imagine a deeper fall for people who have gone through three revolutions, more than once looked death in the face in search of social truth, and Stalin was considered the highest and most immoral concentration of all social abominations than this public, humiliating self-flagellation.

Now, not fearless fighters who last year at the February, April and November plenums of the Central Committee mercilessly smashed Stalin, but political suicide bombers, who, in fact, ask only for a "worthy funeral," are speaking before the congress. "You are the victors, we have disarmed, we are capitulators, be indulgent, let us live the remaining days without storms and upheavals" - this is what comes through from their speeches. How did the Stalinists respond to these dying words of political corpses? It is enough to cite the speech of one of them - Bukharin's former friend and minister in Rykov's office - Mikoyan. Mikoyan disappointed everyone who reasoned in a philistine way - "they don't beat the lying!" The very concept of "pity" causes in this former priest some kind of painful reaction of ruthlessness against his own past - "love your neighbor." Therefore, he begins his speech by declaring the leitmotif of his sense of justice as a judge: "Defending the general line

party, you can't be guided by pity" ("XV [Congress of the CPSU (b.). Verbatim report", 1931, p. 256).

As for the repentant leaders of the former "Right Opposition" at this congress, Mikoyan thinks that they were not beaten enough, they should be beaten again and again and harder, because the Party and the Right Opposition are "two camps, two lines, two paths."

Since Bukharin was outside the Politburo, the fate of Tomsy was a foregone conclusion, and Rykov still remained both in the Politburo and as chairman of the government, the Stalinist apparatus especially concentrated its fire on Rykov.

On the eve of the XV] Congress, the apparatus of the Central Committee sent Rykov to the Ural Party Conference with a report on the work of the Central Committee. Rykov conscientiously carried out the assignment, praised the Central Committee, its "general line", and, as expected, lifted the "great leader Stalin" to the skies, but after all this, he was asked a question from the presidium of the conference: Tell me, how do you feel about

"general line" of the party? Dumbfounded by this question, Rykov only proved how little he still knew Stalin. Rykov not only did not understand the question, but he did not understand why he was sent to this conference. This is clear from Rykov's answer itself. Here is his answer:

"I am the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (Council of Ministers of the USSR. - A. A.), a member of the Politburo, and if, after my statement that I voted for resolutions, I participated in the drafting of some of them, neither I nor anyone the other did not contribute, if after seven months (since the right capitulated. - A. A.) of my political, economic and Soviet work on the implementation of the general line, after the elimination of disagreements, a person comes and asks me - how do you feel about the general line ? - then I can only say one thing in response: I absolutely do not understand what grounds there are for such questions "(ibid., p. 264.).

The Stalinist congress explained to Rykov his bewilderment and told him how it was necessary to answer this question. Rykov had to state briefly and clearly: We, the Rights, wanted "the death of the revolution and the victory of capitalism."

But now Rykov, and Bukharin, and Tomsy understood what was required of them - they again and again publicly repented, disarmed, knelt before Stalin. It seemed that it was difficult to find a person at this congress who would doubt the sincerity of the capitulation.

Bukharinites, who would not have felt the whole tragedy of the fall of these yesterday's leaders, who would not have forgiven them yesterday's mistakes for the depth of today's fall. But it only seemed. The congress was not satisfied with the self-flagellation of the Bukharinites! A person who does not whip himself to death cannot be considered sincere. The behavior of the Bukharinites at the congress was considered a performance of "suicide" in order to achieve certain goals.

That is why one of Stalin's squires, Mikoyan, warns the congress directly in a directive tone: "After listening to the three former leaders of the right opposition, the congress cannot be satisfied with their statement ... The congress has every reason not to trust these comrades!" ("KhUT congress of the CPSU (b). Verbatim report", 1931, p. 256).

And so they did. At the end of 1930, Rykov was removed, and Molotov became the head of the government.

Yes, it seems that the congress did not demand a performance, but a genuine, not only political, but also physical suicide ... But it soon became clear that even such a suicide - in desperation from false accusations - the Stalinists do not recognize as proof of innocence. Thus, when Tomsy, in response to false accusations, actually committed suicide in August 1936, the Politburo issued a brief communiqué stating that Tomsy had committed suicide entangled in his anti-Party connections!

Thus, by the beginning of the thirties, Stalin had done away with the most popular among the people, and therefore the most dangerous opposition for him - with the "right opposition". In a long and difficult struggle on the path to autocracy, Stalin is helped not only by his faithful comrades-in-arms (Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Mikoyan), not only by the "hierarchy of party secretaries" devoted to him, not only by his personal qualities of a patient combinator in tactics and the most cunning master of power in strategy - but also absolute carelessness, unluckiness, naivety in the policy of his

rivals. It may be objected - how is this so, can such experienced revolutionaries as Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov be considered unlucky, naive politicians?

If politics is not only the art of the possible, but also the art of the proper on the way to power, then the greatness or insignificance of politicians must be measured by only one scale: how much the given politician succeeded in the struggle for power. As an orator of the October Revolution and

the organizer of the civil war, Trotsky is a world-class figure, and Stalin is a provincial, but as the organizer of the apparatus of power and its ruler, on the contrary, Stalin is a giant, and Trotsky is an amateur.

As a theoretician of orthodox Marxism, Bukharin is a first-class mind, and Stalin is a primitive handicraftsman; but as a pragmatic emperor and political exploiter of Marxism, Bukharin is a child, and Stalin is a criminal unique.

To fully comprehend the drama of inner-party events and the psychology of their leading representatives, it is not enough to be a historian of the CPSU.

There are also situations in these events, which eventually led to the establishment of Stalin's tyranny, in which a conscientious chronicler can only helplessly capitulate before the sphinx of Stalin's rivals' ill-luck. It is clear that every word of Stalin, every tactical step he takes hits one point - the point of power - just as vague are the ideas of his rivals about their goals, interests, prospects. Nine-tenths of his own tasks Stalin solves them with anti-Stalinist hands.

It was generally accepted to consider Stalin a "gray beast" in the leadership of the Bolshevik Party and a man of "mediocre abilities" in politics. At best, Stalin was recognized as a "serviceable executor" of someone else's will. This is how Trotsky paints him. People used to see him like that under Lenin, and they continued to think of him like that even after Lenin. But Stalin turned out to be a sphinx even for his closest friends and former associates. Lenin's death was necessary for the "sphinx" to begin to take shape. The Stalinists have their own special understanding of politics, tactics and strategy. Yes, and they considered their party and still consider it a party of a special, "new" type. In order to fully understand and boldly maneuver in the darkest labyrinths of this specific "new politics", one had to possess one indispensable quality: freedom from the old politics. Stalin, of course, also knew the "old politics", but he knew only "mediocre", and this was also his greatest advantage: he was less ill with the "childhood disease" of naivety in politics. He was free from all moral and ethical conventions in the political game. Trotsky did not recognize Stalin as a party theorist either. In Marxism, as a political doctrine of the communists, he was considered a complete ignoramus. And that was also an advantage.

Stalin. He was free from the dogmatic fetters of Marxist orthodoxy. "There is dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism. I stand on the point of view of the latter," Stalin said at the UT Party Congress, on the eve of the October Revolution.

In the "new politics" and "party of a new type" Stalin did not recognize either the romance of historical memories or the laws of historical succession.

veins. Attributing to Trotsky his own intentions for the future (which he quite often resorted to in other conditions and on another occasion), saying that Trotsky allegedly wants to debunk "old Bolshevism" in order to delete Lenin from history in order to assert his own greatness, Stalin himself was internally free from servility even in relation to Lenin. In the "new politics" Stalin steered towards the "recent". His words on this subject are very characteristic: "It is possible that some of the clergymen will not like such a manner. But what do I care? In general, I am not a fan of clergymen ... (Stalin, Works. vol. 12, p. 114). Therefore, Stalin also recognizes the "old Bolsheviks" insofar as they are capable of becoming "new". Here are other very characteristic words of his, uttered at the same April plenum:

"If we are called old Bolsheviks only because we are old, then our deeds are bad, comrades. Old Bolsheviks are respected not because they are old, but because they are at the same time eternally "new"" (ibid., pp. 1-2).

Making a small digression, I must immediately note a well-known fact: Stalin, of course, recognized and rewarded clergymen, but those who bowed their knees only to him alone. And, having come to power, he proved that he placed himself above Lenin both as a theoretician and as a political leader. Here is an extremely vivid illustration of this. In the "Philosophical Dictionary" of 1952, published under the editorship of P. Yudin, there is an indirect comparison of Stalin with Lenin. About Lenin it says: "Lenin is the greatest theoretician and leader of the international proletariat." The same dictionary says about Stalin: "Stalin is a brilliant theoretician and leader of the international proletariat." Lenin is only "the greatest", and Stalin is "brilliant"!

It must be said that such an internal freedom of Stalin from Lenin's norms, traditions and "respect for rank" in relation to Lenin was also Stalin's strongest side as a "new politician".

Finally, Stalin was ignorant of theoretical matters and could not be considered a theoretician in the sense of the old Bolshevik understanding of "theory".

As paradoxical as it may sound, weakness in theory was also Stalin's strength, like a "new type" of politics. Not being in the dogmatic tentacles of Marx and Lenin and not bothering himself with the puzzling wisdom of the "scientific socialism" of the future, in which he did not believe, Stalin remained on the ground of reality. In the same reality, "socialism" did not mean an end, but a means to an end - to power - at any cost and with the help of any methods.

The difference between him and Lenin was also significant. Lenin came to power in the struggle against classes hostile to the party. Stalin, on the other hand, sought and achieved it in the struggle against his own party. However, the same Lenin taught, which Stalin deeply believed, that getting power is half the battle, the most important and most difficult task is to stay in power. For the successful solution of this problem, Lenin saw only one way: political isolation, and then the physical destruction of classes hostile to the party. Stalin completely transferred this teaching of Lenin to his own party - he could gain power relatively easily, but he could keep it only according to the same Leninist principle: by political isolation and physical destruction of persons and groups hostile to him in the Bolshevik party. So far, Stalin was busy seizing power.

In order to destroy the Leninist guard under Lenin, it was necessary first to destroy Lenin himself. In this guard there was only one person capable of this - Stalin. This, too, was his exclusive advantage.

All that was Stalin's advantage was lacking for Bukharin. The Stalinists were right when they saw Stalin's "genius" in all this. It remains to be added that this is precisely the "creative" character of Stalinist Marxism, as well as the secret of the all-conquering mastery of Stalinist dialectics. Terror did not yet play a decisive role in this Stalinist dialectic of the first years of the struggle against the opposition. The decisive role was played by Stalin's extraordinary ability to say the right word at the right time, and having said it, to recklessly proceed to the implementation of a practical plan, even if such a course of action contradicted all the dogmas and concepts that were still considered "sacred". In doing so, he acted

an accurate account of the psychology of a completely new party elite rushing onto the stage. This character trait makes Stalin related to the character of his historical idol - Napoleon.

"I ended the war in the Vendée," said the latter, "when I became a Catholic. My entry into Egypt was facilitated by the fact that I declared myself a Mohammedan, and I won the Italian priests to my side by becoming an Ultramontane. If I ruled over the Jewish people, I would have ordered the rebuilding of Solomon's Temple."

Stalin was not a theoretician like Bukharin. This was also his greatest advantage as a leader of the "new type".

French philosopher and politician, later minister Jules Simon testifies:

"Two months before his omnipotence, Louis Napoleon was nothing. Victor Hugo has risen to the podium (Meeting of 1848), but has no success... The rare and powerful genius of Edgard Quinet does not help either... Political meetings are the places where the brilliance of genius has the least success. Here, only those eloquence that suits the time and place, and those services that are rendered to the party, and not to the fatherland, are considered. For Lamartine in 1848 and Thiers in 1871 to be recognized, their decisive importance as a driving force was needed. When the danger passed, gratitude disappeared along with fear.

Quoting the above words of Simon, the famous French sociologist Le Bon writes:

"There are intelligent and educated leaders, however, this harms them, as a rule, more than it benefits. The intelligence that recognizes the connection of all things, helps to understand and explain them, becomes malleable and significantly reduces the strength and power in conviction, which is necessary for the apostle. The great leaders of all times, in fact the leaders of all revolutions, were limited people and therefore had great influence. The speeches of the most famous among them, Robespierre, often surprise with their incoherence. When one reads them, one does not find a satisfactory explanation for the monstrous role of the all-powerful dictator" (Te Bop, RsusBo] ode eg Mazzep, Ea dagE, ACrea Kroner Uepad, 1951, 5.169).

So they will write about Stalin in tens of years, not finding any

speeches, nor in his "brilliant works" not only a spark of genius, but even the necessary dose of simple intelligence. And yet this man

mastered to the last screw the gigantic state machine, in the legislative body of which there were so many contenders for the post of Lenin. I cited all those "subjective factors" that made Stalin, in my opinion, the driver of this car. I must now add to them, running somewhat ahead, and one "objective factor" of the greatest importance. The same Lebon speaks of a similar factor in politics. True, while stating the phenomenon of the order I want to talk about, Le Bon does not explain it. However, the statements of Taine and Spuhler, which he cites in connection with this, are strikingly reminiscent of the picture of the Bolshevik party parliament of the time I am describing - the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission (ibid., pp. 171, 172, 173, 174).

"The history of the revolution shows," writes Le Bon, "to what extent meetings can be subject to artificial influence, which is completely contrary to their advantages. It was an unheard of sacrifice for the nobility to give up their privileges, and yet it happened on that famous night of the Constituent Assembly. Giving up their immunity meant a constant threat of death for the members of the Convention, and yet they did so, and were not afraid to point at each other, although they knew for sure that the scaffold, to which their colleagues were brought today, they themselves faced tomorrow. But since they have reached that degree of automatism of which I spoke, nothing can keep them from falling under the influence that guides them.

"They approve and decree what they despise," Tan says, "not only stupid things, but also crimes, killing innocents, killing friends. With one accord and with the liveliest approval, the Left and the Right jointly send Danton, their natural supreme leader, to the scaffold. Unanimously and with the greatest approval, the Left and the Right jointly vote for the most villainous decrees of the revolutionary government. Unanimously and with cries of admiration and enthusiasm, with passionate demonstrations for d'Herbois, Canton, Robespierre, the Convention protects the government of murderers, although its party of the center hates for murders, and despises the Mountain, since its ranks suffered through it. Center and Mountain, minority and majority, end up plotting their own suicide. On the 22nd Prairial the whole Convention surrendered; On 8 Thermidor, within the first quarter of an hour after Robespierre's speech, he surrendered once more."

Here is a description of the 1848 meeting by Spuler: "Disputes, jealousies and

discontent, which is replaced by blind trust and endless hopes, has led the Republican Party to its doom. Her unluckyness can be compared to her distrust against everyone. No sense of legitimacy, no sense of order, just fear and illusion without limits. Her carelessness competes with her impatience. Her savagery is as great as her obedience. This is a feature of immature temperament and lack of education. Nothing surprises her, everything confuses her. Trembling, cowardly and at the same time unfailingly heroic, she will rush into the fire, but will bounce before the shadow. Actions and relations of things are unknown to her. Just as quickly discouraged as it is heated, it is subject to all horrors; and triumphant to the heavens or frightened to death, it has neither the necessary boundaries nor the appropriate measure. Fluid than water, it reproduces all colors and perceives any form.

The many times made analogies of the events of the French Revolution with the events of the Russian Revolution do not hit the target as well as the episodes just cited. Look at the lists of the three compositions of the Russian revolutionary convention - the Central Committee and the PKK:

1. after the victory of Zinoviev-Bukharin-Stalin over Trotsky in 1924 (XIII Congress),

2. after the victory of Bukharin-Rykov-Stalin over Zinoviev in 1925 (XV Congress) and

5 after Stalin's victory over Bukharin in 1930 (XVIII congress).

Each subsequent composition of the Bolshevik convention sends to the political scaffold the leading tribunes of the October Revolution from the previous composition: Zinoviev-Stalin-Bukharin - Trotsky and the Trotskyists; Bukharin-Stalin-Rykov - Zinoviev and the Zinovievites; Stalin and the "old Bolsheviks" - Bukharin and the Bukharinites; Stalin and the Stalinists - "Old Bolsheviks". Then Stalin brings them all together in one place - at the Lubyanka, in order to eliminate them physically there. Russian Marats and Dantons, Saint-Justs and Robespierres, "Girondins" and "Highlanders" with a kind of fatal doom repeated the acts of the French drama in order to perpetuate the nightmarish regime of the French September on Russian soil after mutual extermination slaughter. The logical line of the Russian October was that

same.

What Lenin nurtured in an embryo, Stalin raised as a monster. The contours of the future Stalinist tyranny became clear only after

political liquidation of the Bukharinites. Spiritual prostration, physical exhaustion, animal fear - this is the face of the party in those days. In desperation from the oppressive, overwhelming, omnipresent fear, this party is henceforth becoming in the hands of Stalin and the Stalinists the silent weapon of such a universal inquisition, examples of which history has not known before and will hardly know in the future. Like animals before an earthquake, people foresee trouble: a mania of fear takes possession of the whole country. The well-known Soviet playwright Afinogenov, himself a communist who was killed during the war, wrote a play on this topic in 1930, which was called "Fear". Then it was staged at the Moscow Art Academic Theater (MKhAT).

Its main character, Professor Borodin, speaking from the department of the institute with a report, defines the significance of fear in the behavior of Soviet citizens in this way: "My report is coming to an end. You saw in the examples with rabbits that behavior is based on appropriate stimuli - stimuli. When we manage to detect a stimulus, we can act on it to change behavior. By analogy with this, having found the dominant stimulus of the social environment, we can predict the path of development of social behavior. The hour will come when science will begin to supplant politics. We decided to bring all possible assistance to our country and analyze what incentives underlie the behavior of modern man. Together with party comrades, we conducted an objective examination of several hundred individuals of various social strata. I will not talk about the ways and methods of this survey - those who are interested will look into the materials ... I will only say that fear is a common stimulus for the behavior of eighty percent of all surveyed. (Voice from the audience: "What?") Borodin continues: "Fear! Works by Gerdike, Watson, Lashley, and others indicate that the unconditioned fear-producing stimulus is

loud sound or loss of support. Eighty percent of all respondents live under the eternal fear of shouting or losing social support. The milkmaid fears the confiscation of the cow; the peasant - forced collectivization, the Soviet worker - continuous purges; the party worker is afraid of accusations of deviation; scientific worker - accusations of idealism; equipment worker - accusations of sabotage.

We live in an era of great fear. Fear makes talented intellectuals renounce their mothers, forge a social origin

nie... Fear follows a person. A person becomes distrustful, withdrawn, unscrupulous, slovenly and unprincipled... Fear gives rise to absenteeism, train delays, production breakthroughs, general poverty and hunger. No one does anything without being shouted at, without being blacklisted, without the threat of imprisonment or deportation.

The rabbit, which saw the boa constrictor, is unable to move - his muscles are numb, he meekly waits for the boa rings to squeeze and crush him. We are all rabbits! Is it possible to work creatively after that? Of course no!

The remaining twenty percent of those surveyed are working nominees. They have nothing to fear. They are the masters of the country! They enter institutions with a proud face, clattering their boots, laughing and talking loudly. But their brain is afraid for them... The brain of people of physical labor is frightened by excessive loading; persecution mania develops. They always strive to catch up and overtake. And, suffocating in a continuous race, the brain goes crazy or slowly degrades.

Destroy fear, destroy everything that gives rise to fear, and you will see what a rich creative life the country will flourish! Let me end with this."

Through the mouth of his literary hero, the writer Afinogenov stated the truth of Soviet life in 1930, the year in which the slogan "beat, beat and beat!" was proclaimed at the KhUT congress. However, when you think about that monstrous terror that unfolded by the middle and end of the thirties, about this atmosphere that then reigned, about those heroes - eminent and nameless - who then acted, you come to the conclusion: a historian can describe this era, but to understand it, you need Dante, Shakespeare and Dostoevsky in one person!

Chapter 30

CONCLUSION: THE DEATH OF THE CC

After the defeat of the "Right Opposition", the Central Committee recognized Stalin as the sole leader of the party. Celebration of his fiftieth birthday (21

December 1929) was produced with such pomp, with which Roman victors or Byzantine emperors were once honored. At the same time, the notorious formula appeared: "Stalin is Lenin today." Mistaking these enthusiastic praises addressed to him for the Central Committee's relinquishment of its sovereignty, Stalin ventured a step that even Lenin never allowed himself. Six days after the anniversary celebrations - without the knowledge of not only the Central Committee, but also the Politburo - Stalin announced on December 27, 1929 a new

revolution from above: violent "complete collectivization and liquidation of the kulaks as a class." Although this sole decision of Stalin was retroactively approved in the resolution of the Central Committee of January 5, but at the same time Stalin was given to understand that he was not endowed with the prerogatives of sole power. Moreover, when the mass anti-collective farm uprisings began, the Central Committee forced Stalin, firstly, to write an article ("Dizzy with Success"), in which he, in essence, was forced to recognize as erroneous his position (in a speech of December 27) on immediate forcible collectivization (now he wrote: "collective farms must not be planted by force"), and secondly, in a new article ("Reply to fellow collective farmers") openly disqualify himself as a candidate for dictatorship. Here is the relevant passage from Stalin's second article: "Some think that the article 'Dizzy with Success' represents the result of Stalin's personal initiative. This, of course, is nonsense. We do not have a Central Committee for this reason, to allow in such a matter the personal initiative of anyone. This was deep intelligence of the Central Committee. And when the depth and dimensions of the mistakes became clear, the Central Committee was not slow to strike at the mistakes with all the force of its authority" (Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 311-312). Vengeful, vindictive, but always patient when his ultimate goal required it, Stalin will well remember this disqualification of his Central Committee. However, even here Stalin was true to himself: he needed public self-humiliation in order to lull the vigilance of the same Central Committee and buy time to complete the preparatory work for his destruction - political and physical. Stalin tried to carry out this operation already on the Central Committee, elected at the XNUMXth congress (1930), but met with unexpected serious resistance even among his own students ("Right-left bloc of Syrtsov Lominadze"), not to mention the leaders of the former "right opposition". Stalin might not have reckoned with this if more decisive circumstances had not become clear: the three pillars of the regime,

on which the "dictatorship of the proletariat" relied - the army, the police and the local party apparatus - were not ready to recognize personal dictatorship over themselves. Therefore, throughout the entire period of time from the 16th to the 17th Congress, Stalin was busy creating the organizational, actually personnel prerequisites for the autocracy planned by him. Stalin made a significant step forward in this direction at the 17th Congress. The Central Committee elected at this congress consisted of full-blooded Stalinists, of those who actively helped Stalin crush all opposition and establish his own leadership. Its membership did not include anyone from Lenin's "Guards". Zinoviev and Kamenev, no matter how much they repented, were not elected to the Central Committee, and Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky were only candidates. However, this Central Committee also consisted for the most part of convinced followers of Lenin (in the sense that they were ready to recognize Stalin as their leader, but not a dictator. The dictatorship, as under Lenin, was supposed to be collective. The General Secretary carries out the decisions of the Central Committee and is accountable to him, the Political Bureau, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee are accountable to him. In a word, Stalin is only "first among equals." This was precisely the essence of the new conflict. Stalin's internal concept of power, at least since Lenin died, was reduced to the following unfixed, but quite logical formula: under a dictatorship, only an absolute dictator can lead the party and the state, and he himself must be the leader. Stalin is now finally convinced that such a dictatorship can only be achieved by physically destroying those members of the Central Committee who will oppose it. member and candidate of the last sovereign Central Committee (139 people) Stalin "studied by bones" (his own expression at the KhP Congress). Not only on them, but on the entire elite of the party and state in the Central Committee there were secret dossiers called "registration cards", where since 1922, since Stalin became General Secretary, all the "pluses and minuses" of each leading figure were entered. The basis of "accounting"

were two criteria: devotion to Bolshevism and efficiency. From the end of the twenties, the criteria for "accounting" were slightly "specified": devotion to Stalin and humility. Stalin calculated that the absolute majority of the composition of the 1934 Central Committee devoted to him still thinks in terms of yesterday, that is, is clearly rebellious. He also unmistakably established that the most ideological fanatics of communism and "Leninist principles of collective leadership" belong to the number of those who disagree with his personal dictatorship. Stalin knew more. He knew that in the almost two millionth party

there will be at least a million communists who really believe in communism in the spirit of its classics (the gradual withering away of the state, that is, the "dictatorship of the proletariat", the restoration of civil rights and political freedoms after the liquidation of the exploiting classes, as promised by the Program of 1919); they believe, like the majority of the Central Committee, in the sanctity of the "Leninist principles of collective leadership." Stalin himself instilled this faith in them when, in his struggle against candidates for sole leadership (from different oppositions), he argued that after Lenin, the party and the state cannot be led by one person, leadership can and should only be collegial. True, for Stalin this doctrine of "collective leadership" popular in the party (first proclaimed by Trotsky on the day of Lenin's death) was even then only a tactical slogan designed to mask his dictatorial plans, but the party, like the Central Committee, mistakenly took Stalin's tactics for his program. Even after defeating three oppositions and carrying out four purges (the first purge of the higher and institutional cells in 1925, the second purge of the village party organizations in 1926, the third - the general purge of 1929-1930, the fourth - the general purge of 1933), in order to turn the party into "a voting herd" (Trotsky's expression), and to make the Central Committee an advisory board under the Secretary General, Stalin nevertheless achieved neither one nor the other goal. On the contrary, already the Central Committee that was created on XY! congress after the defeat of the last - "right" - opposition, proved to Stalin that among his own comrades-in-arms and students there are people who are determined to prevent his dictatorship. When Stalin's dictatorial plans became more obvious, the members of this Central Committee, one after another, led new opposition groups: 1) the Syrtsov-Lominadze group; 2) the group of A.P. Smirnov (it included prominent party figures and heroes of the civil war Eismont and Tolmachev, members of the Central Committee Rykov and Tomsy and the candidate of the Central Committee Schmidt were once again condemned for their connection with this group); 3) the group of N. A. Skrypnik (Ukrainian "national communists"). Outside the Central Committee, but among the activists of the party, an anti-Stalinist group was formed around the old Bolshevik, former candidate of the Central Committee M. N. Ryutin and prominent party theorists Astrov and Slepikov. The conclusion from all this for Stalin was clear: bloodless purges do not lead to the cherished goal. Bloody purges must be prepared. Preparations for such purges in a dogmatic party like the Bolsheviks must begin with the promulgation of new dogmas. Stalin did just that. At the January plenum

Central Committee (1933), he revised the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin on the gradual withering away of the state. Stalin declared that "the withering away of the state will come not through the weakening of state power, but through its maximum strengthening" (Stalin, Questions of Leninism, pp. 394, 1947). Stalin cared little that his "dialectical logic" lacked simple human logic. But let everyone know: the country is now entering the era of "maximum strengthening" of the purified party apparatus and renewed police power, on the basis of which he decided to liquidate the Central Committee. At the 17th Congress, he gave an ideological justification for another dogma - about the permanence of purges because of the permanence of the class struggle. Here is a new example of Stalin's "dialectical logic" in this connection. He stated: "If

The 15th Congress of the Party had to prove the correctness of the line of the Party and fight against well-known anti-Leninist groups, and at the 15th Congress to finish off the last adherents of these groups, then at this Congress there was nothing to prove, and, perhaps, there was no one to beat ... The Party is now united together like never before..." (Stalin, *ibid.*, pp. 465-466). What conclusion did Stalin draw? His conclusion was not only unexpected, but also strange. He said: "The Left openly joined the counter-revolutionary program of the Right in order to form a bloc with them and wage a joint struggle against the Party... A classless society cannot come by itself... It must be won... by strengthening the organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat... the destruction of classes in battles with enemies... Our task is to systematically expose the ideology and the remnants of the ideologies of trends hostile to Leninism" (*ibid.*, pp. 475, 476). Thus, having solemnly reported to the congress that the left and right had already been eliminated and there was no one else to beat, Stalin told him only the well-known news: a "bloc of left and right" had formed against the party and therefore "it is necessary to systematically expose" his ideology. Whom does Stalin consider to be members of such a bloc? The absolute majority of the members and candidates of the Central Committee and the delegates of this XUP congress, but they will know about it only three years later, when they find themselves in the cellars of the NKVD. Finally, at the February-March plenum of the Central Committee in 1937, Stalin announced the third dogma: the more socialism wins, the sharper the class struggle becomes; consequently, even after the liquidation of the antagonistic classes, the class struggle continues. These three dogmas, announced at the plenums of the Central Committee and at the Party Congress, approved by them, served Stalin

for the ideological justification of the upcoming physical liquidation of the Leninist party, the Leninist Central Committee and the organization of the "Great Purge" throughout the country.

Parallel to this ideological war against the imaginary "enemies of the people" there was a deeply secret organizational preparation of the Central Committee apparatus (Yezhov, Malenkov, Kaganovich) and the new leadership of the NKVD (Yagoda) for the upcoming purge. However, in order to start it, it was necessary to have some kind of catastrophic "casus belli". The XUP congress proved to Stalin that it was necessary to hurry up with the creation of such a "casus belli" if he did not want to lose the post of general secretary. We have official evidence on this score, printed on the pages of the Pravda newspaper after the 20th Congress. It comes from accidentally surviving old Bolsheviks, delegates of the 17th Congress, such as, for example, G. Petrovsky. Here is the evidence presented by L. S. Shaumyan, a delegate of the KhUP congress: "By this time (by 1934 - A. A.) Stalin's personality cult had already begun to take shape ... Stalin violated the principles of collegial leadership, abusing his position. The abnormal situation developing in connection with the personality cult caused alarm among many communists. Some congress delegates, as it turned out later, especially those who remembered Lenin's "Testament" well, had the idea that the time had come to move Stalin from the post of general secretary to another job. This could not but reach Stalin. He knew that in order to further strengthen his position, in order to concentrate more individual power in his hands, the old Leninist cadres would be the decisive obstacle "(Pravda newspaper, February 7, 1964, emphasized by us. - A. A.). Who were these "certain delegates" who believed that it was time, finally, to fulfill Lenin's demand to remove Stalin from the post of general secretary? The names of the old Bolsheviks named in L. S. Shaumyan's article leave no doubt about who they are talking about. These are just the ones that Stalin dealt with in the first place. Here they are: Kosior, Postyshev, Chubar, Ordzhonikidze, Yakovlev, Vareikis, Bubnov, Rudzutak, Kaminsky, Eikhe, Tukhachevsky, Blucher, Bauman, Zelensky, Serebrovsky,

Ugarov, Grinko, Kosarev, Lenin's sister M. Ulyanov and Lenin's widow Krupskaya. Who should replace Stalin? There were no two opinions in the party on this score. He was to be replaced by someone who, by the number of votes received in secret elections to the Central Committee, was in first place, far ahead of Stalin himself, and in all three executive bodies of the Central Committee (in

Politburo, Orgburo, Secretariat) was elected unanimously - Sergei Mironovich Kirov. Shaumyan also indirectly confirms this when, speaking of Kirov's speech at the 17th Congress, he characterizes him as "the favorite of the whole party."

"Casus Belli" for the destruction of the PC and the organization of the "Great Purge"

Stalin chose the murder on December 1, 1934 of this "favorite of the whole party" - Kirov. Who killed him? The neo-Stalinist regime now existing in the USSR does not want to answer this question, because to answer it would mean legally fixing that the organizer of the current CPSU was the greatest criminal in history. Therefore, the commission of the Central Committee to investigate the role of Stalin in the assassination of Kirov, a commission whose powers were confirmed at two congresses - at the XXth and XXII - was dissolved by the post-Khrushchev leadership. However, the reports of the Central Committee at these congresses (based on the archives of the Central Committee and the NKVD and the testimony of witnesses who accidentally survived) contained some very important facts related to this murder.

Here are the relevant passages from these reports:

1) The report of the Central Committee at the Twentieth Congress (1956) "On the cult of personality and its consequences" says: "It must be stated that the circumstances of Kirov's murder to this day contain a lot of incomprehensible and mysterious things and require the most thorough research. There are reasons to suspect that the killer of Kirov - Nikolaev - was assisted by one of the people whose duties included protecting the identity of Kirov. A month and a half before the murder, Nikolaev was arrested for suspicious behavior, but was released and not even searched. It is also extraordinarily suspicious that when the Chekist, who was part of Kirov's bodyguard, was taken for interrogation on December 2, 1934, he died during a car "accident", during which none of the other passengers of the car were injured. After the assassination of Kirov, the leading workers of the Leningrad NKVD received very light sentences, but in 1937 they were shot. It can be assumed that they were shot in order to hide the traces of the true organizers of the murder of Kirov "(N. S. Khrushchev, Speech at a closed meeting of the XX Congress of the CPSU, p. 18, Munich, 1956).

2) In the concluding remarks on the Report of the Central Committee at the 20th Congress on the same issue, the delegates were informed of the following: "The beginning of mass repressions was laid after the assassination of Kirov...

attention to the fact that the murderer of Kirov had previously been twice detained by security officers near Smolny and a weapon was found on him. But on someone's instructions, both times he was released. And this man ended up in Smolny with a weapon in the corridor along which Kirov usually passed. And for some reason, it turned out that at the time of the murder, the head of Kirov's security (Borisov. - A.A.) was far behind Kirov, although, according to instructions, he had no right to lag behind the guarded by such a distance ... When the head of Kirov's security was taken to interrogation, and he was supposed to be interrogated by Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov, then on the way, as the driver of this car later said, an accident was deliberately made by those who were supposed to deliver

head of security for interrogation. They announced that the chief of security had died as a result of the accident, although in fact he was killed by those who accompanied him... Then they shot those who killed him... This is a deliberate crime. Who could do it? The most thorough study of this complex case is now underway. It turned out that the driver who was driving the car that delivered the chief of security Kirov for interrogation was alive. He said that when they were going for interrogation, an NKVD worker was sitting next to him in the cab. The car was a truck (why exactly this man was taken for interrogation in a truck... Apparently, everything was foreseen in advance, in detail). Two other NKVD officers were in the back of the car, along with the head of the Kirov guards. The driver spoke further. As they were driving down the street, a man sitting next to him suddenly grabbed the steering wheel from him and steered the car straight at the house. The driver grabbed the steering wheel from his hands and straightened the car, and it only hit the side of the building wall. Then he was told that during this accident the head of the Kirov security guard died. Why did he die, and none of the persons accompanying him were injured? Why later both of these NKVD officers, who accompanied the head of the guard Kirov, were themselves shot? This means that someone had to make sure that they were destroyed in order to cover up all traces "(XXP Congress of the CPSU. Verbatim report, vol. P, pp. 583-584, 1961, Khrushchev's Closing Words).

It only remains to specify the rapporteur of the Central Committee and give the name of the person he had in mind: Stalin.

In the whole history of organizing the murder of Kirov, one can feel the ingenious hand of the criminal cases of the master Koba - Dzhughashvili (moreover, murder with the help of car accidents has even become his favorite technique -

the murder of Kamo in 1922, the murder of Borisov, the head of the guard of Kirov, in 1934, and the murder in 1948 of the Jewish director, People's Artist of the USSR S. M. Mikhoels). However, Stalin did not particularly try to "cover up all traces" or divert any suspicions from himself. Here are three interesting facts in this regard: 1) Kirov was killed on December 1, 1934, on the same day G. Zinoviev, a member of the editorial board of the Bolshevik magazine (now Kommunist), sent an obituary to the Pravda editorial office for it to appear 2 December, but Stalin forbade it to be printed. This means that Stalin, before starting the investigation, already knows that Kirov was "killed" by the Zinovievites (this case was told by the USSR Prosecutor Vyshinsky at the trial of Zinoviev, Kamenev and others in August 1936); 2) after the murder of Kirov, Stalin destroyed not only all the witnesses to the murder, but shot, without exception, all members of the Bureau and the Secretariat of the Leningrad Regional Committee, headed by Chudov (second secretary, member of the Central Committee), Ugarov, Smorodin, Pozern (all candidates of the Central Committee), Shaposhnikova (wife of Chudov), that is, he shot all friends and colleagues close and devoted to Kirov who could know about the suspicions of Kirov himself and about the facts of previous attempts to assassinate Kirov; 3) At the trial of Bukharin-Rykov-Yagoda and others in March 1938, Stalin put into the mouth of Yagoda an amazing testimony against Kirov: "Rykov told me about the Rights, that apart from him, Bukharin, Tomsy, Uglanov, all Moscow organization, trade unions, Leningrad organization. From all this I got the impression that the Rights could win in the struggle against the Central Committee" (A. Ya. Vyshinsky, Judicial Speeches, p. 533, 1948, Moscow). In other words, not only the entire Moscow organization, headed by Uglanov, but also the entire Leningrad organization, headed by Kirov invariably since 1926, was in conspiracy with the "Rightists", constituted that "bloc" about which Stalin so mysteriously spoke at the HUP congress.

Although by killing Kirov, Stalin thereby removed his

the most important competitor, but still this was not his main goal: the terrorist act against the "darling of the whole party" was supposed to be a pretext, thus the "casus belli", which was mentioned above, in order to open total terror simultaneously in three areas at the top - in The Central Committee, the government, the generals - and then in the party itself and the people. On the evening of the same December 1, 1934, that is, a couple of hours after the assassination of Kirov, Stalin, without the decision of the Politburo and without the knowledge of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR (then Soviet "parliament"), proposed to his personal friend

Avel Yenukidze, secretary of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR (whom he, however, also shot two years later under the same "law") to sign the following secret "law": "1) The investigative departments are ordered to expedite the cases of those accused of preparing or carrying out terrorist acts. 2) Judicial authorities are ordered not to delay the execution of death sentences relating to crimes of this category in order to consider the possibility of pardon, since the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR considers the receipt of such petitions unacceptable. 3) The bodies of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) are ordered to carry out the death sentences for criminals of the mentioned category immediately after these sentences are passed "(N. S. Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 17).

When mass arrests began and almost every "enemy of the people" was charged with preparing a terrorist act against central or local leaders (the famous article 58, paragraph 8), and the accused refused to recognize themselves as "terrorists", Stalin also issued another secret "law": NKVD investigators have the right to subject persons under investigation to various types of torture until they sign a "sincere confession". In response to the bewilderment of the local party committees that the NKVD continued to torture the arrested even after Yezhov, on January 20, 1939, Stalin sent an encrypted telegram to the local authorities, which stated: "The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks explains that the use of methods of physical influence in the practice of the since 1937, it was allowed by the Central Committee

All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ... The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers that methods of physical influence should, as an exception, continue to be applied in relation to known and notorious enemies of the people and be considered in this case as an acceptable and correct method "(Khrushchev, there same, p. 27).

Two trials served as a prelude to the "Great Purge": one trial over the mythical "Leningrad terrorist center", which included 13 former Zinovievites from the Leningrad Provincial Komsomol Committee, headed by Kotolynov and Leonid Nikolaev, who was never a Zinovievist, but was considered a Stalinist. Another trial is over the equally mythical "Moscow terrorist center", headed by Zinoviev and Kamenev. Process over

On December 29, 1934, the "Leningrad terrorist center" failed - none of the defendants, including Nikolaev, recognized himself as a member of the non-existent center. Nevertheless, they were all shot on the day of the verdict - December 29, as members of such a "center", which allegedly acted on behalf of the main center - the "Moscow Terrorist Center". Zinoviev and Kamenev were subjected to two trials one after the other. The first trial took place on January 15-16, 1935. Some of the old Bolsheviks, their personal friends, as well as a group of

unknown persons as their accomplices. Zinoviev said that for the first time in his life he saw these people who were sitting with him in the dock as members of his "Moscow Terrorist Center" here, at the trial (later it became known that these "unknown persons" turned out to be agents provocateurs of the NKVD, who were supposed to testify at the trial against Zinoviev and Kamenev, which they did very diligently).

Of course, Zinoviev and Kamenev categorically rejected the "frank testimony of unknown persons" who claimed that the Zinovievites persuaded them to kill the leaders of the party. Zinoviev and Kamenev equally categorically denied the existence of any terrorist center, but since the persons shot in the Nikolaev case had once been their supporters, Zinoviev and Kamenev pleaded "morally" guilty - for this they were given terms - Zinoviev 8 years, and Kamenev five years in prison. At the second trial, in August 1936, Zinoviev and Kamenev said everything that Stalin wanted to hear from them ... The true organizer of Yezhovism was not Yezhov, but Stalin in the Kremlin and Zinoviev with Kamenev in the basement of the Lubyanka. In the cowardly hope of buying their lives from Stalin, they became the main instrument of his monstrous conspiracy against the people. But Stalin organized the Yezhovshchina or the "Great Purge", relying on two institutions: the Politburo and the NKVD.

By the time of Kirov's assassination, the Politburo consisted of 11 members - Stalin, Kirov, Molotov, Ordzhonikidze, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Andreev, Kuibyshev, Kalinin, Kosior, Chubar; out of 6 candidates - Mikoyan, Postyshev, Rudzutak, Petrovsky, Eikhe, Shvernik. The first question that confronted Stalin even before Kirov's assassination was: which of the named members and candidates of the Politburo is capable of unconditionally and under all conditions to support and implement his plan of the "Great Purge"? Judging by

Soviet revelations and in the light of the objective facts of the subsequent events themselves, it is clear that among the members of the Politburo, Stalin was actively and unconditionally supported only by the following persons - Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Andreev, and to a lesser extent Kalinin. Other members - Kirov, Ordzhonikidze, Kuibyshev, Kosior, Chubar did not support Stalin. Stalin liquidated them. Of the candidates, Stalin was unconditionally and actively supported by Mikoyan and Shvernik, other candidates - Postyshev, Rudzutak, Eikhe, Petrovsky did not support Stalin. Stalin also eliminated them (but Petrovsky survived). However, until the Yezhovshchina (1937-1938), Stalin did not touch any of them. Only such measures were taken that guaranteed Stalin against any "surprises" on their part. The Stalinist part of the Politburo, as in the days of Trotsky, created a "Political Bureau in the Politburo" in order to isolate persons subject to liquidation from big politics.

Exactly two months after the assassination of Kirov and two weeks after the first trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev, on February 1, 1935, a plenum of the Party Central Committee was held. At this plenum, three organizational decisions were adopted, which outwardly seemed to have no connection with the future purge, but in fact represented an important step towards the organization of the "Great Purge". These were the following decisions: instead of Kirov, Mikoyan was introduced as a member of the Politburo and Yezhov was appointed secretary of the Central Committee of the party for the NKVD. Yezhov was simultaneously appointed supreme judge of the party - chairman of the party control commission under the Central Committee. Zhdanov, appointed as Kirov's successor in Leningrad, was made a candidate member of the Politburo (in 1936, Yezhov was transferred to the Politburo).

The second trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev was prepared very carefully. Stalin, Yagoda, Yezhov and Vyshinsky worked hard to make this process a success. The outcome of the trial between Zinoviev and Kamenev depended on how and to what extent Stalin could carry out the conceived plan of the "Great Purge". The investigators were instructed (among them were People's Commissar Yagoda himself and the future People's Commissar Ezhov) with the promise of any benefits and the admission of any threats (but without physical torture) to force Zinoviev and Kamenev to declare before the open Supreme Court that Kirov was killed on their direct orders, together with Trotsky and that they were preparing to kill other leaders of the party in order to seize power in the country. Zinoviev and Kamenev were given

to understand that they can be shot without any trial, but that it is in their own interests to accept the trial plan proposed by him, in this case the Central Committee and Stalin guarantee their lives, and their family members will be released from arrest.

After a long resistance and after a private conversation allowed by him in the cell, Zinoviev and Kamenev surrendered and demanded a meeting with members of the Politburo in order to confirm the conditions on which they surrender. Stalin knew that not all members of the Politburo, if they learned from the lips of Zinoviev and Kamenev the essence of the matter and the nature of the "deal", could agree to arrange a judicial comedy on them. Therefore, at the suggestion of Stalin, the Politburo allocates only a "commission" for meeting with the arrested, which included only those on whom Stalin could rely in all respects - Stalin himself, Molotov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Andreev, Zhdanov and Voroshilov.

At a meeting of the Politburo commission with Zinoviev and Kamenev, Stalin confirmed the terms that had been offered to them by their interrogators, including Yezhov, secretary of the Central Committee for the NKVD. It was said that Zinoviev expressed his fears that by letting them play a false role in the process, they would still be shot, and therefore demanded guarantees from Stalin. To this, Stalin sarcastically remarked: "If you do not believe the Politburo, then what guarantees do you need, maybe you want a letter of guarantee from Geneva from the League of Nations?" Indeed, it was super-naïve on the part of Zinoviev to demand any kind of guarantees from Stalin, assuming that Stalin could keep them. The meeting ended with the conclusion of a "gentlemen's agreement": Zinoviev and Kamenev would say whatever was asked of them, and Stalin and the Politburo would guarantee their lives. An open trial took place in August 1936, Zinoviev and Kamenev, like all the other defendants, Lenin's most prominent associates - Evdokimov, Smirnov, Bakaev, Mrachkovsky - honestly fulfilled the terms of the agreement. They recounted such fantastic details of the preparations for the assassination of Kirov and the planned assassination of Stalin, that reading these testimonies, now recognized by the Kremlin itself as false, one involuntarily thinks not only about the greatness of the director of this tragicomedy, but also about the outstanding talent of its actors to play a false, tragic, suicidal role with so passionate and so convincing. Yes, they kept their word, but Stalin did not. On August 24, the court sentenced everyone to death, but there was still little hope: according to Soviet procedural law, the defendants had 72 hours to apply for pardon to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee

USSR, but already on August 25, that is, after 24 hours, Stalin offered to shoot them. Kamenev died bravely, but the sick Zinoviev was carried to be shot in the arms. Even in those dying seconds, he believed Stalin - "For God's sake, comrades, for God's sake, call Stalin" - these were his last words. Alexander Orlov says that when Pauker, head of Stalin's bodyguard, and other participants in the execution of Zinoviev and Kamenev,

If they reconstructed this scene of Zinoviev's death before Stalin, then Stalin could not calm down from the outbursts of laughter for a long time (A. Opou, Tier Zesgeo H1\$ory oE ZbaPp'\$ Schipes, pp. 353, Hop4op. 1954). Stalin forced Zinoviev and Kamenev to serve him one more service before they died. They testified that they had contact both with a group of Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy, Uglanov, and with a group of Trotskyists (Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov, Rakovsky) for joint espionage in favor of the Gestapo, preparing the assassination of party leaders and organizing the seizure of power in Kremlin. (It is characteristic that in the number of victims supposedly planned by the "conspirators", Stalin invariably included in the first place those members and candidates of the Politburo who remained skeptics - Kosior, Postyshev, Chubar, Rudzutak, Ordzhonikidze, in order to convince them of the need for a "Great Purge"). When Bukharin's group, still at large, indignantly began to deflect these slanders from Zinoviev and Kamenev and demanded a confrontation with them at a meeting with the Politburo, Stalin used his old trick: a Politburo commission was again appointed, consisting of Stalin himself, Molotov, Kaganovich and others, on which the Zinovievites and Bukharinites were to be placed face to face. But this time, Stalin failed brilliantly. To the point-blank question posed by Bukharin, Zinoviev began to answer evasively, and Kamenev simply announced that he did not remember anything of what he had said during the investigation. Meanwhile, Tomsy committed suicide at his dacha in Bolshevo near Moscow. Considering this suicide just proof of the "bad conscience" of the right, Stalin suggested that the USSR Prosecutor's Office initiate a criminal case against Bukharin and Rykov. But when the question, at the request of Bukharin and Rykov, was brought up for discussion at the September plenum of the Central Committee (1936), they were rehabilitated by a majority of votes. Even Yagoda supported them. Stalin was forced to go on a temporary retreat. In the newspapers Pravda and Izvestia on September 10, 1936, a small "chronicle" appeared on the last page: the case against Bukharin and Rykov was dismissed for lack of evidence.

This was not true, calculated to appease the Central Committee and the party. It was also the surest disguise for the preparations for the annihilation not so much of Bukharin's group as of this very Central Committee. But for this role, the KGB "pedant" Yagoda was completely unsuitable. What was needed here was a Chekist of absolute class and absolute meanness. Exactly one month after the execution of Zinoviev and Kamenev, and two weeks after the case against the Bukharinites was closed, members of the Politburo received from Sochi a telegram dated September 25, 1936, from Stalin and Zhdanov, who were vacationing there, about the need to appoint Yezhov as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs instead of Yagoda and about the need to more widely deploy cleaning. The telegram says: "We consider it absolutely necessary and urgent that Comrade. Yezhov would have been appointed to the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. Yagoda definitely showed himself clearly incapable of exposing the Trotskyist-Zinovievist bloc. The OGPU is four years behind in this matter" (Khrushchev, *ibid.*, p. 18).

Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Andreev immediately carried out the appointment of Yezhov. At the same time, Rykov was also removed from the post of People's Commissar for Communications of the USSR, appointing Yagoda, who fell into disfavor, in his place. Now, in fact, the "Great Purge" called "Yezhovism" has begun. Yezhov now simultaneously held the posts of Secretary of the Central Committee, Chairman of the Communist Party of China under the Central Committee, member of the Politburo, member of the Orgburo, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs with the rank of "Commissar General of State Security."

Yezhov's task is to catch up with Yagoda for the past "four years". Yezhov more or less successfully carried out two trials: the "Trotskyist center" of Pyatakov and the "military center" of Tukhachevsky. But the holding of the third trial - Bukharin's "right center" - was sabotaged by the Central Committee.

The February-March Plenum of the Central Committee of 1937 was a decisive public test of the moods, thoughts and degree of readiness of the members of the Central Committee to support or reject the plan of the Great Purge.

plenum:

1. Stalin's report "On the liquidation of Trotskyists and other double-dealers."

th Report by Yezhov "On the lessons arising from the wrecking

activities, sabotage and espionage of the Japanese-German Trotskyist agents."

In his report, Stalin brought to the fore his already mentioned dogma about the laws of the class struggle in Soviet society - he

He said that the greater our successes in building socialism, the closer we come to communism, the more class enemies, the more the class struggle intensifies. From this, Stalin drew the conclusion that mass repressions of the authorities against "enemies of the people" were not only inevitable, but also quite natural. But since the "Trotskyist double-dealers" had already been shot, Stalin and Yezhov concentrated their fire on the so-called "other double-dealers", and this code meant not only Bukharinites, but also all members of the Central Committee who opposed the purge. After the reports of Stalin and Yezhov, the question of exclusion from the candidates of the Central Committee and the arrest of Bukharin and Rykov is brought up for discussion. It became clear that Stalin wanted once again a public check of the mood of the members of the plenum, who was ready to support him and to what extent. However, according to the testimony of the post-Stalinist Central Committee, even at this plenum, many members and candidates of the Central Committee did not agree with the Stalinist terrorist course. The report of the Central Committee to the 20th Congress on the "cult of personality" says: "At the February-March plenum of the Central Committee in 1937, many members really doubted the correctness of the adopted course regarding repressions under the pretext of combating "double-dealing" (Khrushchev, *ibid.*, p. 20) . Why, then, did the Central Committee not call its general secretary to order, as it did at the beginning of 1930 in connection with the repressions of collectivization? The answer of the post-Stalinist Central Committee reads: "What is the reason that mass repressions ... began to take on larger and larger dimensions after the XNUMX Party Congress? The fact that at that time Stalin so exalted himself above the party and the people that he ceased to reckon with the Central Committee and the party. If before the 17th Congress he still reckoned with the opinion of the collective, then after the complete political liquidation of the Trotskyites, Zinovievites and Bukharinites ... Stalin began to more and more disdain the opinion of the members of the Central Committee of the party and even members of the Politburo. Stalin thought that now he could decide everything alone, and all that he still needed were extras "(Khrushchev, *ibid.*, p. 17).

This very February-March plenum of the Central Committee in 1937 was the last plenum of the Central Committee in general. In order to save themselves, the members of the plenum of the Central Committee handed over the Bukharinites to Stalin for reprisal, but before they had time to disperse to their places, their arrests began (Bukharin and Rykov were arrested at the plenum itself).

It is not the purpose of this work to analyze the course of the "Great Purge" (the most detailed work on this topic, in the light of recent data, was written by Robert

Conquest "The Great Terror"). Here we will only summarize its results. Concerning the fate of the members and candidates of the Central Committee of the KhUP Congress and the generals of the Red Army, we will limit ourselves to citing official Soviet documents. So what are these outcomes?

1. Purge of the Central Committee of the KhUP Congress

"It was established that out of 139 members and candidates of the Party Central Committee elected at the 17th Congress, 98 people, that is, 70%, were arrested and shot (most in 1937-1938) ... The same fate befell not only members Central Committee, but also the majority of the delegates of the KhUP congress. Of the 1,956 delegates... 1,108 were arrested" (Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 16).

2. Cleaning of the officer corps

"In 1937-1938, as well as in subsequent times, as a result of unjustified repressions, the color of the command and political staff of the Red Army perished. As "agents of foreign intelligence" and "enemies of the people" three marshals of the Soviet Union (out of five) were destroyed; all the commanders of the troops of the military districts were killed ... Many prominent military figures and heroes of the civil war were destroyed or demoted and subjected to long-term imprisonment ... All corps commanders, almost all division commanders, brigade commanders were removed from the army; about half of the regimental commanders, members of the military councils and heads of the political departments of the districts, most of the military commissars of corps, divisions, brigades and about one third of the military commissars of the regiments "(The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. A Brief History, edited by P.N. Pospelov and marshals A. A. Grechko, V. D. Sokolovsky, M. V. Zakharov, I. Kh. Bagramyan and others, pp. 39-40, Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Moscow - 1965).

3. Shoe party:

According to calculations made by me on the basis of official party statistics, at least 1,220,000 communists were purged out of about 2,800,000 communists, which then automatically meant arrests (see my "Technology of Power", p. 252).

4. Purge of the people

According to recent studies by prominent Anglo-American experts on Soviet affairs, the "Great Purge" among the people was expressed in the following figures - according to R. Conquest, the total number of arrested party and non-party Soviet citizens amounted to about 8,000,000 people

lovek (KoregE Sopaues{, Tve Crea% Teggorg, p. 527, Tre Maschman Competitors, Gondop, 1969), and according to the data of prof. R. Tucker, even about 9,000,000 people (V. TaskKer apa \$5. SoBen, Te Creayo Ragde Tima], r. XXUP, M. U., Te Cro\$5e apa Rishchar Rab1zBeg \$ 1765).

Only the former elite of the party enjoyed the advantage of being put through the formal legal process. Four trials were held in Moscow:

1) trial of Zinoviev-Kamenev and others (August 1936),

- 2) the Pyatakov-Radek trial and others (January 1937),
- 3) trial (military) Tukhachevsky-Yakir and others (June 1937),
- 4) trial of Bukharin-Rykov and others (March 1938).

All other arrested members and candidates of the Central Committee and members of the government, as well as all secretaries of regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Union republics, leaders of industry, agriculture, culture, transport, diplomacy and military units, and the Chekists themselves were tried through the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR or Military Tribunals. Moreover, as it was openly reported at the 20th and 20th Congresses of the CPSU, the sentences against those arrested were approved in advance by Stalin and members of the Politburo. Here are the relevant documents. At the Twentieth Congress, the Central Committee reported: "The NKVD began to use the criminal method of preparing lists of persons whose cases fell under the jurisdiction of the collegiums of the Military Tribunals ... Sentences were prepared in advance. Yezhov usually sent these lists personally to Stalin, who approved the proposed punishment. In 1937-38, 383 lists were sent to Stalin with the names of thousands of party, Soviet, economic workers. He approved these lists" (Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 25). Two clarifications were made at the 20th Congress: firstly, these lists were sent not to Stalin alone, but to all members of the Politburo, and, secondly, it was not about approving sentences in general, but about approving death sentences.

The then head of the Party Control Committee under the 3rd Central Committee, T. Serdyuk, informed the 20th Congress that members of the Stalinist Politburo, together with Stalin, approved and signed the death sentences for prominent party and state leaders. Serdyuk said: "There are countless accusatory documents, and one of which is enough to serve as a severe accusatory act.

Here is one of those documents. Yezhov wrote: "Comrade. Stalin. I send to

approval of four lists of persons subject to trial by the Military Collegium: 1. List No. 1 (general).

22. List No. 2 (former military workers). Threat List No. 3 (former workers of the NKVD). 4. List No. 4 (wives of enemies of the people).

I ask for sanctions to condemn everyone in the first category. Yezhov.

"It must be said," Serdyuk comments, "that the first category of condemnation meant execution. The lists were examined by Stalin and Molotov, and on each of them there is a resolution: "For I. Stalin, V. Molotov" (XXP Congress of the CPSU. Verbatim report, vol. III, p. 152, 1961).

With even greater knowledge of the matter, the then chairman of the KGB A. Shelepin reported to the 22nd Congress. He stated: "Stalin and those close to him used the assassination of Kirov as a pretext for organizing reprisals ... Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov, grossly abusing their high position in the party and state, with one stroke of the pen sealed the fate of many people. You are simply amazed at the criminal ease with which all this was done ... In November 1937, Stalin, Molotov and Kaganovich sanctioned the trial of the Military Collegium of a large group

comrades from among prominent party, government and military workers (their signatures on these documents have been preserved). Most of them were shot. A number of cynical resolutions by Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Voroshilov on the letters and statements of prisoners speak of a cruel attitude towards people. For example, at one time Yakir, the former commander of the military district, turned to Stalin with a letter in which he assured him of his complete innocence ... definition", Molotov signed this, and Kaganovich attributed: "To the traitor, bastards and ... (followed by a hooligan obscene word), one punishment is the death penalty" (ibid., vol. P, pp. 402-403).

Having documented the horrific pictures of the mass terror of Stalin, his Politburo and his NKVD, Shelepin exclaimed with sincere or feigned indignation: "Sometimes you wonder how these people can walk the earth and sleep peacefully? They must be haunted by nightmares, they must hear the sobs and curses of the mothers, wives and children of their innocent comrades" (ibid., pp. 404-405).

With regard to ordinary Soviet citizens, including here and

non-party intelligentsia, the reprisal was simple: in the regions and territories, "Extraordinary troikas of the NKVD" were created (composition: the chairman - the head of this NKVD plus the first secretary of the regional party committee and the regional prosecutor). Troikas sentenced people on lists and in absentia to executions or to 10 years in prison.

What was the fate of the members and candidates of the Central Committee of all convocations from the first congress to the XVII congress inclusive?

Based on the study of all sources available to me, I tried to answer this question, finding out the following: 1. Which of the members and candidates of the Central Committee of all convocations survived until the "Great Purge"? 2. Which of them was arrested? 3. Which of those arrested was sentenced: a) to imprisonment, 6) to the death penalty?

The first two questions are easy to answer, the last question is more difficult. Officially (at the 20th Congress) only the execution of 98 members and candidates of the Central Committee of the 17th Congress was announced. To them must be added those former members and candidates of the Central Committee who were shot in the trials of the thirties. With regard to the rest of the former members and candidates of the Central Committee, Soviet reference literature of the Khrushchev period used the formula: such and such (name) "fell victim to the repressions of the period of the Stalin cult." This meant that the person in question had been shot. Now the neo-Stalinists from the Kremlin have abandoned this formula as well - in reference books they only report the dates of birth and death of Stalin's victims, without indicating the cause of death (but since the vast majority of the members of the Central Committee died in the years 1937-38-39, one might get the impression that during these three years, some kind of deadly cholera raged in the USSR!). However, what a screaming historical falsification the neo-Stalinists have come up with is shown by the following: Before me lies the "Warrior's Calendar for 19772", published by the USSR Ministry of Defense; it lists the outstanding military and political figures of the USSR, indicating the fate of each. Reading the "Warrior Calendar":

"On February 16, 1893, Marshal of the Soviet Union M.N. Tukhachevsky was born. Died June 11, 1937.

"January 14, 1896, born. I. P. Uborevich, Soviet military figure. Died June 11, 1937.

"On August 15, 1896, I. E. Yakir, a Soviet military figure, was born. Died June 11, 1937." (pp. 29, 43, 127).

All three died on the same day, because they were shot on the same day.

The same "died" appears in the biographical information about Marshals Blucher and Yegorov. Of course, they all "died", but they died because Stalin shot them and he did not hide it, but Stalin's students decided to hide it from the young commanders. According to the Calendar, Central Committee member Gamarnik and Politburo member Ordzhonikidze also did not commit suicide because of Stalin, but simply "died." Even the man whose murder was the reason for the violent killing of millions is presented in the Calendar as a natural death: "Kirov died on December 1, 1934"!

I cite these examples to show how little party historians value the true history of their own party and how, instead of clarifying important details, they try to obscure or even hide them. Because of this, it turned out to be difficult to clarify the circumstances of death and the dates of death of each of the liquidated members and candidates of the Central Committee, except for the Central Committee of 1934 and those members of the Central Committee who went through the Moscow trials in the thirties. For this reason, both those who were shot and those who died in political isolators and concentration camps, I include in one group: "those who were shot and died in custody."

As we have seen, the Central Committee - the supreme and legislative and administrative headquarters of the Bolshevik Party - has always consisted of a relatively narrow circle of leading leaders of the party. The Central Committee of the First Party Congress (1898) consisted of three persons; The Central Committee of the Second Congress (1903) also consisted of three persons; The Central Committee of 1912 consisted of seven people (later 8 people were co-opted, including Stalin); The Central Committee of the April Conference of 1917 consisted of 9 members and four candidates; The Central Committee of the Congress in July-August 1917, which led the October Revolution, consisted of 21 members and 8 candidates; The Central Committee of the 11th Congress of 1922 (the last congress headed by Lenin) consisted of 27 members and 19 candidates; the last during Lenin's lifetime (but without Lenin's participation) the Central Committee of the KhIP Congress was expanded - it had 40 members and 17 candidates; the last Central Committee before the "Great Purge" - the Central Committee of the KhUP congress of 1934 - consisted of 71 members and 68 candidates. For the entire time of the creation of the Central Committee from 1898 to 1934, 284 people passed through the Central Committee, (moreover, the Mensheviks who were members of the united Central Committee, the Bolsheviks co-opted into the Central Committee, who did not play any prominent role, as well as the provocateur R. Malinovsky

we do not take into account in our calculations).

What was the fate of these 284 people - the fathers of Russian revolutionary Marxism, the organizers of the Bolshevik Party, the leaders of the October Revolution and the commanders of the Red Army in the civil war? They can be divided into the following five groups (see tables in the Appendix):

D. Deaths: 45 people died of natural causes or died before the Great Purge (see Table No. 1).

P. Suicides: 8 people committed suicide because of Stalin (see table no. 2).

Sh. Shot or killed: 188 people were shot or died in custody during and after the Great Purge (see Table No. 3).

GU. Disgraced: 22 people found themselves in disgrace (they were expelled from the Central Committee) (see Table No. 4).

y. The victorious conspirators: they make up 21 people and entered the "Stalin Guard" (see table No. 5).

Thus, out of 231 members and candidates who survived the Great Purge (1936-1939), 188 people (81.3%) were physically liquidated, and out of 43 people (18.6%) left alive, only 21 remained in power. people (9%) (The further fate of the "Stalin guards" is also interesting: five people managed to die themselves under Stalin, Stalin shot one in 1952 (Lozovsky), expelled another from the Politburo (Andreev), two were shot after Stalin (Beria and Bagirov), five people were expelled from the Central Committee as "anti-party members" (Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Poskrebyshev), one person - as a "voluntarist" (Khrushchev), two people were withdrawn from the Politburo as Khrushchev's comrades-in-arms (Mikoyan and Shvernik). At the 18th Congress (1939), Stalin appeared as an absolute dictator. The last sovereign Central Committee was killed, and the thinking party was also killed. Stalin created a new Central Committee, which was directly subordinate to his personal secretariat. A cemetery world settled in the party: "and the battle ended for want of combatants," the French would say. From now on, no one fought against Stalin, but Stalin continued to fight against the people, who seemed to him a bottomless reservoir of potential pests, spies, murderers ... But this was not a mania for persecuting a sick person, it was a deeply considered strategy to insure his absolute power from any

surprises. The very nature of Stalin's power demanded permanent purges in all strata of society. They saved Stalin not only from potential enemies, but at the same time they rooted in the people the consciousness of hopelessness even a hint of resistance. Stalin started with the destruction of entire classes before the war and moved on to the destruction of entire nations during and after the war (genocide against the Chechens, Ingush, Karachays, Balkars, Kalmyks, Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans). Khrushchev said at the 20th Congress that the Ukrainian people escaped the genocide only because they were a large people and there was nowhere to resettle them. After the war, Stalin launched an anti-Semitic campaign in the country under the guise of fighting "cosmopolitans". From the case of the "Kremlin doctors" it was not far from the organization of anti-Jewish pogroms. Somewhere far away - in Siberia or the Far East - even a ghetto loomed in Stalin's eyes ... Stalin, like a tyrant, despised the people, for he knew well how this people deeply despised him. Stalin's over-inventive mind in criminal cases was accompanied by his unique ruthlessness. As much as Stalin feared in panic for his own life, he was just as callous to the lives of the millions whom he tortured and killed. In a fit of anger, he could well repeat the regret of his spiritual prototype, the Roman emperor Caligula, only slightly paraphrasing: "Oh, if the entire Soviet people had one head that could be cut off at once!"

THE FATE OF MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES OF
THE CC OF ALL CONVENTIONS WITH TPO
HUP CONGRESS INCLUDING (1898-1934)

Table No. 1 D.
Died before the "Great Purge" (1936-1939) Since what year

Surname in the game

1. Artem (Sergeev) F.A. 1901 2. Baranov
PC.I. 1912

3. Bogdanov A.A. 1896

. Weinberg D.G. .
Vladimirov M.K.

. Japaridze P.A. .
Dzerzhinsky F.E. .
Dubrovinsky I.F

4

5

b. Gusev S.I.

7

8

9

. Zlobin St.

. Ivanov A.V.

. Kirkizh K.O.

. Kirov S.M.

. Korostelev G.A.

. Krasin L.B.

. Kremer A.I.

. Kuibyshev V.V.

. Lengnik F.V.

. Lenin V.I.

. Lapse

I.I. .Lindov K.D.

. Menzhinsky V.R.

. Meshkovsky I.P. .
Mickevijus-Kansukas V.S. . Myashnikov
A.F.

. Narimanov N.N. .
Nogin V.A.

. Noskov V.A.

. Pokrovsky M.N. .
Radchenko S.I.

. Rozhkov N.A.

. Saveliev M.A.

. Summer I.A.

. Sverdlov Ya.M.

. Spandaryan S.S. .
Skvortsov-Stepanov I.I.1896. Stuchka P.I.

. Taratuta V.K. .
Tovstukha I. 1.

1910
1896

1895
1893
1890
1906

1904

1890
1890

1893
1904
1895
1902
1892

1906
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1898
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1905
1890
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1903
1897
1901
1902

1903
1895
1913

1906

1898

1910

1905

1904
1893

1903

40
41
42
43
44
45

P. Committed suicide because of Stalin

. Uritsky M.S. 1895 . Frunze
M.V. 1904 Tsyurupa A.D.
1898 . Chicherin G.V.
1905 . Shaptser V.L. 1895 .
Shaumyan S.G. 1898

Table number 2

Last name Since what year When in the party in the Central Committee committed suicide

Sh. Shot or died in custody

a a

Gamarnik Ya. B.
Ioffe A. I.
Lashevich M. M.
Lominadze V. V.
Lyubchenko P. P.
Ordzhonikidze K. G.
Skrypnik N. A.
Tomsky M. P.

Table No. 3

1916	1900	1901	1917	1918	1903	1897	1904	
1925	1917	1918	1925	1934	1912	1917	1919	
1937	1927	1928	1937	1937	1937	1933	1936	Surname

and I

Avdeev A. D.
Akulov I. A.
Alekseev P. A.
Amosov A. M.
Antipov K.N.
Balitsky V. A.
Bauman K. E.

8. Beloborodov A. G. 9.
Bergavinov S. A.

10. Berzin Ya. A. 11.
Blagonravov G. I. 12. Blyukher
V. K. 13. Bryukhanov
N. P. 14. Bubnov A. S. 15.
Bulat I. L.

16. Bulatov D.N. 17.
Bulina. WITH.

18. Bukharin N. I. 19.
Bykin Ya. B.

20. 'Vareikis I. M 21.
Barsky A. E. 22. VegerE.
AND.

23. Volkov Ts. Ya. 24.
Voronova P. Ya.

25. Gay K. V.

26. Gikalo N.F.

27. Glebov
Avilov N. P.

28. Goloded I. M. 29.
Golosche

30. Grinko G. F. 31.
Gryadin

32. Dtsanishev

33. Demchenko N.N. 34.
Deribas T. D. 35.
Dogadov A. I. 36.
Evdokimov G.E. 37.
Evdokimov E. G. 38. Egorov
A. I.

39. Ezhov N. I.

40. Enukidze A. S. 41.
Eremin I. G. 42. Zhukov
I. Ts.

43. Zalutsky P. A. 44.
Zatonsky V. P. 45. Zelensky
I. A. 46. Zinoviev G.E.

1912 1907 1914 1914 1912 1915 1907
1907 1917 1902

1917 1916 1912 1903 1912 1912 1914 1906
1939

1937 1941

1937 1938

1941

1938 1938 1943 1940

1941 1937 1938

1884 1897

1888 1884

1883 1895 1877

1887 1888 1890 1883

1912 1934

1894 1913 1924 1939

1889 1907

1899 1917 1934 1938

1917 1930

1917 1930

1916 1924

1897 1917 1934 1939

1882 1904 1917 1942 1894

1918 1930 1937 1876 1903

1912 1941 1890 1919 1934

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1939 1940 1937

1900

1916

1913

1905

1903

1918

1918

1917

1898

1917

1909

1937 1940 1938 1936

1907

1917

1906

1901

47. Zorin S. S. 48.

Ivanov V.I.

49. Ikramov A. 50.

Isaev U. D.

51. Kabakov I. D.

52. Kaganovich M. M 53.
Kadatsky I. F. 54 Calamano

55. Kalygina A. S.
56. Kamenev L.B. 57.
Kaminsky G.A.

58. Kakhiani M. I. 59.
Kartveshvili

e) L. I. 60.
Kviring E. I. 61. Kiselev
A. S.
62. Klimenko I.E.

63. Knorin V. G. 64.
Kozlov I. I. 65.
Kolgushin F. T. 66.
Kolotilov N. N. 67.
Komarov N. P. 68.
Kosarev A. V. 69. Kondrat

70. Condrat

71. Kosior I. V. 72.
Kosior S. V. 73. Kotov
V. A.

1924 1937
1924 1938
1925 1938
1930 1938
1924 1937
1934
1925 1939
1890 1917
18931915
1898 1918
1899 1920
1891 1914
1905
1893 1914
1888 1917 1930 1937 1915
1925
1883 1901 1917 1936
1895 1913 1925 1938 1917
1930

1891 1888 1879 1891 1890

1885 1886 1903 1910 1912 1898 1912 1910 1918 1905 1903 1904 1919

1930 1923 1917 1925 1927 1930 1927 1923 1921 1930 1938 1939 1938 1938 1939

1937 1937 1939

19181925

19131927

1893 1908 1925 1937

1889 1907 1923 1939

19151925

74. Christening

sky N.N. 1883 1903 1917 1938 75. Krinitz

cue A. I. 1894 1915 1924 1938

76. Kubiak N.A. 1881 1898 1923 1942

Kuklin A. S. 1903 1924 Kulikov
E. F. 1910 1925 Kulkov M. M.
1891 1915 Kuritsyn V. I. 1917
Kutuzov I. I. 1885 1917
Lebel D. 3. 1893 1909 Leonov F.
G. 1892 1914

Lena A. K. 1914 1934 Lobov
S. S. 1888 1913 Lokatskov F.
I. 1904 Lomov

Oppokov G. I. 1888 1903 Lukashin
S. L. 1905 Lyubimov I. E.
1882 1902 Matveev I. D. 1918
Medvedev A. V. 1884 1904
Mezhlaik V. I. 1893 1917 Melnichan

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V.P. 1884 1910 Mirzoyan L. I.
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Mikhailov-

Ivanov M. S. 1913 1927 Moskv
I. M. 1890 1911 Musabekov G.
M. 1888 1918 Nosov I. P. 1905
Ovshintsev M. K. 1918
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Shvili M.D. 1881 1903
Osinsky V. V. 1887 Parlunov

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Sarkisov S. A. .
Safarov G.I. Saddles

. Serebrov

Pakhomov N.I.
Perepechko I.N.
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. Semenov B. A.

. Smilga I.T.

. Smirnov A. PSH.

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Smorodin P. I. .
Sobolev S. M.

. Sokolny

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. Stroganov V. A. .
Struppe P.I.

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. Sukhomlin K.V.
Syrtsov S.I.

. Teodoro

Terekhov R. Ya.
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153. Tolokon

tsev A. F.
154. Trotsky L. D. 155.
Tuntuli. I. 156.
Tukhachev

sky M.N.

157. Uborevich I. P. 158.

Ugarov F. Ya. 159.

Uglanov N. A.

160. Unshlikht I. S.

161. Uryvaev M.E. 162.

Ukhanov K. V. 163.

Fedorov G. F.

164. Filatov N. A.

165. Harito

nov M. M.

166. Khataevich M. M.

167. Holoplyan

kin M.I.

168. Tsarkov F. F. 169.

Zeitlin V.N. 170. Tsikhon

A. M. 171. Chaplin M.P.

172. Chernov M. A.

173. Chubar V. Ya.

174. Chuvyrin M.E.

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176. Chutskaev S.E.

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Sheboldaev B. Psh.

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Shmidt V.V. 1886 1905 1918 1940 180. Stein

hardt A. M. 1887 1913 1934 181.
Shubrikov V. P. 1917 1934 182. Eyidel

manB. A. 1867 1893 1898 1942

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EikheR. I.
Eliava Sh. E.
Yagoda G. G.
Yakir I. E.
Yakovleva V.
Yakovlev Ya. A.

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